Caribbean reason episode 51 is very special show normally I never have guessed but today very special show I have on here a Thomas 777 codename a man who is a major he's a pimp for Chicago cartels an exploiter of women's dissident historian and just he is also I believe I had technical advisor for are the top brothels of a Chicago mob. Unbelievable guest on the show. Actually, in all seriousness, Thomas is one of the people who has much influenced Bronze Age thought. He's one of the original right-wing bodybuilders. And his historical imagination, his literary commentary, has been very important to me, all my friends, for quite a long time. So with that, say, uh, I, I will come to the show, uh, Thomas seven, seven, seven. Hello. Welcome Thomas. Hello, my friend.

That's a quite a, that's quite a gangster introduction. I don't know if, uh, I don't know if I'm comfortable with you sitting in a bar that high, but, uh, I very much appreciate the endorsement and, uh, always pleased to be able to do what we do, uh, with the added benefit of an audience, man. So yeah, I, uh, I am in your debt. Yes. And I will call upon Zedd that next time you will take me to, you know, the place with the gilded bathroom. But this is a family show today. We cannot talk such thing. So, Thomas, for how long have we known each other? Must be, I think now, 10 years, at least actually 12 or 13 years. I think even longer, man. I think it was approximately 2009 when we first crossed paths And, you know, there was some agro, man, in those days.

As you may or may not remember, I don't think you were too clean or too hip to my jive as it were, man. Like, is that correct, or do you have a different memory of those days? Yes, no, I suppose Thomas and I have had many disagreements over the year, even flame war against each other, centered around mostly idea of politic, foreign policy, but in certain other way, too, that actually I've come around to Thomas's view over time. He bully-sided me, he bully-sided me out of some of my past views, because I know I should tell the audience, when I first came online, I was a, you might say, orthodox follower of Nietzsche. In that sense, I always thought that the reasoning for starting wars doesn't matter so much.

I wanted America and the West to drop modern softness, and I thought that even the stupid wars in the Middle East, for which I never bought the reasoning of democratization and so forth, but I thought nevertheless, militarization is good because it will lead to a spiritual transformation but seriously you mind if I interject for a minute it's it's directly relevant to what you're getting that no please you know it's it's interesting I mean you're familiar with the concept of bounded rationality I mean basically people instinctively people conform to prove to the prevailing ethical system I mean whether consciously they might reject it but there's always some kind of subconscious tendency towards accepting that ethical

paradigm and the fact that the matter is man like most guys who would tend towards the right like you did in those days they still can't entirely go away with the ethical rationalization for war and only considering things within those parameters it's uh it's an interesting phenomenon man just kind of like charting how you found your way out of that proverbial darkness and starting to realize that there are modalities of thought like outside of what what is received from you know official channels and and what's what's what's considered decent according to, you know, according to those who control the cultural settings in the country. That's all, man. Like, I wanted to get that thought off before it left me. Yes. No, I think this is completely correct.

And I slow changed my mind, in part the result of Thomas and other friends bulliciding me, But also around the time of Libya's intervention, the complete lies of these people became very clear to my mind. Yeah, I'll bet you there's a lot of, I'll tell you something man, I'm a pretty jaded person and the fact is, I'm old enough to remember watching Waco burn fucking people to death live on TV in 93, I remember Ruby Ridge, I remember the kind of callousness of the way people talked about, you know, collateral damage and civilian attrition in the first Gulf War. Like, I'm talking about, like, you know, media people, what have you. I can't remember the name of the fucking prick who interviewed her, but, you know, when Hillary,

like, right after Gaddafi, I mean, the guy was, like, literally torn to pieces by a lynch mob. Like, that fucking bitch, she was clamping like a retarded seal about, like, a man being lynched. I mean, even in this country, it's totally desensitized to violence of all sorts, and, I mean, how many people just found it so grotesque that they realized they could no longer accept the raison d'etre for waging war on Muslim states after witnessing that? No, that was completely disgusting, especially since it was very obvious that Gaddafi, a superior man, a superior creature, he managed to take over his country, age of 27. And then also Saddam, despite my support for some of these wars, I never thought Saddam was this monster.

He kept the country together and insofar as he was a monster, to me that was respectable. And over time I saw how these normie conservatives and the neo-cons, they actually bought into all the ethical framework that you criticize and the lies. And I should say now that actually I would support these and other wars if they were actually wars, but they are simply these, I call them, desultory police actions in which Hillary and other ghouls send a few men to do police, ineffective police action, leading to, you know. Yeah, it's interesting, man. Like some of the fascinating things that happened, I mean, we can, it's a huge fucking topic and we don't, I mean, I don't want to bite off more than we can chew with the time we do have.

However, if we're going to talk about foreign policy, we've got to talk about Nuremberg. There's no way you can get around it. Everything from the language people invoke to the means that are considered acceptable to the rationalizations, to the symbolic psychological mechanisms that are appealed to to try and draw support for military action. Its origin is all in Nuremberg. Nuremberg supplanted what was previously essentially the reigning ethical law of war and peace among western states, plus Japan, and that's an interesting narrative of history in and of itself, but for our purposes, figure, okay, from early modernity, I mean, until 1945, the prevailing system between western states was that, you know, war is something that

happens, it arrives like the seasons, you know, it's essentially the cunning of reason in history or the hand of God is what's responsible for its origin and its resolution, or denouement, States that have a developed morality realize there's certain restraints that must be abided. I mean, do you follow me? Do you agree with that, that that's what occurred in terms of establishing the president of just war? Yes. Absolutely, yes. Okay. Well, something happened in Nuremberg, which is fascinating. At Nuremberg, it was declared that waging a war for aggressive purposes was not inherently, was not legitimate. There was an inherent criminality involved in prosecuting such a war. Now, I mean, before we even get to the fact that it's, you know, how does one decide what

constitutes an aggressive war? Because in any war, every, each combatants find themselves at times acting offensively and at times defensively, or at times aggressively, or at times demuring to conditions in which he cannot act aggressively just by, by on ground to the situation on the battlefield. it begs the question is like how we can in how we can in rational terms define what an aggressive war is but this idea that war is a criminal act it implies a lot of things but one of the primary one of the primary issues it raises is the view of sovereignty you know if war is a crime like who is that who is that crime he committed against who decides that that's a crime well what was decided at Nuremberg is that well the United States and the Soviet Union they're they're the

representatives of humanity, like all the people on the planet were apparently corralled under the sovereign authority of either the United States or the Soviet empire. So presumably the position forwarded was that whatever the United States or the Soviet Union, now mind you later this coalition fell apart in terms of what was a legitimate act of sovereignty when it was carried out by the the communist side but for our purposes I mean that's remarkable like think about that like think about a state reporting that it doesn't exist to guarantee the posterity of a discrete people or population or state that doesn't assert that well you know within a within a Terrence within a territorial imperative and it's contiguous you know sea lanes it it has

authority but whether that is authority literally over the entire planet and and over every man, woman, and child who lives on that planet. Yes, and Evan McMuffin is at the Retardo, Evan McMullen, he actually had tweet or two about how the retrograde idea of sovereignty. Now, that guy doesn't come up with any ideas. He's fed these. So obviously in corridors of power, so to say, in America, and this is common idea of what Thomas say just now, that sovereignty is an outmoded concept, apparently, and some people invoke even universal sovereignty the way that Spanish judge abrogated the right to risk Pinochet. I mean, it sounds like I'm reducing it to caricature, but, like, think about this. Like, some fucking Spanish judge, he's literally declaring that he has sovereign authority

to hail the chief executive of Chile into court in Madrid. I mean, this is, that's, I mean, that's, that'd be like if a guy fucking, that'd be like if some heist man, like knocks over a fucking bank branch and like Terry hoed Indiana. And then he's like hailed in the court in the last, like, Hey, you like that? You know, I, I've declared myself that universal sovereignty over the, over the totality of, of the United States of America. Like now, admittedly, I mean, like I said, that's, that's kind of a ridiculous caricature I'm invoking for comparative purposes, but I mean, there, there has to be like a rational dimension to it. Oh, it's a law and order. It's not just what's ethical or what's desirable or what's philosophically something that's a proper ambition of a judiciary.

It's, I mean, how the hell, so basically if you are a proponent of universal sovereignty that means that like any man who serves government in any executive capacity, he could be hailed into court and you're on the planet for any reason. If a judge happens to come across some act of war at the state that he finds personally offensive, I mean, that's, I mean, just in practical terms of administering that, like that, That would be, do you remember the way Brazil, like it's Terry Gilliam's little satire of bureaucracy, like run amok? And it would be like that, it would be like that on like the most fucking unbelievable, like the most unbelievable performance enhancement stack. You know, it'd be like the Frankenstein's monster of all jurisprudential contrivances.

But yeah, no, go ahead, man, go ahead. No, no, so yes, actually this, but what you are saying is this, what I wanted to get to with our old disagreement about the wars that America carried out. Because I came to Thomas' view, again, partly as a result of events and the absolute failures of American interventions abroad. But Thomas, you are saying it's not just a coincidence that these wars look like these failed police actions. it's not just a question of intensity, it's the reasons they carry out the war in the first place, their view of sovereignty, it leads to these repeated failures. Is this, what, this attempt to criminalize war, criminalize foreign policy by, you know. I think there's a few things going on here, man. Like, I think about this a lot.

I think on the one hand, these State Department types, I mean, it's endemic to all the government in the executive branch, But particularly the State Department, I think, is the most egregious example. Like, a lot of these fucking people really are, they're conceptually illiterate. You know, like, they've got no more understanding of power political nuances than, you know, like, a fucking monkey who does a calculus, so that's number one. Number two, I think there's a lot of cynics, too, man, like, so you got these people who, you know, they're not so much idealist as they are, they're like, well, you know, this is the prevailing paradigm and maybe it doesn't work, but, you know, A, number one, you know, It's like there's this careerist incentives for me to kind of facilitate the continued

prosecution of these criminalized wars, as you so adroitly put it. But also, there's a sense of, I've run into this argument too, particularly from guys like David Fromm, if you're familiar with him, okay, maybe the Iraq war was a failure. Maybe the product from American Century and its objectives is outlined before the invasion of Iraq. Maybe they were too lofty or whatever, people in their estimation. But hey, Saddam Hussein was a bad guy, so we just had to punish him regardless according to some kind of restorative justice model. And I mean, that actually gets played in America, man. And that's kind of like one of the vestigial like hangover effects, or like the herpes, like after you lie with like the horror of neoconservatism, even when you wake up the next morning, sober up,

and realize what a dirty perverted fuck you are for like rolling in the hay with that fucking pig. Like what you have left over is like a case of herpes, and the herpes in this case is that like, well, yeah, you know, the war in Iraq was a disaster, but hey, Saddam Hussein was bad, and you know, fuck those people anyway, because they're beneath us, or they're just a bunch of rag heads or something of that order. What people don't understand is that, you know, you're laying the phone, and any military action has generational consequences, man. I mean, as a guy named Frank Kitson, I mean, I don't wanna piss off the Irish bros who might be tuning in. You know, Kitson is not exactly, He's not a very loved individual in history, but he took a very brutal tack in Northern Ireland,

Operation Banner. But one of the things that I think is inarguable, wherever you fall on that issue, is that he said, what we do here, we, meaning the British Army, is going to have generational consequences. And I think that sensibility is totally lacking both in the State Department and in the Pentagon. I can see what I'm getting at that even these people, even if they've got an entirely cynical view or an entirely idealistic, ridiculous divorce from reality view of the situation, they're incapable of realizing that 20, 50, 100, 200 years on, this is going to have dramatic consequences for power political affairs and for the way politics is conducted. Yes. And even a- We can even call it over the West and these alien societies. Yeah, go ahead. No, I was just going to say that, yes,

this argument that, oh, he was a bad guy. But even decades ago, Burnham point out how all you needed to do to get American people to support intervention is to say that you are going against a monarch or a king. And they would immediately jump with you. That's really interesting, too, because that's particularly in the Old South. Like, that was an interesting sympathy they held. Like Teddy Roosevelt, he really became kind of an icon to a lot of these old south types. Like these guys, they were pro-segregation, they didn't like the federal government. For all practical purposes, they were proto-white nationalists, okay? However, if Teddy had come out and thumped his fucking chest about sending the US Navy over to the Philippines to scare the hell out of the gooks

or whatever was the fucking notion, they thought that was great, man. They thought it was the greatest thing since fucking moonshine and pork and her sister. And that kind of incongruousness, I think is a holdover from, yeah, like anti-elitism that gave rise to the American revolution. But it's also just, I mean, to your point, man, like let's say you're a guy like you were when we first had, you know, it's like, okay, you're immersed in this kind of cultural paradigm by which there's limited outlets for violence, you know, and there's a culture you can't really identify with in any meaningful way. like you just kind of take what you can get and that coupled with what we talked about a minute ago, you know, like the ethical cues that everybody internalizes, you know, suddenly,

even though you'd be otherwise based in your opinions and kind of rejects the, you know, the mythologies of the modern state, like when the prospect of war like emerges, you know, you lose like all sense of reason, man, you know, it's like you become like a sailor on shore leave, like catching a glimpse of a whore with a great can, Does that make any sense? Yes. And I should mention one other peculiarity, since we're on this Iraq war and other neo-Khan wars. An obvious problem everyone knows about is, yes, there may be these high-minded things about ideas of sovereignty and Nuremberg and destroying dictatorship or monarchy, so forth. But on the other hand, let's face, Everyone knows with with dwarves like from it's also a, you know, a parochial desire they have to help Israel.

And, you know, everyone understand the degree to which like a truly like Jewish tribal enmity informs judgment on these matters is incredible. I mean, it's it's it's it's abominable. It's a terrible fucking tendency. But when I say it's incredible, I mean I mean because it's twofold. But number one, it's really kind of remarkable that otherwise sensible people who are not Jews You know get behind these kinds of things for all manner of reasons And I John Muir Shimer's book. You remember Walt Muir Shimer. It's like many years back now I think it was all seven. They published a book the Israel lobby. You're call that book. Yes, of course See that I mean, I'm a big fan of Muir Shimer and Muir Shimer like myself as a Chicago guy So that gives them automatic credit but

What's fascinating about that book is that Stephen Walt and John Muirshammer their point is not despite like the ADL and usual suspect said Their point is not like oh, you know Jews pull the strings, you know They're they're in the they're in the driver's seat at all times. Their point was that yeah, you know the Jewish lobbies singularly powerful But the true source of their ability to manipulate policy and get their way is because there's so many non Jews Who simply are willing to either abide? their dominance or are the most enthusiastic kind of holy warrior Jewish causes. I mean, you can, that's an incredibly complicated issue. Yes, and also it's not just, it's very strange because... I want to emphasize how remarkable it is and it's largely unprecedented.

That's number one. Number two, the thing to keep in mind, I don't want this to devolve into a conversation about, you know, like the relative merit or evil of, you know, like the Jewish race or whatever, or to kind of try to deconstruct the Jewish cultural personality. But what I will say is this, and E. Michael Jones is really, really base in terms of how he describes and identifies the tendency, the way the Jews as a people approach war and peace is radically different from the way Christians do or Moslems do. It's viewed in terms of a kind of absolute enmity, the most stark possible terms separate themselves and their ambitions, morally I mean, from that of the adversary, and it's an entirely existential affair. You know, it's, as you know, because you're quite a,

frankly, I mean, you're quite a brilliant classics scholar. I mean, you understand that the Greeks, they distinguished very sharply between various levels of enmity. You know, I don't speak Greek, and I'm weak on classics, but I do know that there's such a concept of hostess and anemicus. One is kind of a lesser degree of hostility that could entail more rivalry. One is a kind of absolute hostility that entails an existential struggle to survive for like absolute stakes. Well, I, while admitting I'm oversimplifying this, the Jewish paradigm of work, it is a lot more like that more severe modality than it is, than it is anything restrained. And that's an alien concept, like I said, to people outside of that ethnos and that faith. The closest, I've heard people who try to rebut

what I've just said, saying like, oh, but what about jihad? Jihad is a very different phenomenon. And yeah, there's incredibly radical measures that people undertake when they believe that they're fulfilling a God-ordained war. But it's a very different thing. Like, its objectives are different. If not, it's concrete modalities. It's one of the ideas you introduced me to actually is that it's not just simply a family parochial affair to try to help out one's cousins that people like Fromm are engaging, but actually it relates directly to Nuremberg post-war order where the Jewish state Israel is given the only exemption under Nuremberg. What's fascinating too and see it's really interesting and I you know to understand this not just understand Nuremberg itself and understand kind of the

Jewish role within Nuremberg But also understand why Israel has that special dispensation like David Irving wrote a slim value on Nuremberg and it basically chronicles the day-to-day of the trial of You know in the defendant's docket like what these men were going through and on the prosecutorial side of how kind of their case ossified and kind of the internal conspiracies as it were between the allied judges and prosecuting attorneys. But Irving made the point that, see Jackson was approached by, Jackson was approached by a number of, Justice Jackson I mean, he was approached by a number of Jewish representatives. People, I don't think Chaim Weitzman was one of them, but there were guys affiliated with him. Board of Jewish deputies,

guys who went on to, you know, guys who had been highly involved in the American Jewish Committee and then later went on to serve in the first governmental structures in Israel, Palestine. But what these guys did was they behooved Jackson, they said, like, look, we think it's imperative that somehow the purported suffering of the Jewish people be acknowledged. You know, Jackson, you know, Jackson was kind of a traditional Southern gentleman type. He said like, look, you know, it's not going to get, he's like, if this is conceived or perceived as some kind of, you know, Semitic vengeance in his words, this is just not going to fly. And interestingly, he was, he thought of the Soviet, so I most vociferously object to that interjection.

However, what did come about is that for cynical reasons, I don't think Jackson nor do I think the prosecutorial team of any of the states represented at that time particularly cared about the forces of the Jewish people capacity but this insinuation of this of this narrative that you know the Second World War you know was looking to attach a few around but you know there was this uniquely aggrieved population that really really stuck in people's minds and it really became kind of a key tenet of the Nuremberg indictment against some of the defendants and again it was twofold I think on the one hand like yeah there were obviously in Roosevelt's administration there were men who who had profoundly dual loyalties, like Jews and non-Jews alike, who nonetheless hated Germany, hated fascism,

and had this kind of abiding sympathy for the Jews, but also you had, excuse me a minute, you had a prosecution team, they had to make a case, and they had to make a case that, from a perspective of due process, really did not pass muster, man. You know, it's like, okay, we're gonna take these guys were acting in executive roles in the service of a national government engaged in a total war and were assigned to them criminal intent. I mean, like how the fuck do you do that? You know, number one, number two, how do you do that while not having the defense, you know, retort with, you know, but well, those measures, those same measures were undertaken by your own countries. Like the one kind of like outstanding, the one kind of standalone I'm charged

that they were able to satisfy both those conditions with Oh, well, you know the the Germans conspired to commit genocide and that's that's the key to understanding man This narrative that there was a conspiracy before shot was fired in the Second World War They commit mass murder against an entire people Which is fucking bullshit that simply cannot be substantiated as a matter of fact or law I want to talk about this when we come back. We are coming up on a heartbreak I must go to commercial break But I wanted to discuss this more in depth with you if you have time for us more World War II, so-called revisionism, and how does this relate to what we talked so far? Can you stay with us for another segment? I sure can, my friend, there's nothing I'd rather do. I'll be right back.

We'll be right back. Yes, welcome back Caribbean Reserve, we're back from a break, please excuse, but we all need a bathroom cocaine break, and I'm back with Thomas 777, right-wing bodybuilder, historian, and men who exemplify Nietzsche's compliment of Gewalt Mention der Kultur, a violent man of culture. And in my conversations with Thomas, he always realized how different is Nietzsche's vitalistic conception of war and of politics, what Nietzsche called the era of Greek politics, and how very different this is from the petty, lying idea of post-Nuremberg, a modern war against crimes against humanity, in which your opponent is called an enemy of humanity. Just a lying kind of attitude, a lying orientation.

And I learned from Thomas this idea that after 1990, the repeated failures of American occupational class, the repeated foreign adventurism that ends in garbage, is not just historical aberration but it's based in large part on a post-Nuremberg order, and that itself is based in the mythology of what happened in World War II. And I learned more from Thomas than anyone about this, so I bring it now back to Thomas for... Thomas, can you please tell us some more about this World War II mythology, so-called revisionism? What do you think about that? Well, here's what I think and it's it's a fundamentally important topic for the reasons you you just fleshed out Very very well Something to keep in mind is is that the liberal and when I say liberal any capital L

I mean even we're talking about we're talking about an intellectual tradition that emerged, you know long before Karl Marx long before You know long before people like Marcuse, uh, you know long before what we think of as is, you know the emergence of the ideologies of these degenerate people today who follow, you know, things like woke subculture. The original liberal philosophical tendency, it proposed certain things about the nature of man, okay? Now, first and foremost, I think the first liberal, I mean, I don't think, I mean, I know the first, the first true liberal thinker was Thomas Hobbes, and that's gonna seem controversial to some people because they associate Hobbesianism with this kind of manly, very, very final executive decisionism

that touches and concerns very grave things, quite literally. It touches and concerns who's going to live and who's going to die at the will of the sovereign. However, Hobbes, he posited certain things about human nature. Hobbes said when he was trying to conceptualize how man develops political loyalties that later come to dominate his life in myriad ways that may ultimately even lead to his death. Hobbes said, look, every man is born as this kind of isolated, rational actor, obviously once he achieves maturity, but that he realizes that in order to get what he wants, in order to enjoy physical security, in order to derive and maintain to protect the fruits of his labor. He's got to somehow seek out alliance with other men. Now, of course, people are idiosyncratic

and the mind is its own place. Everybody's inner life is different from anybody else's. So basically, you seek out men that may agree with you on basic values of ethics. And the way that you can overcome that idiosyncrasy is because, well, your fellow man is capable of reason. So by appealing to reason, we're gonna develop these ethical thought structures that's all bind us together. And that way we can, we coalesce against enemies who are not like us because they want what we have and they have not reached this agreement between us. They have not reached this agreement with us that we have between us. Now that's compelling in its internal logic, but it's also complete bullshit. Because while Hobbes was brilliant in terms of how we describe man's relationship

to the state, practically as well as psychologically, the fact is it's just fucking bullshit to talk about man as if he's born as this kind of isolated integer who consciously seeks out alliance with others and then by some process that's not really understood other than in terms of millions of discrete preferences coalescing into a massively scaled whole, somehow we have, you know, society and civilizations. You know, when people are born, you know, they're born to families, they're born to extensive kinship networks, you know, they're born to cultures. These cultures have an entire history behind them. You know, they have, there's linguistic nuances that they inherit. You know, their sheer experiences that, you know, that shape, you know, not just the values of people,

but, you know, their physiology. I mean, this is obvious. I mean, I think sociobiology in the last 40 years is, albeit, it's still rather devoid of spiritual content. It does, in fact, at least make clear that that kind of habeasy and liberal rationalist view of human nature is misguided. But, okay, I mean, forgive the tangent, but I felt it was necessary for foundation. If you ascribe a liberal view that I just outlined, obviously, it would only make sense that wars would occur because people conspire to make them happen. That's a complete breach with the way that man has understood war in the West for 40,000 years. As I indicated earlier, in the earlier segment, rather, war traditionally, and by men like Nietzsche, and really by all of his philosophical predecessors,

with the exception maybe of Kant, but even that's dubious, and certainly by the classical philosophers and the priests of critics that you have such a splendid expertise of, war was viewed as arriving like the season and, or like the seasons rather, it's a part of the cycle of birth and death and conflict and strife and development that is endemic to man and to life as life as an essence. That's what's remarkable about Nietzsche is that Nietzsche was a secularist, but he found a way, see like, I'm not an Nietzschean, but I nonetheless have to tip my hat to his brilliance. Like, Nietzsche developed an entire moral system based upon aesthetic considerations, you know, so good and bad supplants good and evil on aesthetic grounds and Nietzsche's notion of eternal occurrence

has a profoundly moral foundation. It really is Nietzsche's version of Kant's categorical imperative, I mean, kind of like this, I mean, like even 30 years on, since I first became aware of it as a concept, you know, the eternal occurrence, if you believe that that's, you know, the destiny of all living things that are fated to endlessly repeat every discrete moment in time, you know, don't commit any act, basically, that you would be revolted by witnessing endlessly repeated. I mean, it's just fascinating, like I... Yes, it's fundamental, it's technical. But it's already asked me the thoughts that keep me up at night. I mean, maybe it's, when I'm particularly disposed of sin, there might be a fucking smoking redhead I saw that day, but it also very likely could be

Nietzsche's eternal recurrence and me contemplating the sheer gravity of that conceptual structure. However, moving forward, Nuremberg obviously drew very heavily upon the liberal notion of war and that this had to have been a violent conspiratorial modality by a control group within the Third Reich that quite literally launched a war because they wanted to exterminate non-combatants who they had assigned guilt for or fault for all the misfortunes that befell Germany. Is that a reasonable assessment, do you think, that that's the prevailing narrative? Yes, war as a kind of a, yes, criminal conspiracy against humanity, and this is total divergence, like you say, from previous conception of war, as is the barbaric demand during the war for unconditional surrender.

I know you have some thoughts about that. Oh, absolutely. Yeah, absolutely. But it's, so here we are at Nuremberg, and there's a few things that the Allies must First and foremost, the Allies have to demonstrate that somehow this war that killed somewhere in the range of 50 to 80 million people, they've got to posit and they've got to substantiate that they were not at fault in any way for this war. They were drawn into it, they were acting defensively, but also they have to demonstrate that this conflict not only were the Axis powers at fault, but that this entire war happened because of essentially a specific intent murder conspiracy now this is problematic it's problematic for a lot of reasons but first and foremost

it's problematic for the state okay it's problematic for the state because there's inconvenient facts okay I think I think Al Gore knows it yeah Al Gore said something about inconvenient facts years ago so I think it's a funny fucking phrase but there's nothing funny unfortunately about what I'm about to relay because the Soviet Union, who was America's stalwart ally in World War II, annihilated 10 million people before a shot was fired in the Second World War. And why did they do this? They did this because there's a peculiarity in Marxist Leninism. Marxist Leninism seeks to change the way people conceptualize their lives. It doesn't just aim to make people abide certain strictures or, you to accept certain modalities of authority it aims to radically and permanently transforms

man's relationship not just to his labor but to his fellow man into authority and people who were not willing or able to do that were branded by the soviet secret police and authorities as politically unreliable now being politically unreliable or being assigned such a status between around 1917 till around 1954 was very very very bad because it meant that you were going to be either shot in the face or in the back of the head. It meant you were either going to be sent to a gulag that essentially worked to death or if you had friends in the regime who wanted to spare your miserable life you might only find yourself living in poverty as a street sweeper after serving months or years or in some cases even decades in a psychiatric facility that essentially

tortured people with sensory deprivation. So what does this mean? It means that the Soviet Union categorically annihilated people who it believed could not be assimilated into its new political structure that was designed to revolutionize man's relationship to political affairs and to production and to labor to his into the inner social constitution of the country in which he lives. Now the Germans witnessed this and a few things happened and I've got an interesting thought as to whether Europeans themselves in the inner war years cognizantly viewed events unfolding around them as a dialectical process or if it was an intuitive of sensibility that that's what was transpiring, or if they did not have those thoughts at all. I personally believe that traditional societies

have hold and a strong intuition about historical events, particularly as regards politics, high politics, and war and peace. So what I'm getting at in a way that's difficult to describe, admittedly, because the topic itself is so complex and abstract, what I'm getting at is that The way the Germans viewed communism is essentially a threat, their existential way of life, which it was. Go ahead. Well, you are the one who, I have a previous show, I don't remember, maybe show 16 on World War II and on Ernst Nolte, and you are the one who introduced me to Ernst Nolte, who, he's called a revisionist, but in fact of what he is, he wants to understand events World War II in context of what happened before, in particular what you call a European civil war starting in 1917.

And this whole historical vision is lost on the moralistic historians who tried to warp that time as a mythology for Nuremberg and the post-war order. No, indeed. And I, I mean, as you know, as you know, cause you, I mean, you see, so you know that, you know, the topic and set it out, you know, Nolte was a student of Heidegger and that's very much, that's very much present within his thought. And I mean, I made the point on, on Twitter the other day to a younger guy who's, who's really, really sharp. He asked me a question about Heidegger as it relates to Plato. And, you know, I don't really know much about Plato, man. Frankly, you know, I'm not a classics guy like you are and like a lot of the frogs are. But what I told him is this, you know, I, you know, I do know,

I do know 20th century political theory and Heidegger was at bay as a political theorist. I mean, yeah, he dealt with, you know, philosophical, um, systems, um, and every, everything, everything you wrote and everything you conceptualize, touching and certain philosophy in, in primary ways. But at bay, he was, he was a political theorist and I believe knows he benefited very much from, you know, not just bearing witness to the European Civil War, as he called it quite correctly, but also enjoying the tutelage of Heidegger. But that's, you know, Nolte obviously what he's more famous or infamous for is the fact that he, you know, he rejected entirely the Holocaust narrative, not because he said that, you know, Jews aren't categorically annihilated in a callous manner during the war, but he

that this was essentially what was viewed as a proportionate response by the institutions, the men serving the institutions who carried it out because what was once unthinkable suddenly became possible in ethical terms when the communists began categorically annihilating entire classes of people. And I mean, when faced with that, when faced with what Nolte called the oriental barbarism of that kind of wholesale slaughter of people for political categories of people. You know, the response to that is that, okay, you know, the way to resist that is to identify who the standard bearer is of that murderous idea. And the standard bearer was to the National Socialists, you know, the Jews and the Jewish world of social existence for a combination of historical and theological reasons.

Gave rise to the monster that was Bolshevism, you know an existential monster that Devoured everything in its path. That was not itself. And I mean if you want to understand what's gonna be known as the Holocaust I mean that's what you need to understand and you see to me that see man to me That's the issue of revisionism guy actually respect a lot then about ten years. Yeah, what ten years back? I don't know if you're familiar other than a rudimentary way with the Institute for historical review It's like you know about it, right? Yeah, they have good articles sometime. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah Mark Webber he he succeeded Willis-Cardo like the Hodge orbiter and he made ways a lot of like white nationalist fucktards because

One of his big priorities was saying like look like stop stop going around, you know Don't be a don't don't be a fucking faggot like Earth's under all and like, you know We're a fucking construction help and see like oh no The Jews were not cured this did not open like what you see, you know, the way to approach it is to contextualize it Like obviously, you know Jews were killed in the Second World War. Obviously, there was huge civilian attrition Obviously, nobody had warm fucking feelings towards them. Okay, why did this happen? Did it happen because you know, the Germans are just like these morally depraved people and the Jews are better So they hated them, you know, did it happen because you know, the West is just just evil and murderous

you know, no, I mean, that's fucking that's dopey fucking dumb dumb bullshit and it's It's it's a it's a cultural modality of post-bolshevik Leftist subversion, but yeah, that's you know, that's what people really need to deal with and revisionism You know We're dealing with we're dealing with facts, of course and and discerning facts from fiction and propaganda because that's the mandates And the vocation of the historian but you know, we're not I mean the whole reason why we have the hard high ground man says, we're not fucking liars. Okay, we're not gonna turn around and be like, oh no, you know, no Jews were killed in the war. Like that's a lie. You know, like we were the victims, not you. Like, no, we're gonna reject that victimology fucking faggot bullshit.

And we're gonna talk about what really happened. And we're not gonna allow commies and their fucking progeny. You know, we're not gonna allow Zionist creeps and scumbags, you know, to transform what was, you know, the seminal event, probably the last thousand years and turn it into some kind of narrative like Jewish murder dormancy promise it like that's the issue man I mean yes so as a bureaucrat I had a very interesting article theories I delayed informatization in which he point out that after World War two after Nuremberg trials as the entire view of man's nature the view of war that you talk about earlier was completely edited out of discourse, suppressed as heretical, not to speak of Nietzsche's fundamentally aesthetic conception of man's nature and so forth.

It continues to be talked about in academia in highly edited form, but constantly, as you well know, Kaufman and many other academics, the Frankfurt School, the postmodernists, They completely try to castrate Nietzsche, and indeed not just Nietzsche, but all of Western philosophical tradition as it continues in academic discourse is castrated. This entire side of human nature is denied after World War II. It's just this way it's kind of, like you say, unique almost event in a thousand years, because they try to edit out completely one half of human nature from people's mind and talk. However, it's also the case that America and the West in general continued during the Cold War because of its struggle with the Soviets.

It continued to maybe instrumentalize the far right, the remnants of it. It tried to use them as Cold War tools. And I remember you had a very interesting view on this subject that we will talk about in the future because I plan to have Thomas on show many times, but one major operation in which Western intelligence used the far right was called Operation Gladio, you can look it up, but that is for future discussion. Thomas, if you would not mind, however, talking now briefly about white nationalism because Because many people think white nationalism is this thing since 2010 or whatever, but actually it's neither that new nor is it very old. It is in fact a Cold War creation, something like this. You had some very interesting views if you would not mind commenting on that. No, not at all.

I mean, I'm glad you raised it because I think it's an important topic, man, particularly that presence because it's a singular fixation as a boogeyman in system media and it's bully pulpit platforms all in sundry to kind of present this as a grave threat to people just physically in a day-to-day capacity, which is ridiculous, but also as some kind of meaningful challenge to the dominant political culture. And I mean, that's ridiculous. and it's also, yeah, I think white nationalism, it was basically a Cold War contrivance, like some of which was, you know, kind of spontaneously came about in the southern states that had been most profoundly devastated by the war between the states and reconstruction, and then had been most purposefully and thoroughly targeted

for social engineering efforts, you know, from 1954 onward. But also, see, something interesting happened, man, Like, as you know, as the Frogs know, and as anybody who spends any time around me in real life or in virtual life or just corresponding with me knows, I think Francis Parker Yaki was about the most, both the most prescient and the most complete right-wing American finger of the 20th century. And something very interesting happened. I don't wanna bog down our conversation with too much historical… No, no. Historical is good. People like… Long story short, when Yaqui was arrested, finally, Willis Cardo, who was an America First type, who later was instrumental in the post-war white nationalist movement, he

went to visit Yaqui in jail, where Yaqui was being held in San Francisco, and he asked him about George Lincoln Rockwell, you know, the American Nazi Party fucking goofball. And Yaqui said, in all honesty, like, I have no idea who that is. Now, I mean, Yaki was a man, he was a confidant of Otto Reimer, you know, who was singularly responsible really for foiling the July 20th plot against Adolf Hitler. Yaki was probably an employee of East German intelligence, you know, I mean, Yaki was a guy who moved in national socialist and fascist circles, okay? Like if we can, if we're going to talk about a man, for better or worse, was plugged in, you know, to kind of the Odessa network, which I don't think actually existed, but I mean- Yeah, they tried to assassinate me in Argentina,

but OK, you see. Yeah, yeah, but I mean, Rockwell was like, in terms of like real national socialism, like Rockwell was just such a nobody. Like, Yaqui had literally never even heard his name. OK, so back to your point that you wanted to address that I want to also. Basically, when the Cold War kicked off into high gear, America had a problem. And that problem was that, you know, like we kind of touched on earlier, like the Cold War, I mean, it truly was a battle of ideologies. It's not just a cliche or something that historians like to trot out when they're situated at the podium trying to sound stately. It really was a conflict that would decide political modalities and how man conceptualized politics. It really had nothing in common with 19th century

wars over territory or trade routes. So basically, both the East Bloc and the US NATO NATO they had to basically sell people on their on their proposition and in the in the developing world in the non-aligned world well they're gonna problem with that because America was highly segregated you know in fact in the north and by law in the south and they give the Soviet Union a perfect jumping off point to say like hey you know look at these fucking people you know they talk about the rights of man and every man is free and one man one vote and you know they won't even let blacks like you know they won't even let blacks use the same restroom as the white man and you know you make him sit in the back of the bus and he shines the white man's shoes

you know he's he's the quintessential you know like exploited proletarian and um that really more than anything was what kicked brown v board off i mean brought this whole story on brand v brown v board but in political terms that that was a catalyst and the reaction to that was um was a is a kind of coalescence of an increasingly dispossessed and increasingly alienated white lower middle class and underclass, both in the Reconstruction states in the South like we talked about, but also in Northern urban centers. And E. Michael Jones wrote a lot about that, how these people in places like Chicago, where I'm at, these are basically immigrant Catholics and the sons and daughters of immigrant Catholics. They didn't have any idea like, oh, you know, like I'm a white man or I'm a white lady.

You know, they're like, I'm a Lithuanian or I'm, you know, I'm Italian or I'm a Pole, you know, or I'm a, I'm Ukrainian. It was really, it wasn't until, you know, you had people like Martin Luther King sort of engaged park saying like, oh, hey, you know, like, oh, we're, we're being, we're being denied equal housing because, you know, the, you know, the white man is, is getting favorable treatment. Like the Lithuanians who threw fucking rotten eggs at them, they don't know what the fuck you, They didn't even speak English, man. They didn't have any idea about the war between the states and that whole kind of systemic enmity between the descendants of the Ulster Scott plantation owners and their African slaves. All they saw was some fucking dark-skinned guy

who was telling them that you wanted to break up their neighborhood and that their parish community was somehow illegitimate. But long story short, you had this weird phenomenon where these Southern Crots and these Northern Catholics You know, they said like, hey, wait a minute. You know, these people on the left, like they're saying like, we're severally the bad guy and that, you know, we're privileged and that, you know, we've got our heel on the black man's throat and you know, hey, fuck that, you know, I'm not, you know, I'm not going to take you that lying down. And you had, you had your like, Willis Carter will really capitalize on that. And in a dog whistle sense, I don't, I don't accept the left narrative that like, you know, Richard Nixon and Pat Buchanan, you know,

were these like dogmatic, you know, racialists or something. But the Southern strategy, which really was a contrivance Nixon and Buchanan. I mean, part of it was an accident of the electoral map. Part of it very much was them recognizing, like, hey, you know, these people really are, their founding was corralled on one very clearly defined bad line of the Cold War, and their enemies were both myriad and held in common. And that tendency, or those two kind of parallel tendencies, That's what white nationalism is. After the Cold War, it became very interesting because no longer was the government in the United States or in Western Europe willing to give lip service to any exclusionary nationalism advocated by the then still dominant majority, but especially white nationalism,

that was just intolerable in ethical terms. terms. And, uh, like, look, don't get me wrong. Okay. I'm not going to sit here and say that like, you know, some of these cats who like became skin heads in the early eighties or these like Southern guys who, you know, fought Martin Luther King's people in the streets. I mean, those guys had balls. Okay. And within their limited conceptual horizon and within their limited intellectual faculties drop on, they were trying to defend their hood and they were trying to like defend their friends and their family and their wives and they're lady friends. I totally get that and I'm not gonna bash those people. However, like no better to clear this to be like some kind of way forward that's utterly fucking retarded.

I mean, is that like a decent summary man for like an introductory kind of a description? Do you think you basically agree? Yes, no, I basically agree with that. And I think that people need to study this history some more to understand just historical context, how it's somewhat recent and limited phenomenon, this idea of white nationalism. And in fact, if you would like to end this segment before we go to break, if you have any advice for young frogs who see what going on now in the world, and perhaps what way forward in the broad sense, We don't need to get into detail, but abroad for a nationalist mobilization or nationalist front against these abuses that we see lately, some advice for them to study, or which way would you like to see forward, more or less?

Yeah, no, I understand what you're asking. Briefly, here's what I think. first and foremost, don't seek out violence, but don't run from it either. Like stand your fucking ground. That's number one, cliche as it might sound. Number two, you don't need to pin some kind of manifesto or find a man who's like inclined to manifestos and then like answer all the complex questions posed by man's existence as a political animal. Like all you really need to do, man, is like educate yourself in a diligent in complete capacity, and the structure of the world becomes more clear, not to get too biblical, but it's like scales lift from one's eyes, and in the process of doing that, not only do you better yourself, again, I'm not trying to sound hokey, but you gotta connect and bond with other people

who are undergoing the same process, and the rest of it kinda takes care of itself, man, because the way forward reveals itself. And a big problem, man, not just in politics, but dealing with romantic affairs with women or trying to pick the right career for like Youngblood's men, it's like you gotta kind of like allow the world to reveal itself to you. I mean, I know that there's really a Heideggerian or whatever, like it sounds like I'm gonna be trying to like draw up on some kind of mystical sense of things to describe the world. But I mean, it really, people have this delusion that they're in the driver's seat and they're not, man. And that's part of, one of the pitfalls of secularism is people deluding themselves into thinking that everything falls upon their shoulders.

They're pretty good young people, they get a really, really confused message about that. And it's one of the reasons, I mean it's not their fault, man, but it's one of the reasons they're so fucking neurotic. Is that sense, man, or is that too, kind of, like, mundane? Yes, they must learn to trust in the will of the gods. And I think on that note we must go commercial break. But I will be right back with Thomas to discuss some related matter. Be right back. Yes, very good. Back from break, Thomas again, he bullied me and I will be sending a letter to SPLC and also you and Thomas bully me in break. But we want to make something clear that we're not just shitting on white nationalism or this because we think it's too naughty or too right-wing and that we want to carry a

favor with liberals is simply that white nationalism is limited historically and in its imagination and doesn't fully correspond to American traditions or Western historical imagination or traditions. It's quite a limited phenomenon, and our conception of what the West is, or what you might call the hard right, is quite different. It's based in different sources, it has different origins in writers like Junger, or Celine, or Mishima, who may have been Japanese, but very important to us nevertheless. In my case, especially in Nietzsche, or as in Thomas' case, I think he is a devotee of Heidegger, but it's simply that we're not just shitting white nationalism because we think it's just not really an alternative to the left.

We present a rather different alternative in more important sources. And of all these writers I mentioned just now, especially important is Ernst Junger, Because when you just focus, let's say, Nietzsche, Mishima, or even Nietzsche, Celine, people like that, there's a tendency to devolve to academic faggotry, to say everything is this literary exercise, whereas Jungar is much more. He was actually a warrior, a soldier, he wrote books of war, he, in my opinion, bring back a Homeric voice. So I always, you must include Junger in your reading, and I want to give now back to Thomas, because he I know is working on Junger, he is reading Junger, and by the way, Thomas is soon to publish a book on Nuremberg, many of the subjects we discuss with Imperium Press

I believe, but I will leave it to him to say, and in particular this central importance of Jungar to our own conception of the West and its traditions and what being right-wing means to us. So I bring back now to Thomas. Thomas, welcome back to the show. Would you mind talking a bit about Ernest Jungar? No, I'd love to, man, and Jungar's a fascinating figure for a lot of reasons. I mean, first and foremost, I mean, he, you know, 16 years old, he runs away and joins he's the foreign legion, when his father finds out and tracks him down and uses his not insubstantial context kind of corral him out of the legion due to him being both underage and having gone off the reservation. Younger comes back to Germany and he ends up, a year subsequent when he is of age,

he signs up, joins the Imperial German Army, fought to the front for four years. I think he was the youngest, I mean, he was, yeah, I think he was the youngest, youngest commissioned officer in the Rikes Fair, if I'm not mistaken. That was, you know, he was awarded the Portland Merit. I mean, the guy's resume is a warrior second to none. But he also, I mean, the guy lived to be 103 years old, I think, I mean, he lived through the Great War, you know, he spent the second war in occupied France. You know, he saw, he witnessed the rise, zenith and a dissolution of the Soviet Union, you know, all within his lifetime. And he was an artist and a true poet philosopher to boot too. Those terms are tossed around and bandied about, but, you know, very kind of cavalier and silly way,

but in Younger's case, it's actually apropos. Younger was fascinating is that he understood, he took Nietzsche's conceptual modalities really and in his own life, he kind of put these things into direct action. Like part of that was willful because, you know, those are the kinds of values that he viewed as important. And part of this was circumstantial, just because these are the kinds of things, you know, the circumstances he's thrown into. And a paramount concern to him was, you know, the fact that, okay, well, you know, if man's conceptual horizon at any given epoch is just that, you know, a horizon, you know, it's not, it's not, you know, it's not, it's not conferred upon him by, you know, by God or by some kind of knowledge of a more perfect reality.

We said, okay, well, it's imperative then that we seek out opportunities for heroism and it would create culture and create value, but what kind of heroism is available when even if you volunteer a frontline duty, you may very well get your fucking lungs torn apart by some kind of blistering agent in the form of poison gas or you might just find yourself as literal cannon fodder, like charging an entrenched machine gun position and torn to pieces before you even get a shot off. And younger solution to this was very interesting. The other solution was he said, well, a few things happen in the modern state and in modern life. He's like, first of all, you become anonymous. Now that's alarming for a lot of reasons because basically one of the only things

that mitigates fear of death is the concrete reality that, okay, in the social world that I live in, I am known to people, I'm known to my family, I am known to a kinship network, I'm known to the village I live in. It's the scale of human sociality was such that, really until the 20th century, like most people carry on account on that sort of memorial existence, I think about it. Younger's notion was like, look, particularly for an urbanite, but even for men who still stay tied to land in some capacity. In the 20th century, particularly in a hyper-modern state like Germany, you become truly anonymous. You do the same job, probably, that 10,000 other men do. You live in a city where you don't know the man who lives 20 feet away from you.

Everybody kind of blends into this basically cohesive, but kind of undefined whole that itself doesn't even really have much in the way of distinguishing cultural characteristics. So, Younger said, okay, on the one hand, it's nightmarish. On the other hand, it's quite liberating because there's always a dichotomy between man's conceptual life and an actual physical reality even if you reject Cartesianism and its implications and what's outside the scope of what we're talking about now there still exists that dualism. So Younger said that, well, in a strange kind of dialectical way, this alienated circumstance of anonymity that I just described, it's liberating because it means that although your action is highly scrutinized to make sure that it satiates

the demands of the machine, as it were, literally your inner life becomes even more private. And that means that you can carve out for yourself a kind of monastic heroism and your ability not just to withstand your confrontation with death and your own mortality without the support of this memorial existence that I just referenced, but that also you learn things about yourself and grounds your ability to withstand pain. Pretty much everything you do becomes almost tantamount to the experience of the battlefield. Younger, he'd write about working in a factory in the interwar years and how in some of these factory floors, like in places, you know, like the star or the roar, you know, they like 10% of men were like named or killed.

That's like, that's like battlefield attrition, you know, like you walk the streets of a Vymar Berlin, you know, you may roll get corralled into a street fight, you know, with the communists or get caught in the crossfire, you know, between the, you know, the Spartacist league and the free core. And, you know, you might take a bullet to your dome, even though you, you haven't even formally taken a side and in the street combat you come across. So in Younger's vision, superior people, even in this debate circumstance, can still rise to the occasion, still create culture, and in a, I mean, honestly, if you'll forget the digression, I think that's actually really frickin' cyberpunk, even though probably won't disagree with that, but in any event, that's kinda why Younger's

a towering figure, but Younger did not lose his humanity and his action lyricism. One of my favorites, the book The Glass Bees, Have you read The Glass Bees by Younger? No, I have not read this one. I didn't read the late Younger. Look, man, and it's truly science fiction of the best kind. But basically, The Glass Bees, it's about this middle-aged soldier. Obviously, a veteran of a conflict like the Great War. He can't find work. He talks about his wife being a proper stoic German woman. He can tell that she's crying at night when he wakes up, but she's trying to keep silent, to not humiliate him as a man. And ultimately he meets this industrialist who taps into this heroic impulse that the protagonist has cultivated both at the front and in this alienated anonymity

of the not-too-distant future. And he helps them redeem himself. But there's a point in the book where the protagonist who's obviously all three of your ego of younger, He talks about coming upon a village in the war days, and he said that the village priests, he'd been crucified at the gates of the town. And he said that it wasn't even, he said at this point, people didn't even really believe in Christ anymore. So it was almost perfunctory that the priests got tortured and brutalized this way. And like you said, out of everything that happened in the war that bothered him the most, because it was such a pointless, perfunctory, you know, disgusting thing to do. But then it's even, it's like, not only was intimacy not possible anymore at that point,

but it's like horror almost wasn't possible anymore. And that made him feel more beaten down than anything. But it's, you know, it's in these ways that, yeah, I think Younger really is kind of, in some ways, like the ultimate scribe of the warrior, warrior, archetype of the 20th century. And the figure he described that we were just referencing, you know, the man who, in spite of this horrifying anonymity and hyper alienation, has found a way to build an ice cathedral, as it were, almost in his own mind, where he, like, lives this kind of monastic, like, warrior's existence. He called that figure the Anarch, not the Anarchist, but the Anarch, and he described it thusly, that the, you know, the Anarch is to anarchy, what the monarch is a monarchy. Like, he's a self-contained man,

and he considers everything he does in aesthetic terms. Like, that's the Nietzschean in Younger coming out. He's neither master nor slave because he truly is, you know, like, the more developed human type. You know, we're dominion over another or submission to another, like, wouldn't even occur to him because, you know, the only people he associates with outside of the temple of his own psyche are his equals, that his equals are just as sovereignly self-contained as he is. Does this make any sense, man? Yes, this always fascinated me as well about the younger idea of a self-contained man who is able to stand against the degeneracy, and not just the degeneracy, but as you put it, the enemies, the despair, the anonymity of modern life.

And it's very unusual because this kind of self-contained aloofness, often people say say this of philosopher, the genuine one who basically doesn't exist, the monk who also is extremely rare, or the literary man who most are bad writers. But these are contemplative men who are usually described in this way, whereas Junger is unique in having been both a consummate man of action and adventure, and at the same time an artist, perhaps an artist of action. And in this context, I should say, much of my audience are perhaps men who desire adventure. And Thomas, many of them, I think, despair at the fact that in the modern world, there seem to be such few opportunities for genuine action, genuine expansion and adventure. I wonder, however, if what the disturbances we are seeing

in our time just now, if this will lead to explosion of opportunities. If, for example, the Leviathan falters and an age of chaos returns, if this allows open door for adventure, this has been some of my hope for the future, but I want to ask you how do you see things panning out in roughly, let's say, five-year horizon and 20-year horizon. I asked Nico Salo, same when he was on show, but just, you know, we will talk more in future, But very briefly, what is your vision for the future in these timeframes? Well, I'll tell you. To your point about youngsters worrying that they might not have opportunities for action, I think they're probably going to get more than they bargained for, for both better and worse. But it's a great question, man.

That's really what anybody who's at all contemplative has got on their mind as they watch political events unfold around them at present. In five years' time, at the conclusion of this election cycle in November, I think Trump's reelection is all but guaranteed for a couple of reasons, both structural and political. but you're gonna see people are gonna stop talking anymore. They're gonna stop invoking the civic myths that like all controversies in America, can be overcome simply through conversation without enmity. That's people are gonna abandon that because nobody's gonna believe it any longer. And it's gonna seem almost tasteless to even invoke it. So you're gonna see steps towards a formal and by formal I mean de jure as a matter of law and balkanization.

I don't think America's imminently gonna break up, but by mid-century, America as you know it today will not exist. Which brings me to my second point. In 20 years, as Nick I'm sure told you, because he's really a top thinker on international relations and geopolitics. By mid-century, the 21st century is going to revolve by 2050 around what we can think of as the supercontinent of Central Asia, minus Western Europe, because Western Europe really is dying in a lot of ways. And geostrategically, it's become not really a factor. But you're going to this kind of great game, this kind of great game, power political confrontation that I believe will reach something of a zenith by mid-century in 20 years time. That's gonna be very much developing and hardening as kind of the new national,

as kind of the new global security paradigm and national states such that they continue to exist are gonna essentially be oriented around that reality. And that's gonna have implications for the man in the street, okay? For better and worse too. And I mean, if adventure is your thing, man, like, well, I mean, if you want action, I think you'll be able to find action. And if you want peace and quietude, I mean, if you can find a way to feed yourself and make money, I mean, you really can, you really can kind of escape, man. I mean, that really is kind of the silver lining of globalism such that there is one. And I really, I don't think there is in any kind of absolute capacity, but there are in fact opportunities that people will have that they did not have before,

even a decade or two ago. And I mean, does that mitigate the annihilation I don't think so, but it does provide other potentialities from which people can derive value. That's my view in a nutshell on the time we have. Yes, I believe so too. I believe as Leviathan falters, it will leave certain parts of the world as refuge, you might say. Yes, probably both life of adventure and life of escape will become more possible in the new world you mentioned. But Thomas, I think we have already talked for some time, why don't we leave discussion of the future, maybe conflict, Eurasia, and of the past, the details about Operation Gladio, our talk of Mishima, many other things we plan to talk about. We leave that for next show, next segments, and now we leave the audience.

We discuss more about the cocaine and the brothels. What do you say? That sounds fantastic, man. Again, Kent, thank you enough for hosting me, man. No, it's my pleasure to have Thomas. Very good. So now I say to audience, I must go. I have technical detail to discuss with Thomas about Chicago brothels. So very good. Until next time, Bap out.