Caribbean Resumes, episode 85. I may warn you there is a fan, some on street outside apartment, it make a noise. I believe they are surveilling me. But I have special guest on show today, Soso. You may know him as nice friend or Soso. He is old frog hand, frog Twitter veteran. He is a student of history, of military affairs and military theory. I told you on last show, when I talk Afghanistan, that I may have a specialist on Clausewitz, and this is what the topic of show is today. We talk Clausewitz, we talk concepts of war, concepts of military history and theory, because you cannot understand fully what happened right now in Afghanistan or the repeated failures of American foreign policy and national security establishment over the last few decades, actually,

without understanding this crucial thinker, Clausewitz, and certain other theorists of war and counterinsurgency. So with that said, I have on show he is, by the way, I should say, Sosso is not a complete human. He is a cybernetic small black cat. Is that right? Welcome to show Sosso. Yes, Bap, that's absolutely correct. You see, I am some sort of an amalgamation between technology and the cunning of the black cat sound broadcasting here live from element and the hidden mountain fortress you are a small a black cat you have lived in ancient castle of Alamut of the Ismaili assassins you have lives there for the last few centuries your consciousness uploaded to compute are designed by the old man himself indeed in fact I don't think I'll ever get the smell of hash out of my circuitry but

all that being said it's a great honor to be on this show to speak on these matters. Yes, welcome to the show. So you are a thinker, a long time we have had many discussions on military history and military theory. What do you think of this insanity now, Afghanistan? Well, I think the only obvious conclusion here is nobody's read anything of any sort of consequence, at least any of the policymakers and people in charge. They're much more, I should say, they are very focused on, you know, their own sort of hubris. They're very narcissistic. Yes, and newfangled theories also, such as I've seen fourth generation and even fifth generation warfare, but all of these new concepts, and any new concept would you not agree has

a kind of Reddit-like quality about it, something contrived, meant to show the writer's intellectualism or something like this. But fundamentally, all these new theories of fourth generation, fifth generation warfare, Such things are footnote, or not even footnote, they are cribbed from one small sentence of Clausewitz or more or less this. But you know these thinkers well, and what do you plan to talk on show today about this? Well, I think when you look at Afghanistan and then further into the sort of conflicts that are going to emerge in the 21st century and the ones that have already existed, things like Syria, things like Libya, things obviously like Afghanistan and Iraq, you can't look at these things without having a good, solid foundation into the concepts that previous

thinkers have put forth on the nature of war, and particularly the nature of limited war, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare. Yes. Yes. In regards to that, the three that I think are most applicable is Clausewitz, Karl von Clausewitz, as you mentioned. He's truly the real primary genius when it comes to writing on military theory. His book, On War, Vom Kriega, is a testament to his intelligence. It's read and reread and understood and misunderstood over and over ever since he wrote it. And no one has really come close to putting his... We must discuss this today, because I think even people who are very well-read in philosophy, in history, many such things, they pass over Clausewitz, Luttwak, Edward Luttwak, writer

on strategy and history, many other such things, he point out there is a kind of prejudice among academics today, among students of politics, where they think war is evil, as therefore it should not be studied. That sounds stupid on its face, but it's their view of things. And he point out, imagine if some scientist was studying butterflies, but he was saying, oh, but I hate butterflies. You know, you cannot fully understand something, I think, unless you love it in some way. You don't need to go all the way with Heraclitus or with fascism and think that war is the hygiene of the world or this. But you need to take some enjoyment in the study of war, of military history. And among educated class today, this is very rare.

So because of this, almost none of them read Clausewitz, not to speak of other military historians and so forth. It's become a kind of niche study outside of academia. And this hurt, I think, American foreign policy, because even its generals, perhaps, but certainly its so-called strategists—and you have to laugh when you say that, but it's strategists and Department of State and other national security apparatus, they don't study war in any objective, historical, abstract sense. It's only moral homilies against war. In any case, this is my rant. But would you agree with this, and that—well, because of this, I'm going to ask you to introduce Klaus if it's even, I'm saying, an educated audience may not have had a proper introduction to him. No, I absolutely agree.

It's fairly obvious that the people in charge of making policy and our government and laying out national strategy and the waging of these wars haven't read or at least haven't understood Clausewitz and many other thinkers on such things, which is ironic considering Clausewitz's most famous statement is war is the continuation of politics by other means. He has held the belief that war and politics were not two separate entities. They were not separate fields of understanding. They were one and the same. They're just waged in different ways. And when it comes to the sort of strategy, if you could call it that, that's put forth today on the national and geopolitical stage by the United States, it's obvious that these

people have no idea what they're talking about or even what they want to do. Yes. I was I read him a little bit when I was very young, and I did not understand almost any of it. Again, later I met General William Odom, who was my friend, and he forced me to read Clausewitz. This was very important for me. But most people, I think, were not forced by someone, even people who are interested in military history, military matters. Who was he? Would you care to just basic introduction to who he was and when he lived and so forth? Well, Karl von Klasswitz is a Prussian, and that's pretty obvious if you've ever read his work but he was born in 1890 and or I'm sorry let me rephrase that 1780 died in 1831 to cholera and when he was 13 years old he joined the Prussian army

and served the Prussian army until his death so he knew war very familiar to him and he fought in the Napoleonic Wars from his youth into his you know the end of such things when Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo which he fought he fought in, and his concepts of war stem from his experience in that, and the contemporary thinkers that he was not satisfied with. A lot of their theories he viewed as, you know, lowbrow almost. He thought that they didn't truly encapsulate everything war had to offer in terms of study and understanding. A lot of it was based on practical needs of generals at the time. You know, if you have X amount of pikemen, X amount of musketmen and your cavalry, you arrange them in these ways, geometrically, from these angles, all very formulmatic and

scientific almost. And he had the idea that war had a lot more to do than just positioning and arrangements of troops. There was a human element that was primary to his concept of how war operated and the concept of how war is waged. So he set out, you know, very early on, he put writings out dismissing these thinkers of his time and earned quite a bit of enemies. It's often said that had he not had his wife, who was a noblewoman, a member of the Prussian court, he probably would have suffered some severe consequences for how outspoken he was. Yes. Let me interrupt for a moment to remind audience, you know, come from Prussia, the Sparta of modern Europe, which was, you could say, almost very militarized, a barrack state, it's been called that.

And nevertheless, although it had elevated military matters to a high degree of intellectualism and almost scientific study, they were wiped out by Napoleon in several significant battles. And maybe you can't understand maybe Clausewitz apart from his Prussian background, someone could say. But it's more than that. It's a theory of warfare as such, the nature of warfare, the nature of modern European warfare as opposed to ancient and so forth. Excuse the interjection. I just— No, that's a great point, and I can build off that. It's Kossowitz's time period in which he served in the military and the experiences of warfare he fought. Prussian has often said it was not a state with the military, it was a military with the state.

And he served against Napoleon and Napoleon's conquest across Europe, the defeat of Prussia and various other states. He witnessed a revolution in military warfare and the way things were done. Primarily, if you look at Prussia and Prussia's excellence in war, it was an excellence in in an old form of warfare, with nobility leading the charge and, you know, very ordered and structured arrangement of troops. Their drill, their discipline was, you know, world-renowned at this time. But what Napoleon was able to do really shocked the world and all conventional thinkers at the time. And Clausewitz wanted to understand that. Why did it occur that way? Why was Prussia so easily defeated by Napoleon and his armies?

And his idea was the creation of the Levian mass and the nationalism that arose out of the French Revolution. This enabled France to raise armies of sizes that had never been seen before and conduct warfare with a sort of morale that couldn't be challenged by any other nation. The soldiers that he fought against, they didn't have the same revolutionary spirit that his own troops had. Yes. No, this is very good. And so Clausewitz then come up with this book On War. It's very difficult to read for some people, but has lucid illustrative passages. Would you care to comment on this? Yeah. I won't pretend to be some sort of expert on war. No one really is. It is, as you said, a very dense and difficult-to-understand book.

In fact, I've heard it said that native German speakers in which the book is written find it easier read in English than in German, because it is very dense and complicated stuff. The approach that he takes is to, he had a Thucydian-like approach to what he was writing. He didn't just want to write a handbook for generals for the next 20, 30 years. He wanted to write something that was going to stand the test of time, and he did. But part of that is delving into philosophic concepts, things that were very heady and required intense analysis. Another problem with On War is he never finished it. He died before he was able to complete the work. He had written most of it, but he hadn't edited it, and there were certain themes that he

wanted to build throughout the book to unify the central message of the book and the theory that he put forth, and he was never able to accomplish that. He finished the first book. On War is written in eight books within itself, and he was able to edit the first book in in a way that he was satisfied with, and part of the last book, the eighth book, but it's those interior books, those other six, that he never got around to actually finishing editing. So it's a bit confusing, you know, there's a lot of disjointed thoughts. Sometimes you can read a sentence on the proper way to manage logistics as you move through country and the dispersion of troops, and the next you're talking about Kantian ideas of reason versus pure reason and practical reason, that sort of thing. Very good.

Well, I think we will leave the particulars of his ideas for the next segment, what you say, because we must get quite close into the concept of war, Klaus Witt's head, and what means the continuation of war and politics. You are going to talk about some other thinkers, however, on this show. You will bring up Galula. Who is this? So David Galula, he wrote a book in the 50s, I believe, 50s or 60s, entitled A Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. He wrote this book out of his experiences in his own service in the military, the French military, where he served with the Army of Liberation in World War II. He also served with the French state in Indochina. He was an advisor and observing China itself during its own civil war.

And then much later, in his sort of combative period, in terms of the theories that he was formulating at the time, he served in the French-Algerian War. And these experiences led him to write this book, which laid out how counterinsurgency warfare should be handled, you know, executed by nations seeking to suppress an insurgency or guerrilla warfare within its borders. LAPAVITSAS. Yes. No, this is good. always been interested in French counterinsurgency thinker. Maybe we can in future have entire show on that, because I think after the Algerian war some of them went to Argentina, and they help the Argentinian general to torture communists, and they had entire theory of how it is important to, let's say, eliminate the social base of

the left and so forth to achieve full counterinsurgency goal. But we will not talk that on this show, perhaps future show, if you want to come on. But so, on this show we will talk modern problem of modern insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. And to this end we will discuss Clausewitz, Galula, and also I believe you would like to talk about Mao. Mao is, besides being put on Obama decorations on Christmas tree, but he's also an important thinker on modern warfare, is he not? Absolutely. You know, Mao is a divisive figure, certainly among the right. There is no love lost for Mao. But one cannot understand Mao and any of the guerrilla or insurgency movements from his point forward, you know, into the 20th and 21st century, without looking at his writings

on guerrilla warfare, his two books, specific on the matter, on guerrilla warfare and also on protracted war. If you want to understand counterinsurgency, you also have to understand insurgency and what's effective for the opponent, for the guerrilla and for the insurgent. Yes. Very good then. Well, what would you say is common to all these three thinkers that will be able to expand on this later in show? But what is, let's say, the cliff notes for now to tell listeners at the beginning that American establishment and not just American establishment, you could say NATO establishment in general, what is it that these thinkers present that has been missed by modern war planners? Well, fundamentally it has to do what I think these three thinkers really bring to the table

in terms of this discussion, is their concepts of war as politics and the nature of dealing with political ends in a counterinsurgency warfare or limited wars, Klaasowitz would describe it. These sort of things speak to the heart of the matter of conflicts in the 20th and 21st century. These are wars that are fought based off of political ideology, based off of popular support and things of this nature, also the importance of will in war, the strength of a fighter or a certain group's willpower to continue to wage war. I believe you mentioned this on a previous show and it's absolutely true, you cannot defeat an enemy if he does not himself believe himself to be defeated. Yes, especially where, you know, extermination is not on the table, which modern governments

obviously cannot do that, you know. But people often have this fantasy of you will go scorch earth, you will wipe everyone out, but we all know that no modern government is going to do this. No, and it's ironic, because it's actually one of the most effective counterinsurgency methods there is, if you were to look at, you know, the Indian wars that the United States fought. As much as we have failed in, you know, this last 20 years in terms of fighting counterinsurgency, there really shouldn't be anyone better on earth than the Americans at doing it. You know, we settled the West and we eliminated whole tribes of people. Not to say it's necessarily a good or a bad thing, but it's the fact of the matter. Yes. No, this is true.

But before we go to break, Soso, I wanted to ask something just came on my mind while you were talking about American Indians now, because that was a war of one settler population with its own population centers nearby against another native population with its, you know, they were tribal and some nomadic, but they had population centers, whereas many insurgency warfare today is, of course, occupying army or colonial army against natives. So the natives in some sense own the territory because they own the people or have more direct access to them. They are part of the people. But it made me think of this. What is the difference, you would say, between rural? I don't know if this is part of military doctrine, but it's something I've thought a long time

about because some of these insurgencies are rural and then others are urban. I posted a few times about the 1970s wars in Argentina, and that was almost entirely an urban insurgency with daily assassinations, daily bombings, where leftist death squads were killing. They started it essentially, they killed rightists and also American executives and diplomats and so forth. And eventually there were right-wing death squads that retaliated against them. But almost all the fighting, at first at least, took place in one city, Buenos Aires, with, again, that seemed a little bit different from when you have a rural insurgency. has happened in many countries, I think, in Peru, the Shining Path was rural, a lot of these incidents are rural. Is there a difference between those, you think?

Well, I think the key difference, it's all case dependent, really, and it has to do with where sort of grievances lie between certain populations and the occupational regime or the legitimate regime, whatever it may be. The nature of the way these wars are conducted, there are different ways that you fight, whether you fight it as a guerrilla in the woods or in the mountains, sort of separate from the population while still dependent on them, or an insurgency where you hide amongst the population, which is what you see in these more urban conflicts, like in Iraq and other places, versus more rural, like Taliban in Afghanistan. LAPAVITSAS. Yes. Yes. You think urban is harder to defeat? I don't know. I mean, Taliban I think were hard to defeat because they retreat to Pakistan mountains,

And the United States did not want to do an invasion of pitched battles there. But do you think an urban insurgency would be harder to put down? I don't know. It's not quite the subject of the show, but I was thinking about it now. No, I think it's actually very applicable to the subject of the show, because it speaks to the heart of the matter of insurgency warfare, and it's the nature of the general population's relation to both the government or the insurgents. And in an urban conflict it can be very difficult to put down if the insurgents hold a significant amount of power over the populations within these centers. It allows them a certain degree of freedom of movement that you don't have in other forms

of warfare, like in the rural areas, where you might be able to run through the mountains, but you're not really able to engage with government forces in the same way that you can in urban environments. Yes. Now, this is very interesting, so this would be a good show on all these topics. What do you say we take a break? I have here, as usual, when I have guests on show, I have cider, I'm going to pour some. I hope this is okay. I hope all the audience does not mind. I need some cider to relax because the tension of talking to a cybernetic cat is too much. But what do you say we take a short break to have a cider or you will smoke hibiscus, I suppose? I'll have a bowl of milk and a little bit of hash. I think we'll be ready to rock for the next segment. Very good, Soso.

We will be right back. Come back to show, I have special guest on Soso. Again, he's Frog Twitter veteran, but who I never realized was actually a kind of cat spirit of some type embodied here. He has small black cat avatar, is very powerful. We're here to talk today about military, not so much history today, but military theory. The theory, the objective understanding of war, this is something, there is so much emotionalism and stupidity, even on the so-called right today. I just want to give one example, because I've been meaning to have show on the institution of marriage and why it has failed today, and on why so-called sexual relationships between men and women are so fraught with tension, which is something many, like, artists have discussed before.

But before my banning, when I start to talk about these problems and I say that in traditional societies men were given an incentive to be fathers and to take care of their family, many people attack me viciously, because they cannot withstand, let's say, idea that institutions need an objective, rational basis. To them it is about emotion, it is about their personal worth, and so forth. The reason I say this is because it's the same problem with the study of war. There's almost no objective or rational discussion possible of what war means, how to carry out war, and so forth. It's all based on emotional reaction by the leadership class who believe in moral homilies And what is bad, what is evil? We should care instead about peace and we should have peace studies.

We should not have war studies. So again, how absurd that would be if a doctor, let's say, would study the stomach. Say he hated the stomach. He does not want to study cancer or ailments of the stomach. He only wants to study. So you see, this is the kind of intellectual environment in which somebody like Clausewitz gets completely ignored, and, however, on the other hand, you have niche studies of military matters and also nearly autistic or mendacious tracts written by officers, by generals, people like Petraeus, who wrote a gigantic counterinsurgency manual. And the reason I call it mendacious, so I will shift to you in a moment, but maybe you can correct me on this if I'm wrong.

But apparently Petraeus wrote a gigantic counterinsurgency manual in which he tries to prove how a democracy like America, whatever you may want to call it, it calls itself a liberal democracy, but of course it's neither liberal nor a democracy, but how such a so-called democracy can win a counterinsurgency war with a very small troop presence, which of course is impossible reasons I think Soso will show just now. And, of course, others like McMaster and similar, they write military histories. It's very autistic things that do not base themselves on, again, a rational objective consideration of military history. It's sort of diverged into these two ways, where the establishment only does peace studies,

ignores war, considers Clausewitz outdated and so forth, and then a few military careerists who write abstruse tracts trying to justify their repeated mistakes. This was my long introduction to the second segment where we will discuss concepts of warfare. So, what do you think about this? Well, it's interesting that you bring up Petraeus. He wrote this field manual, FM 3-24, which was all about counterinsurgency. All the parts of it were essentially lifted, or rather misunderstood, straight out of Galula and his book, Counterinsurgency, Theory and Practice. He tried to apply a lot of things that he took out of Galula to Iraq and other generals applied to Afghanistan. He fundamentally misunderstood a lot of the points that Galula rose, and we can speak

a lot more on that when we get to him. But before speaking on Galula, you sort of have to understand his ideology when it comes to warfare and his own philosophical understanding. He was a big social contract theorist, and he had these ideas regarding democracy and popular empowerment that applied to the circumstances that he found himself in in wars. But when you translate that to totally different parts of the world with totally different social structures, you have to adapt to those things, which was not done in Afghanistan or Iraq. Yes. Yes. Well, let's get to Galula in a bit. First, let's go back to Clausewitz. You were going to talk about his theory of warfare, his concept, the trinity of the centers of gravity of war and so forth.

And what means this phrase war is continuation of politics by other means? Yeah, now, Clausewitz spent his whole life dedicated to understanding warfare and trying to write a theory of warfare. And you can spend your own life trying to understand Clausewitz. But in the context of this discussion and these themes that we're discussing here, what really needs to be understood is his belief and his conception of war as politics, that Wars are fought for political goals and they are executed by the military, but fundamentally their purpose is purely political, the attempt to secure either a concession or to achieve a certain state of affairs within a political sphere. He dealt a lot with what we would call Westphalian states, you know, the modern state and their interactions in warfare.

But his theories, his concepts really apply to all forms of warfare, including the non-conventional or the irregular, there's many words to describe such things, but insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, that sort of thing. And a big part of that is that nature of politics and war, that there is not a single guerrilla movement or insurgency in the world or in history that wasn't fought without a basis of political ideology or a basis of a political goal to achieve with such things. Another important part of Clausewitz is his understanding of morale and willpower in warfare and the effects that it has when conducting it. When you look at the insurgencies in Afghanistan or Iraq or many other places, these are people

who are fundamentally very committed to their cause, have a strong belief in their righteousness and the validity in their own legitimacy, and likewise a doubt in the legitimacy of whatever regime they're opposing, which is why things like Afghanistan failed as rapidly as they did because the United States entered into that country, disposed the Taliban, and tried to create a government whole cloth out of nothing, which is absurd to think about. But a key aspect of counterinsurgency warfare or insurgencies in general is the population and the legitimacy of whatever, you know, both sides, both the government and the insurgencies. And I think that that really speaks to Clausewitz's understanding of centers of gravity.

Now centers of gravity in the context of military theory is whatever is the center point of a military's capability to fight. So whether it be its logistics, if it relies heavily upon such things, a good example would be Napoleon's foray into Russia as well as Nazi Germany's foray into Russia. As many forces as they arrayed on the borders and marched into that land, logistics was their center of gravity. They simply could not afford to maintain their forces so far away. And in other places, in other wars, you know, the center of gravity changes. It's not always the same thing. But routinely in counterinsurgency warfare, or just insurgencies in general, that center of gravity is the population. Yes, I think at some point, actually, a German army ran out of oil, no? It ran out of oil even.

It definitely ran out of oil. It had problems with not just producing oil and acquiring oil. This is why, you know, these famous push to the Caucasus to secure the oil fields there. But just getting the oil to the troops at the front was very difficult. Yes. Whereas with Russia, if Russia army run out of vodka, then it stop. This is all joke, you know. Yeah. That's, you could say of the Russian army and the Russian people in general that their center of gravity hinges on the potato liquor. Yes. Yes. But so I interrupted you. You were talking about the people as the center of gravity. What is the center of gravity, if you can explain for the audience? Well, as I mentioned, you know, center of gravity is the core of either a nation state

or a, you know, non-government actors or groups like an insurgency or guerrilla force. you know, these paramilitary groups, rather, their core essence and their ability to wage war. And if you can defeat that, Clausewitz's ideas when it comes to planning strategy and focuses of operations, what we would call operational warfare today, is targeting these centers of gravity of the enemy. You have to, if you can destroy that, annihilate it, or in some way hamper it, you weaken the the enemy's ability to wage war in all cases. So centers of gravity are very important to understand in any conflict and to analyze exactly what a nation's center of gravity is. A good example of the United States' center of gravity since the Second World War has been popular support.

If you look at Iraq and Afghanistan or Vietnam or other such conflicts, the war was able to continue essentially indefinitely until popular support ran out. And this is likewise for the populations on the ground in these far-off regions from America. The guerrillas that fought in these areas relied upon the populations to supply themselves, to shelter themselves, and to hide. And targeting these centers of gravity in the case of counterinsurgency warfare, the population, is of utmost importance. And you can't properly do that as an expeditionary force going into a foreign land, disposing the government, raining havoc, you know, with bombs and casualties and collateral damage, and then say, oh, no, this is the real legitimate government that I wrote on a bar napkin in five minutes. Yes.

Yes. No, this could you-by the way, I was thinking, since war a continuation of politics, by other Could there be a case where you could achieve your political end by losing a war rather than winning? And there is a funny movie—I don't know if you know this movie, The Mouse That Roared, I think is the name—where the leaders of this very small country, they want to provoke America to war with the intention of losing it, so that then America would introduce to them a Reconstruction aid package. But the funny part of the movie is that then they win the war instead and they don't know what to do. What do you do if you win the war again, you know? And I think, aside from the humor of this movie, this in some way is America's problem

in these last few conflicts when it gets into the country, it wins, apparently, the war, but then doesn't know what to do with the victory. It's almost as if victory was never their intention. It was never planned. And so then it gets frittered away in a generation-long some kind of police action and so forth. Well, that was just my aside. I don't know what you think of that. But yes, would you care, before we move on to Galula, to discuss the concept of war some more in Clausewitz? D. LASCARIS Well, actually what you mentioned is very applicable for an important concept of Clausewitz's, this idea of the trinity of warfare. He had this idea that there's this sort of paradoxical tension between these three concepts when it comes to properly waging a war.

Those would be the nature of reason, skill, and passions. Also conceptualized is the government, which would occupy the place of reason, which is ironic if you look at today, like anyone could make that claim. But it would occupy the space of reason, and it would occupy the goals. What is the point of this war? What are we trying to achieve? And this is balanced by the military and skill in the Trinity. The ability to wage this war, what can actually be achieved by military ends? What can be done? When it comes to the tension between these two, this government's political goal of securing a territory and then establishing a government, those are things that only the military can do halfway. They can secure an area pretty well, but when it comes to creating a government out of whole

cloth, you're really asking too much out of the military, as we've seen in Afghanistan in the collapse of the so-called Afghan government. And likewise, the people, which would be the passion in Klossowitz's Trinity. He had this idea that, you know, without the tempering of skill and reason, the passions of the people would demand total annihilation of the enemy. You know, they would have a rabid bloodlust. They are inspired, if properly inspired, to conduct war and, you know, absolute violence. Yes, the people is a woman. Yes, absolutely. She's very fickle and she's very scorned, as it were. And that her wrath when, you know, affronted in any sort of a tragedy, as you saw in 9-11. You know, if anyone alive listening to this can remember, the American population after

9-11 was very, very angry. And they demanded blood. And they didn't really care whose blood, as long as it wore a turban and praised Allah. They didn't care that the actual hijackers were Saudis. They just, to them, the conception was, you know, Arabs did this to us, Muslims did this to us. In fact, it was the Grays. It was the Grays. And Haqan showed me this picture of Trump after he talked to Obama. He had this look on his face. They are all informed—so, this is true—all the American presidents are informed, as soon as they come into office, that the Grays did 9-11 with nuclear weapons. Yeah, this is what they're told. Loki delves into this in quite some detail in regards to the nuclear theory of 9-11. And I think there's quite a bit of validity to that theory.

But the Grays must be understood in the context of the Mantis aliens, who are the true enemy. Yes. Well, since we're on this lighter side, I should mention Hakan also sent me TikTok video with Kat at laptop. And this, I think, is evidence that Kat are smarter than people think and they wish to post. They want to post. I've seen cats at laptop many times. You never know online if you're speaking to a cat or not. I sort of make it clear from the beginning, I don't want there to be any mysteries. You're dealing with a superior feline being, but the cats are the true masters of humanity. It's gone back to the ancient Egyptian times. I believe in the cat, but look, the audience might get angry when we go on light aside. So let's go back to Clausewitz.

So you have reason, skill, and passion corresponding to government, military, and people. This is the trinity of, you would say, how warfare can be understood and who carries it out. Yes? Yes. It also has to do with the implementation of strategy. You know, strategy, as Clausewitz understood it, is using specific battles to win the war. And strategy is dependent upon whatever the political goals, the policy put forth for the purpose of this war. And to properly conduct a war, these three things must be in some sort of unison. You can't have a goal of the government that is unachievable by the military. And likewise, if the people have no want for this goal, they're not going to support it, and, you know, military will suffer for it.

Before I interrupt you, you were saying this, the people on 9-11, they wanted blood in response to that. And the government, the so-called reason part, which should really be termed crippled reason in the case of the United States, they did not give them blood and they did not give the military skills something that they could do. They instead had this idea that we will build a feminist Switzerland somewhere in the Hindu Kush or something like this. Yes, absolutely. There was a disconnect between what the government wanted to do and what the people wanted to do, and likewise what the government wanted to do and what the military could actually do. And this is a breakdown of Clausewitz's Trinity. Yes, yes.

And not only what the people wanted to do, but what the people could want to do, if you want to take it. Because I'm thinking now, I used to see these articles, maybe I think you're younger than me, you don't remember, but after 9-11, I would see these ridiculous articles about how bourgeois liberal stolidity would win as a war on terror and how the American people should be passionate about setting up, let's say, some kind of—they didn't use the word feminist, but really they meant a longhouse human resources state in Iraq and all these areas, just some—you know, the same thing that exists in the West, this spirit-killing, boring, you know, it's essentially a war camp. You go to work, you come home, and led by the ideals of Reddit and so forth.

And there were these insistent articles, I think, in The Atlantic and elsewhere that this is the crusade of our time, to set up this kind of what I call longhouse state everywhere. But of course the American people, or any people, for that matter, they can't get hot for that kind of idea, you know, setting up, you know, General Miley setting up transgender education in Kabul, you know. Yeah, absolutely. And you see these sort of articles even today, this sort of try this this attempt by feckless journalists who have no real world experience and certainly no sort of geopolitical real politic political savviness that they're going to co-opt this will of the people to their own ends and they use smarmy language and these ideas of more freedoms and many other things.

And that's just simply not ever going to work. Yes. Yes. If you lecture people enough about rights and about the Constitution, and I'm not even talking about the shitlings now, but even the conservatives have this delusion that if they can hector the people enough about the nobility of the Constitution, the American American people will have a passion to wage war on behalf of that, and of course, I don't think that's ever been the case, but I don't know. Maybe you think that's unpatriotic of me, so I don't know. No, I think it's absolutely true. And, you know, it's this absurd idea that the American people are going to spend this amount of blood and treasure to bring feminist education to peasants in the mountains of Afghanistan is absurd.

You know, the last thing that the Americans wanted to do after 9-11 was provide, you know, health and housing to the Middle East. They wanted to provide death in the form of depleted uranium, which we did as well. So, so you don't understand that Taliban, they just want a dental plan. If they had a good dental plan, so they wouldn't want to do this. This is what the left tells us, right? This is what Marxist theory says. If they had full bellies and a dental plan, they would not want, they would not be hot for Allah and self-sacrifice. Oh, yeah, absolutely. You just have to provide the proper amount of bourgeois comfiness and these freedoms, like the freedom to watch your daughter turn herself into a whore, that'll win over Afghanistan.

I think that's a good segue into Galula and also David Petraeus and his infamous counterinsurgency field manual. The essence of proper counterinsurgency, right, of actually defeating, you know, these radical elements that seek to dispose whatever government or expel any expeditionary force hinges on popular support and what actually the people want. And Galula goes into this in great depth in his book and his ideas. You know, it's all about popular support. It's not over territory control or seizing this valley or that valley or this city. It's about, you know, getting the public, the population on your side. And a big part of that, too, is that very rarely does the population in these areas care for one side or the other. They're generally neutral.

But they can be very, very quickly pushed to one side or the other based on the actions of both parties. And that's why you see things like in Afghanistan, this total collapse of the Afghani army, because Because when they came apart, you know, there was no popular support to sustain it, right? What are these people really fighting for? Corruption in the trillions of dollars, you know, to let their daughters walk through the streets on their way to their women's studies degrees? No, you're missing very important where I saw article where America tried to impose soy agriculture on Afghanistan. The Afghanis would not want it, but America spent, I think, tens of millions of dollars But that surveillance van is now gone. I'm happy to report. And in fact, it was not drawn. It was magpie.

You know, magpie is a smartest non-human animal. Magpie will play trick on you, opposed to llama, tell me this. But we are back to show. We were discussing David Galula, counterinsurgency theorist. And I would like to add that connection perhaps to Clausewitz, I say maybe on last show, I that Clausewitz's point about popular will and about how war is continuation of politic by other means will, in what he called absolute war, so let's say in theory an exterminationist war in which, as you say, the population's out for blood, they want the other side wiped out, and it becomes an existential struggle, that might be called absolute war. But as conflict moves away from absolute war, so think a gradient or something like this,

and let's say in a conflict where military becomes involved abroad as an expeditionary force and the population of the expeditionary or colonizing power, whatever you want to call it, as that population is not passionately involved, the political side of that equation starts to predominate. So war becomes a lot more political and a lot less, like, absolute or exterminationist of war. Now, this thinker, Galula, David Galula, he is French or rather Tunisian Sefard, the Jew, yes? And he had very popular, very influential theories of counterinsurgency based in part of this insight from Clausewitz. Or am I getting this wrong so-so? No, a large part of it was influenced by Clausewitz and also just his personal experience, you

know, he watched France fall in World War II as a young man and later joined the Army of Liberation when they returned to France and then later he observed in China the Chinese Civil War and the brutality that occurred in that war. Later after that he also was involved as an observer in the French Indochina War where where he watched the French get pushed out by the Vietnamese, and he sort of culminated his experiences in the French-Algerian war, where he led men into battle in Algeria against the Algerian insurgency, and to great success in his area. He used these experiences to formulate his theory on how counterinsurgency would be properly conducted and effectively conducted. Yes, yes. Go on. How please explain to audience the views of Galula on these ideas of popular will, popular

fickleness, and so forth. So Galula, when looking through the lens of his experiences, saw that, as I had mentioned prior, that popular support was the essence of counterinsurgency warfare. It was the center of gravity, as Clausewitz would describe it. Yes, controlling popular opinion and negating that for the enemy, for the insurgent. So it didn't matter so much about particular territory controlled, although that is a factor, just to deny areas to insurgents. But more importantly, it was the focus on getting the people on your side and giving your own side the legitimacy that the insurgents were trying to dismantle, which is the most important part of an insurgent movement in that phase of a guerrilla war. You have to destroy the regime's support among the people.

And you can do this in very many ways, things like terror attacks, even, where the claim that the government is going to protect you, that they can provide law and order in certain areas, falls apart when you have explosions in the street or targeted assassinations. And what's very important to understand about that is it's not a two-way street. What a regime or an expeditionary force or whoever is set out to destroy an insurgency can do and maintain its own legitimacy is not the same as what a guerrilla or insurgency movement can do. The insurgents have a lot more leeway in terms of what they're able to get away with. They can, quote-unquote, play dirty. And what's really good about Galula is he sort of lays out a step-by-step process and

what it takes to dismantle the legitimacy of guerrilla movements and shore up your own, things like, you know, establishing a government or maintaining whatever government you're trying to maintain, in his case, like, a colonial government in Algeria, and securing a friendly minority in Algeria, like the Péd noir, to get the— These are the French colonists. Yes, yes, the French colonists. But people don't know they had lived there for 150 years. You know, they had been there a very long time, and they were all ethnically cleansed at the end of this conflict. Anyway, I just wanted to remind people about this. No, it's very good to mention because it kind of gets to his point, you know. A million and a half people ethnically cleansed from Algeria.

It's a great tragedy that such a thing occurred, particularly when you see the level of civilization that was brought to Algeria through these French colonialists that didn't quite exist after, certainly not in any sort of productive way. When you look at what Galula's views on how do you establish government legitimacy, you have to have that support of at least a friendly minority, in this case a million and a half people, the French colonialists, who you can't just walk into any country in the world and demand that the population, you know, you can't coerce them into believing in whatever regime you try to establish there like we did in Afghanistan. You have to build out of the population this legitimacy and this support.

You can't just demand it or coerce it or create it out of whole cloth. And a lot of what was done in Iraq and Afghanistan out of, you know, David Petraeus's famous field manual counter-insurgency FM 3-24 took parts of what Galula said, particularly tactical parts. Galula had this idea of a three-part war or a three-block war it was described in Iraq, where on one end, one block, you're fighting the insurgents in kinetic warfare, gun battles in the street. So the block behind it, you're sort of repairing whatever damage was caused by the previous advance of the troops. And on the block behind that, you're returning to a sort of legitimacy, where you're removing martial law and patrols in the streets and establishing civilian governance.

To an extent, this worked in Iraq, because Iraq had a traditionally, you could even say, Westphalian state, the remnants of Saddam's regime. They had a level of civilization that didn't exist in Afghanistan and couldn't be done in Afghanistan. And these things, you know, that Petraeus took out of Galula's book, they worked on the tactical level, but he fundamentally missed the point of having some sort of popular support to begin with, or at least a friendly minority. Likewise, to speak on our next thinker, Mao talks a lot about the power of the people and the importance of political support among guerrillas. This is the tension between the governments and the insurgencies, or the expeditionary force and the insurgencies.

It's a battle over the mines, the infamous phrase, hearts and minds, which is a lot harder to win than many people believe. It's certainly not something won by providing Starbucks and Western education, whatever that is. I think when it comes to understanding counterinsurgency warfare, you have to look at Mao. And I don't think many listeners to the show would need a long biographic history of who Mao was, but just to give a little bit of reference points, you know, he fought the Japanese occupiers during World War II in China, and then later against the Kuomintang nationalist governments that he eventually defeated and exiled to Taiwan. The war that he waged was fundamentally guerrilla, and the difference between a guerrilla and

and insurgent is sort of nuanced, really only of interest to pedantic theorists such as myself, but fundamentally a guerrilla is a military force, a paramilitary force that exists outside of controlled territory of a government that sort of operates almost as a regular force, uniformed even in some cases, but in the mountains, in the woods, in the hard-to-reach places, and relies on hit-and-run tactics. Whereas an insurgency hides among the population a lot more than a guerrilla movement does. An insurgency hides inside of the control of government territory and chips away at that legitimacy of the government and the security that they claim to provide. Mao as a guerrilla had this concept of exponential gains where from the mountains they moved

into larger regions and they took small villages. the small villages, they could build their support among the population, gain more members to recruit to their forces, provide more material or logistical services through these populations, and expand that to larger cities until eventually you've taken control of the whole country. Many guerrilla movements, many insurgencies have tried to model this in their efforts to greater or lesser success. I think looking at Afghanistan and the Taliban and what they were able to do in 11 days or however long it was is a perfect example of this. They went from hiding in the caves of Pakistan to controlling Kabul, and it was all built upon one another. It was not something that was just done overnight.

It was done through whether it be people that they had paid off or people that they had influenced or coerced both in the Afghan government, Afghan police, and Afghan national army. Yes. Let me interrupt you for a second and go back to this idea from Galula about you need to have some kind of support in a country. In, I believe, the English in Malaysia insurgencies, they were fighting the Chinese, if I'm not wrong. And always the English tried to cultivate some local populations who were loyal to them and to provide them with genuine inducements. And I don't mean just money, but, you know, because Petraeus offered, I think, money to the Anbar Sunnis, and that money is always temporary. And aside from money, the only thing America offered to populations it colonizes, whatever

word you want to use, but in these countries is some kind of hectoring. America never provides a genuine long-term, some kind of promise of an advantage that the local population wants. So in the case of Iraq, the Sunnis were deposed because Saddam was essentially Sunni supremacy over Iraq as a nation. But then who are America's friendly population center in Iraq? was certainly not the Sunnis. They formed the basis of ISIS, if I'm not wrong. All of Saddam's ex-fighters went and joined the jihadi groups, and Saddam Fedayeen became ISIS. Again, correct me if I'm wrong on this. So it was not the Sunnis, even though if you could pay some, it was not the Shiites, who were apparently the majority in the new country, because the Shiites are friendly to Iran.

So essentially, as many people said before America invaded Iraq, it was America was serving Iran's long-term strategy in the Middle East. And the Shiite majority of Iraq essentially said to America, well, thank you very much for deposing Saddam, now we are with Iran. As in, the Kurds also, for various reasons, did not respect America. So who is America's friendly population in Iraq? Who is it in Afghanistan? It did not make friends with any of the ethnic groups. I say on last show it used to have the Tajiks on its side with the Northern Alliance in the beginning, but it stabbed them in the back by saying, America said, oh, we're now with the Pashtuns, but the Pashtuns said, no, thank you very much, you know, we'll take your money, but we're not with you.

So I don't know, in terms of the Galula idea of you need some kind of friendly population center. America, even since Vietnam, however many decades back you go, you know, whatever colonial conflict it gets in, it never tries to cultivate an already existing power base, or am I wrong on that? No, I mean, that's pretty accurate to describe America's attempts at these sort of wars. There's a real misunderstanding, and essentially it comes down to this cultural narcissism. Yes, sorry to interrupt. Its strategy always seems to be, well, no, we want nothing on the menu. We like nothing on the menu in this country. Everything is backward. We're going to find a new thing. We're going to put a new thing on the menu, and everyone will want it, because we're America

and we'll say it's good and the values and liberal values and this. Am I wrong? I don't know. No, no, that's absolutely true, and that's what I was getting at. This idea that the way of life that Americans live, even this idealized way of life that Americans live, such as free elections, which we both know don't exist, certainly not anymore, that if we just provide all these, quote-unquote, freedoms and these rights and Burger King on each corner and education that teaches nothing of any practical use, the populations will just swarm in adoration of these expeditionary governments, bringing the lights of democracy to their dark corners of the earth. Obviously, that's false, and in every case that's been tried it's failed.

There's no attempt to actually understand the will of the people and the places that they go and build off of that. Yes. Yes. Well, let's go back to Maoist war for a moment. You were pointing out that for Mao, what is the purpose of guerrilla war? It's not the whole thing. It's part, again, it's part of a political struggle. Yes. The key part of Mao's understanding of guerrilla warfare is that it's just a phase to be fought. It's not, you know, the ends of everything or the essence of the whole conflict. It begins with political dissidents. In Mao's case, ideologically, you know, communism or Chinese communism, whatever you want to call it, and that evolves through popular support into guerrilla warfare, where people

take up arms, flee to the countryside, and resist whatever government they intend to resist, whether it be Japanese occupiers, or later the Kuomintang nationalist government. And then from there, once enough power is secured through guerrilla warfare by taking territory away from the government, by securing the population to your belief and support, can start to form more regular armies and culminate it into a conventional war, which is what we saw at the very end of the Chinese Civil War and later in Korea and other places. It's this idea of as a transitionary phase of the People's War, the Revolutionary War. It's merely a step along the way. Yes. How would you relate this to what happened in Afghanistan?

Well, in essence, what you saw in Afghanistan is the guerrilla warfare extending for a large amount of time just due to American presence. You know, obviously when the Americans left, the government fell apart, and the only thing that kept it together was American presence and American money, American bribes and American air support. And what Mao would say on such things is that that's important to remember, that the will and the morale and the belief and the righteousness of the cause, in this case, the Taliban's faith-based morale, you know, this idea of the certainty of their beliefs in Allah and in other things, gave them the ability to resist and form and wage a guerrilla war for 20 years. And now that they've succeeded at that stage, it's a question of how they transform themselves

into a ruling government, which we will see. But that's the essence of Mao's opinion in regards to waging guerrilla war, and it speaks to the ideas of Golula and as well as Klossowitz in terms of morale and willpower and the legitimacy of both sides. You know, whoever has the legitimacy, whoever has the popular support will win in the end. And that's what we saw. Yes. How stupid are America security for an establishment when they look at what's happening now in South America with something called the Forum of São Paulo. I don't know if this interests you. I forget which show I talk this—it might have been number 11, but I don't remember. I talk this problem of the São Paulo Forum in South America, where, for example, the

leader of Argentina now, the so-called socialist who was elected, Alberto Fernández, I think His name is—look, he has the face of a rat, the physiognomy of a rat. But he's part of this pan-South American organization called the Forum of Paulo. And they are relatively open in promoting a Maoist vision of political struggle, in which they see guerrilla warfare as, again, only part of the story, and they are building up to that, but they're very clearly declaring, again, half openly, you know, we are doing this political mobilization in Chile and in Argentina, and they're obviously supported by Venezuela and so forth, but they're saying we are doing this with the purpose of starting eventually guerrilla warfare to take over these countries and completely, they say,

uncouple them from United States, although it seems to be United States has very little influence in that area right now at all. But how stupid are people in American foreign policy establishment? They do not study Mao, I guess, or they are friendly to this. Maybe they want it to happen. I don't know if you have any thoughts on that, because these people are saying what you're saying. They are, you know, but they're saying we're going to carry it out, we're going to carry out Maoist political struggle in South America. Well, it's interesting, because it sort of speaks back to, all the way back to Clausewitz at the beginning of the show, this idea that war is the continuation of politics by other means. The inverse is also true, or the reverse, I should say, is that politics is war.

And wars begin not with the first round shock, but in the political agitation that begins the separation of either idealists or the population in general or whoever it may be into camps, one side or the other. And wars begin based on this, and it reaches a point of violence of actual—the conduct of military action long after this point. But the war had begun before it. And that's a key part of, like, Mao's understanding of war and his attempt to seize China and other thinkers and other revolutionaries, is that you begin with the agitation, the political agitation or the political separation, this distinction between us versus them or our politics versus their politics, etc. Yes. Well, Soso, I think we are now reaching a 20-minute mark. I think we must take another break.

I think our audience would like to have a smoke or this. Let's say we come back for another segment. I had some thoughts on how American regime misunderstanding of some of these things we talk about how they applied even at home, very good, we will come back. So I was reminded while you talk about Polish case in World War II, which, as everyone knows, German in Eastern Front were extremely brutal to destroy partisan base of support whenever somebody took a shot at German soldiers. They would come in, they would do, they would wipe out the whole village sometimes. Sometimes they would do something called selection, where they would take the men, they'd separate the men from the women, and they would see if the men were, you know, and they would kill the men, and so forth.

And many people say, including Lutvak, who I mentioned earlier on show when I posted his clip about this on my old account, but he said they basically had pacified all resistance on the Eastern Front. Mostly they were able to send German troops on Polish railways with Polish railway men controlling the trains, and there was no resistance, because if there had been any, they would just respond with massacre. And this partly is also why in ancient world there was no insurgency warfare, because, you know, the Greeks, certainly the Romans, if you did that too much against them, they would just come in and kill everyone, and that sends a message very fast. On the other hand, I was reminded of a Polish case, because in Poland there was eventually

a very strong resistance, and why was there resistance? Because the Germans did not wipe out eventually, of course, all of the Poles, and nor did they apply this brutality smartly but randomly, and it became so frequent and so random that But then the other side say, well, it doesn't matter, we could get killed anyway, so we're going to start resisting. And similar to I'm going to get attack, of course, for saying this, but I remember during so-called second intifada in Israel in the 2000s, I think 2002, 2010, the Palestinian And terror attacks were so frequent in Israel that even the left-wing Israelis who had favored somewhat the Palestinian cause or some kind of rapprochement with them, but even I had

met leftist Israelis who had adopted completely nihilistic attitude and were telling me that people at cafes were just blasé about, oh, there's another bombing, we hear it. It was just daily and it was random. And this is actually what led to Netanyahu holding on to power for so long, because it completely discredited any faction that would have wanted the negotiation with the Palestinians and so forth. So there is a case where brutality or where it's all, let's say, all stick and no carrot does not achieve what you want unless you're actually able to exterminate the other side, which is very rare in warfare, certainly modern warfare is very rare. And so why I say this, because I see something like this happening in America case. I know you will talk about America on this segment.

And I'm not crazy. I know that American regime is not killing Americans in ways that Germans killed Poles in World War II. People forget this, but there are millions of Poles, and, I mean, Polish civilians, were killed by the Germans in capricious and cruel ways in World War II. To the extent that Eamonn Girth, not the ruler, but the guy who managed Auschwitz and antagonist of Schindler List, he's played by Ralph Fiennes in that movie, Fiennes being a Norman name, by the way. The village Fiennes, I think, is where the castle is in Normandy. I get off track, you see, so I get on too many tangents. Eamonn Girth was especially repentant at his trial, assuming, let's say, it was not coerced, but he was repentant over his treatment of Poles.

Now, if I had Thomas 7-7 on show, he would point out that if you point—if you're a historian today and you put too much emphasis on the suffering of the Polish people in World War II and point out that millions of them also were killed, that it gets classified in today's discourse in America as Holocaust denial is completely insane, so that this historian, I think Evans, unless I'm confusing him with somebody else, but a mainstream historian, because he was too much interested in how many Polish people got killed in World War II, he gets called Holocaust denier by completely crazy people. You know, you're not allowed to point this out, or that 20 million Russians died in World War II. Anyway, this aside, I see something similar to what American regime is doing in the United

States in how it treats the Americaner, the core, let's say, working, taxpaying population that also founded and built the country, is that not that it's killing it, but it's presenting it with all stick and no carrot. There are absolutely no credible inducements given to the Americaner as a population, yes, the individual who betrays the Americaner, who wants to join or aspires to join the so-called occupational elite, as I call them, there are certain inducements. But there aren't enough of those positions available. And to basically its core population that pays most of the taxes, fights its wars, maintains the country, the regime offers absolutely no credible inducement. And it made this same mistake as I see it abroad.

Yes, it offered some money to the Sunnis in Anbar, and maybe it bought off some Pashtuns. But the money doesn't work. America spent enormous amounts of money in Vietnam to support Diem regime, and that was to no effect. Money support is temporary. It offered no inducements. It had, as you say in previous segment, no local allies. What does local ally mean? It means you choose somebody. Let's say in the case of Afghanistan you choose the Hazara or the Tajik, or if you will have the Pashtun, although it's not good to choose the majority or plurality population when you are a colonial power. That's another story. But you would choose somebody like that and give them permanent inducements, status, power, stability, etc.

America did not do this in any of these cases and makes the same mistake, as I say, at home. It gives inducement only to extremeónow, it's not even minorities. It's minorities that it invents, like the transsexuals, who areóyou could say, well, the Jews are 2 to 3 percent of population, where transsexuals are 0.002 percent or something like this. It's that. So it always makes, I think, this same mistake, which I don't know if you agree with this, but I see it as coming not just from wickedness or maliciousness of ruling class, but from their political stupidity. And political stupidity or blindness to political reality is somehow taught, it's somehow inculcated into the American from very early on in his education. I will give you one example. It's a silly example, but very telling.

I was in some classroom. I was very—I don't remember if this was high school or so-called college. But teacher was reading passage from Tacitus, different passages, from ancient Roman historian Tacitus. And there was a particular passage where the Roman emperor is being paid obeisance to by foreign kings. So there is a procession of foreign kings and tribal chieftains. They are coming to Rome, and they are presenting gifts, and they're paying obeisance and honor to the Roman emperor. And he presented this passage, and I think four or five others, and he asked the question, which of these do you think best show the Roman supremacy or Roman political power or something like this? And basically everyone but me got this wrong, as they all chose other things I don't remember.

But they could not understand the power of that image, because they had been taught that political means something else than it does. So for the American regime, for example, winning hearts and minds, which as such could be a good concept, it means being nice. It means, as you say before, giving money, making Burger King, preaching to people about your values, preaching to people liberal democracy as is. But there is somehow inability from early on in American education to understand just this image I say now, the primal political reality, oh, there are chieftains and kings of other nations who are there to give you honor and obeisance, and that is the most powerful image. know maybe now some friends would, frogs think differently. But the normie Americaner just does not understand that.

He thinks in completely unpolitical terms, oh, if I offer, if I'm nice to people, if I offer this and that, I will be winning hearts and minds. Well, that is not what winning hearts and minds is. If I may go on extra, extra tangent, I think here, Trump made similar mistake, because he thought being nice to deep state, giving them positions, making compromise, showing them that he cared about the country, to run it well, to make it rich, that they would like him in the end. And, of course, that didn't happen, because people don't respond in primal way to that. That is not inducement. Inducement is different. Anyway, this was my long way of beginning our final segment, I think, on this show, with which you are going to talk about this problem of will in insurgency warfare and

also political struggle, and also to see how maybe some of the things we talk about apply to America today. What do you think what this or what I just said? Well, I think the point that you make about American ignorance in politics, the sort of inability to understand what's happening around them in a political way, is very important. As we mentioned earlier, you know, politics and war are the same animal. They're not separate things that can be clearly distinguished between one another. Wars begin long before violence occurs, and politics is the means in which these goals are achieved, this will is achieved, whether it be by certain individuals in a regime or the will of the people. And when you look at America today, you can clearly see so much is done as, frankly, malicious,

you know, political intent against the Americaner. Laws are passed to disenfranchise them. They are forced to tow so many ridiculous party lines in terms of what they can say and what they cannot say, lest they lose their jobs, their livelihoods, their personhood even. And it's gotten to the point where such things, like basic fundamental American rights, as would be conceived throughout our history up until this point, are nonexistent. Any sort of resistance to the regime or disagreement with the regime is met with very callous and not quite violent, although violence does occur in some cases, oppression. Yes. Also, I don't mean to interrupt you. I will be making some noise, because they try to cut off my internet.

Just as you're saying this, they try toóso I have to make a procedure here. But youóI listen to you, yes, and audience listen. Please don't mind the noise I make. Yes. And as I was saying, you know, it's very important when it comes to counterinsurgency or anything of that nature, questions of legitimacy, questions of, you know, willpower, questions of regime loyalty or loyalty in general. And when you lack legitimacy and loyalty to your regime, you're sort of left in the dark and what you can do and what you can't do. I recently read a very good article, I think you posted it, from Finlay, author of Breakfast with the Dirt Club, and he said in the article, and I might be paraphrasing here, but essentially, the occupational regime no longer has the ability to inspire or convince.

It can only coerce, and that's what we see here in America today. You cannot really have anyone, even, you know, Biden supporters, look at the government and the way it's operating and the way it handles things and think, yes, this is good. This is the alternative I want. This is how things should be done. But the people in power, they are very, very committed to retaining that power. And they're using political warfare to keep it. You saw this with the election and the various ways it was rigged, whether you think it was was outright rigged with number of balance or just psychologically or propagandically rigged with the way things were documented or people were censored, that sort of thing, to the point of censoring the city president himself.

So what Americans and what frogs need to understand is that we are in a state of war. That it hasn't reached terminal violence yet is sort of inconsequential. You must operate and understand these things. This is why things like OPSEC and various other matters are very important. And in the course of surviving and waging this, you have to understand the concepts of insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and the importance of politics and the population in regards to the center of gravity. It's the question of legitimacy, right? It's the essence of propaganda warfare. You have to... The most effective thing that a frog can do right now is laugh in the face of these different mandates of these, you know, scholarics in charge of us who can barely keep two sentences together. Yes. Yes.

It is interesting something you told me before about how this become almost political struggle, because whatever the Wignat or, as I call them, they're called white nationalists, but I call them Uyghur nationalists and their fantasies of extermination and so forth, nobody's exterminating anybody, okay? It's hundreds of millions of people. Nobody is going to wipe out the white race in America or whatever people are saying. Even the recent census report is overblown, because it has mostly to do with people not identifying as white on the census or lying about it and so forth. And since it is a political struggle, it is all about will. Is this not what you're saying? It is all about whether people have the will to persevere in this fight, whether abroad

in a conflict or in a United States or the West right now, where it is—again, it's not violent conflict, it's entirely political, but it's always—it's a matter of will, as you say. Yes, absolutely. It's very important, particularly for frogs, to rebuke the so-called black pill, because As we saw in Afghanistan, we are currently being led by very incompetent people. I say led, but really ruled over by an occupational regime that has no knowledge of how things should be run. They cannot keep things orderly and they cannot provide the basic functions of a state. In this way that will is important, it must be understood that their popular support, of which there really is none, is very fragile and very fickle.

They do not have a real sizable minority of the population that is 100 percent dedicated to their, you know, continued, you know, establishment. What a lot of people... They have the transsexuals. They're very dangerous, you know. Oh, they are very dangerous. I won't mistake that. The Bergen-Belsen's of the future will be staffed by them, as I think you've said before. But in terms of numbers and in terms of general capability, I'm not so concerned, but dangerous, absolutely. Yes. Yes. I was thinking, sorry to interrupt, but something came to mind while we were talking about these things, you know, in terms of, for example, terrorism in the modern world, OK? And now, because I go on this, very malicious people will accuse me, but it's simply an observation.

Loki has made it, too, is not my original insight. But what you say is meaning of terror attacks in the modern world in terms of some of these concepts we talk on this show, and so forth, because I understand when you say, for example, that terror attack in the enemy's territory is a way to show that their government are gay losers who cannot provide security, and so you lessen the legitimacy of that regime. I can understand that in a context like, say, Vietnam, where you have the South Vietnamese, which is a puppet government of the United States. It has no basis in local society. And the North Vietnamese are telling their proxies, essentially, well, do these terror attacks in their population centers, and he will show the Vietnamese people in the South

that government is gay, cannot protect them. But we are here, and we can. And so I can understand that in a context where there is a credible other, let's say, neighboring governments that can credibly take over very fast and provide security. But what could possibly be the meaning of mass casualty terror attacks in the West right now by jihadis? What is that supposed to accomplish? Because they must know human nature, they must understand. We attack on 9-11 or that type of attack or Bataclan in France, the French or American people are not going to say what is the one in Russia called, Beslan, and other similar attack in Russia. They must know that those attacks are not going to make the people say, oh, we hate

our government, we will change our policy, they will only inflame their passions more against you. So I don't understand this kind of mass terror attack in the modern world, especially when, strangely enough, it seems nobody important dies in these attacks. And when you compare to terrorist attacks of 100 years ago, they targeted important people. major politicians or this, or when you look at the way that Hezbollah attacks, Hezbollah generally does not attack civilians. They attack military targets. And similar with Iran or Shiite so-called terrorism, they attack—yes, they've attacked school buses, I think, once or twice in limited circumstances, but mostly they attack military target or they want to attack important people.

So, for example, Soleimani, is that the guy that Trump killed in—I think his name was Soleimani, right? Yeah, yeah, Soleimani. So Soleimani— Special Forces Iran commander. Yes. He was planning to attack something like Cafe Milano, or he had plans that were never acted upon to attack Cafe Milano in Washington, D.C., because that is where he thought that the American so-called elite hangs out. Now, again, it's not, you know, objective discussion of these things is forbidden. I'm not advocating that, but I'm saying that makes some sense from the Iranian point of view. But what kind of sense would it make to have mass terror attacks in these circumstances where it's not like North versus South Vietnam or it's not like Afghanistan, where you have

this neighboring already established power that can step in and provide security? Why would they do mass terror attacks in the West? This is what I don't understand. Do you have any thoughts on this? Well, there's a few ways to analyze those sorts of things. I think first and foremost, you sort of have to understand the purpose of terror attacks, which we had mentioned earlier, right, like the dissolution of government security or the illusion of government security. Essentially, these are all just different tactics to use in the waging of such warfare, and they can be properly applied and improperly applied. When you look at attacks, if we are to take these attacks at face value, they're quite often improperly applied except for perhaps the purpose of further entrenching Western

powers in the Middle East and these quagmires and getting them to commit more and more resources over here or over there and in a way sort of bleed these Western powers out by getting them to overcommit to these wars in the sandbox. Now, at the same time, also, you can't rule out the possibility that these terror attacks are led or influenced by other actors or other parties to establish their own political goals, which may not serve the purpose of either the regime or these jihadist groups. Like it's hard to really understand the motivations of these different attacks if you don't really know who is responsible. Yes. Yes, it's very strange. I don't fully understand this, except to point out that countries that do not have counterterrorism establishment tend not to have terrorist attacks.

And I know what you will say, oh, well, it's the other way around. The terrorist attacks take place first, and then you have a counterterrorism establishment. But how do the terrorist attacks take place, let's say, with regard to Muslims? Hungary and Japan do not have Muslim terror attacks, and that's not because they don't have Muslims. They have lone, you could say, lone wolf tourists. They have many tourists. But somehow the tourists and the temporary lone visitors there from Muslim countries do not commit terror attacks. What does that tell you? I don't know. This is perhaps topic for other show. But now this subject of will in warfare, people misunderstand this. They believe that will just means, you know, you go to the toilet when you are constipated or this.

Now will means persistence, and it means approaching the enemy from numerous sides. So ETA, the Basque organization, have a famous saying, bitan jaray, fight, keep up the fight on both, referring to both the political struggle and military struggle, and they never give up. Now, ETA is maybe not—maybe, as terror movements go, is not very successful or as separatist movements go, not very successful. But their attitude show they understand what you were talking about earlier, the Maoist continuity of political and military struggle, which is central to also understanding, I think, what's going on right now, South America, because Forum of Sao Paulo is doing this in numerous countries, and they are not very smart about doing it, but they're apparently

faced with stupider opponents in the CIA or anyone who could oppose them. But that being said, given the fact that within Western states there is no military struggle and it's all political, what other advice would you have, for example, for frogs or people who want some semblance of normal government and, let's say, return? I could even talk like a normie here and not do it ironically, some kind of return to constitutional norms and constitutional governments in Western countries, where, of course, there is no military struggle and there shouldn't be, but, for example, people should continue posting some is that, continue. When you talk about will, that means chipping away the legitimacy of the regime, which it still holds, unfortunately, with some of the population.

But isn't that part of what we're doing? Essentially, in part we're doing agitation propaganda in a humorous way to chip away at legitimacy, dignity, if you can call it that, of the ruling authorities. Yes, absolutely. The really important thing for, I think, frogs to understand in regards to will in the context of our own struggles and then struggles abroad is that, as mentioned prior in the show and then I think in the show before this, you're only defeated when you accept defeat. as long as you are willing to endure whatever your enemy throws at you, you can win eventually, and you will win eventually, if you can outlast their own will to continue their own waging of the war, whether it be violent or purely propaganda. And this is what people on the right or on the internet, us frogs,

must truly take to heart, is that as long as we maintain a belief that we can to either return to some sort of normalcy or true proper governance or that we can win this thing and take back control of the West, then we will. It's a matter of having the faith, having things like friendship and religion, whatever your personal faith may be, to sustain you in even the darkest times. But I do not think such times are set to last very long. A good example in current events is if you look at what's going on in Australia right now with their own lockdowns and this ridiculous, absurd, extensive martial law that they're trying to impose on the country, many Australians, and I sent power to the Aussies, my favorite people, they are not accepting this. They're rising up.

They're having demonstrations and protests. And even when many are arrested and thrown into prisons and jails and are treated very poorly by the government, does not seem to have dissuaded them. So I send power to that, and I think that's a good example for the rest of us, is that as long as you maintain the righteousness of your own cause, the faith in your own belief, and keep the morale of yourself and your friends alive, you can withstand these things, and that there's no amount of money or no amount of technology and no amount of, you know, military raw strength, even, that can suppress such things, as we've seen in Afghanistan in recent weeks? Yes. And, in fact, it should be emphasized what you said earlier, that there is no question of military strength.

In other words, I keep saying that, yes, perhaps there will be civil war in America in the next five to ten years. I think this is a real possibility because the left is foaming at the mouth for blood and so forth. So we will see what happens with that. But even if it comes to something like this, where the left goes completely crazy and they have antifa paramilitaries doing I don't know what, even then it will not be a question of extermination or absolute war, right? It will be a kind of another guerrilla war where the question of will will be the most important. But let's not get ahead of ourselves. Right now in the West it's not a military struggle, it's a passive-aggressive political struggle full of passive-aggressive, let's say, middle-aged women almost on both sides

running the show. And in this context I think there are two dangers. One is the black pillars you mentioned. These are pessimists or what are called in war demoralizers, actually, who are telling you the other side is one, you should give up. I mean, it's a really absurd thing to, you know, when the other side essentially suffered Trump for four years and then had to come up with this BLM, which I talk either on last show or the one before. It was, in terms of numbers, it was very limited and it was very hyped up by media to try to pretend that they have popular will on their side when they do not. But so one of our dangers is the demoralizers, the so-called black pillars, the people who say the shit libs have already won, the transsexual religious transformation is coming, you cannot

do anything, you should not fight. It is absurd, right? The things we do online, which is to ridicule ruling authorities, both with mockery and trolling, but also as increasingly I think we must shift to presenting science, presenting studies, presenting HPD, so-called findings, but just shaming them with studies, and not just scientific studies, but historical studies. The city bureaucrat is back, and he does a very good job at this. But these kinds of things we do online are, I think, very effective in delegitimizing regime and moving people, you know, more and more into our camp. On the other hand, it's not just the black pillars or the demoralizers who are the danger. It's also the extremely earnest and I would call them federales. But let's say they're not federales.

Let's not be cynical. Let's say they are genuine people. These include the white nationalist diehards, the so-called five percenters, the Richard Spencer types, that whole universe of face fag, white nationalists and so-called, and many associated, who instead of mocking the enemy regime and delegitimizing them, they are involved instead in the pretense that we are a united party front and they are presenting policy proposals. And of course this puts us, if we adopt that kind of strategy, it puts us on the defensive, because we are presenting a positive program that then can be attacked, it can be taken apart and mocked, and then the other side can go to the normie American, who is really the target here.

People forget the normie American is the target of this propaganda war of will that we are involved in. And so if you go around saying, I believe in us, no state, and if you fall outside these policy proposals, you are the enemy and I reject you, and it's called purity spiraling on our side, but it's much worse than that. It's essentially people turning themselves into caricatures and stuffed puppets that then say Sarah Silverman or a Jewish regime comedian can say, oh, you see, these are basically Probably World War II comedy Nazis and you as an Orbea American should beware of them, because not only are they dangerous, they're not even dangerous, they're ridiculous. And so these types of people are the Wignat ideologues who I just mentioned. It's not just Wignat.

It's also called radical feminists, white nationalists. You've seen these new idiots, right? So it's these types who attack people like me. attack people like Menaquinone and the frogs, because we engage too much in lighthearted satire, which, of course, is the really effective thing. What they do, if we adopted that, would turn us into, as I say, caricatures and so forth. What do you think about this, that these twin dangers, the black pillars or demoralizers on one hand, and then these other people who, let's say, let's take them at their word, that they're not federales, that they're genuine people, but they just misunderstand the situation we're in. Right now we're not in the position where we're building a government with policy proposals.

We're engaged in, let's say, agitation propaganda to delegitimize the ruling regime with mockery. What do you think about this? Yes. I mean, speaking primarily to the latter case, these Wignats, the problem is a lack of any real strategic, operational, or tactical understanding of the circumstances they find themselves in, or what should be done to improve those circumstances. Their goals are ridiculous to begin with, and they target things that have no importance to the politics of the United States. As you say, the American normie is the target. That's absolutely true, as we pointed out in earlier segments, right? The control of the population and the population's support of one cause or the other is the fundamental

key battleground that it's fought on, and whatever tactics are used from the most benign to the most extreme must always be used to serve the purpose of capturing that battleground and holding that territory of the minds and the support and the will of the American people. Anything that's done that loses that support, that makes the legitimacy of the regime, the occupational class more legitimate and makes yourself look ridiculous and loses that popular support is foolish. It's self-sabotage. That's to take them at the word. Now obviously that's being pretty generous because I think it's quite a common tactic for regimes to use extremists as a tool of solidifying their own power base. And if they're a part of that then they're the enemy And if they're not, they're useful idiots. Yes. Yes.

It's almost impossible to distinguish the retard from the enemy agent now, you know. So this—I'll give you one example, okay? I have this show where I attack the Irish, you know. Now, I attack everyone. I attack all peoples. It's good fun. I have, of course, many Irish friends. They like that show. They don't feel offended. But this mentally ill Wigner nationalist girl start to attack me, say, oh, I'm pitting Nordic European against Southern European, and I am pitting Irish against Anglo, and so I am a psychological operation to deprive, you know, the white nationalist front of its leadership of the resistance. It's something like this, you know, just absurd. And, right, think of the point of view of that type of person who can come to that.

Think of where they are in understanding the situation of the struggle right now, which is we should use humor and art if possible. I'm not calling myself an artist, but others can make art, they can make movies, they can make books or whatever. But we should use these tactics to make ourselves attractive and to mock the regime. And for these people it's this buffoonish thing where you put on a uniform, even if that uniform is the Republican suit and tie, and you go to conferences and you talk in public and you roleplay as if you're leading a powerful party or something like this. I just find this ridiculous also. It is ridiculous and it's a total ignorance. It's frankly just stupid. Yeah, they're idiots. It's a total misunderstanding of the circumstances and what needs to be done to win.

And it's why this show, I think, is very important, because you have to look at what's occurred in the past through the lens of the thinkers that we mentioned and their own theories, to use their theories as a tool to analyze history and different political movements and insurgency movements and their defeats and their successes. When you use these thinkers and you look at history through these lenses, you can then begin to understand what needs to be done in your own circumstances or in your own country, whether it be America or abroad. So these people, they're not very serious people. They might believe, you know, to take them at their value, what they believe, but they certainly have not spent any time to analyze their circumstances and what needs to be done

to further their goals, whatever they may be. Yes. So objective analysis of what you want and how to achieve it is illegal among hyperemotional responsive people like this. In some ways, also, you don't even need to study Clausewitz and these. Of course, you should. It deepens your understanding of things. But when you say the insights of a Clausewitz or some of the other thinkers we've talked about, when you say them openly, they sound, oh, they're obvious, it should have always been obvious. course, to many people is not obvious, and they are instead caught up in the kind of stupidity I've mentioned so far, where they have immediate emotional response, they cannot think two steps ahead. And it's part, I think, of the monetization of the right, which has unfortunately started

to take place since many of us have been banned, let's say, starting 2017, all of frog Twitter was banned. And the only people that are left are these activist types, the Spencer types, the idiots, the people who only have immediate emotional response and no two-steps-ahead strategy. Yeah, it's very curious to see, you know, who the regime targets through their intermediaries, like tech corporations, like Twitter and others, and who they don't. And I think it's very revealing that, you know, people who have that sort of strategic mindset, who are able to understand the circumstances and play to the advantages that we do have and use them effectively to secure whatever it may be. Classic example is 2016, Donald Trump's election.

There's many factors that went into his election, but you cannot deny the effectiveness that frogs had online in helping his campaign. And whatever could be said about Trump and his failings and his successes, it was a positive step forward in the way that can be obvious in the regime's reaction to him. They have never seen in my lifetime or probably in anyone's lifetime that's currently alive that sort of knee-jerk, spastic, almost rabid response that the regime itself and its loyalists had to Trump in his election, to the point of stealing the next one, in my opinion. So I think when you look at these overly emotional characters online and the sort of ridiculousness that they portray themselves as and their own ideas and strategies on how to move forward,

you can only really laugh at them and it all comes down to morale, right? Morale is more than just a belief in victory, it's also being able to keep a cool head and think strategically and endure setbacks. When things go south, you can't just spastically black pill and, you know, accept defeat and try and harm the morale of your comrades by doing such things. You must have a unity, a friendship that uplifts the morale of yourself and others and builds upon that. So it's—go ahead. No, I was going to say I agree with you that, you know, some kind of unity or loyalty among dissidents and putting longer-term goals, oh, you want a Catholic monarchy, well, how about we get, we mock Kamala and we mock the values of, so-called values of shit-liberty

first and of the uni-party regime first before you attack your friends because you want some kind of Catholic monarchy or you want an ethno-state or whatever. But, well, I think we're in agreement on this. But the primary purpose, I think, of online agitation should be directly or indirectly mockery of the regime, which can be achieved with trolling, but also, as I say, with just posting information they do not like, whether it's about Wuhan flu or studies about unpleasant human nature that they want to sweep under the rug and so forth. But it's also I've kept you a long time and I know that you must recharge in cybernetic pod that the old man of the mountain is built for you. Yes, absolutely. I mean, us cats, we can't stand to be awake for longer than a couple of hours.

A 20 hour sleep session is pretty necessary. Yes, I too must go to sleep. Yeah, I think this very good show, I'm very honored to be a part of it. And I hope the listeners enjoy it. No, you must come back and we will arrange. I think I was planning to have you on next time with a feast for Putin, who is going to send emissary and we're going to have vodka and Rolodets, you know, this aspic. You know what this is. It's an aspic snack with meat and aspic. Very good then also. Well, it was a pleasure to have you on the show and an honor. I hope you come again and we go now very good, we will win Soso, very good, we will win. We will win. Very good. Until next time, BAP out.