Welcome Caribbean Rism, this is episode 103 breaking news. My source in Volhynia at Club Katanga in Lvov, which Club Katanga is an African themed, leather themed adult night time entertainment bar center of Lvov. My sources inform me Zelensky and his government of entertainment industry figure, a long time patron of the back room of this club, I am informed by NATO contacts still in that city and that establishment. I'm informed that there are in fact no Russian troops in Ukraine at all. There is no Russian army or invasion of Ukraine. The Z, you see the Z on the vehicles, the flags, the Z on the tanks, it stands for Zelensky. He is invading his own country, Z for Zionist occupation government. This meaning of it is in plain sight, Z Zelensky.

He is invading his own country for funding, to give speech also to Congress and House of Commons, where he is very disrespectful, with mantis poking out of his shirt from his Hollywood set in Lvov. And he is making a play for international stardom, where he motivated out of jealousy of the starlet Lorde. I don't know. Lorde, I think, is singer of New Zealand. It's a very complicated emotional situation. Look, what can I tell you? These things do happen, you know. These things happen. Look at supposed AIDS rates in Africa for decades, but there are no actually death rates to match what would be expected from the enormous death, excuse me, the enormous AIDS rates, because the governments of Africa are redefining, for example, traditional African wasting diseases

and types of diarrhea and this caused by parasites of all kinds, and they're redefining them as aides because they know this is a viral, meaning Twitter, viral thing right now and for the last 20 years, and they know it 30 or 40 years actually, and they know it will get funding and attention. Can you blame them when you have Western officials like Fauci and other similar who are willing to send them money for all this time? But anyway, that is not for this show. So you know, I kid, I joke to you, bada-bing, you know, actually there is a Russian invasion, as you know, but Zelensky is, I have heard that you see these negotiations now between Israel, Russia and Ukraine, Israel mediating, and the director of Israel, Bennett Higo,

to run so-called negotiations, but I've heard from other source in that room that actually All of these negotiations are about the evacuation of Ukrainian Jews, of 400,000 Jews in the Ukraine that are actually being held hostage right now by so-called Zelensky government, something else that you're not told, Zelensky. He's not Jewish, by the way. I don't know if you look at his history and people talking about him even before this conflict, there is no evidence that Zelensky is Jewish, just so you know. He doesn't look, he looks like a typical Pontic, South Slav type. He may have, I will grant, one-eighth Jewish blood or something like this. Maybe that. It's a Sean King type situation. He knows, oh, the Jewish comedian is Seinfeld and he knows it will get sympathy from West.

But he's running out of rhetorical tricks to do. He just played his last rhetorical bullet trying to shame hysterical German MPs, member parliament Germany, that, oh, never say never again about Holocaust, and this is another Holocaust, you know, with the Schindler List musics, and this, he's run out of things. What will be next? I think next he will have to say, I now choose to live my life as a gay man. I think that is coming next in major speech. But there is a Russia invasion, as you know, and I don't want to talk that in detail on this show, but I want to mention where there are very few videos that come out of this conflict, which I find a little bit strange. There is GoPro footage of ambushes of Russian tanks, Russia equipment.

Lately, today actually is the first day that I saw a little bit of this, and actually it was mercenaries, foreign mercenaries. They had American accents, they got killed, you know, they were using for cover a civilian car and then ran into a civilian house. So this is how they ruled the Western mercs in Russia. But this is basically today is the first time I saw GoPro footage. Where is it? It was plentiful in Syria. So don't say, oh, people who are fighting don't have time for that. Many videos come out of Syria, but here nothing, even though they are very eager to advertise ghost of Kiev, and I will never say Kiev, by the way, for the same reason I will not use your special pronouns, okay, and yes, it's exactly the same thing, which I'll discuss

later on segment of this show, is exactly same thing, I will attack fake and gay idea of identity that unfortunately has been adopted by parts of the right who seem to think it's It's merely a synonym for nation or ethnicity, but it's a mistake to use it. Just call yourself nationalist or even racist if you want. I mean, I have the luxury of calling myself that because I am – it's not just because I'm a non-account. I like to be honest. But why you call yourself identitarian is a big mistake. I will come back to this to explain why. My objection to it may not be what you think. But anyway, they are so eager to show Ghost of Kiev other fantasy propaganda victories. By the way, this is number one family show, but today not family show. Maybe not have children listen to my show today.

It will bore them anyways. This very long show today, very personal show actually, because I want to discuss Dominique Venner and other members of the French New Right and what means their idea of identity and nationalism. But that's for later in the show. But now I want to complain about this ghost of Kiev. They try to make up all kinds of stories, so don't say they're not publishing videos for the sake of operational security because they're not being released even days later. I mean, imagine the value of them, and I don't mean just the Ukrainians but NATO and all the people supporting them, if they were actually showing plucky Ukrainian guerrillas destroying and humiliating big Russia tanks, but they're just showing them by abandoned tanks, abandoned convoys or trucks.

You don't know from where they are. Some of them have been proven to be from 2014, some of these images. But I think they're not showing GoPro videos of Ukrainian guerrilla successes because they're not really happening. I mean, you know, having a mulatta virago from Tampa running Turkish drones under the Ukrainian flag isn't quite as hot for optics, you know, as showing Ukrainian guerrillas. So they don't show, you know, you know, the ghost of Kiev, yeah. Also very famous, the ghost, the fist of Theodosia, you know, that's right, secret operative, the fist of Theodosia, a French volunteer for Ukrainian foreign legion, deep cover operative behind enemy lines, active in Crimea, in the bathhouses of Feodosia, sitting there, the

public bathrooms also of Simferopol and Sevastopol, taking just cock after cock down his throat behind urinals, there are dozens of loads in his elbow deep, his elbow deep and dozens of bathhouse regulars, sucking off just hundreds, full spectrum glory hole dominoes. This is the French foreign volunteer, American foreign volunteer plan for the Ukraine Foreign Legion, a new era of Michel Foucault-inspired biowarfare. I mean, anyway, as far as I can tell, the Ukrainian resistance is sporadic. It's based on drones, which I assume are flown by foreigners, because no matter how high the IQ you have, and I do not deny Ukrainians have high IQ, they are a European people, But so are the Russians, by the way. But it takes time to learn to fly a drone.

And the Turkish drones they have, I don't know who's flying them. But I think the Ukrainian army itself is pinned down in the east. And the Russian advance is slow, but it's not slower than, for example, the American advance of Baghdad during the last war there. So we will see. I still predict total Russia victory. But I don't want to talk day-to-day Russia war on this show. This is for next time. I invite guests on segment this weekend to talk about war, daily progress, and such thing, but this show is for something else, and it looked to me like a paroxysm of hysteria that continues for some reason from Wuhan Greed's crisis the last two years, and it made the so-called West take a suicidal turn. It's a society circling the drain with hysteria, and it made me think about history.

Is this actually how epochal societies end? Not through weakness that invites foreign conquest, because many societies can survive foreign plunder and even conquest for a while, but how do they actually end? Maybe it's not what we thought. Maybe it's women and spiritual females too. They take charge of a place, and it's not that they are weak, although they are that too. They're physically weak, but not realizing their weakness. start making extremely rash, reckless decisions based on emotion, self-destructive impulses. Because you look at these sanctions against Russia, they are taken with no plan, no regard for consequences. They are pushed just a little bit further. They would make the economy of Europe shut down.

For example, if Russia cut oil and gas, and if Russia cut airspace the way Europe and America did for Russia planes, it would make it next to impossible to fly between Europe and Asia. It wouldn't be economically feasible even with the previous prices of fuel. And if Europe's economy shut down, and I remember statistics from some time ago, this probably has changed recently with relative rise of China and India, Vietnam too you know a lot of outsourcing in Vietnam, but even very recently, as recently as 2008, 2009 and 2010, America had five times as much investment even in tiny Belgium than it did in huge India. And even if there's been a change now, you can see still America economy and West Europe economy are so integrated and they are a large portion of this world system now.

They are the world system. Everything else is just hanging on to them. And they are a shutdown of something like German industry, which would absolutely happen if Russian energy was cut now. But what do you think? And by the way, it's not just oil. Both Russia and Ukraine are major producers, not just of wheat and other big agricultural products, some of which feed Egypt and Africa. Egypt was, I think, the population 2 million a hundred years ago or so. In 1910, I think it was around 2 million and now it's around 80 million, if I'm not wrong. And they rely on foreign import for more than half their calories and other parts of Africa are the same or worse. But there's also wheat, there's fertilizer, and I'm sure you've seen people talk this.

And latest news I hear from Farmers Direct, where their prices for production have gone up so much that in some cases it makes no sense for them to continue producing. And there are such disruptions and shortages already that are given. So what can I say? Normally for the spoiled West, those types of disruptions would be self-canceling, I think. They would cause riots. But coincidentally, the populations of the free world have had a two-year training now in house arrest and privations and lines for toilet paper and their cities burning down. So coincidentally, right, I don't know. But it's not just these things. It's nickel, where they shut down the market for nickel because again forgive, I don't know, I'm not financial reporter or I don't want to give you this information, but I saw

that the nickel price rose so much on a London metal exchange that they shut this exchange down. Same way they shut down the GameStop thing if you remember that. But in this case, because Chinese companies were going to go under and this exchange London Commodities Exchange is owned by China, so they shut it down. so that their companies would survive. So you see whole rules-based international order rhetoric is when it suits them they just shut down markets illegally, they steal your bank account, they steal that country's foreign reserves and this and so on. And countries are watching and if they have any mind they will make plans, they will get out of this fake financial system that is being used as a weapon increasingly by United state abused as a weapon.

And it's not just nickel, of which Russia is a major producer, it's also a major producer, unusual rare earth metals and also processing of certain gases. And I'm not talking about Masha Gessen after late-night Vareniki and she's purging it in the bathroom of Veselka, Ukraine alcoholism restaurant at 4 a.m. Where is it, in Judork? Is it in Brooklyn or is it on Houston Street? I forget that restaurant 4 a.m. bathroom vomit after fingering. Look, I'm not talking about her cabbage emissions or max boots. I'm talking about Russia, certain gases are processed, I believe, for production of your phone and many other such things that make the Apple dick-pick app economy make it whirl. And what happens when all of that gets shut down? That also comes from Russia.

You know, maybe GDP is not a good measure of economy. GDP, if you have a GDP run by vendor-financed consumption, is not quite the same thing as producing two-thirds of world fertilizer and the nickel and the gas and other things and the wheat that require daily life to go on. People can live without tinder, believe it, but I know many on the right think this is a planned, controlled thing, some great plan, planned years ahead to shut down world economy and to make the great release that happened. But I doubt this. I think no one was prepared for this. I've seen numerous statements from various big financial firms. They say things like, it's like early COVID-19 crisis. No one knows what will happen next. You keep hearing that. It's reckless decisions based on emotion.

It's not thinking what happened when Russia produces two-thirds of ammonium nitrate of world or the nickel or, excuse me, they attack me, or anything else of the financial consequences. So you're left with UK media, British media publishing now that home insulation could offset the hit taken by Russian energy cuts. So it's just insane. You know, I have no doubt that they will try to repurpose this for you to say it's great that it's happening, we see everything, we intended it, can we have now less agricultural production for animal feed and move to a plant-based way of eating. So you know, some of you should make posters, wartime poster propaganda, eat bugs for Ukraine. Take it in the chin, comrade, eat locust mulch for Ukraine. We all have to make sacrifices.

All of us, of course, not Jidlinski or Jen Psaki, of course, for them, the lobster risotto must flow uninterrupted in a Podesta pizza party. So I take a quick break now, I come back because I wrote an article many of you may have seen this week. It got spread around quite a bit. I want to add one or two words to what I said there on Ukraine crisis. I will be right back. And as I record this, there is a big storm moving in, very high wind. I myself will hopefully not hear it. I have headphones when I record with music, I play kind of drone when I record show. So hopefully it will not startle me but if you hear high wind sound in the background do not worry. So I wrote this article trying to convince mainly European rightists who I consider my

friends if you remember I talked before that I first went on Twitter and so forth because of the French right and at the time in 2013 they were protesting against gay marriage But really that was a pretext to protest in general against the European Union and its plans for mass demographic transformation. And I've always felt very close to them. I don't know or care if they reciprocate, but I like them. And I was disappointed to see, not so much in France where there is a lot of pro-Russian sentiment among the right, I mean. But among other parts of European right, they become very anti-Russian now and in my view this is a mistake. They are playing fools for NATO and the EU who are their enemies. Why would you fight your enemy's fights for him?

But I wrote this article about why they should support Russia and not Ukraine or NATO or EU, America and this conflict. So actually, too many friends who are not plugged into debates online or to publications and opinions of the European New Right, they were very surprised this is the case at all. Some friends who saw the article wrote me to say, BAP, is this true? How can this be? Why would anyone on the right be for Ukraine? And please do not talk to me about defensive homeland. First of all, Ukraine is not your homeland any more than Russia is if you are not Ukrainian. And if you are, Léon de Grèle, Brassilac and Pierre Drew, Larochelle and many others of the French right were executed as collaborationists at the end of World War II. Léon de Grèle was Belgian, he escaped.

But I don't consider those men to be traitors, even quisling. Others who got smeared as traitors, collaborationists in World War II, I consider them true patriots, true lovers of their real homeland. And Ed West, he's a journalist from England, I think, he wrote recently an article on Unheard about something called oikophobia, which is his word for conservatives, he says, or those on the right, who side against their own governments. Of course, oikophobia means fear or hatred of your own home or homeland, but he talks about how people side with Russia and not with their own governments in this conflict. And no, Mr. West, I tell you, Mr. Ed West, if your government is oicophobic itself, if it hates you and your people, and if your own government seeks your people's end in

a global tenement of labor auction, because essentially that's what Western governments have turned Western countries into now, you know, they auction you like slaves on a global market of labor, and because you are too expensive because of inherited protections, both cultural and economic and political, and because of institutions in part like unions and so on – they don't really protect workers in the United States, but they do in Germany – but because of these things and because you refuse to breed like they think you should, as if that is their business, you refuse to breed like sewer rats to feed their lust for money and artificial economic growth based on population growth. So because of all these things they want to import fresh meat that will work for less,

for longer, that will take being abused as a slave. And that is what government of America is now, that's what governments of West Europe, their internationalism is the cosmopolitanism of open air slave market for cheap labor in Mombasa or Babylon. So no, Mr. West, if you support their aims in defeating their external enemies, that is oikophobia, Mr. West. But anyway, I wrote this article, I don't want to restate the whole argument in detail because it's quite clear what I say there, a simple point, but my main thing on which I disagree with the European right on this matter of Russia, Ukraine, I believe NATO and the EU, not Russia, is the greater and more immediate enemy of Europeans and Americans as well, by the way.

And second, I think people on the right are deluded, many of them, that they have sovereignty or that they own their nations. But your nations are owned. You do not own them and you are a slave. And until you face this fact, you will go from loss to loss. You will be, you know, this hyper-emotional female hissy fit against Russia right now is a case where your innate love of country, your love of honor and such things are easily being manipulated against yourselves, and I'm talking now to the European right, but I think also to many American conservatives, who in this Ukraine hysteria seem to have forgotten the last two years, if not the last decade. Your government abuses you, steals your election, but now you fall into line behind them. Why?

Because they beat war drum or foreign enemy attack. Which I also see in articles in the near future when all of Europe becomes a Bosnia or replicates even the political situation of the Congo for the last 20 years, you will need someone to help you in that situation, and who will that be? So this is my main argument in article I put, it got spread out quite a bit, and although I hate discursive writing, you know, where you go back and forth and bring up arguments, but I wrote this article in part this way because to try to counter certain things I I heard from European rightists, arguments, counterarguments, I consider them my friends, so I try to convince them in good faith to see that wolf is not even at the door, it's in your house, it's in your bed.

And you are trying to roleplay some fantasy from 1930s where you square off against the Bolshevist oriental hordes, or maybe from 1950s where you have to make an alliance of practical necessity with NATO and the United States. But the Bolsheviks are now your government, and Putin is not Bolshevik. He is actually the first leader to be able to free himself and his nation from their clutches. They had taken over Russia in the 1990s, thoroughly owned. I remind you, the Russians didn't even see any profit from their oil industry until well into the 2000s, I think 2006 or 2007. They had not seen any profit. All the profits from the oil industry were going abroad. You don't need to love everything about Putin, but that one thing is enough that he managed

to take his country back from literally this globalist gang that was just pillaging it dry. But it's not the Cold War anymore, and I just wanted to add another word here on the show about this and some related thing, because Cold War was a very unusual time. Both world history, where you had this intensely ideological revolutionary battle for world dominance, but it's highly intellectualized and ideological in some way, it was a religious struggle of sorts. There were indoctrination and deprogramming centers on both sides, deprogramming. So you could see, I don't remember where, but I read in Biography of Certain Cold Warriors, just casual mention, oh, such and such was running a deprogramming center in Vietnam,

you know, like a rehab for Marxoids to try to teach them and convince them why this was bad. side had the same thing. But that type of political struggle is very unusual in world history, and you almost cannot blame older, boomer, conservative intellectuals when they have this view of political lives that's highly based on propositions, like the propositional nation, because the Cold War really was a lot like that on both sides. But in that kind of struggle, the calculation of Russia-Ziz and Russia-that, it changes because it's really not about Russia anymore, it's Russia become a platform for the spread of this global revolution and Stalin was in Spain before World War II, his opposition to Trotsky notwithstanding, he was spreading Bolshevist revolution around the world and

colored third world global revolution had been an early doctrine of Lenin's and it got resurrected in force after Stalin by Khrushchev. Russia since 1990s, you know, it does not follow this course. It closed down its basis in the third world. It ended its funding of Cuba, for example, and many other places. It closed down. It's no longer this worldwide aggressive ideological force, whereas America has expanded its ideological struggle both in the third world and Europe. So by any analogy, no, Russia does not have expansionist ideological aims at the moment. The Russian Embassy in France or Spain or Uganda is not pushing some kind of novel life-changing ideological project. But the American Embassy is. And the second big change is just this, that actually Russia's behavior after 1917 is a

historical anomaly. Because before that, Russia was the reactionary and anti-revolutionary force in Europe. And although European nations were rightly wary of Russia as a, quote-unquote, you like this word geopolitical threat. But the thing about geopolitical threats is they're very different from something like Bolshevist ideological revolutionary threat. You know, and some thinkers were around in 19th century, they realized even non-ideologically the Russian Empire was important long-term threat, but the emphasis, as Nietzsche's words on this, are long-term, because Russia was known to do things slow. And that is one of the main points in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, where he discussed Russia and elsewhere, that Russia acts like it is all the time on his side, as opposed to the

European chattering states with their parliamentary democracies and newspapers which act on day-to-day. Russia's process of expansion, its strategic vision is slow, measured in centuries. So it's a slow threat. And he was hoping that this type of slow, long-term pressure, the reality of this threat would force also Europe to form a united vision of itself capable of countering Russia, meaning one able to set plans for centuries in advance, to think ahead, not based on daily newspaper or election cycle or the kind of hysteria that go with mass democracy, this fast dealing. But yes, Russian behavior during Bolshevism, with its revolutionary gambling attitude, this was an anomaly. And now Russia seems to return to its traditional way of acting, which is slow and conservative.

And with a near aim, Russia seems to have a reabsorbing or protecting Russian minorities in territories of former Soviet Union, which is really the Russian Empire. And I think this is a legitimate goal, but it doesn't need in any case to affect Europe proper, which if Europe was smart and truly sovereign, meaning it was not beholden to the cabal that has hijacked America and actually the governments of the EU, Europe also could return to the pre-1917 attitude it used to after the Russian Empire, which is a kind of wary standoff, fully conscious of long-term possible opposition, but also, like Europe before 1917, Europe was willing to make alliances and various other pacts, including dynastic intermarriages and so forth, because Russia was treated as a kind of member of a European

family, a frenemy, that's how it was treated before that. They didn't have this ogrish caricature image of Russia that is spread now. So instead now you don't have a return to that type of 19th century statecraft, some of you like this word, but you have instead a self-destructive recklessness where you You have freaked out over some very limited Russian aims in their former recent territories. You know, Europe is in a tough position as such, quite aside from Russia. Because you must ask how many bushels of wheat, how many barrels of oil does Europe have? So this, if you're European, this is just your problem. You know, Papa Hitler, he tried to correct this fundamental problem, but he failed. So now you are stuck in the middle of America and Russia, and being totally beholden to

one like you are doing now is not smart. You must look, Mongolia is stuck between Russia and China, but plays them off against each other. It's a better model, I think, but I mean all this to say the calculation from time of Cold War has totally changed. So play acting as if 1950 is not smart for European right, the threat are different. If you're European in 1950, it makes sense to side with America, because your siding with an enemy or, okay, I will be nice, is a rival, a frenemy. But he's much farther away, right? So he's beyond an ocean. He does not have the ability to fuck you over as much as a big enemy who lives right next to you and who just invaded Europe or tried to. So it makes sense. Soviet near America, far, so you choose the master who is far away.

But now the things are opposite. America near Rashafar, geography notwithstanding, time has defeated geography, by which I mean after 70 years of American domination, your government is thoroughly owned, the illusion that you have independent government, your media has become so corrupted and zombified by American media and interests, financial interests also, NGO and this fake civil society interested and very active in Western Europe, directed often from American embassies. This is the WikiLeaks. It is not debatable what America is doing in West Europe. So American master is actually now much nearer, and he's sleeping with your wife, in fact, and he's pimping out your daughter. And by contrast, Russia actually is far, because it's physically weaker than it was, but also

because it has abandoned revolutionary ideology of Bolshevism. It seemed to have returned in some way, in some way to the imperial conservatism it had before 1917, which that is an animal that you know, or you would know if you had had any continuity of political tradition, but in any case it is a milder animal someone can be dealt with. But no, European rightists do not want, listen to this, they want, maybe keep a role playing that we are standing against oriental Bolshevik horror. I mean, on a personal level, I understand if your great aunt was raped by a mongoloid 90 IQ fetal alcohol syndrome step-monkey and you don't want a Russian soldier, you don't like to see that in a Russian tank, you hate that on a visceral level.

But you know, how is that different when Jews are quenching about ancestral wrong and feeding German shepherds? You have Jidlinski in his bra before Congress just two days ago playing Schindler-list music and this is what you want to evolve. But this brings up the question of how you're letting yourselves be mobilized by your enemies to fight their fights for them. And this is a long-running problem among right-wing men. During Cold War, you might have heard some of us complain and some leftists about so-called Operation Gladio, when American and NATO and EU, not EU yet, but prototype EU, in any case the establishment governments of West Europe and America, they were using the hard right

in Operation Gladio, mobilizing them as stay-behind networks in case of Soviet invasion, and mobilizing them also to fight against the Bolshevism, both in Europe and in Third World. But that's a very different situation. I will talk about Operation Gladio some other time. I've mentioned before, perhaps, excuse if I repeat myself, but if you're a hard-rightist, let's say, ex-SS officer in 1950s and 60s, I think it made sense to let yourself get used that way, you know, and I think those men were fully conscious that they were being used and they would say, okay, use me, I have my own interests, I'm also using you. But in this case, you're not using them. They are just using, you're not getting anything out of it.

In America too, Appalachian men, they join military because they are manly, they want to fight for national honor, but what they end up being used for. I made this point in my book. I like moment in Japan history when the samurai class realizes, you know, we don't have to follow the imperial nobility faggots anymore, the administrators and the long-nailed people with robes from Kyoto. We have all the physical power, why do we need to do what these effites say? But before that point of realization is reached, it took some time, it took 200 years, and I say this, I think one of the big reasons for that delay is that men of honor are especially the ones least likely to want to think this way, they want to be loyal.

But this sense of honor and loyalty is often abused by women, by spiritual women. And this very much so right now is a matter of Ukraine. First of all, if Russia is oriental, so is Ukraine. If Ukraine is European, so is Russia. So I ask people on the right to please stop-talk with some Asiatic ogre violating European power with blond braids in wheat field, or maybe you have not been to Ukraine, you have not seen what average Ukrainian look like. Because there are blond ones, but there are also many Tatar and many minorities, some Some of them very nice. I like them. But it's just like in Russia, you know, many don't look European, and that's fine. And in Russia there are blondes too, you know. But for those of you not on the European right who are listening to this, I'm telling you

these are the kinds of arguments you see spread by your liberal State Department and your so-called liberal world order or rules-based institutions, they are spreading this propaganda. They're trying to convince hard-right men of the things I've been hinting and telling you just now in this show. And why they do this is because they know they do not have fighters. I mean, who will volunteer for this? In America, yes, you have Appalachian men. But now you have a guy from Arkansas, an MMA fighter I think he is, and he speaks very well openly saying, realizing, you know, we don't want to do this. We don't want to fight these stupid wars for you any longer. But how do you motivate Europeans to go fight for what?

You can't get people actually to self-sacrifice for dick-chopping your sons or gay right rally, or even for cheap Chinese consumer goods and Tinder wine bar dates. So this actually is not recent. It's a long-running problem with comfort-based liberalism. It's an ideology based around the stomach, ultimately, and on the preservation of mere life from its very beginnings. So even Hobbes, he has trouble, he has to engage in all kinds of co-convoluted arguments to justify getting men to die in wars for his type of state and such a thing. Because Hobbes' state is based on preservation of mere life, so how do you get men to sacrifice themselves for that? But this becomes much more so today because the residual culture of honor that was dominant in Hobbes' time, it has all dissipated by now.

So this fatal weakness of a world order based on satisfaction of petty material needs, it becomes very clear, it becomes critical now. So what do they do? They bring back the Sonnenrad, they pretend Ukraine is about the black sun and the swastika and the whole Azov neo-Nazi, esoteric Hitlerist role-playing, the runes, the blonde wheat girl braid carrying basket of egg in field, it's suddenly about homeland, about race, about the galactic swastika and opposing the Bolshevist horde. All courtesy, by the way, of a Jewish billionaire named Kolomoisky, who funded all this garbage as his private militia to give himself cover. And mostly what this militia did was to protect his and other industrial interests in the east of Ukraine, by the way. But you know, right, we are neo-Nazis, right?

So we're not the muscle for a Yid oligarch. We couldn't be, because we're neo-Nazis. You understand how it worked? Second of all, this lie was promoted by United States, various NGO and intelligence organs for the reasons I just told you. Because again, they realize who the hell else would fight today. It's rather actually an optimistic thing maybe to notice that aside from a few Redditors, the most that Western government can do now is to rile up minorities to racial hatred, to racial riot like it did during the St. George Floyd thing. Maybe eventually it can get blacks and others like that to commit disorganized pogroms, which I think is coming, but they cannot get the left or any faction of it to engage in organized systematic warfare.

In other words, to put themselves in a situation, in a uniform, where they think their lives are in genuine danger. Only the right is brave enough, but also dumb enough, to do that for the sake of the aims of their own enemy. And so this is what's going on with this fake Nazi stuff. And the way it got spread on the right, one of the main ways, that is this girl Olena Semenyak, she was the conduit for it, for a lot of it. And who is she? Some people have written an article about her. There is article recently I linked on my telegram by one boreal baron that he codenamed. It go into some detail on everything I'm telling you here, but Olena Semenyak is a Ukrainian a nationalist, an internet addict who actually has been active online for a long while. She's a forum's ego, you know.

She's an internet addict spurned like me and my friends. I've seen her a long time. She was on Facebook arguing with Richard Spencer's wife, Nina Byzantina, I think even ten years ago or more. And by arguing, I mean cat fight, you know, vicious online cat fight, Elena versus Nina. You know, you see problem with women's politics, very embarrassing to see this by the so-called rights, the women with their crap and so-called hard-right women feminists, the racist feminists that have been promoted for the past years in our spheres, these accounts and messaging platforms that have shown up. Hello, I am a right-wing, hard-right, racist, white nationalist feminist, and feminist white nationalist. A lot of this is Ukraine-based.

If it's not actually Ukrainian, it's Ukraine-derived, because Ukraine, for whatever reason, is very big on that, radical feminism, pussy riot and such thing are from Ukraine. But so anyway, this girl Olena Semenyakha, she would have just been another of the shrill forum e-girl and faceboard narcissist. But somehow she is inviting for some years, I think, many figure from American hard right to conferences in Ukraine. Greg Johnson, who I have nothing against, very nice to me, but him and many other guys like that, who are on the alt-right, the identitarian and white nationalist right. How? Tell me how. Tell me where she has money to invite American hard right to Ukraine. You have to pay airplane tickets, hotel and so forth.

And I don't know where she has money, but it could be through whatever cut out your friend Victoria Nuland and such. And if you don't think American State Department or intelligence group, even through NGO system, If you think they would interfere, shaping right-wing discourse, that they are exceedingly concerned about things we say, I ask you again, for example, to watch Insane Homeland show. If you remember Showtime show where Claire Danes, schizo-tranny character on Homeland, she is depicted as just destroying a 4chan poster, this after 2016. So you know, we only got to them in 2016 with the election and Brexit and so forth, and And then the coming of Bolsonaro, they've been desperate actually, but a lot of that messaging was done online by people like us, even in Brazil.

Bolsonaro campaign took place almost entirely on WhatsApp with people shitposting. So you know, they've been calling us Russia agent operation since that time, since actually 2015 or even before. And more recently, they were shocked, they were embarrassed by online response to the Afghanistan failure, and they do not want a repeat of that. So a lot of what you're seeing, in fact, yes, they do interfere heavily to preempt possible anti-war messaging from taking over the discussion. So for this alone, but for other reasons too, but for this alone, they will interfere like I tell you, but it's beyond that. This is my second message to European rightists, which I did not cover in the article, but it has to do with a particular message spread by these groups I've mentioned about how

how supposedly supporting Ukraine will help change Europe toward the right. I've seen this argument made and it's of interest not only to European right if you're listening to show, you should know the kinds of things are being said to convince people to cheer on this Ukraine-Russia fight. Because the argument being made is this will make Europe, it will lead to European unity and it will wake up Europe to where it becomes strong and manly again. And this big argument in the Euro-nationalist, other-rightist circle is this, that quite aside from ideology, simply the fact of having to oppose Russia in a new geopolitical conflict with possible military confrontation, that this alone will reform Europe. It will unify it, it will remilitarize it, it will awaken its identity.

And in this militarization and mobilization of life, there will be this, this revitalization. There will be, they believe, political revitalization, a new sense of unity found, a new sense of purpose that will revolutionize and transform European, small, EU man, concerned with creature comfort and meek and dependent on Americans and left wing. But now he will be mobilized and become strong again and so forth. One thing that few are saying, but which many mean maybe without even knowing, is that in a condition of crisis, of hard times, possibility of military conflict, the drows of humanity has risen to the top of the EU and the modern state because of comfort times, the meek bureaucratic creature. But this will now, because of hard time, be replaced by manly and brave and enterprising

men of genius, because sometimes it happened in history during war and time of crisis. So you know, famous example, Napoleon, he would have remained obscure officer who went AWOL often. If it had not been for the time of crisis that allowed him to rise, you know, so I just want to tell you, if you're young and you have maybe been misled to believe this, it's all lies. None of this is true. And I say this as somebody who, you know, maybe you read my book and you think, BAP, most of all, I would have thought you believe this, but in general, such things may be true historically sometimes, but it's not in this case, because you will not in fact have mobilization or militarization of a kind and scale you're thinking, and you will not lead to revitalization.

I've been through this before, you see, I believed some of the things these people believe during time right after 9-11. In terms of my fundamental views, I've always believed very much what I do now. who've known me, who have got in touch with me recently, say, you know, Bap, you've been very consistent since we've known you since you were 16 or 18, you have the same views. But after a while, after 9-11, in America, you had some of these same arguments that you see now, exactly, actually, the same argument being advanced. And sometimes they were genuinely believed. Bill Kristol was advancing, if not exactly, this line with these words, what I've just told you. something very similar about how the new struggle will be a project of national greatness that

will transcend the petty, self-satisfied world of liberal men, it will inevitably, the leftist prospers in time of comfort and dissipation, but now a new era will come for the revitalization of national greatness and so forth. These were actually neo-con arguments, in other words, there were two types of arguments Neocons were advancing. They were talking about democratization and democracy projects, but to other people they were advancing this kind of argument I've just said now, the same type being put forth now by Euro-rightists or pro-EU Neocons without knowing it also, the same thing. But as everyone knows, no such revitalization of America took place. It was a false hope, because there was first of all no militarization then, they will not

be now in Europe either, there was no new so-called cunning of reason or arrival of intelligent statesmanship of genius, supposedly called forth by the new time of crisis, nothing of that happened, the opposite happened. The crisis was used to change, in a very immediate sense it was actually used to change in the wake of 9-11 the operations of government in a way that power got re-channeled and usurped to hands that were actually more reckless, more stupid, but it didn't lead to an adventurous society. It solidified instead the rule of the woman, the shrill, the bug man, the hysterical. And meanwhile, tens of thousands of brave American men got maimed, right? The casualty count is not whatever they claim, 3,000 to 5,000 dead. Tens of thousands of American men got badly maimed.

Many of them seriously maimed in Iraq-Afghanistan war, losing hand, foot, arm, they found no real adventure there but only betrayal. I ask you again to read Sam Finley's book, Breakfast with the Dark Cult. You all know what happened. America continued and even accelerated its relentless decline into genarchy, into genocracy, because these types of modern-day conflicts, they're not real wars. I've called them desultory police actions. They are just used as pretexts for domestic grab of power by the people who are already there. So there will not be any turnover to military and adventurous men. The product of that generation, the fighting post 9-11 generation, for American political class it created are people like Tom Cotton, who is a regime lickspittle.

All you got was moron like Sean Kennedy stomping for more Appalachian men to get a leg blown off and so forth. If you go with this, the same thing will happen in Europe. There will not be any general national awakening, not from this. You will at most get your foot blown up or obliterated by a Russian cruise missile if you take this seriously and go to participate in it. You'll never see the thanks for it. You'll be called a fascist and a privilege still. And the people who hate you will be enhanced in their power and position and security. This is why they are doing it, in fact, because their failure for 20 years and now especially with the Wuhan grid psychosis, it was catching up to them. It brought them to the brink.

There were huge protests in France and Canada, of course, but other big protests in Holland, many places they were not reported, much bigger than the Astroturf-Floyd thing and so forth. Real anti-lockdown and anti-establishment protests. So now, okay, war with Russia, we are all in it together, you know, this saves them. You know, I hope people get over this hysteria, so they work against you, but no, modern war mongering of this kind, there is no shortcut, do you understand? There is no magical transformation process through which, by virtue of some economic or social forces, the condition of Europe will be changed. That's not how it happened. The only solution is the removal and replacement of the current ruling elite.

You must understand, this only solution, the only solution there has always been, you know, there is no shortcut, there is no path to that through war with Russia or even China or anyone else external, unless Russia invades and deposes your government, which it won't So stop being hysterical about that as well. But that would help you if they did that because if Russia, let's say, took over Paris, they would not be able to stay there. They would just get rid of your parasitic foreign governments right now. But don't worry, that will not happen. There is not a based EU, a based European Union. There never will be. There is no process by which the current European Union will turn, as some of you hope it to to hit law, a new order, or whatever it is.

This European Union has been designed against that. It is insulated from democratic pressures. It consists of human apparatchiks who have an understanding of Europe that is borderless internally because it has no peoplehood or unity aside from being another liberal, another industrial area. And you will never convince such people of anything, neither by designing new theories of identity, nor by argument about migration, nor by clapping like a trained seal when they attack their external enemies. In the vain hope that the necessities of conflict and struggle will affect some kind of spiritual vital transformation in them will not ever happen. Only their replacement is Europe's salvation. But as for what comes after that, I will talk about this briefly on next segment and on

future show because this idea you know idea of identity is that I brought up what means theories of identity what you mean European identity you may have heard this word what they mean I feel be right back I need extra strong coffee glycines I have a new kind of just before I close segment I found new kind where I am of honey which never turns solid it stays in a liquid state and in In Europe, if you can get heather honey, that's what it does. It has amazing medical properties and where I am, I found similar type tropical version. For some reason, the most medical amazing honeys, I think Manuka solidifies, but the other ones, they remain in liquid states. It's very interesting. Anyway, I will be right back. Except Ukrainian identity so-called.

For some reason, I won't accept idea of a gay identity or a Palestinian identity. None of these exists, in fact, and being a bit unfair, I think, to Ukraine in the comparison, because it has somewhat greater claim to being than the others I mentioned, but not by much. So basically, if your grandfather didn't call himself what you call yourself today, or rather if he didn't have the option or idea to call himself this, your grandfather or great-grandfather, is basically a fake neologism and invention, okay? Chekhov, all of these Ukraine writers, Bulgakov, great Russian writers, they call themselves Russian. They never call themselves Ukrainian. Ukrainianism did exist in their time, but they saw it as very thin, as something silly they didn't identify with.

Immigration record, for example to America from that time, are clear there was no Ukrainian option to list yourself, people from that area, or listed as Russians or Poles or Jews and such. The Ukrainian identity so-called come from Galicia area and far west of the country. An ethnographic map similar called people living there, petty ruse, small Russian, many such thing, and most important, this what the people called themselves, they speak Russia at home. Ethnogenesis, in other words, the birth of new people, this does take place. But it's a profound event, a complicated subject. It doesn't happen by government diktat or as a product of a shabby school system, a public school system, or a propaganda state media that teaches children that in fact they

are Ukrainian or trans or gay Palestinian or that they are Tanzanian or whatever. Tanzania is another fake country. It never will exist. This is not ethnogenesis, this is the birth of fabricated state identities, and I will give you that if that's what you mean by the word, but they're not a real thing, and they disappear just as quickly as they appear. They disappear in times of weakness. Let me say what I mean a little bit in a segment, but what's happening now in Ukraine could in theory happen in any European country, so it's strange to see Spanish nationalists, For example, support this, you know, if you're a Spanish nationalist, you have your own problems with Catalonia or Basque country, or if you're English with Scotland.

And all of these have long-running separatist intentions, and unlike Ukraine, all that I mentioned have a much longer history as independent states, a much more developed national cultural awareness through their own literature that's extensive and so forth. Or in the case of the Basques, a very different language and culture, they are Neanderthal and whatever. But by contrast, Ukrainian is mutually intelligible with Russian, and I think at least half Ukrainians speak Russian at home, more than that in some part of country. In Basque country, you don't hear that. You hear people talking Neanderthal tongue in restaurants. But in Ukraine, it's Russian. In Barcelona, you rarely hear Catalan anymore, however, it's much more frequent. I heard Urdu when I was there.

I don't like Barcelona, it's overpriced, it was good 30 or 40 years ago, I hear, right now it's dirty, filthy, overpriced, gypsies, tourists, whores. I don't know what happened, this city is only full of Urdu speakers now, they run all the stores. But on this point, I am from the East, I will not say, okay, I am Russia, okay, but many of you East European nationalists who are anti-Russian, okay, because you are from East You know, maybe you remember a time when you were a small boy, you travel with parents, you go to fishing trip away from the capital, maybe you remember you run into people there in the provinces who speak a dialect of your language, and I have to say maybe I understood a fifth or so of the words that I was hearing. Very difficult.

And this was the only time I saw in the wild, by the way, the use of the phrase, the many, which I enjoy using, hoi polloi, you know, the mini. Used by an old peasant woman, she was selling wild blueberries and paper, delicious, but she used to refer to people from the capital just tremendous aristocratic intent to, you know, the mini. She was just local peasant woman. So now this is from the province of any random European country, maybe. If you're from Europe or Russia or East Europe, you've maybe had similar experience. Now think of it this way, by historical circumstance, whether some administrative mistake within the history of a country or whatever, or the province, let's say, it becomes autonomous or semi-independent even, you know.

And then it gets some foreign support, and some foreign NGOs come, and Netflix come. And eventually, let's say, it even breaks off, but most people there still think themselves as part of mother country or mother identity. But after ten years of, especially this happens through the public school system, where they get the children. And now also Netflix and TV and law and order sexual victims. And the new public system tells the school system, you're not French, you're Bourgondians. You're ancient Bourgondians. You've always been oppressed by the French. and television propaganda, and all this, and they can be very much like Ukraine now, anywhere you pick. Not to speak of what happened in the 19th century in the United States with the war

with the south, where actually the southern identity, if you want to use this word, but the southern sense of peoplehood, their origins were even different from arguably the settlers of the north. They had very different culture, very different way of life, much more cause, I should think, to succeed than Ukraine does from Russia. So you know, they claim they believe they're a different identity and so forth. But what I told you just now is all it takes. Public school system, a little bit of television propaganda, and what's behind it? Ultimately, it's just some random event, some historical process of fragmentation or or balkanization, some of you like this one, but I tell you, no, what's behind it, who stands to get the most from such a process, is a local elite.

It makes this happen, right, because maybe they're just provincial heads, or opposition of provincial heads, they're in the local opposition party. But now, in a cessation, they rule, or they think they do. They're no longer country bumpkins. And the people themselves, they may or may not be getting something out of it. The people of, let's say, breakaway Ukraine, they could very often lose out. In fact, if you compare how Ukraine fared after Western involvement, not just Maidan, but even before, because there was a previous color revolution, and Yanukovych, by the way, was not pro-Kremlin, he was trying to play both sides, but Ukraine is doing worse than Even other former Soviet republics that are within Russia's sphere, by the way, like Belarus

and others, Western involvement and this crazy fake nationalism has hurt the Ukrainian people. So they could lose out, but the elites, they always get something either way, no matter how bad the people are doing. And then if there's foreign meddling and Victoria Nuland running $5 billion through your country according to her own words, then even more so. They can become quite rapacious. They can just invite a foreign logging company into the country and tear down ancient virgin forests and they get all the money. Our stewards of the nation were nationalist. Whereas before, the capital would have gotten the money or they wouldn't have been allowed to tear down the forest or whatever the natural resource. So this process, what do you call this? Is this nationalism? What is it?

Within the United States, even without secession, you have similar incentives. For example, Jesse Jackson, and actually mostly mulatto, high yellow leadership of the black community, they always get something from black identity and from this agitation you see, but the average black, not so much. And Jesse Jackson makes up like a baller either way, right? But people like Dickie Spencer and the other supposed leaders of incipient white nationalism, They wish for nothing more than to be this, the Jesse Jackson of the white community, right? If the blacks have black entertainment television, why not white entertainment television identity? I'm exaggerating a little bit, but not much. And there are still faker countries like almost all African countries and national identities

not to speak then of the other, you know, the furry or the gay or the trans identity within any state. And I guess I'm talking maybe you could say about two things at once, but ultimately it's the same thing. Because on one hand I'm saying yes, there are many countries that are fake neologisms and they're inhabited not by peoples, but by state-fabricated so-called identities, and that this is an illegitimate process of ethnogenesis. And I'm saying it's illegitimate from point of view of history, meaning it's weak. It will break apart quite fast at first sign of real trouble, and then it will transform into something else, or it will revert to tribal identity as a way, you know, the fake peoplehood of Libya, it reverted into the real tribal peoplehood when times of trouble

came and Gaddafi was falling. And the same I'm saying now about gay and this, but it applies to the fake state created identities within any country, the gender and other identities, they're not strong. People will not so much die for the sake of being trans, I mean they'll commit suicide but that's different. This entire model of talking of identity in this way, something that comes from postmodern left, and I think is not really usable by the right, which I made a tweet saying I will elaborate on this, and I will in writing, because it complicates subject, but I wanted to talk on it brief also in this episode. What means concept of identity? Where it comes from? Why has it become to be used by the right? And why I think this is a mistake?

And you may have heard then the word identitarian. Many on the right refer to themselves this way. In Europe it's generation identity, there were similar groups in the United States, Some are my friends. I am not against them. I agree with many of their aims. But this language, it mostly comes from the French New Right. And again, these are people I like. I consider them good on our side. Mostly so. I'm very much for these people in France, where they include names like Alain de Benoist. I know I will pronounce the name this way because I want to. Then there's Guillaume Faye, William Faye. And then my favorite, Dominik Wenner, who I've talked about on the first episode of this Caribbean Rhythms, and I'm writing now actually an introduction to a new translation

of one of Dominik Wenner's books in English. So some of these men I very much admire, but I disagree with this word they use, identity, and it's not just a matter of semantics. I think they're encasing themselves in the frame of the left. They make mistakes. So just I want to show you how they use this word, and I'll read short from Dominik Wenner. I admire Wenner very much as a man of action and also as a historian. He has long books on this very relevant subject, history of Europe, what Europe means, many such things. But I will read for you an introduction from his book, The Shock of History. It is the end of the introduction. It's a somewhat long passage, but you will like it, and it's a very direct statement of what he means by this idea of identity and identitarian.

So if you want to understand French New Right, this is as good a statement as any. Higher civilizations are not simply regions of the planet, they are different planets entirely. Much like our own in Europe, Chinese, Indian, Muslim, Native American, and Hispano-American civilizations all have roots that reach back into time immemorial. These roots often dig deep into the depths of prehistory itself. They rest upon specific traditions that are passed down through the ages in ever-changing forms. They are composed of spiritual values that build behaviors and nurture representations. If for example, sexuality is universal in the same manner as eating, love is then different for each civilization as our representations of femininity, cuisine, architecture, the visual arts, and music.

These all reflect a spiritual morphology transmitted as much through atavism as through experience. These features make us who we are, unlike any other. They constitute our perennial tradition, our unique way of being men and women in the face of life, death, love, history, and fate. Without them, we are fated to become nothing, to disappear into chaos and to end into the chaos of a world dominated by others. Fortunately, our tradition survives in our subconscious, despite having been forgotten due to all divisions that have shattered our memory, a memory further scarred by the delusive belief in our universal mission, a belief that is dangerously wrong, more wrong than even Samuel Huntington could have imagined.

It denies and destroys other cultures and civilizations, specifically those that threaten the universalist values said to be Western, that in reality exist simply for the benefit of globalizing markets and democracy summed up in the triptych fun, sex and money. It is clear to us, of course, that this globalist pretension rallies the resistance against itself and even the revolt of peoples who refuse it. This universalist belief is also dangerous for those of us in Europe. It stunts our ability to comprehend that other men do not feel, think or live the same way that we do. It is dangerous because it acts destructively upon our own identity. After having colonized other peoples in the name of universalism, Europeans are now in

the process of being colonized in the same way of the very same principle against they which do not know how to defend themselves. If all men are brothers, nothing can stop the arrival of others on our doorstep. In the past, when Europeans were strong and powerful, when they dominated the world, they had made of their Christian or secular culture, which in both cases was universalist and individualistic, they had made of it the tool by which they conquered, intending to impose it upon the entire world. This was shattered following the upheavals of the 20th century. Both world wars in Europe, decolonization and the reawakening of ancient civilizations. What had once been a source of strength had become the cause of their weakness.

Their old, universalistic worldview has removed their moral defences, in spite of their economic strength and a few vague stirrings of illusory power. Europe has been thrown, naked and defenceless, into a world aching to vengefully humiliate her. Elsewhere, things are perceived far differently than the average European could ever imagine. To help elucidate this reality, I would like to cite two accounts drawn from French experience. The first is that of Dalil Boubakour, Rector of the Mosque of Paris and President of the French Council of the Muslim Faith. He explains that Islam is at once a religion, a community, a law, and a civilization. It is not only those who practice the five pillars of Islam who are considered Muslim, but all those who take part in this identitarian whole.

He was quoting here. The key word here is identitarian. In this way, Islam is not simply a religion. It is in fact much more than that. It is a community, a law, a civilization. This interpretation runs parallel to another account given by the philosopher André Comte Sponville. In a book about atheism and religiosity, he mentions friends of his who identify as atheist Jews. The term left him dumbstruck. One cannot imagine Christians who identify as atheist Christians. He took it upon himself to discuss it with other former classmates, formerly a militant Maoist. But do you believe in God? His friend smiled. You know for a Jew whether one or not believes in God is not really the issue. For Comte Sponville, who has raised a Catholic, this was antithetical to the central question

of religion. His friend explained to him that it is a completely different issue. God does not exist, but we are his chosen people. For him, being Jewish meant being loyal to a particular history, tradition, law, book and community. This loyalty has helped his people survive centuries without a state, a homeland or any other refuge than memory and fidelity. When we are immersed in Christian culture, which is at once universalist and individualist, this is surprising. However, many other religions, even Islam, as we have just seen, and of course Judaism but also Hinduism, Shinto or Confucianism, are not just religions in the Christian or secular sense of the word, namely a personal relationship with God, but also identities, laws and communities.

The thinking that associates a group's identity with its perennial tradition can help modern Europeans who are often de-Christianized by a deeply rooted culture of secularism. It can help them find strong, identitarian ties that lie beyond personal faith or lack thereof. What ties? Precisely those of tradition, ties capable of uniting Europeans with each other and arming them morally so that they may confront the impending threat of complete disappearance into the great void of the universal melting pot and of Brazilization. In the same way that some consider themselves sons of Shiva, Mohammed, Abraham or Buddha, it is important that Europeans see themselves as sons of Homer, Ulysses and Penelope. The European tradition, whose origins predate Christianity as Benedict XVI bravely reminded

us in his Regensburg lecture of 12 September 2006, can be safely reconciled with religious convictions or the lack thereof, since these have become a private matter in Europe, whether one is Christian, free thinker, or whatever else on top of that. The point is that, in order to resist and renew, we must rise above political and denominational variables and rediscover the permanence of tradition which has permeated our founding poems for millennia. These thoughts have been at the center of my thinking for a long time. The ongoing evolution of the world and of Europe continues to underline these issues. This is why, when Pauline Lecomte, a journalist specializing in the philosophy of history asked me to collaborate with her on a book of interviews, anyway, he talks there about his book.

This has been the end of the introduction of Dominic Vener's book, The Shock of History. Now what I just read for you is something I agree with almost entirely. And I think, by the way, even a Christian, although Vener is skeptical of Christianity from a Nietzschean point of view, but even a Christian should be able to agree with almost all of that. He cites Pope Benedict and I think maybe Bishop Williamson, who I had on two shows ago, but But many other kinds of Christians also could agree with all of this. This is just an aside though, but so what they mean by identitarianism, it is the word I disagree with. But again, that's not merely a matter of semantics. And before I tell you why, I read for you another passage, not from Wenner, I won't

tell you from who until after I read it, you guess from who, but you will notice some similar theme. Yes, you will notice a certain similar theme, you know. This is what has in all ages compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention and to credit the gods with their own wisdom, in order that the peoples, submitting to the laws of the state as to those of nature, and recognizing the same power in the formation of the city as in that of men, might obey freely and bear with docility the yoke of public happiness. This sublime reason, far above the range of the common herd, is that whose decisions the legislator puts into the mouth of the immortals, in order to constrain by divine authority those whom human prudence could not move.

But it is not anybody who can make the gods speak, or get himself believed when he proclaims himself their interpreter. The great soul of the legislator is the only miracle that can prove his mission. Any man may grave tablets of stone, or buy an oracle, or feign secret intercourse with some divinity, or train a bird to whisper in his ear, or find other vulgar ways of imposing on the people. He whose knowledge goes no further may perhaps gather round him a band of fools, but he will never found an empire and his extravagances will quickly perish with him. tricks for a passing tie. Only wisdom can make it lasting. The Judaic law, which still subsists, and that of the child of Ishmael, which for ten centuries has ruled half the world, still proclaim the great men who lay them down.

And while the pride of philosophy, or the blind spirit of faction, sees in them no more than lacking postures, the true political theorist admires in the institutions they They set up the great and powerful genius which presides over things made to endure. We should not, with Warburton, conclude from this that politics and religion have among us a common object, but that in the first periods of nations the one is used as an instrument of the other." Isn't that great who you think that is from? That's from Rousseau. That's from Rousseau, who I have discussed previous on show as perhaps father of many strains of modern leftism, many nasty strains. But he was also a great thinker in his own right, and so he is correct about many things.

And here you see the same two examples given in that of Wenner, of the Jews and the Muslims. What it mean? mean as a foundation of a kind of political community. And the political aspect must be emphasized because it contains all the bonds of loyalty and belonging to a group that Wenner mentions in his own introduction. But the shorthand of this is a people. So you are talking about what makes a people. And in Rousseau's case, about the foundation of a people. And I love the difference he gives between enduring and passing creations. This is what I mean, peoples are the enduring creation of men of genius, whereas this whole identities talk are simply passing tricks. Rousseau lays out quite nicely. And if you want still another, you say, okay, Rousseau is a leftist and so on, no, no.

But Rousseau, he is right about human nature in many ways and about nature of political life and foundation. And the passage I just read for you from Rousseau is not really unique to him, that attitude to what takes to found the people. If you want still another instance of Moses specifically discussed as a founder of a state or a people. You can read Machiavelli, especially in Discourses, I think, Book 1, Chapter 9, where he talks about Moses alongside Lycurgus, the founder of Sparta, and Solon, who was not so much the founder of Athens as the reformer of the Athenian state, although you could say I think in all these cases that the group calling themselves Spartan, Athenian, and Hebrew had existed before these founders, but they are the ones, certainly in the case of Lycurgus

and Moses, they are the ones who gave the people their full character as a political unity as a people. If you want a similar view expressed, you can read Josephus against Apion, a totally political view of what is the Jewish religion. It's a people, even when they lack a state. And many other such insight from many other philosopher, from Plato, from Nietzsche, from many other. You could say a classical view of what goes into the foundation of a people. And then my question to the identitarians and to people on the right who use this language of identity is, why do you do that? Why do you talk about identity when you should be talking about a people, their character, their state, or sometimes they do not need to have a state, but their unity or lack thereof?

And to ask this question is to see that identity is a neologism, something akin to what Rousseau described as a cheap magic trick. Because no one, actually not even in 19th century nationalism, ever used a word identity in this sense it is used now. So look, I must take a quick rest break again, I will be right back, maybe I take a quick nap. Thank you. Come back to show, you know, when I made announcement that I would write against concept of identity, because I consider it inappropriate neologism invented basically after 1940s, 1950s, and it is a leftist concept meant to neuter ideas of nationalism and race and so forth. But when I made this announcement, I was immediately accused by a number of low IQ and highly emotional people of, oh, look, Bepper is pivoting. He's pivoting away from

racialism and nationalism because he's for Russia, a multicultural empire. This is why he's signaling. In the words of Pastor Linstead, how stupid are these mamzers? I mean, I'm I'm trying to stop friends from thinking of race in nation in terms of these words identity and identitarianism because I think it's self-defeating. Now as for identity, of course it was used as a word and still is used in other senses. For example, detective story, what is identity of perpetrator, 1940s Los Angeles noir detective story. This sense where it actually seems to mean a people or its character, that is new. And I think it's a mistake because whether you want it to or not, when other people who are not on the right hear it, they don't understand by what you mean.

They don't understand it in this sense of a people forged by Moses and by history or a race or a Genos. They don't, a lot of people on the right seem to think that identity is merely a synonym for nation or race and when I attack or anybody attack identity or attack nation, race, etc. That's not how most people understand it even, it's not how it was meant in its beginnings. It reminds me of another word you should be skeptical of using, genocide, a word that has not been used before 1940s when Raphael Lemkin, I think that's his name, he came up with it, and you can see the danger of that, which is, it's not that genocides had never happened in history because there was not a name for it. That's another fake argument

people use. Oh Beth, you're making this postmodern argument. No, I'm actually saying the opposite. To use the words is to bind to a whole other system of thinking that is not your friend. So for example, in ancient Greece, genocides, which is a word we all use casually sometimes, Now genocides happened all the time in ancient Greece, but it was taken as a right of conquest of one Greek city to genocide another when they won a war, for example. It was not always done, but sometimes it was. You killed all the men, and you stole the women and children into slavery. And the Athenians famously did this to the Melians, and they did this almost to the Mytileneans, which some of you know about these things from Thucydides. You read Thucydides, these are famous examples.

The Spartans did it to the Plataeans. It said also that, for example, the Romans did it to the Dacians, who were too unruly. And so the Romans killed the men, and then the Roman soldiers married the women, which is why in Romanian an old word for husband is mire, which is unambiguously the local form of the Roman word milas, soldier. The word for husband, in other words, is derived from Mila, soldier, it's very suggestive. And this was told to me actually by a Mohawk, as a part Mohawk linguist. He was a communist, but a man of great learning and really a genuine autist savant. He spoke more than 60 languages, he died a few years ago, I and other frogs who knew and miss him quite a bit, he was a once in a lifetime type character.

But genocide seems to be a rule in history, and not just among Greeks, the barbarians did it more often, but especially among farming populations, because on the steppe, you know, you always needed more men, more warriors. Men are scarce and territory is endless on the steppe. So on the steppe, despite its great brutality and there were occasional genocides of a different kind, they sometimes killed off farming populations, but a tribe was more likely to absorb the men of another tribe on the steppe, but in farmland, agricultural populations, genocide of the type I mentioned was relatively common. Anyway the ancient Greeks did, the Romans rarely did too, especially to very unruly peoples. They did it to the Jews in part after continual revolts.

Again, the barbarians did it always much more often than that, but they never used this word. Why? Again, it's not that I'm saying it didn't exist, but it's significant they didn't use this word. It means they understood it in a very different way. And it had to do with just, you know, when you use it, think about what you are saying. What is genocide a kind of? What is it? Genocide is a subset of what? It's a kind of what. When you start thinking this way, in terms of political violence, in terms of crimes of state or political crimes, you get into this frame of the left where you accept implicitly a global legal authority that judges political necessity by a supposed law of morality, and it leads actually to the criminalization of politics and is part of an understanding of

mankind according to this whole complex of human rights and so on, and if they are right it means they have to be guaranteed and so on and so forth. Now, of course, again, we all use this word genocide casually, just as you may use the word neoliberalism or identity, but these shorthand ways of talking, unfortunately they do mire you into an enemy's frame of thinking if you end up taking seriously. And I made this aside because I'm saying identity is the same. Identity refers fundamentally to a specific understanding of man that is individualistic, fundamentally. I mean, imagine, you know, Plato saying, I identify as Athenian. What kind of foolishness is that? He was Athenian. To say I identify implies there is a choice there, and that's the point here.

The assumption of the word identity, the way it was designed, is of a man, an understanding of the human, the individualistic, arbitrary, and homogenous, when the individual is then able to create his self by choosing an identity or even fabricating it, creating it if you want to be. And then, where through some intermediaries, this is very important, but through some intermediary then others are to recognize this identity and this act of free self-creation and to validate it. And I've talked on this show before about David Sidorsky, he has a good article on just this, the origin of this concept. If you can find the essay, you can fully find it online, but it's not easy. It's called The Third Concept of Liberty, in which he talks about, so you may have heard

of Isaiah Berlin, he's a, you know, I don't believe that philosophers exist in 20th century, but he's a good commentator, let's say that. And his famous formulation, Two Concepts of Liberty, the liberal concept of liberty, which is negative liberty, where you are free from the impositions of state power, where you have certain inalienable rights by virtue of nature or of God or some other thing, whatever, but these rights are the right not, for example, the right not to have your life or property taken from you without due process and so forth. You have the right not to be deprived of A, B, and C. And then this is challenged and changed by a later concept of liberty, positive liberty, which you can think of in two ways.

Really it's a wrong word because it used to be more properly defined as power. Positive liberty is a kind of power. But it rests on observations. For example, a Marxist might say that it does you little good to have liberty to buy health care if you don't have the money to enjoy that right, actually. Or you may have the formal liberty to eat in a restaurant, but you can't afford it. So it's almost an irrelevant right. It's hypocritical, even an insult, it could be seen. So this should be then replaced with the concept of positive liberty. I'm taking Isaiah Berlin's frame now, trying to summarize it. I'm sure many of you are familiar with this though. But the concept where you have the right to health care and so forth, and later UN human

rights declarations I think even include the right not just to health care but for a spouse to be sexually satisfied. And they mean, of course, when they say this, they only mean women. They have that right. Men don't. But that's beside the point. But now, obviously, with resources being limited, when you give people a positive right, say, to health care or some of the second concept of liberty, positive liberty, will be in conflict with negative liberty, because to provide for all you must take from some, justly or not. You can say it's justly, but you must still take from some. You must infringe on that first concept of liberty. And in fact it is clear that even the second concept of liberty is mostly a rhetorical

ploy in which the desires of the communists and the socialists for equality, they reframe this in the language of freedom and liberty, which shows you actually that peoples across the world, at least until recently, they prized liberty and freedom above equality, at least as an idea. It forced the lovers of equality to talk this same language of liberty. And the more important version of the second concept of liberty, in other words of positive liberty, is the liberty or power of a group to decide and define its own fate, in particular of a national group. So a Hungarian or a Czech in the Habsburg Empire would say, well yes, thank you very much for the negative liberty, for proto-Austrian school people giving me the freedom from state

interference so I can pursue wealth and not have my property taken from me, and these other kinds of negative liberty, the civil rights that I can enjoy as an individual not to be deprived of life, liberty, etc. But I want the liberty to define our own destiny under our own sovereignty, the freedom of us as a people, by which in fact again is meant power, our power. But I don't use that word to attack this impulse by the way, but that's what it is. And so the second concept of liberty is then more really an accompaniment to traditional nationalism, but within 20th century, and in part, it's not the only source of it, but as a result of the thought of Heidegger, more so of some of his followers, then comes

the third concept of liberty, which is the ability not just of an already existing historical national or ethnic group to define its course and destiny, but even the invasion of new national groups and new groups as such, hence, for example, gay or Palestinian or others which had not existed before a few decades ago, the liberty to define your own identity and against this crucial part, to have others recognize it. Recognize my identity, use my pronouns, recognize my suffering, the suffering of our people. No, I've never suffered, but as part of this identity, I partake in the extended body of the historical community, even if it actually has no history that is known, but anyway, so you must respect my victimhood.

And here is a very unusual thing, because in history actually new groups have arisen. At times new peoples were founded, new sects. But I'm saying it used to be much harder. Now in modernity, where everything is improved, of course, it's also much easier and faster, right? I mean, it used to be that to found a new people you had to, again, you know, the most profound thinkers, Plato, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and especially Nietzsche, they devote so much attention to this one, this supreme act of political significance. What it means to found the people or to found a religion. You used to have to be able to come down from mountain with tablets of laws or through many travails like Romulus and Numa Pompilius.

You used to have to win wars or communed with gods who give you laws and wisdom and visions and you come up with tablets of laws that actually work, you know. So you used to have to be able to write national epics like Homer or others, and then the people who cleave to these epics of laws and their divine revelations of laws, they used to have to be able to secure their own independence through force of arms and many other things like that, against all odds. Or if you wanted to fund a sect, which is actually, for example, what the gays, they would have been, right? I mean, you can't talk of a gay people or a gay state. Think about this identity of the gay people, the gay nation, the gay state. So you cannot talk about the gays in the same way you talk about Islamic ulema or Spartan

people. I mean, maybe you can, but it would be funny. But no, the gays would have been a sexual, religious sect in pre-modern times, but even in their case, so much more would have been required to forge their own way and to perpetuate that sect against all odds, right? But now, in modern time, everything is fast and easy. And that's what I mean. These are the fast-food trick versions of peoplehood and of belonging. The fast-food version as opposed to the pre-modern slow cooking. They're all very flimsy, they're transient. They depend on the existence of this liberal, shadowy, I don't mean shadowy in the sense that it's secretive, everyone knows a liberal state exists, but shadowy in the sense that it likes to hide its power, they depend on it, they're flimsy, they can give birth

neither to great art, nor cultural works, nor anything else that peoples have given mankind through their cultures, because these modern so-called identities are incapable of generating culture, they're more like the media advertising branding campaigns of a few elite factions who profit politically from them, while the participants on the other hand, the many who take part in these identities, they get to indulge in vanity and narcissism, usually as an oppressed and fractious group against the man, while on the other hand they are getting a pat on the head, they're getting validation, recognition, and approval, a pat on the head from teacher, identity, right? Gay identity, for example, is about teacher says it's okay.

And that's really what all the identity talk is about, which is a big reason I object to because identity talk again presumes a centralized authority for validation and recognition of said identity, which it means it accepts and even enshrines the liberal hegemonic state. It depends on it. So this way I object, for example, to white nationalism because in buying into the identity talk, what they want most of all is for the already existing liberal state to treat them the way it does other ethnic pressure and lobby groups. They want their own pat on the head. They want their own corner of playground sandbox. I find this repulsive, this concept of own space in my book very important to me because

I didn't come up with the idea of space and so forth, but even, by the way, if white nationalists, some of them, they say and they think they want something else. When you use this language seriously, I mean, as opposed to casually, all you're doing is you're lobbying big mummy, ginocracy state for your own recognition. Or otherwise you'd be talking of peoples, of the character of peoples, of the foundation of peoples, of the special destiny of this and that people and so on. You know, furry is an identity, Russian is not. Again, Plato did not identify as an Athenian, that is absurd. He was an Athenian and a Greek and a human and quite something else besides, but he was not simply engaged in an act of display for the recognition of a central epistemic social authority.

And I suppose that what fundamentally really disgusting to me about this concept, this underlying assumption coming to all actually postmodern French thought that the only thing that exists in society is this, excuse me, the only thing that exists in society is this. Social regard is the only thing that exists. Peoplehood, some very profound intersection of history and nature, that's what peoplehood is. And both history and nature exist aside from men's delusions and vanities. Peoplehood exists regardless, in other words. Nature exists regardless. The necessities of history continue to exist, whatever you think of them. But identity is a matter entirely of social regard. So like I said, it is the prefab, fast-food, post-modern version of peoplehood and belonging.

And like that fast food, it leads to spiritual obesity in this case, it's not the foundation of a lasting state or people. I will be right back. There is a good reason the French identitarians like Dominique Venner, a good reason why they don't use the language of traditional peoplehood or of race or of the character of nations and so forth, or rather correction, he himself does occasionally use that language. Like I say, often traditionalists and nationalists make this mistake to think that the word identity is simply a synonym for nation or people or tradition, but there is good reason he doesn't. Before I tell you what that is, underlying the identity talk everywhere, there is, look, and it's new. It's entirely new.

If you look at historical graph of use of this word identity, it was just a rare casual use with a different meaning before 1940, and then very fast starting in 1960s, and especially 1980s, you have an explosion of it. It's just not the way mankind understood itself in the past, but underlying it, an underlying idea of individual as engaged in the free creation of its own self, is a radical and almost, I call it, hubristic egalitarianism. It's egalitarianism on several levels. First of all, it's fundamentally democratic because in placing, let's say, the Greek identity or Spanish identity or even European identity eventually as the primary social phenomenon, it assumes that everyone in that group is equally partaking of that identity, whereas

this is not really the historical understanding nations and groups have had of themselves at all. There's a very significant passage in Bishima, Runaway Horses, where he's describing the the League of the Divine Wind, one of my favorites. These are about young samurai who rose up against the modernization and democratization of Japan in the late 19th century. I'm sure I've mentioned on this show before, forgive for repeat, but members of the League realize that with the coming of democracy, the regard for the gods would die out. It devolved to a mere popular superstition where the people don't know how to honor the gods. The gods would be disrespected. The gods would become once again lone spirits wandering the grasses and reeds by the river.

The people were never the carriers of nationhood and of a nation's destiny, or you could say identity to use this word. The aristocrats always and everywhere were. The people almost everywhere are relatively homogenous in their passions in ways, I mean, which is why worldwide democratization actually means homogenization. Different nations used to be identified by different ways of life. They had different laws, different dress, but what also used to be called unwritten law. These are the habits and manners of a people. It's taught to them from young childhood. It's pre-rational. In turn, the whole unity of a people or a nation's life, its culture, was ultimately driven by one or two high aims, aims in which these people sought to reach beyond itself,

beyond man as the monkey, man as a mere domesticated ape, so to speak. Excuse if I repeat, but again for Persian this would have been to shoot straight and tell the truth, for Greek to excel all other individuals in contest, for Hebrew to other mother and father, or for German to command and obey, and many other such things for all peoples, they each set something high above themselves. And each of these high aims were favoring a different type of man and shaping that population over time in a particular direction, allowing finally for the creation of supreme specimens that embodied that high vision. And yes, all along in practical day-to-day life these people would have been bound by ties of loyalty to each other and often kinship, but all traditions and peoples worth thinking

of were not egalitarian. They were hierarchical. They put one type of man above another. They put really one man above another because they believed in one high thing, and certain men embodied that more than others. And the word identity, when applied to a nation, obscures that there was an aristocratic group whose position within this identity was of a different order entirely from that of the people, which again is relatively homogenous. And you cannot rely on the people to bear traditions or identities the way Venner would put it. But worst of all, the concept of identity is egalitarian actually in assuming that traditions are equal among each other. So the furry identity, the gay identity, the Muslim identity, the Christian, the French,

the Uyghur, you know, it's all just mix and match, you know. The individual can mix and match and also design new ones like, I am a disabled dragon or whatever. Now, I know someone like Wenner does not believe that, but others do. The inherent respectful equality of each identity, this is so gay, the respectful equality of of each identity towards the other identities. This is a feature in part of Benoist, Alain de Benoist work, I think. Although it's hard to tell, of course, how much they mean this genuinely and how much they're doing it for self-protection. But it's inherent in the understanding of identities as these free-floating things, these wares available on the market that the individual may feel free in choosing and assuming for himself, or worse still, as proceeding

from his free creative protean act, the free act of the individual, the creation of the identity. This egalitarianism and interchangeability between identities is inherent to this view of things. After all, they're all identities. Isn't that what matters, having an identity, not being a man without any identity? So once you have this understanding of tradition as identity, it's very then hard to rank among them. Again, they're all valid self-creations of the individual, and the only claim many of these types seem to make is that the white identity is as valid as any other, and it's worthy of its own recognition, which I think is a huge mistake if you take it as anything beyond trolling. As trolling, it can work. But in any case, if you take this seriously,

This view of identities as equally worthy, of respect and equally valid. Again this very ahistorical, weird thing, because it goes complete against the totalizing nature of peoplehood and of traditional religion. It demands a kind of traditional peoplehood of this kind, demands a kind of intensity that you can only draw from people when they are convinced this is the truth, this is the way, that these people around them are the best people, Roman aristocrats, willing to sacrifice their lives easily, to give their lives for the Republic, martyrs willing to martyr themselves for faith. No one really does this for identity. So of course you are expected to choose it, to choose an identity in this frame of things because it's your own.

That's what a nationalist identitarian might say, because you are thrown in it by birth, supposedly. But this case is not made anywhere as clearly as it could be, and if it were made, you would not be using the word identity. But again, historically, traditions are not just ways to group people in equal and arbitrary cleavages. Because traditions, nations, make claims about what is great in life, what goes beyond men, what is worth sacrificing for. And Wenner obviously had this understanding, he sacrificed his own life in a spectacular way. But that was the result of his lifelong dedication to a true vision of Europe, both in body and mind. not a result of his pseudo-Heideggerian musings on the nature of the self as such.

And anyway, I'm trying to say for traditional peoples, take Christianity for example. I just had Bishop Richard Williamson on show. He's obviously as Christian as it gets. He's saying he is concerned with getting souls into heaven. That is the purpose of a Christian priest. That is the purpose of Christian religion, to get souls into heaven. You cannot then turn around and say, oh, well, but other religions are just as good as mine. They're equal. It's no big deal. We each have our own views and we do things our own way with different identities, you know. The Muslim identity is just as valid as mine. How could you say that when you know that what they teach is false and does not get people into heaven? Right?

Okay, so other, let's say, more primal national religions do not have doctrine of salvation, of soul in the same way, but still, do you think Shintoists, who believe their people to be descended from goddess of the sun, that they are children of the sun, do you believe in their intensity, devotion to emperor, through which they are devoted in turn to their nation and the land? Do you think that all this is achieved by people who believe, you know, oh man, we're just doing our thing, and we're okay with you doing your thing, and it's all equally worthy, you know, just, we want some respect and acknowledgement of our identity from an An overarching liberal state whose job it is to dispense recognition and validation for life choices and so forth. It's a disgusting view of life.

It's the acceptance of life actually as a caged animal where nothing really matters. Because this actually is the vision of the liberal state. This is what it wants to promote, where they own the public life and then we have the option as individuals of various harmless hobbies and personal private projects, they like this kind of phrase. Maybe they can give us all equal validation for our choices. This is actually one kind of liberalism loved by actual liberals today, and it seems entirely compatible with the New Right's identitarianism, which is not a complement to the New Right. So anyway, as such, these types of objections are why I don't like doctrine of identity, but I consider it a neutered and denatured and ahistorical view of what nations and races are.

go back, return and talk about nations, races, character, this is better. But I will be right back to discuss a little bit more why I think the French New Right, people like Dominique Wenner, why they don't fully embrace that traditional language of peoplehood. Welcome back to the show. It was a long show. I take a cigar break. I got nicotine poisoning the other day. I was fasting and I thought it was a good idea to have a big cigar. So I usually have a Cohiba club size, cigarette-sized cigar, but I had a big one. It was a special treat, and I got a Cohiba Piramide, a very delicious cigar, but because I was fasting, it put me flat on my back, almost passed out. I don't recommend a big cigar on an empty stomach, and today actually was also the first time I tried Zyn.

Somebody brought me a box, a tin of Zyn from the United States. I had six milligrams citrus flavor, and I had to stop after 20 minutes, I'm not used to it. It's quite a rush. Nicotine, I think, much stronger stimulant and nootropic than caffeine. Which is why the old medical establishment banned it, they need to have obesity instead, the Israelis persecute me, the Israeli medical establishment, you know the old phrase, when you do well, the doctor does badly, and tobacco is one of the most important medicinal plants, I believe this. Of course, what you get in cigarettes, normie cigarettes, is not tobacco. It has the same relationship to natural tobacco as supermarket milk does to real raw milk. So look, anyway, to go back to the French, you're right.

There's a reason they do not use traditional language of peoplehood and race or don't just use that. And it's not just self-protective. It's that too, a little bit, they do not want to say they're racist, which, by the way, If you want a European-white identity in this sense, it has to be racist. I'm only interested in preserving human types and even purifying them. But on that front, by the way, I'm very concerned, for example, about how void nationalism, if fully put into effect, would get rid of blonde people. Void nationalism is blonde genocide. It could also be self-protective. Dominic Venner and such, they don't want to say, OK, I'm a racist or I'm a racialist. But I don't think it's just that. And they don't want to say they're nationalist either, in part because maybe it's also a

slight dirty word, but really because they happen not to be nationalists. I mean, they're not nationalists and neither am I. I agree with them on this. They are ten Europeanists of a kind. And that's good. But then what do you do? Because you cannot go around talking just casually about a European nation, a European people. introduce all kinds of problems. What is the nature of that peoplehood? What is the nature of this global white identity that you are trying to talk about? It's not clear. I'm not saying it doesn't exist. I'm saying its existence, it's not that it's not there, it's a complicated matter and a lifelong meditation on what that means, on what its elements and changes are in history. This actually is Dominique Wenner's life work. But the problem people

like me or Wenner have is that this European, and see, it's tempting to call it this European identity, but once you do, I think you've lost. But this European peoplehood or being, it would have to be racial in some sense. So you cannot just rely, for example, on Christianity to provide the substance of it, although in its recent history, meaning actually for the last thousand years proper, which Oswald Spengler believes the West actually only started a thousand years ago in the remnants of Charlemagne's empire in northwest Europe. But Europe has been, in other words, Christendom, the heart of Christendom. But Christendom is not so much that it denies race, but it's actually not a real political identity in the way Venner wants. And even if it were, it would not be racial.

And so the EU cannot be the basis of European nationhood either. or I hold EU papers. I mean it's not something you'd want because it is frankly and openly anti-racist and in fact the European Union only deletes borders between European nations. I mean the same reasoning by which it does this, it also deletes borders potentially between European and Africa, Europe and Africa or whatever. The only practical, the only thing you can do to let's say prevent bringing in African migrants or Arabian migrants or Indian or whatever into the European Union as conceived now, is yes, you can bring practical and therefore temporary objections. I don't want to bring in migrants because our economy cannot handle it or has no need

for it or so forth, but these are the only types of objections that can be raised to importation of a billion Africans or Aborigines for that matter. But in principle, in the vision of nationhood or political being, as the EU has it, it is open to all. There is no reason why an Aborigine or a Thai cannot just come and become part of Europe with papers. This is what they believe. So how do you have a...based on what would there be a European nationhood that is limited to the white race? So you see, this is quite a complicated question, although it is something simple to want. It's not straightforward to talk about because, in fact, such a self-conscious racial peoplehood, a global white racial peoplehood, this has never existed.

In the same way that a black peoplehood has never really existed, or a yellow one. I mean, you know, black Africans don't consider black Americans, I don't want to get into that, please write Tarik Nasheed, but imagine the absurdity of a yellow identity worldwide. I mean, imagine what yellow nationalism would be, like either Japan or China would have to destroy the other. There could be no way around that. And Japan was actually trying to do this with the greater Asia co-prosperity sphere before World War II, where also it was presenting itself, Japan was as the protector of minorities within the Chinese mass, that is to prevent their absorption by the Chinese Han Borg. I mean to say once politics become global, these problems of big estates and of racial

self-awareness and race as the basis of new states, this is something that naturally come up. But because these racial political organizations and peoplehoods have never actually existed before, it's not clear how you would constitute such a thing. And hence the French right talk of identity this and identity that. But I think that is a cop-out, because you cannot avoid the work, really the work of divine genius it takes to forge and found the people. And you can't hand-wave all of that work away with this post-Heideggerian talk of identities and brands and self-regard and self-creation. And the objection Dominique Venner and others of the French right have to nationalism, by the way, is quite good objection, and I agree with that too, which is that nationalism actually

is a terrible homogenizing movement. It's modern, it's a 19th century, it erases local ancient tradition and local ways. German identity, if you want to put German nationalism, deletes Bavarian, for example. It hasn't fully, but it would. So I mean if you want the destruction of local traditions, global liberal secularism may may end up being more destructive, but I think so far actually 19th century nationalism type still is well ahead of it, just I mean in destroying local, and I don't say identities, but local traditions, ancient knowledge, local bodies of law and so forth, just absorbed into these fake homogenized 19th century states that Nietzsche also hated, because the nation state is vampiric actually on the people, it does not constitute the people, it wastes

And it got this 19th century state, nation state, it got rid of many regional ways of being that differ from each other, old custom, laws, old laws, so forth, saying we have to be national community is homogenous, which that is not a traditional and it was just not done in Europe historically. And right now this war in Ukraine is in large part because Ukrainian government tried to do this, to delete, for example, regional differences where you had Russian speakers and for the sake of the nation-state, supposedly, you are no longer allowed to use Russian publicly anymore or even to have Russian schools for your children. So nationalism as a solution to the question of this new racial peoplehood, this isn't something Dominique Wenner or the French New Right want to do.

They want some kind of pan-European being that preserves still the homelands and the races of Europe, but that also protects local folkways and traditions and does not demand their homogenization into some pan-European mass. And this is all an admirable goal. It's funny enough, this is actually how Russia operates. Russia leaves many of its minorities to be. This is how Rome operated. With a few exceptions, there were some minorities that simply out of love of Romanity wanted to become fully Roman. This happened in southern Spain, for example. But other identities, see, I'm using their language now, it gets to me also. But it's not really true. Other peoples within the Roman Empire maintained their own ways, their own traditions, their own peoplehoods apart from Rome.

Rome did not try to homogenize them. But to bring up Rome is interesting because Rome actually is the only plausible candidate for European peoplehood that has actually existed in history so far. But I think Dominique Wenner and others, French in your right, do not want that either. They don't want to resurrect the idea of a Roman Empire and a Romanity for two big reasons. First of all, there are a number of European peoples like Irish or the Scandinavians and some others who were never part of the limits of the Roman Empire. They were never touched by it. They were only brought into the European family later through the Roman spiritual residue, which is Christianity. Which, you know, we are back then to the problem of this, that Wenner does not like that, does

not think Christianity can provide a basis for exclusive European peoplehood. Second of all, Rome itself was not racialist, and there is a long-running contempt against Rome among European nationalists of various kinds. They like instead the image of Armenians and of the Germans as a virtuous, nationalist, localized and racially strong European folk who are standing against this Babylonic confusion of peoples and races from the Mediterranean, this urban melting pot Babylon expanding, they claim, like the Borg and bringing spiritual exhaustion and alcohol and other such thing all around Europe. I'm not saying that's Wenner's opinion on Rome, but it's actually quite common in the rightist circles, I've encountered it many times.

And the Roman way of being is not clear that can be resurrected today either anyway. So you see then this question of what would constitute European peoplehood is quite difficult, more than it would foresee. And I say that as someone who fully agrees with Wenner that such a thing actually exists, but a being to take to the next level, you need a Moses who come with laws and that does not exist yet. What does exist is as a historically organic cultural unity or space of closely related unities and that alone is very hard to serve as the basis of what Schmitt calls a decisionist unity or political union proper, which does not even have to be a state but something like Jewish peoplehood or the Islamic ulema.

Jewish peoplehood was held together, I think, by the rabbis in large part during the time when they didn't have a state. But by the way, Islam is also not racialist, as you know by whatever and so on. So this is why it's even more important to use the traditional words like race and peoplehood and not identity. Because it forces you to think about what is a race and what isn't yet, but could be a race. And Nietzsche says something like this actually when he compared European to Jews. He says the Jews are a race, but the Europeans are not yet. And how they will be forged into such a race. This is the big question, but this big question, I repeat to you, you can't take shortcuts, and it's not just a matter of shortcut of excuse PR language, but of how you sell it

to the people and to the political elites that will lead the people. How do you make them buy it? This language of identity won't cut it. In this sense, I think French New Right come up very short in providing attractive program around the word identity. For someone like Dominik Wenner, who spent his entire life studying this problem, and he spent his many years writing many books about deep history, European culture, its unity and uniqueness, what is it that makes it European, which includes but is never just limited to its race, race is necessary but not sufficient. But this is obvious to him, to somebody like Dominik Wenner, after long study. I won't even say to an intellectual, he's above an intellectual, he's a true historian.

But the people do not have such long study, and the elites that will lead the people also don't, to be frank. So if your public cell for a political project is the stock of identity, I don't think that is adequate. First of all, because the liberal state by now, and even the European Union, they pretend And actually to accommodate identities and not, they promise, really not be seriously harmed even in its program of mass immigration. This is what they claim. I'm not saying it's true. But Dominique Venner, I mean to say, he's very much in conflict with French militant secular republicanism that demands assimilation and so forth. But in Sweden, for example, immigrants were told to preserve their cultures and so forth, but they were still invited in. So you see what I'm saying?

union can actually accommodate identitarianism and allow for mass migration. They just say, you know, you can maintain separate. So there are varieties of secular liberalisms and some of them do allow for expression of so-called identities and multiculturalism and even encourage it, but they would deny sovereignty to any of them, which is really the only issue that matters. And second, and I close this long show on this point, this talk of identity is not good because the sell point, to use PR language, the sell point of liberalism and of certain other kinds of universalism is actually attractive in its own right. And you make a mistake if you don't see this, if you think all universalism is obviously wrong and foolish and holds no appeal to people.

You are making the same mistake when they act dismissive about fascism, don't want to understand why the entire European world went all hot for fascism in the 1920s and 30s. You make the same mistake when you don't want to see that what they offer has its own attractiveness and that you need to compete with that. It offers this so-called urbane cosmopolitanism, it offers prosperity and most of all it promises freedom even if it doesn't give it its promises and freedom is intense attractive to all human but especially to European peoples. And right this is what Wenner and us are trying to convince and if one side offers you this attractive image of freedom even if it is never fully achieved but offers you this promise

and the other side, the identitarian side, they seem at times to offer you just submission and full spiritual assimilation into this or that group, or this or that identity, with the promise of what? The promise of belonging, and maybe a validation of your group self-image. But this is not, in my opinion, a good trade-off. And this wouldn't really appeal to as many people as identitarians seem to think. There is a big disconnect between Wenner and other racialist intellectuals' own experience of European history and culture, which is, right, Dominik Wenner, his own experience of what Europe is, is rich, it's varied, it's intensely romantic and attractive, it's based on Homer and many other poems and texts and literature and philosophy.

But then on the other hand, the main public discourse they engage in, what they seem to offer is this thin gruel. This is what they offer, this public selling point, which is this really bleak talk of identities, of the need for belonging, as if you are some broken, you know, this pseudo-Heideggerian stuff about who you are and self-reflexive, excuse me, self-reflexive free choice act of self-creation and so forth. It's not just that it's hand-wavy inadequate replacement for real peoplehood, which it is, but it's just simply not that attractive, will not often be preferred to the freedom liberalism seems to promise. And this is so even for many non-whites. They often fall back, you know, on what Venner described when he talked about that imam from

France, they fall on that either because the West fails to fulfill its promise of freedom to them, which is, however, a practical and circumstantial failure that could in theory be corrected. Second of all, they fall back on that often just because of intimidation and repression, which is again a failure on the West part because then it cannot guarantee the safety of individuals who want to escape that so-called identity. Let's say they don't want to be Muslim anymore, but they can't escape because the law will not protect them, the Western law. So I'm not defending liberalism here, you know my opinion about it, but I'm telling you as somebody from a nation that was communist and that actually later was trying to replace

communism with nationalism the same way that North Korea did, all the communist nations tried this switch. Certainly Yugoslavia, I don't want to get into it, but the promise of the liberal West at its best version, this can often be more attractive than, you know, identity, belonging and so on. And so while I despise Western liberalism, you have to be able to despise it even at its best. Even when it actually gives people everything it promises, you have to be able to despise it. you have to offer people something better than Western liberalism, not a regression to identity, gay branding, or mammyism, or the hut, or yes, we must follow the imam, we must follow this Jesse Jackson, this identity talk just will not cut it as something better. I will tell you what's better.

When Moses made the Hebrews into a people again, or like Kyrgyz made the Spartans, or Romulus and Numa made the Romans, they did not go around making appeals to individuals and how embracing your identity or this or that identity was a fulfilling thing for you as an individual, or as an act of freedom or this other kind of pomo-denatured Heideggerianism. No, they offered something intensely attractive. They offered the voice of God, the voice of gods. They set people afire for a great task and destiny in which they could unite. That was the basis of unity as a people. An attempt to throw the spear of mankind beyond the mere life of a domestic ape, beyond the human as he found himself. And in all these cases, it is a great longing and striving that was the fuel of a people,

from which it was forged, which sustained it, and always through spectacular shows of divine magic and glory, they brought the voice of the gods. This is how they convinced people. And this is what's better than secular liberalism, and this is why it's been my biggest concern for a long time, how to make man's spirit, how to make man's spirit in a state when it can accept the gift of divine vision again, how to make man on fire so that old friends, as I say, old friends can return and whisper to him, so the gods can return. It's not about social utility of religion, that's bleak, but is instead religion what has to offer genuine ecstasy, the excitement of a new world and new vision previously unseen.

And how to get men to abandon himself to nature, to this delirious urge, to the devotion for the gods. This has been my longest interest, because this is the only way. This is the secret path to the past and to the far future. This is the only way out. You must see this. Until next time, Bep out.