End Of World
Mr. Fukuyama is my least favorite overseas Japanese Francis of what kind name is for Japanese Francis I don't like Fukuyama. I like Fujimori. Okay, I like that kind of Japanese I'd like to see Alberto Fujimori the ex strongman president of Peru the man who suppressed the shining path Maoist guerrillas and you listening Bolsonaro. I'd like to see Alberto Fujimori use, and by the way, he did that, Fujimori defeated the Shining Path guerrillas with Edward Lutvak help. I hope I'm not being indiscreet, but it was Lutvak and his subcontractors who ran down the Shining Path guerrillas. You know, he just finds them and kills them, it's that easy. No advisors, no military attachés, just subcontractors, you know? No human rights eyes on you. And it worked, just death con Terminator style.
But I'd like to see Alberto Fujimori use similar level of majesty on his co-ethnic Fukuyama. I'd like to see them oiled up in sumo match, imagine oil, do they use coconut oil, like Hawaiian wrestling? I want to see oil glistening on Francis Fukuyama. I am joking, I am joking, no violence, peaceful show. But Fujimori, I like Japanese like that, overseas Japanese who win. Samurai spirit. I don't like this lazy, blood-blasted Fukuyama who just wrote a clickbait article for the Atlantic. I suppose these magazines are very hungry for click, for traffic and eyeballs. But here I observed an article in Atlantic, maybe two weeks or so ago, in which he, with With great laziness, he tarnishes his own very well-known theory from The End of History
and The Last Man book, which you know is a book if he had called it The Bug Man, he would have understood better, because he misses the mark entirely on what he described in that book as The Last Man, as do almost all of his intellectual relatives in the Strausoid schools. misinterpret Nietzsche's last man as a type of aimless, apathetic, self-satisfied creature driven by own private comforts, and whose life is perhaps bad only because it's one of lassitude or anomie. And here they miss the mark entirely, you see, because they read out of Nietzsche's account, they edit out of the last man's malevolence, they edit this malevolence out at the fact that the last man can in fact be driven by quite some energy according to Nietzsche,
when he contrasts for example the last man with the bourgeois. The last man wants to tear everything down. When it comes to targeting men of higher spirit, he can exhibit actually very much energy, which is with certain other enhancements that I've added to the description myself. I believe then that the bug man is the more correct, vivid term for our time, because the quality of the insectoid is, these are some of the most aggressive creatures, right? Think Xenomorph from Ilean. But anyway, I go on tangent. I mean to say that his theory in 1989 book, or is it 1991, right, is he had an article first and then he expand to book, right, as Cold War was ending. And his theory, which wrong for many other reasons besides the one I just said, but is still
interesting enough theory to be talked about even now. I think mainly just because bar so low and almost no one thinks or can write in these terms but he betrays his own still wrong but interesting theory in this latest article and please you spit on me if I ever write anything in future so lazy as he does where you know he just misunderstands himself of a journalistic distillation of his own thought. Because if what he meant in his famous book is what appears condensed in this latest article, it would be much dumber and more irrelevant theory than it needs to be. I think the reason he wrote this article, he basically copied the claim from something else written by one Richard Bonanna, who you all like to retweet him so much. Richard Bonanna, not to be confused with Cameron Bonanna.
Reverend Cameron Banana of Zimbabwe fame. Have you heard of this? One of the big honchos of Mugabe's early Zimbabwe in 1980s, early 19, and nobody knows where this man got his theological training, just like Reverend Al Sharpton. But to the entire world, he was Reverend Banana of Zimbabwe, one of the funniest political articles ever written. You can find, if you look, Markstein obit, obituary of Reverend Banana from the Irish Times, I think I've posted this before I will really find it and post it It's just perfect piece of satire not the sentence out of place River and banana You see this man had special tastes He liked to slip drugs to members of Zimbabwe soccer team and then help himself to them while they were asleep and this became a big scandal and
Stein tell us this story in the context of Rhodesia's becoming Zimbabwe It's not just for the download brothers Tarik Has anyone asked Tariq Nasheed about this Reverend Banana of Zimbabwe? Is there such a thing as the Bantu people butt-breaking themselves? History would seem to say so. You go to Africa, and despite, I know many of you like the righteous declaration from African religious leaders and preachers and priests and some dictators saying that they outlaw homosexuality and so forth, but you don't know the reason they fixate on that That is because, let's just say, the down-low phenomenon is universal to the Bantoid race and is rampant as practiced throughout this tropical area, at least of West Sub-Saharan Africa.
And I don't think actually this area is included formally in Richard Burton's famous sotadic zone. Richard Burton, famous English explorer, the first westerner supposedly who entered Mecca, and he wrote a sotadic zone about, the sotadic theory is about those regions of the world where pederasty is practiced. But I think his theory refers specifically to pederasty, where it's traditionally practiced. And I don't think that's necessarily the preferred form, this, what I'm talking about, takes place in West Africa. It doesn't take pederastic form. And furthermore, as it was, and it is a culturally matriarchal society, tropical West Africa, there was no public sanction or cultural regulation of this, what I'm talking
about. It is complicated matter I might cover on future show. But anyway, Cameron Banana, the spoiler of Zimbabwean soccer players, you know, it's called executive privilege. Executive, don't ask Mugabe about this, it's very embarrassing to him, Mao Zedong's tastes were more in line, I think, though, with what you think of as the Roman emperor, let's see, of the Nero or Ilegabalus persuasion. But anyway, yeah, Nero, he, he gay married twice, pioneered in gay marriage. But anyways, this Richard Bonannia isn't related to anything I've been saying, I should not attack him anyway. He makes some nice tweets. I have no problem with them. I'm making friends everywhere, every day, you see. That's what this show is, Friendship Society.
Welcome to Caribbean Reason, episode 121. And don't ask me, please, Brazil election. I will tell you his friends in Brazil chats online and others I hear from are very upset with what appears to be a buckbroken Bolsonaro. Unless men like Bolsonaro or Trump are willing to burn it all down and take steps to organize people to resist. And by people I mean boomers, respectable boomers and so on, as they show willingness and signal willingness to burn it all down, they will always lose this game of chicken. Because the other side is willing simply to dispense now as you see elections matter nothing and they take things to a civil war if need be. And if you don't take that step at least to show you're willing to match them. Because that is what compromise comes out of.
Actually that's what new constitutions come out of, when people lock horns and something needs to be settled. But if you always signal that you will give in, and then you meekly follow the letter of the law after it has been ravished and impregnated by the enemy, you are by definition a cuck, you see. So don't talk to me about these men until they do and become what their enemies accuse them of. Where does that leave Brazil, friends? I don't know. Same place that leaves United States, so more or less maybe they are farther along. You need to understand there's no one at the wheel. I had intended my book for military men in a moment such as this. In Brazil, military men, if they had read my book and absorbed its spirits, they would
have taken charge at a moment like this when the population, or a large enough portion of it anyway, stands with them. The portion actually that pays the taxes. And they could push away both sides, say, we are the moderate compromise solution. And it wouldn't just be rhetoric, it's the reasonable solution, by the way, because neither side can accept the other ruling. It's becoming increasing condition all over the Western world. So you need then some neutral authority to mediate. And same principle, you know, some European countries in the past would invite foreign monarch because no faction could accept another to ascend to power. You know, skin in the game can mean different things. It's become unfortunately a line that kills thought among dissident circles and so forth.
Sometimes you don't want skin in that particular game. Same idea as, just to give analogy, for a while ago I heard classicists tell me this once, although what I'm going to tell you now is surely a wrong explanation, but it was interesting. say, when you look ancient Greek mythology, you see Thessaly, the plain of Thessaly is let's say in central, north central east Greece, the eastern coast of Greece, but north central. And Thessaly, this area features very prominently in Greek mythology, Mount Olympus is in Thessaly. But it goes a long way beyond that. Many of the famous heroes you hear about are from Thessaly. of the most distinguished bloodlines and so on, all from Thessaly. And why is this? Well, in historical times, Thessaly was already a backwater.
You know, you don't hear of, you hear Corinth, Athens, these places, you don't hear so much Thessaly. It was kind of a rustic place. Not much went on there. So the theory goes that the different Greeks from around Mediterranean world already by archaic period, let's say 800 BC or so, 700 BC, when these myths were being formalized by bards, and by then Thessaly was already, as I say, a rustic backwater. And so the different Greek tribes, Ionian, Aeolian, Dorian, and so on, they decided somehow to retrofit the myths, to edit the old tales, to make Thessaly the home of heroes and gods because it would have been otherwise a matter of envy to say that some other, you know, if some prominent Dorian area or city was in a mythology, the home in a tradition that was passed down, the home of such
and such a hero, then Ionians would be jealous, right, and vice versa. So over time, the theory go, they all politely agreed, okay, let's have them all be from Thessaly, you know, nobody cares about Thessaly, they're not part of the game, It's like a country that everybody likes today like Sweden or something or Paraguay or so everyone likes them then and let's say it's that backwater Same idea, you know, but I think actually by the way, this theory is wrong I think the ancient myths and traditions said Thessaly was the home of gods and heroes because it actually was Their considerable evidence. It was a landing place of the first Aryans in Greece And I discussed this on future show maybe in more detail, but I forgive if I've mentioned before but is this same idea agree?
On neutral outsider and that's what military could be in this very divided time You know, what else do you want is either military rule? Which in United States very unlikely because the military is not a separate political self-conscious class But I'm saying in general in Brazil or in other countries It is, and it's either military rule or it's secession, which could happen in same mechanism you see in Nostromo. Actually what's happening now in Brazil is almost exact parallel of Nostromo, a situation where a big, relatively rich country, remember Brazil is eighth or sixth largest economy in the world, despite the fact that it has poverty, they also design, as Steve Saylor likes to remind you, very good airplanes, Embraer, has achieved really excellent reputation.
They have very good engineers, German and Italian, frankly, from the far south of the country. But they are able to make jet airplanes, not many countries are able to do that and sail them around the world. And again, they make very good ones, it's a very good reputation. But there is secession and there isn't, as far as I know, talk or any acceptable path in place for that, either in Brazil or other troubled countries. Or in case of not secession, what is other possible path, I think the far more likely scenario, one of just some of the bloodiest civil wars will happen in the next five to ten years all over the Western world and places like Brazil, in all these divided countries. I think this will be true.
Because the hate that both sides have for each other, but especially the murderous hate that the left has for everyone else, and the murderous rhetoric, you can't really come back from that. The rhetoric is already at Hutu Interahamwe levels, which is why you call it the Interahamwe left. And that's so much for Bolsonaro election. I hear there are ongoing protests at this time. I'm recording this two days, I think, after the election. And you should follow the account on Twitter, Benjamin Braddock and some other friends. They're posting videos from Brazil accounts. They're translating them for you because there are massive demonstrations, truckers closing down highway, people gathering in front of military barracks.
Things are happening that were not happening in the United States following 2020 election. But there should have been. So, you know, it's South American country can still go either way. Let's watch and enjoy a show for now. I may write very soon the letter of exhortation I kept thinking about to send to Bolsonaro, but if I do, I will probably put it under third pseudonym, not Bronze Age pervert. Nobody wants letter of exhortation from Bronze Age pervert. In fact, I design so that people don't want that. But in other week news, other of the weeks news, there are also American elections, and it looks like Democrats will get trounced, which, you know, let's hope they don't steal elections also, because it looks like in Pennsylvania, for example, a report just last night, 250,000
fake ballots were sent out unsolicited, and Pennsylvania already announced they will not do results election day. They will just wait it out until they have votes to do what they need. And what will GOP do? Will they defend themselves in a way they were unwilling to defend Trump? We will see. I do not bet on this. But will Blake Masters win? He taken measures to prevent this happening in Arizona, where again, massive fraud, I think Maricopa County and so on. But will he achieve, more important to me, will he achieve eventually seven consecutive terms as director, as director position of the new American refounded republic, which can accommodate a director position that can unite in himself the, let's say the meandering branches of government.
And I'm talking seven terms, I'm talking my laboratory idea in Antarctica funded by the United States taxpayer where I can continue certain experiments and so on. And finally, there is Elon Musk takeover of Twitter, which some, it looked, it was unclear if it would go through, but I have to tell you, and please hold your fire on Twitter, because it should have been obvious, but rules have not changed yet. Many friends getting banned or locked out of accounts, you know, he cannot just snap fingers. If he does anything rash, they can take it all away from him. And not just what some people are saying now, I think Mystery Grove Publishing is saying they can indict him on nonsense charges, take his money, put him in jail. These are all possibilities.
But even just they can, with some inconvenience to themselves, yes, but they are willing to take the inconvenience, but they can make a new Twitter and they can just shut out this existing Twitter out of any platforms like Apple or payment and so on, and that's that. And then it becomes Gab, it becomes Parler. And then that's it, you see. So ideally, Musk would have a plan to take care of this in the sense that he needs to build his own parallel app platform and payment platform and similar, but he'd need at least a year or so to create that parallel electronic platform environment. And even if it weren't for that, even if it weren't for that, he'd need still to loosen the censorship gradually. Like I say, it would have to, I would have expected gradual loosening over the course
of a year. And even then it probably wouldn't go back to 2016. But you know, any movement in our direction, even for example, a mostly neutral platform, excuse me, that is a great good for us. But many of you cannot hold your, you know, I believe the Kanye thing perhaps was a way to try to embarrass Elon in this, you know, because you have this mentally ill retarded celebrity chimp, engaging in low IQ performating chimp, and unlike what many of you believe, this will do zero to move discussion in the direction you want. In the minds of normies, this will just further associate things like antisemitism and associated things, it will put that in their mind with low IQ minorities in the middle of having a nervous breakdown, you know, but that's the association that the normie will see.
But the other side cannot ask for, then, a better fake controversy, you know, to force Elon into a media-staged moment of decision. In other words, oh, is this what you want, boys and girls? This is what a Twitter without censorship would look like, boys and girls. So I don't know if it's true, but it feels like that. It doesn't even need to be planned. I mean, some people are just unstable and will precipitate this without having their leash pulled by anybody. But same thing like the explosion of spam on Twitter the last week or two, right? Because for normies, things like spam and things like Kanye are super annoying and they're off-putting, you see. So it's like a way to embarrass Elon and to stop him from what the only thing that he
could do, which is to gradually loosen the restrictions while keeping a liberal face. And that's the only thing he can do. I mean, actually, he's a liberal himself. But you should welcome a liberal who believes in freedom and free speech. Just like what his name, the bearded Jack Dorsey, right? Also I told you for quite a long time, he didn't agree with censorship. He was just a coward, he couldn't stop, they took the company out of his own hands. But the techno-libertarian Silicon Valley people, they actually, you know, they believe in free speech. And you should welcome that, or do you imagine that you are in a position to take power and to be a dictator for yourself and limit free speech in your own direction?
I think there's some delusion of some people on our side, but some grace period to see of what Elon Musk does, give him a grace period. But I feel that things don't depend on what you or I say. I think that mentally ill or malicious posters will not let Elon Musk loosen restrictions and they will give plenty of ammunition to the left to say, see, this is what we have to stop. And so many such things. And in general, Elon, the richest man in the world, supposedly, and one of the men integrated with American war efforts even, as you can see with the startling thing in Ukraine. But the fact that he's targeted so viciously for merely wanting to uphold a liberal value like freedom of speech, supposedly it's one of the cornerstones of liberal democracy, right?
But that he's targeted for this should dispel for some of you the delusion that it's rich corporations and rich men who run the world. They run nothing, okay? At most they are profiteers and they are associates to a program that's run by the left. It is the left in the driver's seat. And you see this actually in Brazil, to come to think of it, let me go on small tangent. You see in Brazil, okay, you know how? You know the show Elysium, the movie I mean, with Matt Damon's, okay? And in this movie, there's global poverty, everything looks like a slum, like Haiti, and the movie presents global poverty as a plot, a plot by the very Machiavellian rich who abscond to a fabulously wealthy orbital station. And they are feeding them empirically, you know, on everybody's poverty.
And a smart frog points this out, you know, that actually, in real life, there isn't, And there's not going to be any orbital station. There's not going to be. The people bringing you world Haiti are not doing it because they have a 44-dimensional chess Machiavellian plot. Most of them actually believe in it. And the public justification for this happening is humanitarian and egalitarian and many genuinely believe in it. And in the process, it is undeniable that some of the very rich, but only certain interests by the way, that they are profiting, for example, from the Haitian of America with the import of low-cost labor and so on. But again, I don't think they're in the driver's seat. Catholic charities are actually far more important in this process, by the way.
But the driver of it all is a humanitarian, egalitarian morality which people on the right have stopped challenging. You cannot exclusively base your attacks on the evils of our time on economic analysis, okay? saying, don't do that. I've done that for many years, so have everyone frog Twitter. But people have stopped criticizing the humanitarian, egalitarian, leftist side of it, frankly because many leftists have infiltrated our spaces, and because there is not really any cost to blaming it on the corporations and so on. That doesn't get you cancelled as much as talking about race and migration and attacking humanitarian and egalitarian ideology does. You know, but that's all people are doing now is this pseudo-Marxoid class analysis
and it's just wrong because the rich are not in the driver's seat. Who is in driver's seat is the Marxoid GNC global Negro communism left. And why do I say Brazil, okay? Because you may have heard me rant on this show in the past when I was in Rio de Janeiro and I had to play Frogger on the street. That was in very nice rich neighborhoods where you have to play frogger so that a mentally ill Negro does not scream in your face or you don't step in shit. Go to a country like this where the economic situation is actually the one you fear the most. It's the one United States elites like the Bushes are trying to replicate in America. In other words, there are vast inequalities with the poor, who are as poor as in Africa
and the rich as rich as anywhere in the first world, vast economic inequality, and the middle class mostly wiped out, labor costs very low, but you look at the city and wow, all prime real estate is taken up by favelas. Guess what? They're not work camps outside the city. They have the prime real estate, the nicest views, the nicest hills overlooking whole city. They are unchallenged in many ways on many of the streets. Bolsonaro stopped some of that, but not really before him. How does it work? So now you can construct another layer of the all-seeing conspiracy run by the rich. They're doing that for cover, you know, you can always say something, but the simpler explanation is that the rich do not have the power to remove these masses of teeming poor from those areas.
In fact, it would be inconceivable for them to even propose it, right? It would be called ethnic cleansing, right? They don't do it because they can't. They don't have the power to, because if you look at who it was who actually brought the slum dwellers to these cities, in Brazil as well as in Buenos Aires, Argentina, it was the populist left who brought them in. But really another word is the Marxist demagogues, or in the case of Argentina, unfortunately it was Perón who, I like certain aspects of Peronism, but I have to tell you, Perón is like Bannon on steroids. economic leftist populism on steroids. His descendants are anti-IMF, anti-Ziz, same nationalist economic rhetoric. But what did he do? It didn't stop Argentina, by the way,
by our time, from becoming overrun with its own migrants from Bolivia and Peru and so forth. How interesting how that works. If you don't focus on matters of race and culture and history and identity, the economic analysis will not save you from that fate, you see. But Perón himself brought in La Negrada. He did internal migration from Argentina's provinces. And this is what La Negrada was called during his time. The people in Buenos Aires called this the mass, the dark mass of people that were brought in as a way to wage demographic war on the rich neighborhoods and on Perón's opponents. And then in time, it's true that then certain of the rich learn they can profit from this and they go along with it.
Okay, you bring me cheap labor and also you wipe out the conditions of life for the middle class who are my actual potential competitors. And so certain of the very rich and Marxist politicians especially are then locked in this idiotic symbiotic frenemy relationship, which this dyad is how nations then start to circle the drain. But it is the left that is in the driver's seat here, not the rich. And in particular, what drives the public justification of it is a humanitarian and egalitarian morality, like I say, that forbids cities and nations from saying, we don't want shit in our streets, we don't want slums, we don't want crime, and so on. But very few frogs are actually trying to challenge this now on its own terms. This is why I say this. I went on a tangent.
Anyway, I do not have a lot of respect. As you see, for the so-called Brazilian upper class, they are cucks ruled by their women. They are soft men. They lose control of their streets, they move to other neighborhoods, and now they appear to get ready, let country be dominated by the poorest province that just makes up votes out of nowhere. I mean, it's not even a racial thing, you know. The Sao Paulo and Rio is where all the money gets made. It's yes, it's where all the ambitious white people go to make money, but many others too. And they went for Bolsonaro by something like 10, 15 percent points. They are also the most populous states, like Sao Paulo, I think, number two biggest city in the world. You go there and it's just buildings like Blade Runner, high-rise buildings stretching
to the horizon. But they let themselves be cheated in this election, and it's an outgrowth of their lack of – you call it asabia, for example, esprit de corps, solidarity, but really it's ultimately a lack of manliness. It's a lack of men having the manliness to band together and form political fraternities that can force political change and can save their cities. But how can they do that when even in their private lives they are cucks who give up their streets and especially who obey their women? You see this, it's a sociological fact. It's not just Brazil in upper class, I'm not picking on them only, it's many Western countries. But I don't have a lot of respect for that. And I have to tell you it's ultimately then a spiritual problem, because if these people
had read my book, like I say, and absorb its spirit, they wouldn't let themselves be treated this way. And what can be done now? What can they do other than complain? I don't know. But I still have some hope for Brazilian truckers and for police who do not want to see their country being given to the cartels. And for Bolsonaro seeing, you know, here's an opportunity, I will try maybe to write him a public letter on this. But we will see. I go on very long tangents. I hope you like this. Where was I on this show? This show about Mr. Banana, a popular article on Fukuyama, or rather about Fukuyama's own response, and I will be right back to discuss that. You see, Mr. Banana believes that because Mr. like Bolsonaro are facing setbacks, and
that because this week Russia is doing bad in the war, that this means Fukuyama was right all along, and that liberal democracy, which they never define, but that liberal democracy He sees the regime-type waiting at the end of history for all mankind. That is, they mean to say it's in some ways mankind's historical telos. And this is the idiocy you see, political philosophy according to the week's news. As I say, if there is another one or two Melones like in Italy, or if Bolsonaro or someone like him come back to power in four years, or if Trump wins, or if let's say next month Russia make advances again. You will see other serious thinkers writing thought pieces about how now Samuel Huntington would have been right all along. It's all hysterical overreaction to
the weeks of the month's news is all this is. And now, Bananas main argument in this article, which again, Francis Fukuyama himself repeats in his piece from just two weeks ago in the Atlantic, that argument is well Russia's wall isn't going well in Ukraine and China seems to have made a mistake with zero Covid policies and just endless lockdowns which are now seriously slowing their economy and many such thing and that because of these apparent mistakes the supposed alternatives to liberal democracy have been once again discredited so after all you know history will really be over very soon just you will just see it because China bad, Russia bad, the media says there are enemies therefore liberal democracy win because as they think liberal democracy is
winning a regional proxy war and carried itself through the Wuhan flu somewhat better, they say it's regime at the end of time. It's a shallow, and in its rashness it's actually quite an emotional argument, I think, determined entirely by who their friends in the media call friend and enemy, and not by any objective considerations of what liberal democracy is and is not. The other supposed alternatives to liberal democracy they mention are again things like Meloni in Italy or Salvini or Orban, Victor Orban, but they never explain exactly how these are supposed to be alternatives or what's wrong with them beyond certain smear words. So I think they fundamentally misunderstand their own theory, like I say. The fundamental part of Fukuyama's theory is
one you could say of what is attractive. This center of Fukuyama history, the center of his theory is what seduces others, other nations, other peoples. What makes other nations want to emulate you and join you? And he's rather vague, actually, also about what this means, right? Because, for example, if you have a very rich man who is rich independent of his ideas or activity, if he came into his wealth by luck or by playing casino or by an inheritance that he is squandering, then certain opportunists might very well flock to his side and even ape some of his ideas and laugh at his jokes. But that doesn't mean, you know, you see what I am saying here. I mean, remember, these men hate Trump because as a rich man, he could get very attractive wives.
But they, as perhaps even more rich men, could never, you know. I mean, look at Bill Gates' wife, and I don't want to get into this. But Fukuyama, vagueness, even on this, what I just said in his original book, and his related inability now, especially to distinguish between the nations of which he is a partisan on one hand, and the The ideologies or ideals or principles call you what you want, but these, these things what I just said that are supposed to, that nations are supposed to embody or look up to on the other hand, his inability to distinguish between these was a fatal weakness even of his original position, but even more so now. So I will talk on the show of these things, of his own misunderstanding of his theory
and of really, okay, in the end, who cares what banana and Fukuyama. This show I talk what is future mankind in regard to political and social organization, in regard to men hope, political hope for future, and what are alternatives if any. Now Second City Bureaucrat has two very good rebuttals to Fukuyama's clickbait and his substack and he attacked Fukuyama cheerleading article. I will discuss on next segment. I will be right back. Yes, did you like these musics? I have never tried playing organ musics on this show I think. And I very rarely do harpsichord because it almost never translate well on car audio, or on good headphones it might, but otherwise, no. And I was taken with this piece today, though, and I wanted to put for you.
So anyways, the Second City Bureaucrat, whose substack I once again encourage all my listeners to subscribe, and I mean become his pay pigs, just do it now. You all will do it eventually anyway, without me telling you why will you, because, and And I say this not just because he is my friend, but rather, he is one of most insightful satirists now. It's top-class satire. And when you subscribe to one of us, the frog Twitter old heads, you give tremendous freedom, you see. Excuse me. You free us from a blackmail, as in, we become maybe dependent on you as our audience, but then we can no longer be fired from a job for our opinions and that type of thing people can't do to us anymore. And on the other hand, as we have no billionaire or other backers, you really, you get the
only free thought, really free thought and writing that exists today. And we already do this simply because we are true believers and many of us do it to a great risk for ourselves. We have done this for a long time. And in America, you know, if you tell truth, scum eventually dedicate themselves to try to attack you and so forth. They become your stalkers and so on. But yes, this also my way of thinking you. Your patronage allow me to see, to hold my tablets of hatred for all mankind unveiled before the world. To spread my psychosis unvarnished around the world. Beholden to no one but the little cat-like monkey creature that sits on my shoulder and forces me to speak the truth. It is cat-monkey hybrid. But anyway, so Fukuyama claims that the end of history revisited, right?
ends after all, because despite supposed setbacks, he mentions that liberal democracies have had over the past 15 years that it's still the most viable and attractive alternative. And again to this end, he lists especially China and Russia as these alleged alternatives. And the bureaucrat makes the point that Fukuyama never really defines or paints an attractive image of what liberal democracy is. He just does it by negative. He does so by comparison with the so-called authoritarian states and their faults are, and let me see how the bureaucrat lists these faults according to Fukuyama, and I will read for you from the bureaucrats articles that is. Fukuyama doesn't really define liberal democracy in the article except
negatively in comparison to what modern authoritarian and strongman regimes are not. He suggests the weakness of the authoritarian regimes are the following. 1. They are inefficient. 2. They don't permit public discussion or debate. 3. They don't have a mechanism of accountability. 4. They don't permit the level of freedom that people want. And now the bureaucrat moved to talk about the Austrian perspective. And it's not very long. And I want to read for you this. His point occurred to me, too, because of what Fukuyama means when talking liberal democracy. He never actually mentioned the liberal old heads like Friedrich von Hayek or any of these people. Where would they stand on these things? So I read now from the bureaucrat substack the Austrian perspective.
This is part of his response to Fukuyama. This is hardly intuitive from a theoretical point. This is right after he mentioned the supposed faults of the authoritarian regimes. This is hardly intuitive from a theoretical standpoint. the Austrian economic critique of the modern state as an example. Although I'm skeptical of some aspects of Austrian economics, I think they get something right about liberal democracy. Monarchies last far longer than strongmen or authoritarian governments. We know from the Austrians and authors like Bertrand de Jouvenel that some monarchs are pretty good at staying out of their subjects' hair. And we also know why monarchs have an incentive to do so, for the same reasons that a heritable
estate wants to protect and ensure the productivity of its land for multiple generations. Even though there were no mechanisms of accountability, many high-modern European monarchs permitted freedom and public debate." I interject here, that's right, 19th century Habsburg, Austria, you had, I think by any definition, much more freedom, both economic and of speech, than you have in any Western state, not just now, but even before the woke thing. I continue reading from the Bureaucrat. What ultimately doomed European monarchies was their inefficiency and the collapse of their legitimacy. In the first case, monarchies were exceptionally incompetent at matching democracies' authoritarian capacity to mobilize resources and personnel necessary for modern warfare.
That is, they were not good at using state power to control people. Let me just stop for a moment. That's right, authoritarian democracy. Is there such a thing? It seems lost on people like Fukuyama that there is, which is, even though they claim to be against that, they forget that the very states they're trying to defend are actually less liberal than could be because of these authoritarian tendencies. So anyway, continue reading from the bureaucrat, who states very plainly that traditional monarchies were inefficient because they were not as authoritarian as these modern states that that Fukuyama and friends are calling liberal democracy. I continue reading, concerning legitimacy, monarchy declined because people were increasingly
disinclined to believe European monarchs' hilarious just-so stories for why they deserve to rule. At some point, people who inherit their station have to earn it again. In fact, from the Austrian perspective, it seems like the authoritarian leaders Fukuyama lists Putin, Orban, Zemur, Salvini, Xi, Trump, etc., are themselves products of liberal democracy This means such strong men clawed their way toward a longer and broader scope of rule than liberal democracy would ordinarily permit by leveraging the institutions of liberal democracy themselves. Their authoritarianism is therefore an extension of the authoritarianism inherent in liberal democracy, and the scope of their authority reflects the scope of political intervention in private freedom demanded by democracy.
If liberal democracy had taken its liberal right seriously, there would be no governmental apparatus for these strong men to exploit. It is precisely the contradictions inherent to liberal democracy that produce so-called authoritarianism. Most of these contradictions stem—I added the so-called in them. The bureaucrat is taking Fukuyama at his word here, but really to call someone like Salvini an authoritarian. Can Mr. Fukuyama name one authoritarian act that Salvini did? Anyway, I continue to read. Most of these contradictions stem from the conflicts between the moralism of liberalism and the nihilism of democracy. But some also stem from the rights and norms that many people often associate with liberalism.
For example, to manage his state, Putin, unlike a monarch, must pander to the socialists, the liberals, the nationalists, the ethnic groups and religious groups. This means it is legitimate for him to extend the authority of the state into every sphere of life to satisfy these groups and keep them on his side. Nobody bats an eye when liberal democracies affect the same level of intervention in the life of the nation. Or take for instance the most infamous strongman of the 20th century, Adolf Hitler. Hitler leveraged the institutions of liberal democracy and the unity provided by its constitution to bolster his own power. Without the Weimar constitution, it's likely Hitler would have never come to exercise such broad and invasive power.
Whether liberal democracy empowers a strongman or some nebulous, mulbuggy and network of interest groups and institutions is besides the point." You know, end quote, end quote, okay? And this discussion reminds me that, yes, again, what happened to Friedrich von Hayek? What happened to him? Because he is one of great thinkers of liberalism, is he not? And I remind you, he says that people born after 1914 never really knew what liberty meant. And it's not a small matter, you know, it's not about occasional lapses in ability to uphold liberal rights and due process. We are not nitpicking here. It's consistent erasure of fundamental liberties since at least 1914, but they certainly accelerate with New Deal,
where in 1930s America became a bureaucratic managerial state, which again has accelerated recently down this path to where, okay, this article from bureaucrats, this is what he does. He goes through not small examples of lapses in liberalism commitment to itself because of whatever temporary circumstance or emergencies, but major permanent changes in American life and even in aspirations that make Fukuyama's case a moot point. In other words, the setbacks Fukuyama should have addressed and which liberal democracy he has indeed sustained since at least 2000, but actually from before, but these setbacks are at home. They have nothing to do with China or Russia. And China or Russia were in any case, by the way, never really alternatives to what America
claims to represent, not serious alternatives. If Fukuyama really thought they were, let me just say, I will reveal on this show that I can make his case better than he can. I have more respect for his ideas than he does. But let's look for a moment first at a bureaucrat explanation of how liberal democracy has transformed into something quite different. And you know, bureaucrats go through lists. He started with mass surveillance. By the way, he has another addendum to his attack on Fukuyama where he talked about how networks of informants have been planted throughout so-called dissident groups, especially on the left, but actually I think the American government was even more worried about the birchers and things like that, but networks of informants have been widely used by American
security apparatus since 1950s and 60s, and the purpose of these informants is just basically to put them there. The bureaucrat quotes a book to this effect, that the American government puts informants, let it be known that there are informants, in order to create an atmosphere of paranoia and of self-censorship. And there's an article posted in The Hill that the bureaucrat talks about, this is in the addendum to his attack on Fukuyama, but there's an article posted in The Hill that go into quite detail about the growing gap between what Americans are willing to say in public and their private beliefs. Again, this mirrors what happened in East Bloc, where people say one thing in public, another in private, they were afraid to speak their mind. Well, this article in The Hill documents
a widespread increasing phenomenon in American life, where there are, and they measure it, percentage gap between what people are willing to say in private and in public and on various issues, and it's enormous gaps. People live in a kind of fear, reminiscent of late East Bloc, okay? But in this article, the bureaucrat mentions mass surveillance, he mentions primitive communal enforcement, he calls it the long house gossip regime. In other words, an informal social score system, much like China has, where you can get deplatformed and fired from job and many such things. You've all seen it happen accelerated in the last few years. He mentioned he has another part of autocratic institution of worship, where basically if
you remember after 2016 election when Donald Trump said that he would reform the intelligence services, which that is supposedly the people's right to do, they are part of executive branch to who are they beholden, ultimately they have to be directly to the people who, only the executive gets directly elected by them all, right? But Chuck Schumer say they got six ways to send it to get at you, okay? And similar stories are repeated by other Democrat politicians like Leahy and others to the effects that it's widely accepted that the American security state and these intelligence agencies are beholden to no one and can intimidate elected officials, intimidate the president that's supposed to be their leader, and so forth.
Not to speak of the copious Netflix and other documentaries that present image of omnipotent FBI and CIA, which again colors American discourse, makes it into this paranoid style of discourse that you found in late Soviet Union or late East Bloc. Similarly the bureaucrats talk about group narcissism and this I think should cut the legs out from anything Fukuyama says because the promotion of fractious ethnic identities who are then not held to the same standards of law is beyond anything that goes by the name liberal democracy. The Bureaucrats give many examples of this. For example, of course, the George Floyd media-induced riots, where you saw massive public funerals and gold caskets for St. George Floyd, the new Jesus, paraded around different cities.
While people were not allowed to visit their dying relatives in hospital, and their dying relatives included old people with dementia, 40-year-old boys with cancer, I don't mean to tug at your heartstrings, but I saw a story on this just the other day. And while these really cruel, egregious offenses were happening in the name of this pandemic, the law was suspended for one ethnic group to cater to their own sense of self-conception and narcissism. Numerous restrictions on scientific research and on free speech. I quote from the Bureaucrat article, indeed, these identities are so powerful that sensitivity to their beliefs has justified the federal government persecution of scientists. The National Institute of Health now denies researcher access to an important genetic
database if it deems their research to have violated the subjective self-image of select groups." Right? Okay, so intimidation of scientists, censorship of scientific projects, because they might upset the dignity of certain groups, you see. So what has to do exactly with liberalism? Nothing. The United States has become a kind of democratic authoritarianism, or pseudo-democratic, where the lowest elements of society are mobilized as a hammer. Police stand downs and selective prosecution allow, for example, attacks on anyone who say anything that oppose regime pieties. And so men like Bill Kristol, for example, they can complain about anonymity and say why you need to be anonymous. We don't live in unfree society. I'm going to de-anonymize Mike Anton.
But when he does that, the reason he's doing it is because he know he exposes somebody like Anton to what the bureaucrat explained is communal primitive censure, the longhouse and these types of sanctions, plus also physical violence, this is what I mean. Police stand down to allow, for example, excuse me, Charles Murray cannot go speak to campus because there is a riot and his co-speakers get a concussion and they burn down the campus. And there are never any punishment of people who do that. This is how repression in American society, so-called liberal democracy, works now. Mobilization of fractious ethnic identities. This is the civil religion. And Fukuyama himself, he supports this in Ukraine. Actually, you know, I will read again from a bureaucrat article, because very humorous.
We've already seen explicit policy recommendations to this effect, meaning promoting Negro-latory and other forms of anti-white, fractious ethnic identities as the new civil religion. He says from academics of the highest pedigree, people like Talcott Parsons, you listen to my show on global Negro communism and so forth. I continue to read. We can see this at home today in the promotion of grandiose abstract group identities by by federal and local governments through the adoption of critical race and legal studies, and abroad in the United States' promotion of extreme nationalism in, for example, Ukraine. Fukuyama himself touts the power of Ukrainian national identity, which he claims Putin underestimated.
Perhaps Putin mistakenly thought the end of history was upon us and that the Ukrainian people wouldn't so readily adopt primitive, ascriptive group identities. This wonderful satire, I think. And let me just read for you the closing segment. It's hard for one to conclude liberal democracy is winning when liberal democracies are characterized by widespread surveillance, social engineering programs, extralegal secret police, primitive mob justice, censorship of scientific research, and cynical political self-censorship. The reality is that liberal democracy already lost. Its institutions and legitimacy have been marshaled to develop mechanisms which undermine the autonomy of individual citizens and encourage a return to primitive identities and social controls.
I'm sure there are explanations for why these things are all good and liberal, because there's always an argument when you're working on Fukuyama's level of abstraction. For example, one could argue that the fact that the revelations about mass surveillance and illegal wiretap warrants against the Trump campaign, the fact that these cause minor controversies prove that liberal democracy works. I'd offer only that it proves America has a subculture that finds such things abhorrent, and that there are not yet enough negative incentives to prevent people from protesting such developments. Journalists, the government and NGOs are working overtime to create these incentives, rest assured. What is winning history? Not liberal democracy.
The leadership of the West, especially its foreign policy leadership, is winning. The purpose of calling their successes a triumph of liberal democracy is to provide management-level types with a mental analgesic to convince them they're fulfilling a moral purpose. They may be more moral than some of their opponents, but their victories are hardly world-historic moral victories on a level warranting an eschatological claim like the end of history. Some of the reasons for the relative success of the West are that it won decisive wars, accumulated an enormous amount of resources, and dispensed with parochial ties, principles, and obligations in favor of nearly unbounded openness to change, be it
technological, social, or otherwise. It also had an exceptional founding stock and continues to exploit the exceptional members of other groups. In other words, the United States has the traits of some of the more successful empires in history. The modern strongman, the modern An absolutist, which is really just Fukuyama's euphemism for a populist or a nationalist in the West, but not in Ukraine, the Saudi Arabia Republic, or Israel, is comparatively sclerotic, intolerant, burdened by historical rights and obligations, communal loyalty, religious convictions and other concrete orientations, in short, thoroughly un-imperial. Fukuyama doesn't notice these contrasts or the collapse of liberalism, because he's only
concerned with foreign policy. And that ends, I just read for you the final paragraph of the bureaucrats article. And this is my point, that Fukuyama cheapens his own theory by turning it into one of cheerleading for particular countries he favors, without actually regard to regime type, whether it still exists in these countries, and more important, whether anyone in these countries continues to believe and to aspire to these. And, well, Fukuyama is the kind who only use the phrase regime type, you know, but you can say, you can think of it like this. Does anyone important in America really believe in, aspire to the ideal of liberalism anymore? Because that, what his theory is actually about, not whether this or that country or
power is doing better or worse at such a time of year, but whether liberalism is the future, regardless of whether it should find a home or not. And I will be right back to talk this more, and next music I will play Bach organ piece, continuation from previous segment, and I tell you this, music, it makes me, people misunderstand Bach, they think it a mathematical or orderly music, or some such thing about balance or order, and they pretend to listen to it for actually autistic reasons. I like the ratios, it's mathematical. I think you make mistake in this. It is music with two moods. On one hand, it is regal and majestic. It's a very foreign feeling for Western men today, regal. You can find this way when you see a Shakespeare king speak, this regal.
On the other hand, it is the music of the Holy Spirit, you know, the snake-handling Pentecostal chimp-out revival meeting. It is both these things. And if when you listen to Bach, you don't feel like getting up and clapping to beat, like snake-handling Pentecostal, you're listening to it wrong. And then of course there's another element to it, it's a darker hidden element few see or want to see, it's something that doesn't fit in any of the overt Western or Christian traditions, there's an undercurrent in it that's forbidden to talk, but I have an article coming out in a couple of days on classical music and the right-winger. You may enjoy this article, I will link it when you come out. But now we go to break, please enjoy musics.
I mentioned on a previous episode that Russia may very well be a liberal democracy as well, and some disagreed with me, but others told me yes indeed and encouraged me to elaborate on this. So I do this now, and I show you why Fukuyama and Banana's latest case about the end of history as supposedly liberalism triumphing embodied in America and its Western allies is not correct, and even actually turns Fukuyama's original thesis into a journalistic triviality. I mean, it's still wrong, but it's wrong for other, more important reasons. But during Cold War, people within East Bloc were lied to constantly about life in America. And yet they knew they were being lied to, they saw movies, they saw shows, and they heard from relatives or friends who lived there.
So I can tell you, in East Bloc, we all loved America. I'm not exaggerating what I'm about to tell you. I grew up hoping the Americans would invade. This was not something like passionately held hope by almost anyone, but it was jokingly held by most people, I think. And in that world, as that decrepit system fell of its own inner contradictions, the inner contradictions of late Marxism, Fukuyama's theory actually seemed plausible to people around the world at that time. Again, it is theory of historical progress, or he would not use this language maybe, but of the historical telos, or end of man, manifested in the aspirations of people around the world for American-style system. And for a brief moment in early 1990s, it seemed to be it was something you could believe.
But conversely, now you are being lied to about what life is like in Russia, for example, and also in China, by the way. You are being lied to by people like Fukuyama, but because most people don't watch movies or television from those countries, and because they don't visit and might not know people People who have been there, they don't know they're being lied to, which allows shouting dwarves like this, in part this Fukuyama, but there are lower shouting dwarves. They go on MSNBC and they froth at the mouth for conflict and war and they compare, for example, Russia and North Korea. And many who watch believe this. And I'm not saying Russia is actually any kind of alternative really to America or something that people should emulate, but you are still being lied about it.
Day-to-day life in Russia is not very different at all from the United States. It's a less rich country, yes, but even this is misleading to say, I think. For example, I remember my friend General Odom, William Odom, who was an extreme anti-Russia hawk. He would get mad at me when I asked, why can't America work with Russia? He'd say, you can never get anywhere trying to reach an agreement with Russians. The extreme Atlanticist NATO hawk type, first head of NSA under Reagan, before that he had worked Carter administration. We end up have many whiskeys and such together and, by the way, he was also very anti-Israel and against American engagement in the Middle East. Again, people forget about this rivalry within foreign policy establishment.
I think I mentioned maybe previous episode, I forget, but it's old rivalry. do not like Neocons, or they didn't used to anyway, and they may have reached a temporary alliance against Trumpists or Buchananites, William Odom disliked Buchanan. They're not necessarily allies of populists, I remind you, even if the Atlanticists now, even if they dislike Neocons, both dislike the populist Buchanan types. But anyway, he was my friend and he would tell me, this man again who very much hated Russia, okay? He spoke, he was not emotional retard about it. He just disliked very much Russian regime and Russia's geopolitical rival. He spoke perfect Russian, I think. And he'd tell me, you go to Moscow now, and this was right before he died, so let's say maybe around
2007, but he'd say you go to Moscow and he talk in wonder of things he saw there that you do not see in American cities, right? This was General Odom. He hate Russia. He You know, if you buy all this hateful idiot propaganda now about Asiatic ogre Russians who've never seen paved streets, you know, this is very rich coming from people with flooded subways in New York City and rolling blackouts in California. American cities and airports aren't exactly state of art, okay, but Moscow actually is. It's a very advanced city by comparison. Furthermore, you know, every girl you see is a 10 by American standards. men do not have to have their living standards cratered in the most fundamental point of life possible, where your pool of girlfriend or spouse choice is shrunk by some 70% because
of the dysfunctional diet and lifestyle fostered in United States. But let's be fair, Mexico, number two in obesity. But it's pointless, I mean, to say to compare the material well-being and resources back and forth like this, because even if, I will grant you that United States is much richer, By the way, that's an inheritance that it's squandering. It's not because of the system that it has now. That's not the point. I'm saying the mood of the day, okay, the life of the mood of the day, okay, I actually grew up in alternative regime. I know what an alternative looked like. I was a young pioneer. That is the communist analog of Hitler's youth. Very briefly, but I was in that organization, we all had to be.
I remember the feel, even though I was a small boy, I remember it did not feel like America or like liberal democracy of any kind, okay, it was very different in feel. It was on its last legs, but it was still technically a mobilised society, highly ideological, it was communist, okay, it felt, you can think Iraq under Saddam was like this too, which is why the neocons, part of the, let's say, the good faith mistake they made, they thought, okay, this is like East Europe, it feels like East Europe, well yes, the Baathist state was similar to East Europe in that it's a party state where the party mobilized all of society with aggressive grassroots recruitment and also this kind of paranoid style of willingness to be violent.
But the difference was in East Europe the party oppressed society and was parasitic on it, whereas in Iraq the party oppressed society, was parasitic on it, but was also the only thing holding the fake country together. But that's another story. But okay, that felt different. And I haven't been, for example, to Bhutan, but I imagine that feels different too. Russia does not, okay? In fundamental day-to-day feel, fundamental life, manner of life day-to-day is very much like West. For example, for all chimp out about putler genocide of the gays. And when that happened, what they meant is he passed a law forbidding that they do to children what they're doing now in West, that all the American conservatives are trying to fight.
In other words, this movement to sexualize and groom children and get them to become beyond meat. Okay, so Putler passed the law saying you cannot propagandize children with sex and groom them, sexual propaganda. But if you do, you get fined, fined, okay, fined, that's all. And for that, the entire Western global Negro communist establishment became mobilized against him, or as some people call it, the gay, the globalist American empire became mobilized against him. an appropriate acronym in this case. But the truth is that despite all of this gay life, there's a vibrant gay scene in Moscow, okay? There are gay club in Moscow. There's also in young people's relations with each other, there is Tinder or whatever equivalent there was, and girls act unfortunately much the same way
as they do anywhere else with the attention fagging on camera and so on. And the entire Russian youth, if you've listened to my show when the Russians with attitude were on, But unfortunately, the entire Russian youth aspires actually to a typical Western life, and not just aspires to it, but lives it day to day. The TikTok life, the Tinder life, okay, and the thing is, unlike, for example, under communism, where we were not allowed technically to do that, they're not censored at all for this in modern Russia. Nobody chides them, nobody tells them they can't or shouldn't. Okay, the stories you hear online about Duganists, traditionalists, That's not life in Russia. Life in Russia is very much like life in West Europe. Now, there are attitudes about life and ethnic differences aside,
because you can also find ethnic differences when you go to Portugal or Japan. Women get treated differently and so forth, and nobody denies that those are liberal democracies. But ethnic variations aside, people's manner and aspirations are much the same as in the West. It's a liberal democracy in that fundamental day-to-day sense. And now Fukuyama and certain others, They engage them in political theory pontifications about Putin's supposed tyranny and sole decision-making authority and how he's an autocrat. But that is wrong as well, the political so-called system or theory part of it. Putin is not a tyrant. He cannot act according to his whims. He is the figurehead of the Russian deep state, which took control of country as it was spinning out of order in late 1990s.
Why I have in Argentina many Russian friends who came in late 1990s, these people were starving. They had enormous crash because of Yeltsin mismanagement of country. And Putin has to juggle placating the deep state interests as well as quite a large number of other interests, as the bureaucrat said at the end of his article. Having a leader who is strong and who temporarily suspends some laws is not furthermore a proof that country is not a liberal democracy. Otherwise you would have to say America under FDR and France under Charles de Gaulle stopped being liberal democracy, but very few except for example Austrian economists and Hayekians would go that far. In fact, they would say it stopped being liberal democracy even before that with World War I.
Certainly Fukuyama would never say that, right? Well, it's the same with Russia now. Russia was faced huge crisis, so it went for FDR-type leader. What wrong with that? And I'm not just being sophistic. Sophistic. I really do believe this. Let me put it for you this way. It's interesting to think about. Consider a big emergency that changes life. You just saw one. Luhan flew, right? Well, let's see that for a moment. Did the suspensions of freedom in the West mean that regime form had changed to something that wasn't liberal democracy? You know, remember extreme violence was actually used against protesters and so on. Trudeau is not the president of France. I confuse them. Macron, they're indistinguishable. Same creature.
Macron used extreme violence against protests that people's eyes were taken out. Excuse me. Trudeau seized people's bank accounts, seized private property because of protests. In the United States, the law again was not applied equally. Again remember the whole 2020 summer St. George Floyd chimp out, remembers the attack on the White House in May 2020, I believe. Nobody talk about this anymore. Did regime form change? I'd say there was certainly something wrong, right? Because Snowden, excuse me, yes, Snowden, but Sweden and Japan, Sweden and Japan did not do this. The Japanese constitution, and this very relevant, why didn't they do this? Because the Japanese constitution enshrined certain liberal rights against medical experimentation tyranny.
So they forbade this kind of thing that happened in the West, okay? They took certain measures by consensus, yes, but not by force. Same as in Sweden. People stopped going to cinema, whatever. So you could argue that yes, it was a form of regime change, or rather yet another manifestation of the fact that we no longer live under liberalism and have not for a long time in the West. But as I say, let me be charitable. I can imagine a case where under the pressure of such an emergency, day-to-day life becomes authoritarian and harsh and weird, but regime form does not change. you can still call it liberal democracy. Why say this? And you don't have to engage in complicated Schmittian abstractions about state of emergency and suspending liberties to protect liberty.
It's rather a simple matter in my opinion. You know, you can say, do the people doing this, the people suspending liberty, do they still aspire genuinely to liberal democracy? For real, I mean, not just as a name or a label or a polemical brand to use against enemies, but do they really truly still believe in it? and they believe maybe it will be restored then eventually, because in that case, I'd say Fukuyama theory would still be valid, and this leads then to very interesting counter possibility. Could you say, could there be a state where day-to-day life resembled liberal democracy, in other words, let's say normal life in America City as it existed in 2005 or whatever, or 1995 or 1985, where it resembled this and it felt like it,
but in fact, the regime was not a liberal democracy at all, And conversely, where life, again, did not resemble this, but it was a liberal democracy, because I think both things are possible. And the latter case I just described, a real pandemic or a state of total war where liberties are suspended, but the people still genuinely believe liberal democracy or liberalism, let's say, and were just waiting then for its full restoration and willing, meanwhile, to make sacrifices for it. Whereas on the other hand, and here interest possibility, there could be regime that is not founded on liberal democratic principles, but because of a condition of peace and prosperity, and maybe also because of international pressures and circumstances or because of cultural alliances or whatever.
It deceptively appears to be liberal democracy in day-to-day life much the same as the West, but nobody believes in those principles. I think that exists too. I think Israel is like that, for example. In day-to-day life, Tel Aviv is probably very much like any Western city, and the attitudes and manners of its day-to-day people are much the same as you'd find in any modern city. The nation even has a Supreme Court, and it very often acts in ways considered leftist by anyone in the West. It stops the government from doing all kinds of things. It cancels laws that the people would like and so on, same as courts do in the United States. But the state itself isn't liberal at all. It's founded on National Socialist principles.
And Thomas 7-7, I should have him on show again, I've talked to him this before, he would agree. I have whole article about this, I'll repost it. Mr. Hazony very mad because it's the truth. The spiritual foundation of Israel is National Socialist and whatever variation may exist at individual level, the aspiration of its important part, its leadership, its intellectual core are National Socialists. It's a state founded, exists for racial survival, and Lebensraum is not a liberal democracy in any sense, in its spirit. And there are maybe some other countries you can count in this category too, but not, I think, Russia. And should I take a break? You want some music? I think possibility for music. I will be right back to talk more on Russia.
Welcome back to the show. You know, Steve Saylor talk about this. He make nice point that Western conservatives are invited to live vicariously through things like example of Israel or now of Ukraine, because in these countries they are supposed to find what they are not allowed to find in their own native countries. In other words, strong racial or national self-identification, militant mobilization and many such things. Men are allowed now to go volunteer in Ukraine and die really, and you should absolutely not do this, it's an industrial thankless war with no gain, but some men might go there who, let's say retired police officer or retired military, oh I can go there and be a man with men and not be politically correct and not be ruled by these heredians.
Unfortunately there are lies again told internationally by these countries for tactical reasons. So again, Israel tells the international left and the liberals and the progressive people that, oh, we are just like you. We have a liberal Supreme Court. We have gay rallies in Tel Aviv. We have such and such freedoms, the day-to-day life, the aspects I spoke about, the superficial day-to-day life aspects, which in the end I see may not be so superficial. But they say these show we are good liberals. We are just like you. We are leftist progressives. at our Supreme Court, not telling them that, of course, these are, in the case especially of the leftist courts, unwelcome additions they have had to impose on their system as
a matter of keeping international aid from the West open to themselves. But that actually contradicts the founding principles of that country. Conversely, a similar type of lie is told to, again, Western conservatives where the the national socialist principles of Israel, they're not called that in the propaganda, they are called conservative or heroic principles or whatever, and they're presented to Western conservatives as something they should like. Again, to give them a chance to live vicariously through that. Again, this nonsense argument, because Shinto Japan also national socialist, but it's never presented to Western conservatives as something they should emulate or something they should admire. And why is that? obviously because their Shinto Japan was not your friend.
What is it to you, their internal organization? But the similar step is not made, for example, for Israel, where the natural attitude should be maybe one of indifference, as it should be to Ukraine, as it should be to Saudi Arabia. But it is on this type of obfuscation that much of Fukuyama's argument rests now. He wants to obfuscate between countries that are friendly to, it's not really the West or the United States or Europe. It's friendly to his friends in the establishment of these countries. And he says anybody who's our friend, who promotes our international goals, is a liberal democracy or at least gets a pass for those parts of the regime that are not liberal democracies, whereas others, whatever the regime for, will be smeared as authoritarian or Nazi or fascist and so on.
And this fundamental confusion on which Fukuyama's argument rests, I don't know if he himself is aware of it. But Russia's aspirations, as opposed to some of the countries I've mentioned so far, are not National Socialists. Russia has actually quite liberal aspirations, both in day-to-day life and in the spiritual foundation, or if you want to call it that, the intellectual foundation of the country as it exists now. This is why I do think it's fair to categorize it as liberal democracy, you see, Russia. This is why many pundits, and similar type pundit things, they try to obscure from you with talk about Dugin and very obscure Dostoevsky type sounding political theory of Dugin and actually Dugin,
they do not tell you, is not very important in Russian state. His theories are not a description of the aspirations of its elite. They may, some of them may read it. That doesn't mean it undergirds their project. It's rather Surkov who is much more important, but he's less flashy and less, you know, less exotic and less egghead type intellectual than Dugin. So not many Westerners know about him. But his theory of state, Surkov, is that is the driver of Putin regime and is very much in keeping with the political theater and the method, the methods of psychological mass control promoted also in the West right now. But I'm saying the intellectuals of Russia, its authorities, so on, their aspirations are not actually very different from people in the West.
And it is only the name liberalism itself that has a bad reputation in Russia because of abuses that happened in the 1990s, which, by the way, the events of the 1990s should be of much worry to someone like Fukuyama. Because in 1990s, there was tremendous desire in Russia to join the liberal Americanized world. I just told you, I grew up hoping Americans would invade. There was tremendous goodwill towards America. But Russia in particular could not do this. By the way, the efforts in many other post-Soviet East European countries were also not great success. A lot of the privatization efforts, for example, were fake. People in the former communist deep state still control much of economies of East Europe. Anyway, what happened in Russia?
It was mostly the corruption of their society, yes, that prevented from fully embracing a a liberal system formally, they mess up on privatization and many such things. Even though 1990s I think had more freedom in some ways than anything in the United States right now, more economic freedom in Russia I mean. But the disaster that followed in 1990s when they had millions of people die premature death for example from alcoholism and privation and deaths of despair, and by the way it is United States that has a decreasing life expectancy now while Russia life expectancy is rising which is interesting in and of itself because a decreasing life expectancy which in their triumphalism Mr. Fukuyama and Banana do not touch on this rather odd statistic from United
States since the mid-2010s but a decreasing life expectancy for a big nation means you You know you are circling the drain, okay? But that disaster that Russia experienced in 1990s, and which America seems to be experiencing since Obama's second term, in only a little bit less intense form, that disaster was aided in Russia by Western officials and individuals. In other words, the authorities that should have made Fukuyama's dream of future mankind a reality, they sabotaged this in Russia. They put their own corruption and profit above the progress and the telos of men. What up with that, Fukuyama? Call K'zhev on phone and you complain to him, please. It was Western liberal authorities, so-called. They weren't really liberal, but let's take Fukuyama at his word.
But it was these men who dealt with Russia, who sabotaged the formal triumph of liberalism in Russia itself. Isn't that interesting? It's actually a small, it's a micro mirror of reason Fukuyama is wrong in the big sense, because those same authorities were sabotaging liberalism in America as well, subverting it for their own financial pillaging, for example, and many such things. But anyway, despite all of this, I say, Russia continues to have very much, I think, liberal spirit, liberal aspirations and dreams, just don't, they don't use that word. And I repeat in day-to-day life, whatever these sanctions may be now, the day-to-day They liked much the same as in any Western country. Now you will say, well BAP, the values people held were different, and again I tell you
no, not that different, and for that matter, were they as different as those of the Japanese are from Americans? Because the Japanese are also quite different, but would Japan be called not a liberal democracy? Because again, they have cafes in Tokyo where you can go pet a cat, or they treat women a little bit different. I have heard of a man, I knew a girl in Tokyo, and the man followed her home from work, and I cannot get into this. He talked to her about why the light was, he asked her, why was the light on in your apartment at night. I can't get into this, but I think Japan is very much, and forgive if I repeat, but when Fukuyama wrote his book in early 1990s, it was not a given that limitless migration of
of hungry mouse dwarfs and that cutting your son dick off and suspension of equal protection of law in favor of negroletry, it was not given that these were fundamental principles of liberal democracy. So if he now wants to define, for example, Japan out of liberal democracy as he does Hungary, absurdly enough, Hungary of all places, I'm not aware what exactly Orban doing, that authoritarian. I was in Budapest and it was a very sterile, liberal-type place. Orbán put some mild natalist policies that seemed to be working with wide consensus of the public. What Fukuyama might mean is that Orbán kicked out of government certain judges that were filthy communists who had inherited their positions from communist times.
And Fukuyama's friends in the American government did not like this very much. But I'm not aware really that Orban is so authoritarian. But certainly, let's forget about Orban, I'll grant you that. What about Japan? Should it be ousted from the definition of liberal democracy? But if not, then what means? It means something like Japan or even Russia, I repeat to you, may in fact very well be salvation of liberal democracy. And for I never thought, and by the way, not that I need to say this, listeners of my show know this, I am not arguing for liberal democracy, I am against it. But I never thought of Russia or China as salvation from liberal democracy. This is my point. China is a somewhat stranger case. China is spiritually communist.
It is a communist nation that adopted some liberal aspect as a matter of practical urgency. But I have Chinese friends, believe it or not, I'm a genocidal racist, I'm not a petty bigot. And I have a Chinese friend or two, they are nice people, you know, I love spicy hotpot Mala-style tribe, I like Chinese foods. My friend Smeed, he may be not quite Chinese, he's Taiwanese, I hope I'm not being indiscreet here, I like to eat the stinky tofu with him, but even so, he has very good understanding of that part of world culture, China, so on. But I have a Chinese friend and I talk to him and he tells me, we are communists. He was rather confused, I don't know why Americans think we're not communists. They are communists in how they think of themselves, okay, in spirit.
And in practice, they may have even more economic liberties than United States. That's true. At least before Wuhan flew, they certainly did. It took less time to incorporate in China and taxes were lower and many such things. But as the carrier of a dead aspiration, that of Marxism, practicing liberal economics, China was also never a viable alternative to liberalism. I never looked to it as something. I like Russia for other reasons, but not for this, and I never saw them as a challenge to Fukuyama's ideas. Fukuyama is focusing on journalistic and petty irrelevancies and on his friends from foreign policy establishment rivalries with other powers, with his so-called categories of authoritarianism and so on, which is easy to prove that the West often can be characterized that way as
well by the same standards. And where it matters, then, in the aspirations of entire peoples, what their hopes are for the future, that is where he's wrong. But he doesn't even realize the terms of the debate. He copes by saying peoples around the world don't want to be like Russia or China. Sure, but they never did. That's not the point. That was never in the running. He should be more concerned that Russia and China don't want to be what America is now, when they did in the late 1980s, where America had a lot of goodwill, and these nations and these peoples wanted to emulate it, and they do not now, I think for different reasons in Russia and China. That entire large swathes of the human world don't want to emulate America anymore.
That America has become contrary, people around the world identify with oppression, negrolatory, race chauvinism, anti-white rhetoric, gay tranny agitation, financial double dealing and so on. He focuses on Russia and China, so he doesn't have to focus on the American occupational class own failure and insanities, which is pretty much the same story for the last seven years, right? When challenges to the excess of his friends are dismissed as foreign subversion, this is what happened. In fact, Mr. Trump, I think, was trying to save liberal democracy, for better or worse. But Fukuyama and his partisan constipation is too ungenerous to see that his theory is not challenged by somebody like Trump or any of these other enemies that he imagines, which
are enemies again of the United States or of his friends, but not of his theory. This all filtered through his petty factional loyalties. He should look closer to home to see why liberal democracy is dead. He should look to himself. So now that you see the relevant question, is this one of aspiration and dream for future, ask yourself, would Fukuyama himself uphold basic liberal tenets such as race blindness? You know what the answer is. He would cower. He would never do that. It is dangerous actually within the world Fukuyama moves to advocate completely race blind policies, and not just policies but a race blind way of life. It is dangerous to, maybe even fatal in his world, he can get you ostracized, to dismiss ethnic attachment as superstition and parochialism.
Try that and you will see what happens in their world, you know. I would go so far as to say there is almost no faction in America now except the oddball Libertarians and the Austrian Mises people who are very small in number and generally powerless But almost every big faction would find something like Locke and liberalism or Hayekian liberalism intolerable Liberalism is dead in people's spirits. They desire something else I'm not sure what that is yet, and I'm sure actually that they themselves don't know what they want But they don't want liberalism try to promote against something like Locke or Mill today You will be met universal disgust in America. America is embraced instead Nobody knows what they want or what they're called
That by the way, the things that have been embraced in place of liberalism are generally worse than liberalism But it's embraced various forms of roughly speaking Communitarianism in spirit and and desire even I mean it's not liberal try to advocate race blindness freedom of association negotiation, inviolability of individual property rights, many such you will be seen as demon by both the left and the right. I'm sorry about what America has become in spirit, what it is then inevitable that it will evolve to in matter. You know, the spirit will manifest itself eventually, materially, and it will not be a good thing. And this question of aspiration is also the biggest reason why Fukuyama is wrong, okay?
It's his ignorance regarding fascism because okay if you want to talk about what future of mankind is and your model of What is most attractive? What do people aspire to and desire the most? Then you cannot dismiss a political alternative that people were wild for they were ecstatic for fascism in the streets And that you can't say that it isn't an alternative That's attractive only because it had to be crushed violently by a worldwide alliance in a world war against it it, and because then also it continues to be repressed legally and socially in all kinds of ways. You can't dismiss it because of these reasons. These are rather more evidence that it is a viable long-term alternative, because it was never refuted in the spirit, Mr. Fukuyama, and that's what your theory is about without
you knowing it. I mean, okay, let me be narcissist for a moment and use myself as an example. I get banned repeatedly, suppressed in all kinds of ways. I go out of my way also to make myself unpleasant in many ways. I use weird language, I have an off-putting name to most people. I openly flirt with bizarre, sex-like doctrines like Carpokratianism and Frankism and such. I post images, yes, the return of the klisty. I post images which, you know, I know are inherently inspiring, but at the same time they're culturally okay in the cultural context of the United States. complicated, but I know how normies attack me for posting those images, okay? On every Handsome Thursday, I used to regularly lose 100 to 200 followers, but I continued to do it.
And to post, excuse me, I know many such things and so on. And despite all this, despite all of these things, and being banned repeatedly from platforms and so on, I still have a much bigger audience than I ever expected. Why? Because I'm presenting, and it's not quite fascism, and I'm not just saying that to protect myself, but more like to make analogy, I'll tell you what the analogy is. When the Roman Empire fell, it left behind, you can say, it left behind Christianity as the spiritual Roman Empire that was able to spread far beyond its borders. Christianity reached Northern Europe where the Romans could not. And when classical Greek civilization fell, it left behind perhaps Platonism as a kind of spiritualization of the city-state form.
And similar, when Nazism and Fascism were suppressed, what you could say was left behind was the meta-Nazism, or the aesthetics, for example, of the Strength Through Joy program that's, you know, at the popular level, and then at the spiritual level, it left behind a kind of Nietzscheanism, which is why Nietzsche has been so distorted for decades and so aggressively distorted academia and press. And the way it works is very interesting. They could not ban Nietzsche outright, you see, so they would have preferred to do that. It's much the same like Machiavelli when he talked about early Christian church. They would have liked to ban Latin and Greek the same way they destroyed Roman statues and Greek statues and closed down the Olympics and so on. It was a civilizational change.
They wanted to blot out the memory of their predecessors, but they couldn't get rid of Latin and Greek. It was forced to keep the Latin language because all the literature and so on and actually the Bible itself was already in Greek, and they needed it to spread their own message. And in not the same, but in similar way and analogy, to ban Nietzsche would have meant banning so much literature and thought that was unrelated to the political directly since especially 1900, even visual art. I mean, Nietzsche's influence and name fame had spread to it. Even innovators in dance like Isadora Duncan, among many others, had been his disciples of sorts, and especially in literature and in thought and so on, it would have meant just banning so much more than just Nazis and Mussolini invoking him.
So because they couldn't ban him, it's interesting to see the mechanism by which forbidden thought is then distorted in a liberal democracy, which again the United States arguably was in the 1950s. And it relies on the fact that information flow mostly controlled before the internet, right? A few big networks, they all agreed, they talked to government, and you have a few studios, and right after the war, the movie studios actually were still doing cheap anti-Nietzschean agitprop. For example, the movie Rope, you can see it's an anti-Nietzschean infomercial. And in general, the role of the Nietzschean thereafter was cast as villains. But where it mattered, where this kind of very attractive thought could have entered the minds, for example, of literary men and intellectuals
and seduce them, following which also the people then would have begun to be swayed again, as they had in the 1920s and so on. It was there on that nexus that it was controlled. It was until very recently, I mean, and it still very much is now, especially after they clamped up after 2015 even more. But it is at that level where it enters, let's say, the intellectual or academic world that it's tightly controlled. Because, okay, if you're a scholar and you're you're working on Nietzsche or a similar thinker. Forget Klages or Junger or anything like that. No one will accept you doing that, even before the woke thing, unless you are explicitly attacking it. And even then, there are almost no translation of Klages in English for a reason. But let's say you do Nietzsche or this.
And if you are a scholar doing that, the only really allowed interpretations of Nietzsche are the ones you see from people like Nehemas, or Rorty, or people like this, who's, whether consciously or not, their job is to defang Nietzsche, to edit out any naughty political content, especially the paths to drawing political conclusions from his work. I once read a kind of small scholarly collection of French intellectuals who were attacking Nietzsche. They were tired of the way Derrida and certain other so-called postmodernists were using him, you know, and they were saying, these people like Derrida the lose are playing with fire because Nietzsche's a Nazi. We don't like him. You should stop quoting him. He's a dangerous thinker.
This is very funny, you know, very funny to me to read that book. In France, things are different. But in the United States, you know, it never left the defanged path that I'm talking to you about. And if you don't take that path, or otherwise at least the path of condemning his politics when you are even allowed to notice them, they basically, what will they do? you will get the silent treatment. They will not publish such academic work that does not distort things in that way. And so, in private, a professor can recognize what Nietzsche was, but no public propagation is allowed. And most of them are also, when it is a question of reaching intermediary midbrow publications like New York Review of Books, that kind of thing, or saying it in front of students,
for which, even well before the woke thing, you would probably get reported by your own students for saying some things of this kind. And so especially then, when it is going to enter, let's say, intellectual midbrow discourse, there is no path by which such ideas would be allowed to enter popular culture or media in any way. And you can have, eventually, maybe I have, I don't know, maybe I have for you some show in future talking about popularized forms of Nietzscheanism in American art, because some things like this exist. if you want to call television shows, art. But The Shield, for example, and maybe one or two movies, they are a kind of popularized Nietzsche-ism, but it's very, let's say, implicit and very downstream. And also, the political content very much warped,
which it's still good that they were able to do that. The Shield is an amazing series. It could never be made today. But the point is, there is an informal method of suppression since World War II by which such ideas simply are not allowed to spread in Western societies, okay? Why, because they know they are attractive, you know? And that is until the internet, which, you know, they only started to notice this on the internet, they only started to notice this with Trump. It caused them by surprise. Because when I was talking Nietzsche, the real Nietzsche, and Mishima and Junger in 2008 or 2009 at that time, in real life, almost nobody was reading them. But now, so very many people are.
And this, you know, it shocked them to the point where they thought it must be a Russian covert ops or something. They couldn't understand how is this fanged and potent, this fanged and potent version of our old enemy returning, returning, you know, and going into the youth, the youth most of all, how is it spreading right now? You know, and it's because the Internet, meaning what? For the first time since 1930s, a mass media environment they did not fully control. And, of course, their mistakes, the anti-white stuff, the cowardice in the face of the left, and then the tranny thing more recently, the migrant thing, all of this helps, but fundamentally the little secret is that what's happening now is not merely reactive to their failures. That's helped me a lot, right?
Their failures have helped me a lot. But it's actually because the thought itself is inherently so sexy and attractive, so seductive in its own rights. The vision of life it presents appeals so much to men who, even outside of these recent leftist excesses, but these men would be, you know, living in a kind of prison, really. Even before all this, an open-air asylum, a chicken coop, put out to pasture. And the vision of life presented by Nietzsche and his true heralds, you know, they can't compete with that. The vision of life presented by Mr. Fukuyama can't compete with that, not even close. So if you don't suppress it, it will always spread fast, even from a weird small account like mine, I mean, even with various suppressions and bannings, it still spreads. Why? Because it's the truth.
What does it mean to be a prophet of an age like Nietzsche is? It means you spoke the truth so deeply and completely that no one can really overcome it or be able to see beyond it probably for centuries to come. So this is why I always knew if I presented this thought in a direct and vivid way as I experienced it, I will always be able to bring others to my side. And of course, you know, it's not just me. of course, there are many other frogs working on the same path and the thought and the light-filled exciting vision of life they are making men remember, right? There's nothing that Mr. Fukuyama and his yapping grey dogs and sycophants of this dreary regime, there's nothing they can say that, nothing they can offer that stands up to that.
So this way even, for example, his ideological uncle, Alan Bloom, who was no fan of fascism, but he said he thought Fukuyama was wrong because fascism had a future. I'm not sure what I just said now were his reasons, but at least he could admit that. And of course, I'm not talking about fascism even here, by the way. And again, I'm not disavowing fascism, I'm not saying that to protect myself, but I'm only saying that because I've actually, I think I've improved on the early 20th century interpretation of Nietzsche, because I am not caught up in the same statist circumstances people at that time were caught up in. So I'm prompting a kind of trans-state or metanichianism, a spiritualized version, like I say, of those things, which is much more potent and whose emanations then,
if the world, if I'm able to plant the seed of light in the minds of many good men, its manifestations would be various and all extremely deleterious to the project of human taming which I am fighting, which is hiding right now under this name liberalism, among a few other things, right? They, the enemy, can't face the truth, right? It hurts them because they can't face it. It hurts them to know they're just a black vagina, right? And that's all they'll ever be, okay? You shut it, shut your black vagina. Okay, please listen this, please listen the following. This from New York subway system, New York subway system entertainment public system. Please, I will, you listen this. You like being called a nigger, right? That's because you act like a nigger, b-boy. You act like a nigger, B-boy!
You have to sit the fuck up. Like nigger is a cn word. Yeah! And his bitch ain't Kim, okay? Sally, shut the fuck up. I don't want to talk to you anymore. You're retard. You're mental retard agent. You're mentally retarded. I'm Sally. Take the fuck away from me. You're a fucking cunt. Okay, block vagina. I don't want to talk to block vagina anymore. vagina anymore you know who you are you're a black vagina and everyone who fucks you who fucks your black vagina is a nigger it's an automatic nigger okay every man who fucks your black vagina is a nigger what are you a mediator a peacemaker are you a peacemaker Okay, I told you to stay the fuck away from me, brock, stay the fuck away from me. Stay the fuck, Sally! Okay? Vagina! You're a black cunt! Vagina! That is all you are!
And that is all your fucking black vagina! Yes, did you enjoy that? It made me laugh, gave me several uncontrollable laughing fits this last week. And, uh, what you just told us, some, uh, fat Korean girl. Kimchi girl with the purple hair, who apparently- No, I- I like Kimchi Koreans, but not- She's not a Kimchi Korean. She's- there with purple hair. Apparently she had schizophrenic breakdown on the New York subway. Have you seen his quite amazing video? And the usually violent bantoids who are trained and given license to respond with violence to such kind of speech. And that's, by the way, that's very, very liberal, no? Allowing essentially one race of people to be outside the law when they feel slighted by triggering words. And basically there are cases where
They're not even prosecuted, even if they kill people, for using such language. Is that liberal democracy, Mr. Fukuyama? Or is that GNC? And is police and legal stand-downs in the face of racial violence the tool that men of your kidney, or those you admire, that they use this tool to impose or excuse red terror in our day? But anyway, you see the video, and they do not attack girl you just heard. They seem rather taken aback, actually. They seem cowed. They seem buckbroken in the face of this girl's schizophrenic fury. And like my friend Bennett say, the Schizo-Asian girl is a rare sight, a rare natural phenomenon. Nature is amazing. I feel privileged to see this unusual, like, Aurora Borealis, it's a rare and precious thing to see.
By the way, over the last week, there have been some controversies I heard online. I don't see, but I went into some spaces and I heard on Twitter, on some spaces, many of of my admirers and defenders and friends have, I heard your voices for the first time, they have very interesting English accents. So this, a thank you and a shout out to the bros, my friends in, the bros in MI6 and Hack Lloyd, thank you so much. But okay, this video, you may wonder why she's not getting attacked by people on the subway, which is the usual demographic and a packed New York City subway car. And nobody really commented on this aside from there were some replies that say, well, the blacks are pussies or they're afraid she has a gun or so on. But true or not,
they would normally attack someone in this circumstance, especially if there are many of them and she's just one person, especially a defenseless woman, they will attack her, okay? The only person who intervenes is a WASP, train WASP. You know, train WASP, as my friend the bureaucrat, He go around the train wasp and he stops ethnics from making scenes on trains. A similar kind of train wasp intervened when Chuck Johnson was seen with a MAGA hat on a New York City subway. He's the only one who intervenes. The blacks on the train, it's hard to interpret why they don't do anything. But why they don't attack these girls? So a friend had a theory, and what do you think it is? The weird theory is that most people in replies to that very viral video, they miss this.
She was being left alone because she looked like hipster. Her style of hair, purple hair, the way she dressed, the manner how she carried herself, the intonations of her voice and her language, especially when she called a retard, you've been around the type you know, she's a Brooklyn type hipster, okay? So basically she's now a woke ally, probably, who is having some kind of schizo-breakdown on the train, and the bantoids are not swarming her because they're confused. They see an ally, one of their own, or at least a type they're familiar with that would never normally talk this way, and they don't know what to make of it. They end up shrugging it off, because the visual and mannerism cues she's giving off don't really match the things they're expecting someone like that to say.
So what do you think is this? I like explanation, but I don't really agree with it. I'll tell you a reason why, and it's because, okay, why was I having laughing fits thinking about this over the last week? Because what you call schizophrenia is actually something else which is very infectious, okay? Schizophrenia, in most cases, maybe it doesn't exist. It's an invention of, let's say, the ASHK medical establishment psychiatry to make you ignore, to make you not listen to people who actually have portal in their brain, a portal to see other dimension of life, to see the hidden things, the uncanny things. And this portal confers not only a vision, this is the thing, but in ecstatic, in their ecstatic chimp-outs, it gives such people a kind of charisma. Can I say divine charisma?
No, I can't, because that's a repetition. But that's what it is, divine charisma. It gives them a kind of infectious magical pull that just overalls listeners. It makes them give in, you know, that at least not attack somebody in this way. There are divine things in this world, physical beauty, for example, physical beauty is one of them. There is a line from ancient Greek, I think is Xenophon, maybe it's Plato, I forget. But the famous line about a very beautiful youth who in armor charges into the enemy lines and they could kill him, but they all, you know, they give way. They try to avoid him. They don't want to kill him because his beauty is so over owing them that they part out of his way. I believe this.
Physical beauty is another divine blessing in a literal way and it makes others, it puts them in a kind of trance and I think it's same with what gets called schizophrenia now. I've always loved to talk to schizophrenics. I've studied, not in an autistic or manipulative type way, but I've studied the way they talk and some of their intonations when they're in the middle of their most involved rents. I try sometimes to reproduce that in my own language sometimes very rare. Okay. I don't know if I can do it for you now because the whole thing is it can't be deliberate. It's it can't be manipulative. You either let the spirit take hold of you for real or you don't. And that's that. And it's, it's a kind of letting go. You hear it in her rent, especially when she gets worked up at the end,
when she's talking about how they are black vaginas. that's all there'll ever be and how it's the truth and how she's speaking the truth and they can't face the truth and yes it made me break down laughing in tears but you have to hear it there's a letting go there in a way she's inhabited by you can call it the holy ghost okay it's infectious and by the way it's not an emotional letting go it's a different kind it being filled by the light of divine confidence and charisma knowing you are speaking the truth but it's it's not straightforward to reach that condition. It's a rare blessing, right? Emotional letting go is different. It doesn't usually work. It comes off as hysterical. It's often unpleasant. There's a difference
between showing emotion yourself and evoking it in others. It's usually not a one to one. You know, this is a message actually, a message for those of you who want to be television pundits. I don't, okay, but a lot of right wing wannabe television pundits, and I mean And a lot of them won't ever make it. They will never have broad audience because they think showing anger and indignation on camera works. It never work on television size screen, okay? And of course that include computer or iPotato screen monitor, okay, like Hitler, who was often in his speeches inhabited by a spirit, I shouldn't say often, when he was blessed in the times of certain of his speeches, he was. Nobody can deny that. But if he had been in television age, he probably wouldn't have made it, or at least he would
have changed his manner if he had, you know. Because his gestures were studied with a special man, Eric Jan Hansen, please do not study who this is, but they were designed to be performed before a large crowd on a stage. So you know, when you're in a crowd and you see men from far away on podium, it's quite different than when camera is focused on him. It doesn't really work then. And I think it wouldn't have, in television age, he would have had to do something different. On radio, it's different. But for television age, men like Berlusconi and Trump, they rule the screen. I mean, literally, they have jolly, big men, relaxed energy. For better or worse, that's what works on small screen. I'm trying to think of, is there a woman who can do that? I don't know.
I assume Margaret Thatcher, actually, but only because I trust Camille Paglia's words on it. I don't think I've ever actually seen her speak, but women today are especially bad at this because American culture teaches them to be strident, you know? And this is what I'm saying, the kind of angry, sneering, strident thing you see from left-oids or now also from some few dissident right wannabe Talmud vision pundits who ape the leftist manner. It doesn't really work. The farthest you can go in that way is Tucker. He does good, okay? He doesn't really do that. He does something different. He expresses some indignation, Tucker does, but it's mostly filtered through an expression of quizzical, ironic confusion, you know, so unfortunately or not.
But for television age, you have to find a different kind of charisma like this with which to woo audiences, right? Tucker tempers it quite a bit with a kind of irony and sarcasm. And again, Trump and Berlusconi, on the other hand, they really have it. Alex Jones has it. Even his outbursts, they are not really angry outbursts, he's incredibly funny in his outbursts, you know, because of how he carries himself, his fatness, also another thing. I'm not attacking, but it works. But yes, in this aside, I just tell you, do not roleplay 1920s, you know, it doesn't translate. You have to get a feel for television magic and how television magic work, okay? I have the eye for it. I'm not saying I could do it myself, but I can see what works. I would make really good pornography, I think.
Top-notch psychological warfare porn. I could make the best, the best. Should I? I ask this question online, people chimp. But many frogs encourage me to do it. Do you like that? Anyway, so yes, it's a different kind of letting go. It's not a letting go to emotion, but to something else. You know, this woman watching her, I imagine this Korean woman on the subway saying the black vagina. This is what Homer must have felt when in his drunkenness He lets the gods and muses speak through his tongue You know most of men today who try to become artists and writers and so on they all have they have a petty ego You see a petty needling ego Democratic and envious and it gets in the way Because what does Nietzsche mean when he say the aristocrat is the expert in the art of honoring?
What means it means you have to know how to appreciate something outside of you to begin with? But really to almost to worship it Mishima has some books dealing with this But how means to worship an object or even another person then to want to glorify it for others It is the art of glorification and it comes from certain conditions of the spirit that first of all not many men have are capable of having to begin with and then they are seen now as unacceptable which the democratic petty envious education of our time teaches men to stamp these things out in themselves so at most they can flatter or simple such things like a slave but they would feel they actually would feel somehow put upon even if they had the talent to do it I mean temperamentally
or in feeling they cannot let themselves engage in glorification which is quite different from abasing yourself before an oriental God or despot it's quite different you see so well again I got carried out on tangents and this quite different matter from the from the shamanic trance this koguryo shaman a step shaman on New York subways this shamanic trance letting a spirit speak through you which is what I see on this woman on the train the voice Korean shamanism very good then until next time back out