Emergency update direct from Vermont, United States, Vermont media. President Donald Trump just gorilla fuck Nikki Haley on full view cameras. What you just heard now were the chants, the celebratory chants. Yes, rhythmic fuck rape clapping. Yes, the chants in Arabic, but the Trump Fedayeen, a new group, the Fedayeen Trump chanting, Baruch bidam nafik yatram, Baruch bidam nafik yatram, yes, welcome this to hottest reggaeton beats show Caribbean Rhythms, episode 156, apotheosis of Donald Trump as leader of American Ba'ath Party. Do you like that image? I'm talking public chants in Congress, public rape rooms broadcast on numerous video screens, simultaneous broadcast, public execution by Donald Trump, Justice Department Fedayeen of entire Congress like in 1979 event with Saddam Hussein.

Listen, okay, this political mixed show regarding Trump, at least first part of this episode, and please, I already know this man's shortcomings. By the way, I think Nikki Haley so-called, for those of you not in the United States, she had no chance, but she was Trump's fake opponent in this primary, and I think she just dropped out. But I think I'm aware of Trump's shortcomings. I covered Trump's shortcomings in many episodes back on this show, although I don't think in Trump case or Bolsonaro that it was even a failure of nerve or cowardice. It's simply that these men don't have a historical imagination and longing for greatness to realize what they could have done and the opportunity that was open to them.

Furthermore, they're too much patriotic boomers to take extra step and they think it could lead country civil war or they didn't want. But in the United States it's become clear very fast that whatever Trump's fault, even on this later election cycle, three elections later I suppose, there's no path outside Trump. So you're seeing as maybe, and he along with Nixon is going to be the only three time, I think it's three time Republican nominee. But there's no path outside Trump, and maybe now the opposition feels it can't pull exactly same trick things that it did in 2020. So you are seeing other attempts to sabotage Trump, especially now, I'm not saying they're competent or will be successful attempts, but you're seeing from influencers on Elon's

Twitter platform and many such who are pretending to be right-wing and to be attacking Trump or criticizing Trump from the right and it's another patent transparent attempt at sabotage. I don't think it will work, again they're mostly incompetent. I wanted to take this opportunity to explain brief why Trump was so good in 2015, why it was an unexpected breath of fresh air and more important for this episode, why he was not, and I mean rather why many of the reasons given now for Trump's ascent in 2016 are false and actually amount to a kind of sabotage. And I've been reading some good articles by one Torbert Fahey. It's a pseudonym. It's used by a smart frog who's writing in the Jacque's magazine. It's out of England. There's something interesting going on in England.

I've heard it called the London scene. I'm very curious what it is, but there's Jacque's magazine and there's Pimlico Journal, both seen some very good writers, in any case coming out of England now. And this mentor, Bert Fahey, wrote a good article about Trump recently about the reasons Trump did well with smart, reasonable people in 2015 and 2016. And then what this episode, the first half, and what the article is really about is then the false explanation for Trump's success, which amounts to bad people trying to take advantage, I suppose, to impersonate what happened and to replace it with their own projects. And I mean to say both for him and for me, the real target, yes, is this false explanation,

this attempt to impersonate, to replace the promise of Trump with something else entirely, which you're seeing increased efforts now in this direction with the 2024 election cycle. Many are surprised. I say again that America can't move beyond Trump, but I'm not. There was nothing like him when he came along. It was a complete surprise to so many. He seemed to come out of nowhere and before him, many of us had just turned out of politics because it was going to be Hillary versus Jeb Bush. There was no other alternative politically at all. The so-called dissidents who bray and scream now, they were fringe positions at the time not worthy of being called dissident because it was, you know, really a joke, the far left and the far right, and they still remain, I think, political nullities.

But Trump appealed, I think, you can see from where I already referred to it just now, when I say he appealed to reasonable and smart people, that's of course not what is widely claimed about him. That could be seen as a, well, it's a provocative statement, how dare I say that, am I trolling you? He did, and this article I mentioned does a good way, quick summarize why many normal people and certainly the vast majority of Republican voters who are of course the middle class backbones of the United States, they're mostly people of Anglo identity, whatever their ultimate ethnic heritage in Europe may be, but they're let's say of Anglo American identity in Tocqueville's use of that word, and they form the bulk of America's business and productive economy.

And the reasons they like Trump wasn't an emotional outburst or such. It was because he was the only plausible promising corrective to a series of government failures, policy failures. Yes, policy failures following on government and media class moralism caused by moralist fantasies about America as shining city on a hill that, to use Steve Saylor language, would invite the world and invade the world, right? So what this translates to, uncontrolled immigration, which actually was and is a huge economic drain on America and Europe, as the immigrants aren't coming to work, in fact, but they come for benefits, and even when they do work low wage, off the books jobs in certain industries like agriculture, they're still net drain on the economy as a whole, because they come

with their families. They are not migrant workers in the way that is claimed, for example, in Dubai or something like this where they would live in barracks, they come with families, their families are big and use services. So they always represent a net drain on American economy and the facts regarding especially the net drain represented not only by black but by Hispanics on lifetime expenditures out of the USA economy, on welfare transfer payments, this is very clear. I've mentioned this statistic before. It bears repeating that the average white and Asian pay into the economy, but the average black and Hispanic receive benefits from the economy to a very great degree, not a little bit. The difference is vast between the two groups I mentioned. And it's even worse in Europe.

And the line from, strange enough, both the supporters and opponents of immigration, although with different emphasis, but the line is that immigration is somehow economically good, or that it lowers the cost of labor. The opponents of immigration who claim this are the ones who say, oh, but we don't want America to be just an economic zone. We don't care about the rise of GDP. We will grant you that it is good for the economy, but we are not just about the economy. We are about the people and we choose to have a worse economy if it means no migrants. In other words, they want to stake out the position that they are above money, that they are above the petty concerns of liberals or classically defined or otherwise, and that they will take the hit. They are noble losers, you see.

They want a virtuous country that's maybe ethnically pure or such, or at least not with these kinds of third world migrants. But I actually, although I agree with them about the identitarian argument, the economic one, they make a mistake in conceding. And let's just say that they're being stupid and not male volat. But it's stupid to take that line. It will not work, first of all, with, as I say, majority of so-called reasonable people, but it won't work with them, and it's simply not true. I'll grant that it lowers the cost of labor in certain industry, but I will tell you, having lived a long time in third world and now also in East Asia, these places have cheap labor, but America and Europe do not.

So you know the old phrase regarding the Soviet Union, you have to break some eggs to make an omelet, and then someone visited and said, I see the broken eggshells, but where's the omelet? And it's the same here. I see the vast numbers of migrants in Europe and United States, but where is the cheap labor? Where are the skyscrapers, the new ones built? Where is the Blade Runner bustling society I was promised? Where is the so-called plutocracy? Actually Europe is impoverished, kind of this, it's not quite communist, but it has this extremely pro-social atmosphere where waiters, staff at airports and so on will mistreat you quite badly, no matter what class you fly in or how much money they think you have or not. In fact, if they think you have more money, you will get treated worse.

I may have mentioned this in my discussion with Mollbug before, but it's simply untrue that Europe is some kind of post-modern, hyper-capitalist plutocracy. It's very much this kind of collectivist, pro-social mess, except it also has vast numbers of migrants, but they don't lead to a slave labor society, not at all. They are there to get transfer payments, you see. And by the way, not that lower wages are a good thing as such, but it's not even – I I mean migrants and I even say most legal immigrants are just moochers. They lower the quality of life, they worsen the economic condition not just of certain people but of countries as a whole in the West because of the insane welfare states and such which it's impossible to get rid of and it's impossible to pretend to get rid

of the welfare state. I mean that will happen eventually when the money runs out if there is such a crash coming. We will see. That's basically what happened in Argentina. Welfare state got so big that they ran out of money. But we will see if Millet is able to solve the problem in Argentina, because to enact the kind of reforms here promising there will be extreme pain, at least for a year or two. And if he is not able politically to outlast that pain that people will feel, he will be remembered very badly. Ultimately, he will be just judged on whether or not he fix economy and bring back some, maybe not even prosperity, but not the despair and poverty to which the previous government had driven the Argentine people. But anyway, I need to repeat again, where is bustling society?

You were promised with the caravans of migrants. You were told Blade Runner, but it not happen. So there is no cheap labor and such, you know. And yes, this economic problems caused by mass migration, which is why people at the rallies were screaming, build the walls, excuse me, Ba'athists chanting, build the wall. And it was caused by a government class supported actually by both the right and the left with slightly different arguments, to where especially in the 2008 election, for example, McCain and Obama were running, but the two of them were in agreement on this, and Romney also more or less the same. There was no difference between the two main parties on matter of migration, and again it was a government failure, a government class, government media class failure caused

by moralism. for moral reasons that they were actually supporting migration. It wasn't for, as they claim, economic or pragmatic reasons. You were asked for moral reasons to have less so that others can have more, so as to fulfill America's promise or something like that. In other words, a moralistic immigration policy. And in this connection, one of the oldest of the GOP consultant class arguments is that Hispanics are natural conservatives. We need to help them because they're Catholic good family values people who stand up to Anglo-liberalism. They stand against the pernicious Anglo-liberalism of the Washington Post and the New York Times values, you know, that's what they would say. And so, which was never true, because despite, let's say, stated values

where maybe on paper Hispanics, and by the way, even blacks may appear conservative in certain sense, if by that you mean that they don't like gays, or they say they don't like gays. Although, as I may have, you may remember from my most recent episode, they may say that in public, but they are both butt broken down low, down low, they're down low, you know, if you know what I mean. But despite stated values, I mean real life outcomes, for example, out of wedlock births, welfare dependence, many such things, have always been, for Hispanics and for Mexican immigrants, closer to what they are for blacks than for whites or Asians. Even especially, by the way, on second or third generation immigrants. In fact, there is a de-assimilation process where the first generation migrants are more

gung-ho about America, you know, and are more often employed than their children and grandchildren. Anyway, back to why Trump came, because he pointed out the pain that this moralistic migration policy had been doing to America. It was stupid. It had to change. It's similar on foreign policy. It was moralism abroad that had brought America loss after loss and degradation of its prestige and influence. In particular, the policies during the Bush and Obama presidencies were in the first one. It was the moralistic neocon policy of democracy promotion abroad, which is very different from, for example, American realist support for right-wing dictators during the Cold War. Neocons would never support someone like Pinochet, for example. They would say he's an evil dictator.

He needs to be replaced with democracy. The people of Chile are clamoring for democracy. Although I'd say, by the way, during the Cold War, American support for right-wing dictators is exaggerated by both leftist press and in an indirect way the CIA to make themselves look more effective. In reality it was in many cases the opposite. But I remember debates from in the 2000s and you took men like General William Odom, part of the Old Guard Department of Defense, the Old Guard Pentagon, an Atlanticist. He helped spread NATO into East Europe, very anti-Russian, but also, by the way, very skeptical of Israel and especially within the United States, very skeptical of neocon foreign policy. He was the first critic of the Iraq war, first prominent critic of that caliber, let's say.

He had been, I think, founded the NSA during the Reagan administration. But anyway, the first general of that rank and so forth to oppose the Iraq war, a lot of their efforts of people like this were directed to countering the false neocon claims about democracy promotion, okay? It was a moralistic foreign policy, the neocon was, I mean. To which end, he, I mean Odom, wrote a book showing that it wasn't democracy that mattered if that's what you're into, as in voting. But it was liberalism defined in a particular way. He defined it as neutral third party enforcement of contracts, a government that could act like what I just said, which is something much harder to export or to import from one country to another than democracy as such, which is easy. But it often doesn't work.

You can just have one vote one time or something like that. But no one really knew how to transfer to another country yet, and I still think no one knows how. How do you transfer a lawful government such as exists in United States and parts of West Europe that stays out of society but enforces contracts neutrally? It's an unusual definition of liberalism. But the examples often given of Japan and Germany being turned in this way after World War II, which neo-con apologists do, they are not really the full story, he would say because both of those countries had decades-long experiences with quite a real liberalism of this kind before World War II. In any case, the reason I go into some detail here is to remind you that, again, neo-con

foreign policy based, what was it, regime change adventurism, a fundamentally moralistic project that assumed the openness of all peoples to Western forms of government and society based on false historical interpretations of things like the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, the importation of certain kinds of liberal democracy to East Europe and then America's moral duty to incur costs to bring this benefit to other peoples, you know. So it was not this cynical Machiavellian foreign policy that even its opponents sometimes assume. It was based on emotional moralism. And as for Obama's presidency, he falsely promised to get rid of this shining city on a hill, again, moral fagging in foreign affairs that people were just tired about.

But instead he set up his own based on different, it wasn't really his own, it was just what the old Clinton leftist version had been. It was the different but similar type of left international, let's say CIA faction type interventionism, interventionism in the name of human rights and many such. And he ended up starting war in Libya, starting destruction of Syria, which by the way Assad What's still there is a living humiliation of the American foreign policy faction that pursued this and many other such things like what despite himself maybe actually Obama got caught up in the same lost adventurism abroad and the persistence of Assad living rebuke to that. So here too on foreign policy matters I mean Trump came and as this writer Torbert Fahey

I'm talking about now, he says, Trump focus on China was another breath of fresh air, in this case for those remaining sectors at the time of American foreign policy establishment who had seen what had happened for at least the last 20 years under Clinton, Bush, Obama, who all neglected China for these moralistic ventures abroad, you know, or in the case of Clinton, you can look up Loral Space Tech and see what happened with that. And they were actually helping China and working with China, as some large portions of Democrat Party especially have done. Dianne Feinstein, with Chinese spy as her driver for 20 years, and her husband's investments in China. this explains why she basically shut down America's rare earth production, by the way,

you can look up the Mojave mine that she shut down. Now there is just news report, Google engineer, industrial espionage on behalf of China, leading dong or something like this, stole many so-called artificial intelligence products, technology, and transferred it to China. But anyway, theories aside, Trump came in strong on this matter because he finally seemed to offer people something real, not more sloganeering about moral duty to engage in insane losing wars and interventions abroad. Finally, there is matter of free trade versus industrialization, which is again a kind of moralistic fake argument. It's often similarly falsely recast as economic argument. In other words, what's left out of this discussion when you argue, let's say, with the free trade

fanatic is that, yes, free trade actually may work well in theory, and I'd say it even works very well in practice when it's actually free trade. But what happened in America trade is that it's free only on one side. So America can't really, for example, export its goods tariff-free to China, Japan or even to Europe. In the case of Europe, you can make an argument. Again, William Odom did, that America chooses to take an economic hit to support its relationship with Europe on which its own, let's say, defense situation and primacy in the world depends. But how do you justify it with the other countries mentioned? It cannot export its goods tariff-free to China or Japan, but they can to America. And when confronted with this fact, the so-called free trade economists will usually invoke

moral principle. They will say, they will concede, yes, America or American individual will take a loss that way. But the more numerous foreigners in those nations have a gain, and by the standards of utilitarian morality, more human souls are pleased by that. So then, therefore, it's good. And I'm not joking. When you scratch a little, that's what the so-called free trade argument amounts to, there is no actually free trade, it's one-sided. So everyone knew, I say, it was not actually free trade, America became de-industrialized, it replaced good jobs with bad, where the promise was that it would replace good jobs with better, so okay, we will not build air conditioner, we will build spaceships, but there were no spaceships, you know, so.

And Trump actually single-handed changed that whole, where now it's agreed America must make efforts in the opposite direction and there is widespread agreement in parts of government class, especially among GOP, but elsewhere too on the need for this, for re-industrialization. As also the orienting of foreign policy posture towards China, again that's another legacy of Trump. And I'd say he also did fulfill his promises on immigration while he was in office with basically refugee aid companies or going out of business and immigration during his term was very much down. Now all of this is meant as a preemptive counter. Everything I've told you so far is a kind of preemptive counter to what, about what I will say next. The false reasons given to explain why Trump came in.

At first from his detractors, but now presumably even from people who claim to support him or claim to be attached to him in some way, but actually are trying to use his name or moment as they see it to impersonate and hijack what all of this was about. One of the oldest tropes about Trump is that it was all about his style, his assertiveness. And I think you can see in many ways this is false. Even when they ape his trial, they try to ape Trump's style. For example, Rubio tried this during the 2016 campaign, only made a fool of himself. And to some extent, the scientists tried this also during this election cycle. It didn't work and I'd say it's more than just that De Santis is autistic or awkward. It's more that what I'm saying it is policy related, okay?

It's a package deal and you cannot try to promote false, unrealistic, moralistic nonsense policies with that kind of Rodney Dangerfield no-nonsense style because people will easily see through that. And a good example of during recent when De Santis, now he was pressed either by Tucker or someone else about Ukraine, and he went off into a commentary on trannies or wokeness in the military. He refused to answer the question, well, therefore answering it, saying that he actually would continue the war in Ukraine or escalate it, but he wanted to change. That's just about right. That shows you, first of all, the scientist, no, he's not the competent Trump. He's not the competent Trump. He does not even agree with Trump's, let's say, I would call it realism and foreign affairs,

but call it what you want. He doesn't agree with Trump on foreign affairs. Everyone knows he would continue the Jeb-style, Bushist foreign policy stupidity. And second, the very telling thing during this exchange I mentioned with DeSantis, it's the attempt to change the discussion on, again, concrete, no-bullshit policy on foreign affairs, in this case of what will you do, what do you plan to do, instead with a discussion about morality to replace that, to replace that with culture war sloganeering, more broadly with religious reactionary mores, you could say, with social conservatism, which has long been pillar of GOP electioneering. But Trump was actually never much interested in it. He was indeed more of a technocrat than a moralist of this type, or, okay, I would not

call it even moralist, I would call it fairly sayical use of religion for coarse political ends. Finally evangelicals saw through this in 2016, they ended up voting for Trump over the Bible-thumping Ted Cruz, even in evangelical South Carolina, it was full of evangelical veterans, right? And Trump attacked the idea of Iraq War there, and they still vote for New York Playboy. But this is the extreme cynicism of this party, which it doesn't even do well as a public relation cynicism, the old GOP, which tried to shift focus away from its failures in various areas like foreign policy and economy to instead talk about religion, sexual morality, formerly more focused on the gays. Now it's all about the trannies, right, which, whereas Trump, remember, none of us really

supported this aspect of him, but we all look the other way. He did not attack LGBT and he was actually the first Republican candidate to support gay marriage. So remember what I'm saying is Trump was not a social conservative, not at all, had nothing to do with why he ran. And he was denounced by the GOP and by Ted Cruz and these types at the time as an urbanite playboy billionaire, multiple divorcee. He married and fucked sluts and prostitutes and he was a degenerate, right? This word you're seeing spread everywhere now. Well, Trump was a degenerate representing, and I quote, New York values, you know, and that's from GOP Ted Cruz, you understand. So I say all this to remind listeners that unlike the extreme messaging you are seeing

now regarding moral matters, tranny, sexual morality, Trump again was not about all that. And this is a false reason given by other people now for his ascent, people with other priorities. No, it didn't have to do with the perceived sexual morality of the so-called of the elite. In fact, he himself was accused of exactly that and these by these same people. And in regard to Trump's style, OK, what was his style exactly? Because in fact, the GOP had previously employed working class or country style GOP, you know, country style type, bumptiousness, you could say in the persona of Sarah Palin, for example. but others too. Even Bush was doing this, oh, I'm a Texas, you know. I'd argue actually in many cases where each GOP candidate tried absurdly to go in flannel or jeans pretending

to be a common man, Sarah Palin, the Wild West Saloon dancer, George Bush, the son, not the father, pretending to be cowboy, you know. But it wasn't Trump who introduced this. In other words, Trump was always in an impeccable suit. He did not pander in this way at all. He presented as New York urbanite. He is genuinely vulgar, yes, in some way, but I'd say no more than of what the GOP had been courting already under quite different types of persona. And in his case, it's the Rodney Dangerfield, you know, a Catskills Jewish comedian. It's quite different. There's a self-awareness also in Trump's theatricality that's not there in Sarah Palin or when someone like Mike Pence or Karl Rove, they do the pedophile evangelical preacher squint.

They get that Reagan sing-songy voice about, talk about our values and this kind of voice, the shining hill and such. Enough of the shining hill, please. I think at least Republican voters are smarter than these consultants think. That type of attitude has made me obsolete by now. But anyway, yes, it wasn't about the style and the point in this article is that attempts after Trump came in and since then, and especially now, have been to recast Trump's win as a cry for help from the so-called left behind. I'm sure you've seen this argument. even at times sounds like a friendly argument from people you think are on your side, dissidents and such. And the claim is that the globalist economy is actually a bustling real success but that

it left behind many irregular folk who could not adapt and that Trump is there attempt to make their voice heard, their kind of emotional cry against the word leaving them behind and an attempt to kick in the teeth of an elite that they feel disrespects them and doesn't listen to them, or some way to get back at that so-called elite. I will read because this article puts it well. The leaders of the political establishment in the media and the parties wanted to say that they'd learned from the stunning spectacle of Trump's victory in 2016, but they did not want to admit they'd been wrong. They were saved by an alternative analysis, the theory of economic resentment, of quote unquote working-class rebellion, and of the barbaric yawp of rage against atomizing neoliberalism.

The problem wasn't that American policies were stupid and destructive. No, they were too good. Trump was not a pragmatic nationalist, but an avatar for the losers against the cold-hearted neoliberal winners. This excellent book review both analyzes it and feuds it in great detail. She's referring to another article I'll mention in a moment regarding England. But right, okay, you've seen this. The constant language about atomization, loss of community, the neoliberal elite, hypercapitalism, the values of the rich liberties promoting hypersexualization supposedly in the forms of transgenderism or other such, the focus on degeneracy of the rich and the loss of religion and many such. These are people who, right or wrong, Trump had nothing at all to do with anything. of this stuff, okay?

And that's important because none of these matters address the vital policy concerns that Trump did bring up. In fact, I think there are ways to deflect from that. They are a restatement of the same type of religious, moralistic, and kind of community rhetoric that the GOP or parts of it have always employed as a means of not having to deal with those actual problems. And the people in government would much rather focus beyond this symbolic cry and a shout against vague neoliberal globalist class, then focus be placed on concrete policies that it's obvious they fucked up for decades, they're unwilling to fix or unable. It might even be racist to fix these problems, you know, you can't get accused of being racist, you see.

And in this connection, Fahey in the article I'm talking about references also Brexit in England and another article I linked on my Twitter by one Jay Sorrell, I think it's in a magazine called The Daily Skeptic, I'm not familiar with it, but it apparently has some good articles. But it's J. Sorel, a pseudonym, I guess, after the main character in Stendhal, red and the black Julien Sorel, in which the same point is made. I mean, in the article, not in the book. But what in England, the Libtard class blames Brexit on an emotional reactionary spirit among the left behind, for they accuse them of wanting an idealized or romantic vision of older England, of being losers unable to adapt to a changing world, and that it was

supposedly this cry for help or such that they voted for Brexit, but actually the article points out reality is the opposite. The Brexit movement was not based on emotion, it posed concrete questions like who determines migration policy into England, what does this migration policy cost England or not, where do Britain's fees go to and what they pay precisely for in the European project and many such things. Whereas it was the remainers, those in other words who wanted England to remain in the European Union, they were the ones using moralistic, romantic arguments about the importance of the European project, invoking memories of World War II and other kinds of such emotional demagoguery. But a similar dynamic to that in the United States

where again the attempt constant made and I say even by people who claim to support Trump and you know to reframe his victory as a kind of symbolic outcry of the left behind against the successful economy that they can't live in and which therefore right the solution in this case you know child tax credits or more religious leadership, Pharisaic preaching, more of the Reagan sing-song voice, more supposedly working-class rhetoric and cynical mobilization and against an unfeeling, globalist, neo-liberal elite with, you know, again, symbolic fixations such as whether you stick it to Disney. Did you stick it to Budweiser today? Did you, you know, stomp for a larger corporate tax rate? Because if you put a larger corporate tax rate, then you really get to punish those

globalist corporations, right, those big woke corporations. I mean, I need to repeat to you, the article doesn't talk about this, but the corporation tax thing, the corporate tax, such a cope for dissidents, such a stupid argument, because Trump ran on and delivered lower corporate tax rates. America before Trump had some of the world's highest corporate tax rates during all those decades when the worst stupidities happened, that Trump came in to correct, and those tax rates didn't stop anything, didn't stop any of those abuses. Russia, by the way, has even lower corporate tax rates, and they don't have these problems because Putin came in and tamed the oligarchs and the parts of government and media that were acting against Russian interests.

He didn't need to do symbolic, spiteful things like raise corporate tax rates to somewhat harm a vague liberal class doing bad things, you see. that this to me is one of the best examples of the fake populism based on symbolism, right? Like, we won't deliver what Trump promised you on foreign policy. We especially won't deliver his migration policies because those things might be racist. So you know, we'll stick it to the real one person, you know, because they're the real cause of your pain and they're the real reason Trump got elected because they want to humiliate you. They want to castrate your son and turn your daughter into a boy and like, okay, can I, I can even agree with some of these things being bad, I mean not the way they frame them,

but let's say the whole tranny thing in schools. But it costs basically nothing to focus on that, and it's furthermore not true again that these are the vital problems that Trump wanted to fix. I will read some more from this article because it's quite good. I'll read from it now. This argument proved immensely seductive to a wide swathe of dubious and shady factions. Democrats and leftists of all stripes loved it because it meant we needn't do anything other than provide more money for them programs. Many Republicans and conservative activists loved it as well. He's talking about this argument that Trump came in as a phenomenon of working class resentment against the globalist elite. I continue reading.

Republicans do not want to be racist and they do not want to do economically risky things like impose tariffs. If Trump was elected to combat something nebulous like neoliberal atomization, then this meant we could respond to his victory by making the Republicans a multiracial working-class party of wholesome Catholic Latinos living off family credits and promoting family values, which was coincidentally exactly the vision of Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio before the arrival of Trump. Enter Sohrab Amari, Tink Zork, Compact Magazine and Adrian Verbula and Gladden Pappin posing as sage explicators of Trumpism because they want to establish an American version of the Chinese Ministry of Religious Affairs, based Blue Jumper Man.

A point Julian Sorrell makes very well in the Brexit article is the incredible insult this line of analysis offers to Trump and to his voters. The argument I've advanced is that Trump supporters were rational people who supported Trump because they identified certain government policies as the failed relics of a grossly stupid and venal political establishment and Trump offered the way to overturn these policies and replace them with more effective governance. The implicit argument of everyone who says that Trump represents working class protest or a middle finger to the elites is that Trump supporters are degenerate cattle who don't know how to do anything but low in pain at the world they don't understand.

Okay, yes, so you see, it's basically what both left and right for different reasons are hoping that Trump was about and are trying to replace him with because of some vague protest against being humiliated by a vague elite is much easier to deal with and to channel into actually entirely politically inert paths than changing concrete actions that government it's much easier than changing certain policies that government got wrong in particular that you and your friends have been involved with getting wrong for decades. Which isn't to say that it's all necessarily conspiratorial, right? What I'm talking about is not a conspiratorial move in some string puller sense, it's in some cases the normal human reaction to try to take advantage of a situation, right?

You see Trump come in, you try to say, well, it's not really about what he said, it's about what I want. You know, so Torben gives a good example of this, right? Russ Dousat, columnist for New York Times, who claimed to see in the fact that Utah was one of the last Republican strongholds against Trump. And also it was one of the most religious places. But Dostoevsky claimed, his conclusion from these facts was that yes, this is proof. You see, the religious people like in Utah are immune to the Antichrist snake charmer. And it's only people devoid of roots and community and religion who are cleaving to this unprincipled demagogue, this proto-fascist as a way to deal with their social atomization and irreligion and many such things.

So I will read it, I will read again from article, I like this article. This is very obvious in the work of Ross Dowsat, who emphasized that the very religious state of Utah was less Trumpy than more secular areas. For Dowsat, this meant that Trump wasn't much more than a cry for help and a wake-up call from people whose lives had been cruelly denuded of traditional sources of meaning by out-of-touch liberal meritocrats. My takeaway is that Mormons are sheltered weirdos, and perhaps being a BLM open borders fanatic meshes quite well with the belief that you'll get reincarnated on the planet Kolob. But the more important point, okay, the more important point is that people like Dowsett and Dineen, Patrick Dineen is talking about, continue the trend of downplaying Trump's

policies in favor of a dubious symbolism. For Republican candidates, the mainstream party message was that Trump won because he embodied aggressive working-class bumptiousness, not for any specific policy proposals. The mainstream party thus inaugurated a new era of tastelessness and working-class pandering in the style of a Sarah Palin, forgetting that Trump had built a cross-class coalition while speaking in a New York City urbanite patois and never taking off his expensive business suits. Was this tasteless stupid and unnecessary? Yes, I definitely agree and emphasize that it was a product of the movement conservative fear of racism. Trump did not create the tastelessness of the Republican Party.

The Republican Party responded to the threat of Trump by intensifying a tastelessness which had always been present, and they did so in order to avoid having to reckon with Trump's serious policy proposals and refutations of airy-fairy post-war consensus pablum. The Trump as avatar of working class resentment argument was embraced both by those who wanted to insinuate themselves with Trump as well as by those who wanted to smear him. Richard Spencer is an example of someone who has very slimily tried to do both of those things. The Good Old Boys Poetcast and Think Zork, these are nobodies that the latter happens to be writers for Compact Magazine, which my understanding, my info is that it's secretly or partly funded by the Open Society Institute of Soros, but whatever.

But the Good Old Boys Poetcast, he says, and Think Zork used the same line to praise Trump. Richard Bonannia and current day Richard Spencer use it to attack him. But what all these people have in common is being soft, unserious media talking heads who pay more attention to streamer drama shadow plays than practical Trumpian matters like trade, immigration and foreign policy. They deserve to be thoroughly refuted and swept forever from the stage of national discourse. A vote for Trump is a vote for deportation, foreign policy realism and more trade strategy. A vote against is a vote for four more years of the dead consensus and senile court politics, four more years of the whatever podcast, of ex-Twitter avatars with glowing eyes, of Malanga

Shpoozie dropping mad shade on Zionist posers, and of Darkbranded. He is using the chasm, the sarcasm, for those of you not in the know. This stuff is past its sell-by date already, but it would be nice to put it to bed right now. Yes, I like this article. You should read it. You should read Jacque's magazine. I was in Hong Kong before the pandemic in 2019, briefly, and I talked there to a Chinese friend, and I didn't ask in detail what they did, but they seemed to be rich Chinese living in Hong Kong, working in the business and such. I assume many of them were probably connected somehow to the Chinese state, because that's how it works for high-level people in China, but I don't know. Regardless, they seemed totally conformist faggots who repeated elite Chinese party line.

What was this line? It was precisely this, okay, they said exactly the same. Trump is the voice of the American left behind common man. He's a symbolic cry for help against perceived injustice. These lines. In other words, an irrational emotional paroxysm that so, you know, it's like it doesn't matter if it's Libtard saying this, if it's Chinese faggot industry chai comms or people who say that dissident populists who are representing the working man and fulfilling the post-Trump promise, putting the same sentiments in a more favorable light, or even supposedly to support Trump. It's all the same angle, and it's false, and it's destructive, because it takes away attention from concrete proposals around which, leaving aside ideological labels and class identity,

you could build a varied political coalition across classes, across many types of people for those policies, they just make sense. And second, precisely by emphasizing the class label aspect of it, you're making it hard or impossible in many cases to score actual elite defection to these policies, which I must say in the American case, for influencers or for these kinds of pundits, they're not even considering that at all, trying to be effective communicators to turn important or decisive minds in American society or worldwide, for them it's much easier to farm rage and despair. You know, it gets you clicks. You never get called a racist that way either, pretty much, right? It's win-win. I mean, when some days you can dream of replacing Tucker, you can dream some days you will replace

Tucker, you will be on TV. You know, your mother said you're a smart boy. Listen, I'll be right back. Welcome back to show. I apologize if you hear in background certain drilling noises or such, no, it is not Mengele drilling into the back of my skull. What happened is already dawn, I waited too long to record the show. I usually like to record in the middle of night. But now it's already dawn and the construction noise has started. This is what they do, they terrorize me with construction noise wherever I go, it follows me. to sleep during the day, but it's very difficult. You see, that's the kind of torture I live under for you to make this show. Now for something entirely unrelated to politics. I return to a favorite matter, the origins of ancient peoples, of the ancient Indo-Europeans

in particular, and the Hittites, and some related, I will get into some details over disputes on these matters. In particular, I talk now about the so-called Anatolian languages and the way this bears on the question of Indo-European origins. So just a quick reminder, maybe even for those of you who already know, it's nice to have a reminder when English colonize India. And so let's say, especially realization coming on literary man towards end of 18th century, it was already noticed that Sanskrit was close to ancient Greek, right? The Englishman of that time, the classically educated, they knew Latin and Greek. And the thing is, it just so happens, If you read Homer and you know Homeric Greek, if you look at archaic dialects of Greek, you know, as opposed to just classical Greek,

but even classical Greek, you feel like if you go back a few generations from both Greek and Sanskrit that it's the same language. So an Englishman who knew Greek, seeing Sanskrit, studying it for the first time, or any European being introduced to Sanskrit, would say it's a little weird, it's on the other side of the world, of the world, but it's like this language that I studied in school. And it just so happens that within the Indo-European language family, these two, although spread so far apart geographically, are among the closest, I think. And this led to discovery that it was in fact the family of related languages, you know the story, and it became one of the great detective tales of mankind, detective historical

questions, one of the still great Indiana Jones, maybe most Indiana Jones type of question to find why these languages are related. If there was a people once who spoke the original language that gave rise to all these dialects, where they were, what they would like, how they lived and so on. Although I say that are related very interesting matters. The origin of the Turkic languages, that's less Indiana Jones, not because it's less important or less exciting, it's just there's much less to go on that. much more mysterious, or the relationship of the Finno-Ugric languages to some others, theories that the Ket people of Siberia are actually a back migration from the Americas, or even that such Native American-derived tribes took part in the Avar invasion of Europe

in the Middle Ages and many other such unusual things. I see one of the reasons I despise conspiracy tards is that there are such weird and interesting things in the world, but they, the conspiracitards, make a mockery of everything with stupid exaggerations, flat earth theory, germs don't exist, this other kind of thing. Anyway, were the Negrito peoples an original root race of mankind that had spread through the oceans throughout the world, that had originally spread, right now they live in the Andaman Islands, but when Magellan arrived in the Philippines, 10% of the Philippines was Negrito, could they have spread to Africa, to the Americas, and many such, you know. But the Indo-European origins question is similar kind of crazy, but it's real.

It's like real crazy as in it's not just speculative. And because of the historical and geographical development of the Indo-European languages, where they were in touch early on with literate societies, there's more evidence to go on. So that's why it's a much more fruitful detective story. So that aside, once you know these languages are related, you can see, just to give you a quick reminder of what kind of detective work has long been possible with the coming of just basic archaeological knowledge, but you can see what primeval words they all shared and which words they don't share. So for example, the words for mother, brother, daughter, father, these kinds of things are shared. obviously very ancient things important to people, but even from what family words like

this are shared by the languages, by all the languages, you can tell something about the family and social structure of that original prehistoric people. Whether they had and how many words for nephew, cousin and such, that tells you actually quite a bit. And in a similar way, you can do detective work to find when and where they may have lived because if, for example, all of them share a word for gunpowder, which they don't, but let's say they did, but then you could say that they only spread apart after the invention of gunpowder, you know? And if you see in their language an obsession with, let's say, different kinds of gunpowder, you can maybe start to speculate, it was very important to them, gunpowder, let's look for

an archaeological location where maybe gunpowder was invented or where it became very important in the society, these kinds of reasonings, you know. But this being a linguistic phenomenon, that's the kind of thing you start from. And that in the gunpowder example I just gave you, it gives you an indisputable floor, an indisputable kind of fact that you can start from, right? So regardless of other theories, that sets a hard date, right? Like they couldn't have broken apart. They couldn't have broken and spread apart after such and such an invention that you can date or before or this kind of thing. And in this case there are these kinds of solid indications, not of course with gunpowder but all these languages, but with an important exception which actually that's what I discuss

on this segment of episode. But they all share the words for wheeled transport, wheeled vehicle, you know, which is not universal by any means. In fact, Egypt, an advanced society of mankind, was not interested and didn't even know about wheeled vehicles until quite late because they have rivers and so on. Of course, in the Americas they were unknown, but these Indo-European languages share very much the word for wheeled vehicle, not just wagon, but also the disassembled wagon, the parts like the axle, the wheel, and so forth, both the assembled and disassembled wagon. And you look historically and see, well, okay, we'll transport, when did it exist? When David Anthony wrote his book, he said the earliest ones that were founded, 3100

BC, but actually it's maybe older than that, it's 3300 BC, a finding in Russia in 1985, for some reason it was not publicized in the West, but they found wagon parts somewhere along the Volga, I think, or close, 3300 BC. So the languages had to still be together at that time, you see. They couldn't have broken apart before that. If not in one primeval language, maybe they didn't exist that way, you know, it was not like a centralized state of the literature, of course, but it would be maybe closely cohabiting tribes with closely related dialects speaking the same language. So that's why they shared the same word for it. And this goes together with another discovery, for example, that of raising sheep specifically.

So domesticated sheep are very old for mankind, but raising sheep specifically for wool as opposed to just meat, and so the word concerned with wool, that's also a mid-4th millennium BC innovation. That's known archaeologically. So that corresponds also, I mean, they had the common words for wool and such. That confirms they still had to be together at that time, let's say mid, let's say 3500 to 3300 to 3100 BC, around that time the language still existed together in a place where wagons were known and probably important because they have different words for different parts of it. And actually that's quite a small number of places, you know. And with similar detective work, attempts have been made to place the homeland geographically,

As in, let's see what words for fish they had, or a famous case, what words for trees. So the word for beach, the beach tree, right? It's been traditionally an important clue. Where did beach trees exist at the time? Where didn't they exist? That also sets for you hard limits of where the homeland could have been. But of course you have to look at the ancient distribution of such and such tree or animal, not the modern. For example, lions used to live in the Balkans and Europe and much of Central Asia, but no longer do. Anyway, sorry to give you this background to those of you who already know all of this, but I find it interesting to remind myself sometimes of this too, because often now, the study of these origins, it has been reinvigorated by genetic studies.

They can find ancient bones and look at the DNA signatures and markers, the population markers and I agree that can be a very important tool, it's another clue, but often this is forgotten that it's primarily a linguistic and historical phenomenon. You don't know what language DNA or bone spoke, you know, I mean in the way in which it became known to people with certainty, it's as a linguistic and historical phenomenon. When you hear disputes about which variants of the Y haplogroup types, which variants of R1D were found on the steppe versus in certain Indian tastes, that's a very interesting thing. It can be part of other arguments, but when I hear it, I say it's a new field, let's wait and see, and it can't change concrete historical matters like I'm mentioning now, which provide

let's say a floor like these languages couldn't have dispersed before such and such a date and so on because they share words for that thing that was not invented before that date and so forth. So in this sense, the status of the Anatolian languages have always been, it's always been a very special case, a very special clue in figuring out where and when the Indo-European languages developed because their position within the Indo-European language family was so unique and unusual. I'm talking about languages, these are extinct languages, but they're known, Luwian, Lydian, and most famously Hittite, although there was no ancient people called the Hittites. It was the language of Kanish, the city of Kanish, and what we know now as the Hittites

were a small group who ruled, let's say, the land of the Hatti, and that's why they came to be called Hittites, and it's not readily understandable through the scheme of modern nationalism. Anyway, yes, these languages, they've always been recognized as Indo-European, but with an asterisk. They were really very, very different from all the other Indo-European languages. The grammar was highly simplified among these Anatolian languages. They're known from some inscriptions, some texts, and so on. But the Indo-European languages that are known today and the ones that are extinct also like like Tocarian and others, well I guess Latin, ancient Greek are extinct too, but they all have very complex grammar.

For example, three verb tenses for past tense, you know what I mean, three versions of the past. They have the future tense, they have different moods for verb like subjunctive mood, optative mood, and these features, the Anatolian languages don't have them. They have no future tense, they have only one past tense, they don't have the different moods and so on. The unusual lexicon, if you ever also studied Greek or Latin, also you'll see there are noun cases, gendered nouns and many such things. But the Anatolian languages didn't have this. So words can change and they can be borrowed from one language, English and Dutch are actually very close in Frisian, what the Frisians speak is very close to English, but words easily change from one language to another.

But for a language to change grammatically in such big ways is a lot more, it's unusual, it's a much bigger change I made. And furthermore, the most ancient words that get preserved, those of family relations and such, they're also different in the Anatolian languages, maybe only the word for daughter possibly being the same, I mean for example in Hittite and the other main Indo-European languages they shared the word maybe for daughter and so on. But the point is that for such big changes to occur a very long span of time needs to pass and the dominant theory throughout the 20th century is that the Anatolian languages were a branch of the Indo-European languages that had split from the others some time before

and they had made their way to Anatolia from the north through a migration of peoples or tribes wholesale from the north, the homeland was assumed at times in 19th century to be North Europe for nationalistic type reasons. Then now the consensus is that it's somewhere in Central Asia or the Caucasus or some part of the Volga River or such, but that they made their way to Anatolia from the north through a migration of peoples, again through the Balkans, and then changed within Anatolia considerably after settling there, losing many of the distinctive features of the other Indo-European languages, possibly through process of creolization with local languages. In German this is called the loss theory. Why are the Anatolian languages so different?

They lost elements that they originally supposedly had shared with all the other Indo-European languages but relatively recently and so by let's say the year 2000 and even actually after 2000 this view has changed in favor of an earlier theory and so now most linguists accept that what I just told you cannot be so. In fact it's the other way around, in other words that the rest of the Indo-European languages developed their unique highly complex features separately in a process that Hittite and these other Anatolian languages did not undergo. In other words, it is the Indo-European languages proper that underwent unique innovations not shared by the Anatolian languages, so in some sense you can think, I'll get to it to explain

what I'm about to say in a second, but the Anatolian branch is more ancient. Maybe right now that's not the right way to say it. It's more correct to say that the Anatolian branch isn't really an Indo-European language language families related to Indo-European in the direct sense, their distant relative of the Indo-European languages, and that there was, let's say, an even more primeval language, Proto-Indo-Hittite, let's call it, it's a bad name but you get the idea, and it bifurcated, and one path led to the Anatolian languages Hittite, Lydian, Carian, and so forth, and another path led to the Indo-European languages, and that the deepest event is this bifurcation, You know, and I think this is now accepted as mostly indisputable by linguists of great

use has been a kind of proto-artificial intelligence from in the 1990s it was used to study relationships between languages, computational cladistics in study of languages at University of Pennsylvania by Don Arange and Ann Taylor, two linguists. And so, okay, why is this important? Again, because time, a great deal of time must have passed. It is the great divergence in grammar and so on, but also, for example, Hittite and these other Anatolian languages don't share with Indo-European languages the words for wheeled vehicles and such. So it must have happened a great deal of time before 3300 BC, that bifurcation. If you take that data as the invention of wheeled transport, it may even be slight earlier before that, let's see what more finds are made in the next few years.

And by that time, by the time already of the introduction of the language of the wagon and the wheel and so on, the Indo-European languages already had their unusual and different grammatical features, you know. So the two language relative families, the Anatolian on the one hand and the Proto-Indo-European, they must have broken apart, bifurcated long before that, let's say around maybe 5,000 BC or so. I mean, that's about how long it would take for those kinds of language innovations to happen on one side. So is it possible then that they had been together somewhere, let's say, on the step or in Europe or such, and that around this time, let's say around 5000 BC or sometime around that or a bit before, that the group splintered off from them and moved to Anatolia

while the rest continued to develop separately? And I think that Robert Drews, whose book Militarism and the Indo-Europeanization of Temperate Europe, which I'm re-reading and I'm talking about here, I'm using him as the source, I think he makes a very strong case for why this is impossible. This idea that the Anatolian languages came from somewhere else, that they splintered off from whatever the original... It's not Proto-Indo-European because it didn't exist yet. Let's call it Proto-Indo-Hittite. So the Indo-Hittite languages, the Anatolian languages split off from the Indo-European languages but both spread off, they bifurcated from something you can call badly but temporarily proto-Indo-Hittite.

But where this location was, what Drew's argue is that it is impossible that it was outside of Anatolia, that, let's say, the homeland was somewhere, as I said, in North Europe or on the steppe or in the Caucasus, and that they moved south. I think impossible, why in fact he make argument that the Anatolian languages must have been native to Anatolia, that they did not come from anywhere else. In other words, the ultimate homeland of the Indo-Hittite proto-language from which both Anatolian languages and Indo-European language families come, it is southern and western Anatolia. And I'll summarize now the reasons why. Why that is, the Anatolian languages at least could not have come from anywhere else. In fact, these languages probably originate in the oldest settlements, the oldest towns

of mankind as such ever recorded. There are small towns or settlements as far back as 10,000 BC and more by 9,000 BC and They are in Anatolia and most having started as ways to mine obsidian. They weren't farmers when the towns are founded actually, they were still hunter-gatherers but they made these towns to mine obsidian which was necessary material to make tools in the Neolithic before the coming of metallurgy. So the inhabitants of these places probably raised pigs. I'm not giving you citations on this episode, okay, you'll have to take my word for it that what I'm about to tell you is as well documented as events in Stone Age and such can be. And for those of you who are aware of the disputes about Indo-European origins, please

hold off judgment until I give full story because there is important twist coming later. I am not making the case here that the origin of the Indo-European languages as such is actually in Anatolia. That what I just said now was argued long ago by one Colin Renfrew whose work I encountered when I was 18, and I had become very interested in this matter. Again, by the way, I liked it because of the fascination I had for remote antiquity and for origins of people. I didn't do it as some others, including major scholars, have done because they want to promote this or that nationalist or racialist story, usually something out of national pride. I know maybe libtard detractors would doubt what I just said about my motivations. I have no reason to lie on this show.

In fact, I tell you the very opposite is the truth. When I saw that many scholars were using speculations about prehistory to support nationalist narratives of various kinds, I lost interest somewhat. I put on hold my study of Indo-European origins. I figured prehistory, because it can be disputed so much, because there is no text, there is no literature, it's archaeological records only, and so you will always have nationalists trying to take advantage, oh this small discovery was made, this symbol sort of looks like that, this must be my people, we are 2 million years old, we are the original humans, this kind of thing. But for example, J.P. Mallory is a famous Indo-Europeanist, he actually does good work,

So is Gimboutas, Maria Gimboutas, and both strangely, but they reach the conclusion that their own peoples, the Irish in one case and the Lithuanians in the other, that they occupy this prime place in their stories. I found that very off-putting, oh, it's actually my people. I do a certain, I find off-putting also a certain Greek in David Reich's paleogenetics lab at Harvard, who has had some good ideas overall, but I won't say his name, he should continue his work of course but he's a Greek nationalist and you will note that in all his papers he never says anything that could counter the narrative supported by contemporary Greek nationalists. I find all this very off-putting. I think it's also why you have to take genetic studies as well

with a grain of salt, excuse if I repeat, but they kept saying always that modern genetic studies show that Ashkenazi Jews are Near Eastern, see that they're from Israel, that's what that means, that was supposedly the case. And so they have maternal DNA, it was said, that can be traced back to the Near East. They kept repeating this, right, various studies. But then some more recent studies show that actually the maternal DNA of Ashkenazis is entirely from North Italian women. So they were so-called Near Eastern only in the sense that a large population of the Mediterranean and of Europe itself has DNA that can be traced back to the Near East, but to the Neolithic prehistoric period, in the sense of ancient farmers, Stone Age, who spread from that area.

This kind of disingenuous thing was promoted to support nationalist Jewish narratives about origins in Iron Age Israel, for which there is no evidence. So anyway, sorry for tangent, I actually got turned off at these disputes because I was interested and remained interested in ancient origins of people and such things for very different, you know, you can say childish, but they're my own naive enthusiasm for Indiana Jones type reasons. But anyway, another reason I became disenchanted with the study of Indo-European origins when I came across Colin Renfrew's turgid work, and his claim is that the Indo-European language is spread from Anatolia by a process called demic diffusion. So let me just take a moment here again to say the idea that the Anatolian languages

have their ultimate homeland in Anatolia, that their native is there, that therefore the primeval language, let's call it proto-Indo-Hintite, from which both the Anatolian languages like Hintite and the Indo-European languages on the other hand as a whole, they both come from this primeval language. The idea that that primeval language has its home in Anatolia is compatible with a different homeland for the Indo-European languages as such. I'll explain why in a moment. In other words, the Indo-European languages actually did not develop in Anatolia. I'll explain why in a moment. But that was Colin Renfrew's again tedious work that I put away. Turn me off to the studying part. He was saying that the Indo-European languages originated with

farmers in Anatolia and that they spread by demic diffusion, which is to say small groups of families, let's say colonists, 20 to 30 families at a time, moving slowly, usually down river valleys, searching for arable land in sparsely populated or unpopulated places. That is a slow process over, let's say, since 8000 or 7000 BC, which, okay, turned me off not only as boring but also not keeping with obvious fact it's not possible. The Indo-European languages proper had to spread relatively fast because, again, a high similarity between languages like Sanskrit and Greek that are so geographically spread apart, if it had happened over a course of thousands of years, they would not have remained linguistically so close together.

They would have actually diverged into entirely different languages, and many other reasons like that. Not to even mention what I said before about the fact that these languages are obviously still together by 3300 BC at least, because willed transport didn't exist before that. Anyway, there are important ways, however, in which Colin Renfrew was half right or a quarter right, which even geneticists now agree on that basically, yes, what gets called Near Eastern farmer genes, agriculture did spread out of Anatolia this way around 7,000 BC and before into Europe. So anyway, back to, yes, the reason why Anatolian languages are native to Anatolia, it has a a lot to do with this because there's a lot of evidence for colonization moving out of that region in the manner I just said.

It was by remote antiquity, by Neolithic times, by the Stone Age, already an overpopulated place. Anatolia is rather arid dry, cannot support large population. It is also the origin of agriculture, livestock raising and so on, the earliest towns. It got populated very fast and it sent out in the process, I just hinted at, it sent out waves of small gradual colonization in this way. So while there is a lot of evidence for colonization of this type moving out of Anatolia, there's basically no evidence for the opposite of colonization moving into Anatolia. So you see in pretty much way Renfrew said, small Neolithic settlements wave out from Anatolia, the settlement of Crete was vacant, empty at the time, around 7,000 to 6,600 BC, was colonized by very few Anatolians.

Obviously, there was a study made, they brought with them, probably on canoes, okay, similar to Polynesia, they brought to them domesticated animal, pig, et cetera, sheep, but at time pottery did not exist. So these colonists, also important to know, they were not wandering aimlessly. They probably had had previous scouting information, travelers told them there's empty land there, it's arable, okay, so good empty land there, so they went. By the way, similar if I go on tangent again, you don't kill me please. I believe the Europeans of Columbus time, they likely knew they were not going to Asia or it was something vague in the back of their mind, maybe that's not Asia, maybe that's a new undiscovered continent, that's this landmass there.

I can't prove it, and this is more wild speculation than what I'm talking about on this episode, but there were likely shipwrecks that happened from the old world to the new world quite a few times throughout history, I think. And I'm not saying there was back and forth regular communication, but I do think that there were vague seafarers and travelers tales that rumors, I do believe this, yes, rumors. There's land beyond there. Anyway, back to main story. The Thessalian Plain, this is the large plain in north central Greece, directly facing Anatolia across the Aegean. It was also settled very early, I think soon after Creta was. Again, small groups of colonists, but they founded what was for the time a large influx

eventually of six settlements there in Thessaly, obviously originating in Anatolia. And by 6000 B.C. or so, by the 6000 B.C. throughout that millennium, there was a large complex in what is now Bulgaria and southern Romania. It's called the Caranovo-Gumelnica culture, and it had spread from the original seed colonies to actually having possibly hundreds of thousands of inhabitants at its height. And important to note, they kept in touch through trade and, et cetera, economy. It was an extension of its Anatolian roots, an extension of the Anatolian Neolithic economy. That is, changes in material culture in the Balkans kept correspondence with changes in Anatolia. They kept in touch with their homelands.

And later on, there is the better known Kukuten Tripolya culture that spread as far as the Dnieper into what is now Ukraine and was a rather huge sized settlement. This has been discussed many times. You may have seen articles recently and so on. But this makes sense. Although the oldest settlements were in Atolia, again, it's a very dry, not terrible place, couldn't sustain large population, whereas Europe was mostly empty at the time. And it makes sense that small groups of farmers, there was no centralized state at the time. How did these people think? Well, they were not a nation in the modern sense, right? They didn't pick up and move wholesale as a nation. They were likely small, loosely affiliated tribes and so on.

But small clans would fan out, small groups of families, endemic diffusion, waves of this small size seeking new land, new arable land, which these new colonies, small to begin with, they could become the nucleus of much larger complexes, you can say. Although again, I don't think even what we know as these Neolithic large conglomerations of people that are being found with some hundreds of thousands of inhabitants or even so-called large settlements. I don't think they were cohesive nations in any modern sense. It's also likely that the inhabitants of these places didn't just include descendants of original Anatolian farmers. Probably local hunter-gatherers joined them, because yes, I think farming life sucked okay,

but probably ancient people thought it sucked too, but there are obvious advantages. It attracts especially certain human impulses that exist in varying ratios in everyone and in every group. It provides you a ready supply of food source. Many people would be willing to sacrifice freedom and independence for that. But yes, the movement was obviously from maximally settled to sparsely settled. And Anatolia was all filled up, you see, dry land, it couldn't support as much as Europe. And while there's so much archaeological movement for the movement into Europe, I've been talking about, there's no archaeological evidence for the opposite, for settlement from Europe or the Balkans into Anatolia, nor as I tell you, any reason for there to be. Who would be moving there? Would it be farmers?

Why? Why wouldn't you move into empty, more arable land in Europe with more rainfall? Was it hunter-gatherers? Why? Why would you move, if you're a hunter-gatherer, into a strictly settled agricultural place? It makes no sense. Then there is also the matter of place names. If you look at East Anatolia, you have languages there, Hatic, for example, and Hurrian. These are not Anatolian languages, they're of course not Indo-European either, they're not anything else that's known, they're not Semitic or anything, they're language isolates so called. But the place names in those locations, Eastern Anatolia, reflect these very ancient, probably also native languages. So basically a variety of peoples originate in that region of the world, let's say the

Northern Mesopotamia, East Anatolia, and then Anatolia, and they probably spoke a variety of languages, Hatic, Hurrian, and then the complex that was to become the various Anatolian languages which were located in western or southwestern Anatolia. So, if you look, I'm telling you, in Southwestern Anatolia, every single known language in that area is one of these that I'm talking about on this episode related to Hittite, Luwian, Lydian and such, and even Carian, which is in the very southwest, like on, let's say, southwest present-day Turkey and such. This was discovered to be Anatolian language rather recently, I think in 1996. Carians are the ones that, the Greeks recognized them as barbarians, but they had a very close

relationship with the Greeks and the Greeks loved them and they loved the Greeks and so on. They're the ones that the Greeks got the crested helmet from, by the way, and they may also have been the first to discover how to fight against cavalry. You stand in line with spears, horses won't charge and this kind of thing. I think they were part of how the hoplites' armor and shield and so on got developed, part of that story. Although that's much later, okay, that's in Iron Age, I don't want to, I'm just giving you some background on who the Carians are. Let me go back to the point I'm making, which is that every known language in that area of Anatolia, including now Carian, which previously was undecipherable, but every known ancient language in southwest Anatolia is of this

Anatolian language family. And so every place name is Anatolian language style also. This is my point. It's same, by the way, for a lot of place names in Crete and mainland Greece, Because it was these people who colonized it first. So for example, any Greek place name ending in N-T-H, Nth or Nth, or that kind of thing. That's not a Greek ending. That's Anatolian origin, Corinth, for example. That's not a Greek place name. In general, when you look at places that were conquered later, they retained the place name in the language of the previous population, right? So I mean, just classic example, all over the Americas you find Indian place names. But in Anatolia, all the place names are Anatolian language. So if there had been a previous different population with a different language, they

would have had to be wiped out so totally that they left absolutely nothing. No remnant language isolates into historical times, nothing, and no place names even. And that's unheard of. In my view, it's one of the small but decisive arguments. In other words, the situation of the Anatolian languages in Southwest Anatolia is very much like the language isolates we know in Eastern Anatolia which we know are native in the sense that there is no previous known language that had been there. They probably are the Hatti people and the Hurrian people, I mean, were the descendants of the very earliest towns founded there around maybe 10,000, 9,000 BC and so on. Anyway, I'm saying the same argument applies to Western Anatolia.

Furthermore, there's the matter that if you look at 5,000 BC, around then or before then, on the steppe or mainland temperate Europe, and it's okay, again, archaeological record shows it's extremely very sparsely settled. from these people I'm talking about, the descendants of the Anatolian farmers, elsewhere it's very sparsely settled. Where would this population nucleus have come from that would have so thoroughly conquered and destroyed Anatolia after having migrated their wholesale through already settled territory in the Balkans? You know, there was no source, there was no known source for such population, you see, no archaeological evidence also at all for any such entry into Anatolia or evidence for destruction certainly at that scale and so forth.

So yes, the story then, if you pair this with the realization that there was this primeval language Indo-Hittite that later bifurcated into two branches, one which was to become the Anatolian languages that were native to Anatolia, the other that were to become the proto-Indo-European and the Indo-European languages, the story might go something like this. The earliest extensive human settlements anywhere seem to have been, again, I mean the earliest recorded. Who knows what existed before the Ice Age? But as early as 10,000, 9,000 BC, there were small and some decent-sized towns in eastern Anatolia as early as any towns we know of. Other early towns were in Egypt and such, and these people slowly spread, populated

first Anatolia, although actually not really the northern coast of Anatolia, that was not so well settled. But south and southwest Anatolia very much so, and from there, by 7000 BC or so, they had colonized Crete, very small colonies, think like 100 to 200 people by canoe or boats with livestock. Probably that settlement would later become the Minoan civilization, and so the Minoans probably also spoke a variety of this, a derivative of this Indo-Hittite language. Then soon after Thessaly in Greece, they colonized that and then they colonized northward through the Balkans, possibly also westward into Europe, slowly along the rivers with Etruscans also maybe being a shoot off of this group eventually in Italy. They travel mostly by water. Many of you hike.

You know how hard it can be and that's when you hike known territory with hiking trails. Now think in open country unexplored, there are often impassable obstacles in your way, plus the many dangers at the time, wild animals and such which are much more dangerous to small groups of people back then than now, plus also yes, a few hunter gatherers who could be hostile. By water is much quicker, much safer for all kinds of reasons. It's always, almost always passable. there are rivers that are not navigable, but less often than land. I think humans in premodern times mostly spread in this way by water, yes, but so these same people end up colonizing and settling much of Southeast Europe, but then they spread,

they become numerous in number, but then they hit the river Dnieper, and beyond the Dnieper is the steppe, which isn't really suitable for the kind of agricultural life they lived. It's more added, the ground can't really be, you know, they didn't use even oxen at the time to plow the land. It's very hard to do that, to do agriculture on the steppe without that. And of course there was no steppe life in the nomadic herd's way that you know it from movies and such. That was to come much, much later. But so then now how do they keep expanding? Well, they take to water. And over time in sei-wei fashion, gradual colonization, they start spreading around the north of the Black Sea by the coast, by boat. And these are relatively well-documented migration, it's not just speculation, okay?

They went clockwise around the Black Sea in small ships by the coast, okay? Because be careful, the center of Black Sea can be bad storms. I once crossed over from Istanbul to Yalta at night and I fucking puked. It was a Russian boat and the Russian guy. He tried to joke with me. They said we were all going to die You know, he said I asked is this normal? What's this? What's this storm? Why is the boat moving like this? He said there's a time to live and a time to die. He said this is Russian humor I hadn't been on a ship in a storm before, you know I was I didn't realize how much a ship moves even in a small storm Okay, and this is a ship designed for Antarctic scientific expeditions it had been repurposed into a tourism boat forgive me if I've said this on a

remote past episode it's inevitable at this point that I occasionally repeat myself but the storm counter you know the measuring can go up to 12 and this went only up to a 3 during this storm and it was amazing for me. So around the coast they they went around the north of the Black Sea clockwise they wheel around by boat and they form small settlements in the river tributaries and deltas that they find that are arable and hospitable, and they circumnavigate the Crimean peninsula and at some point in the 6000s BC, unknown exactly when, but in that millennium, the first Neolithic settlements are found in the northeastern Black Sea coast along the Sea of Azov right near the Don River, right near the estuary of the Don River, with

the same package of domesticates as in the Balkans, you know, same package, excuse me, sheep, goat, pig, cattle, these four. And considerable evidence besides this that this was extension of that same wave pattern of colonization as the Cucuten tripolia culture, in other words, that had come out of Anatolia and had become very numerous in the Balkans and along the present day, let's say, northeast Romania and Ukraine. So these settlers likely spoken Anatolian or rather not Anatolian, the precursor of that right, an Indo-Hittite language, it's a bad name, but language ancestral to both Anatolian and Indo-European, okay. But it was these people who, okay, if you look on the map, they reach the Don River on the east side of the Black Sea, so it's already by the 6000s BC, they've taken again

small groups of colonists have reached already the Caucasus, they've reached the Don River and if you, they go down the Don River and the Don River comes quite close to the Volga River. They're only about 100 kilometers apart at the closest point and there's not a long way to trek over the flat land between the two, okay. So then this same economy you can see it then spread along the middle Volga River, right, And then the Don River and the Kuban Rivers in the Caucasus. And these places were already inhabited, well inhabited by hunter-gatherers, foragers, Mesolithic people, hunter-gatherers who also hunted horse. And basically, this is the origin of the Proto-Indo-Europeans in the sense that having ended up in this

remote location, isolated from their original homeland, the relatives in the Balkans still kept in touch materially with the homeland in Anatolia, the economy, the material culture shows this, but here it was no longer possible. So these people who spoke an Indo-Hittite language, the same as those earliest farmers and town dwellers, but they became isolated from the others and archaeological records shows that they were accepted by the local hunter-gatherers. So basically these two mixed and formed the new people. They mixed the language they spoke, again cut off and isolated from the ancestral home and constant intercourse with it. It underwent considerable unusual innovations. It became much more complex than what was to become the Anatolian languages.

And so it was likely in what's known as the Maikop culture, where you find in so much emphasis on the wagon, this was a culture on the Kuban River in the Caucasus, let's say 3700 to 3000 BC, it's called a culture. We don't know how these people understood themselves, certainly not as a nation, but the word culture in Soviet archaeology means material similarity between implements found. But this is obviously a culture with some similar material, very similar material goods and similar cultural artifacts in the sense of funeral rites. So you find emphasis on the wagon and the funeral wagon, important men buried with a wagon. So again, around 3700-33000 BC, it was here likely that the Proto-Indo-European language

matured, having been maybe already spoken before this a little bit in the pre-Maiqab culture. located along the banks of the Kuban River in the Caucasus, okay, a wagon culture. But I find this actually a colorful and beautiful story, you know. I could write maybe a novel, maybe a long miniseries about this, okay, because what story really says when you look at it? Let me read from Drewes. And by the way, I want to emphasize something. I enjoy Mr. Drewes, Robert Drewes' writings, but I have no idea what Professor Drewes' politics are at all and as far as I know has nothing to do, he wouldn't probably like my political views. One of the reasons I high appreciate his books is the same reason Camille Paglia appreciated,

she introduced me to him, is just such nice logical arguments, such attention to facts, such ability to synthesize material from different fields and without ideology, without screaming And I think also without any of this kind of petty nationalism, oh, it was my people actually, I sense none of that in his work. So if that's your motivation, maybe you wouldn't like some of the things he says. But I just wanted to make this disclaimer. I make no claims about, I don't know, I don't want to smear him with my politics and people to say he Nazi or whatever they smear me with, you know. But I'm reading from his book, just the paragraphs, you know. So, from the certain and the near certain we must venture into the uncertain but probable.

A wave of advance cannot account for the evolution from Proto-Indo-Hittite to Proto-Indo-European. Here we need not a gradual extension, a day's walk or a day's sail at a time, but a clean break. A hiving off or colonization to a distant land resulting in a considerable geographical separation from the originating population. An oversea colonization probably before the end of the 6th millennium BC must have established settlements of Indo-Hittite speakers far from Western Anatolia and the Balkans, and the colonists or their off-string must have proceeded inland to a place still farther away. Far enough away, that is, that the settlers were no longer connected to lands already inhabited by Indo-Hittite speakers.

In their new home, the colonists would instead have been in close contact with the local hunter-gatherers. Interaction between the Neolithic settlers and the native hunter-gatherers would have led to far-reaching innovations in the Indo-Hittite that the settlers brought with them, and so to the evolution of Proto-Indo-European. This borrows from Marek Svelibil's creolization hypothesis, except that Svelibil speculated that creolization accounted for the divergence of the several subgroups of Proto-Indo-European, And here the speculation is that Proto-Indo-European was itself a Creole language, contact induced language change that is from a very important factor in the substantial, excuse me, contact induced language change that is was a very important factor in the substantial divergence

of Proto-Indo-European from its Indo-Hittite roots. Surely Proto-Indo-Hittite colonists, when they mixed, excuse me, when they reached an arable land far from their original point of departure, must have mixed intensively with the Mesolithic inhabitants of the place. Excuse me that I read for you like a retard, but you understand point Drew's is making. So the split within Proto-Indo-Hittite, within Indo-Hittite, between the Anatolian languages and Proto-Indo-European is the deepest event. And yet it's compatible with a steppe Urheimat for all the other branches, because the new people was formed through mixing with local wild men, you see, and then Proto-Indo-European developed independently on the step and that's one thing I find so interesting and somewhat

evocative of a fantastic story that there must have been some kind of wild man maybe, some unusual wild man living there. The language became very interesting and I wonder also the culture became very interesting too. And I wonder if it's a process of becoming wild, of feeralization, of literally a longhouse Neolithic farming population who in their wanderings got cut off from the rest of the slowly spreading Borg hive and they met unusual natives and then they went native. They went feral. They abandoned that way of life eventually and then eventually later became militaristic warriors and conquerors, very different from what their remote ancestors had been. I like this and there are rough analogs from other parts of the world that are known.

For example, the Sioux one, the Sioux group who reverted or shifted from farming to hunting, back to hunting, forgot farming and left it behind willingly. For example, it produced the Digigan Siouxans. These are some of the tallest recorded people anywhere. The tallest skeletons anywhere, by the way, are found on the Kuban and the area I've been talking about. I think it's a story of feralization, of the recovery of rather of people of undomesticating, untaming itself and therefore embracing wild freedom with a greater understanding, love and subtlety than peoples who had never known the subjection of long house life possess. I think there, I think this, I like this story, maybe I find it inspiration. Very good, I will talk such more migration matters. Until next time, Bap out.