Welcome this emergency historical broadcast, and by this I mean is on historical topic of great interest to me lately, the emergence of militarism in 2nd millennium BC, the militarization of Europe and for the next two, three thousand years actually, and of the whole world maybe. I've been reading book on this, I want talk, I find extreme evocative images of beginnings of a warrior class. I imagine myself too, I imagine carrying trusty swords, Apa sword type. You can look this up model on Google, Apa APA sword. It's one of the earliest effective models of sword developed maybe around 1450 BC, 1500 BC or so. And I imagine myself trekking with my trusty, maybe named, it would have name sword like Siegfried's sword, Nautung,

trekking through deep forested misty ravine from Carpathian mountains, west Carpathian mountains along rivers up to, into Czech and then northern Germany in search of amber treasure, mostly unpopulated Europe full of monster, trading routes following for amber treasure. Very exciting time, I wish. I could be, live in such a world as then. I wish also that Plato was here today to break the spines of all the faggot philosophizing on Twitter and in universities to drop you on your heads in judo, Greek, judo moves, Greek judo, and break your spines, the people who talk about things that they shouldn't even have been taught to read, I think. I think maybe, I was alive back then too, anyway, it's time of great import, maybe the I read for you now from Spengler, this from Spengler.

Along with the weaponry came a new type of man. A delight in daring and adventure, in personal bravery, and in a knightly ethos asserted itself. Ruler races made their appearance, made up of men who considered warfare as their way of life and who looked down with contempt upon the castes of farmers and stock men. Here in the second millennium BC, we hear men's voices that had not been heard before. A new kind of soul was born. From that point on, there has been heroism, conscious of itself. Yes, Bronze Age mindset, indeed, you like this. The chariot made heard the voices of the unheard, you see. When Tushratta, King of Mitanni, come with 500 chariots and a running S-wave band design inscribed on his forehead, you sit your Neolithic ass down and listen.

But anyway, look, there will be time for that on following segments of this episode. For now, I will cover brief the week's news, everyone talking, what can I say? Has World War III started yet? The hyperventilation on this, where if you look online, the kind of moron dissident influencers who are just lying, lying for engagement, finally Elon has called on them. But they're posting photographs, fake videos and photographs, many of them from Ukraine, others from even older, from some older conflicts, just outright lying and saying these are images of Iranian strikes on Israel, or now that Israel just a few hours ago struck so-called it's another, they're going back and forth like, yeah, to, you know, slap fight, a limp

wrist slap fight pansy back and forth and Israel just did their own ineffectual missile strike inside Iran. But I would bet nothing happens. But yes, these influencers are just one fake video after another, but how much do you want to bet? Nothing happened. I give 70-80% odds, something like that, that there's no significant escalation. Almost certainly there won't be a broader war, certainly there won't be a world war. Alex Jones is being an agitation-tardling, as usual, claiming that Russia could intervene on Iran's side. It won't ever happen. It's amazing. Again, the alternative or dissident emerging media, call it what you will, please, Mr Tucker, I love Tucker Carlson, but please Tucker, don't go down this hole embracing the grab

bag dissident talking points of – this is actually a good example of somehow the impression has formed among the American and much of the French right, not just the right, but the new alternative media influencers. Some are actually on the left, like Compact Magazine and others, but the line that Putin is anti-Israel or would conceivably intervene to save the Palestinian children or intervene for Iran. It's really telephone game agitation, tarnation. Andrew Koribko, I don't know this man, but apparently he's an analyst on Eurasia and Russia and he linked to an article on Oriental Review, it looks like some kind of online magazine. I retweeted it, I'll repost after I upload this show. But it's informative, includes many, many quotes from Putin and Kremlin in support of

Israel, in support of integration with Israel's military intelligence complex, even at times. And it's Russia's friendship with Iran, by the way, excuse me to repeat myself, I must have said this on some past episode. But this comes straight from William Oden's mouth, General Oden, I remember him saying that Russia's close relationship with Iran now is a historical anomaly. They've had repeated wars since 19th century because they compete over the Caucasus, especially that area around Azerbaijan and Armenia, they've always competed. over Central Asia and these tensions are still latent geographically that obviously still there and it's only because of America's blundering in the Middle East including yes its support for Israel Odom was very much against

that but it's only because of that that Russia and Iran have a closer relationship now than before or then it's natural for them to but it's somewhat opportunistic in other words they would just as soon as abandon that if the West stopped antagonizing them so much and this is why for example David P Goldman constantly says that Russia should not be antagonized he's been saying this since I think before 2010 they say Russia shouldn't be antagonized over Ukraine and many other thing because America needs them to oppose Iran of course Goldman's priority is probably Israel I don't think he denies that but the point is this leads to larger problem also with dissident talking points because in fact within the American security establishment the people

they are not united the so-called deep state the people who are for facing down Russia and who are in other words NATO hawks and Atlanticists they oppose the neo cons who wanted to shift America's weight or center to the Middle East and these tensions have only I think been temporarily obscured by coming of Trump but I think just as easily they could be exploited by smart trumpets or others. In any case, I have no special information to tell you about Israel and Iran now except that I remember from early 2000s, it was basically 2004 or 2005 around then the war in Iraq was going quite badly. But not just then, periodically since the Iraq war, you would hear agitation rumors in media and on the internet that any day now, next week it's confirmed, next week Israel

it's going to take out Iran's nuclear facilities, they're going to take out the nuclear program just as they did with Iraq in the 1980s, I think it was, the Osirak program, there was Israeli strike there, very much like the recent movie Tom Cruise, what is it, and he's playing volleyball nude on the beach, I may be confusing it with something else, but you'd hear this agitation constantly, to the point I remember Michael Savage was going off saying I'm tired of hearing this crap from Israel. If you're going to do it, just do it. Stop pretending, you know, and barking and trying to bring the United States in it. What use is Israel if it can't take care of Iran on its own? But it was constant, this kind of any day now, regional war any day.

And on the other side Ahmadinejad was warning similar things. Any day now we're going to wipe the earth clean of the great Satan and such things. He was the bus driver or taxi driver who had been president of Iran at the time and he wore these kind of cheap suits, if you remember, some of you may remember him. But I remember again, old on, this was 2007, he would say, actually the Iranian regime has been very moderate in its actions, not in its rhetoric, but it's what it actually did. People were expecting it to go crazy in Central Asia after the end of the Cold War and they've been extremely slow and moderate and they sent an actor, really it was a kind of buffoon player out like Ahmadinejad, to agitate and use rhetoric in order to drive certain sectors

of American and Israeli society up to a pitch of hysteria. But Iran, I think he is right, acted mostly moderate and even when they seek nuclear weapons It's not to initiate the apocalypse or this kind of thing, to drop a bomb on Tel Aviv. They want that as security, they are very prudent, boomerish type of old men. They want security for their government and they want that as insurance because they saw what happened to, for example, Gaddafi. You know, America promised him things and then he got killed in horrible way after giving up his nuclear program and so now other nations are free to see example of that versus North Korea and they say no thank you very much we don't want to get sodomized with a bottle

on TV and killed and our families killed we're going to have nuclear weapons to protect ourselves and I think it's perfectly reasonable choice on their side to pursue that but my point is none of this is new I've seen it before and it's a lot of you know gold chain Middle East, Near East kind of prison rape society, slick oil, hair puffing. Almost always nothing comes out of it. So just like when Trump killed, he drone-striked Zion Don, the Talmudic network. Be careful now. Zion Don drone-striked Suleiman the Magnificent, I think, or Suleimani, an Iranian general. And people were saying, this is it, he's done it now. The insane Trump, the boorish Trump, has sparked a world war for those who have geopolitical pretensions.

It was a regional war, you know, they like this word, but nothing at all happened and this is what I mean. I'm tired of, you know, the same thing, by the way, with Palestine, it's nothing new, you know. I love getting into fights, I'm contrarian, just to go on a brief tangent to tell you something about this Palestine thing. I made a list of mostly leftist accounts, some neo-con, but it's called a tack list or something. But they're mostly far left to it and freaks like the woman who's now head of NPR that Rufo is doing such a good job of exposing her this week, of lifting up her skirt to expose her walk, FTM dildo under those panties. So okay, so in order not to pick on friends and friendlies, because if I look at timeline

and I'm combative, and I only see posts from friendlies on Twitter, I am tempted just out of combative spirit to attack them, so I don't want to do that. So I made a list of only lefties, and I did it some time ago, I say, okay, let's attack the left. But, you know, Washington Post, Chappotards, daily cost types, and so on. Maybe a hundred accounts. And then as soon as I wanted to start really using it on October 7 happened, you know, just as it happened. And since October 7, all of the messaging, maybe 80, 90 percent, is about more Palestinian Chileans and Israel and all of that. So I can't use that list, or I would be talking about that only, and I don't want to. But what I'm saying is, in this respect, the Palestinian-Israeli thing right now is not

different from what happened during Second Intifada during early 2000s. It was exactly the same hysteria back then. And in Israel's also mostly failed war in southern Lebanon, also just nonstop seething from both sides, you know, the pro-Israel side trying to win victim points and then the other side, the Palestinian agitation squads on the left, nonstop seething. Rachel Corey getting flattened as in cartoon by one of those steam trucks in an Israeli settlement or whatever it was. It was the same back then, the same rhetoric from the left, the world is turning, world opinion is turning, everyone's turning on Israel, and nothing happened. It's always the same coalitions of left oids and college students and a lot of people in Arab world and Africa and such or Indonesia.

And I remember it was, I imagine actually that it was whenever similar flare-ups happened with Palestinians or whoever else in Middle East. Same thing has happened probably for decades, this same agitation, except without the internet. So with that too, when you hear solemn pronouncements that now it's really different, the world would turn on Israel and the Great Satan, Israel and the Great Satan. I don't think so. The only thing that could change support in the West for Israel is if widespread demographic change took place and you know people from Arab world came in or such but otherwise even then it's not clear that it would for example if in United States the things actually became that much more numerous in a political block what many forget is a lot of them are now

evangelicals and they think of themselves as the new Israel which is why for example Brazil is mostly pro-Israel because of the huge evangelical contingent there but that's That's about the only thing that could conceivably change it, and even then I doubt, and it would take a long time anyway, it's not anything so near. But this world of rhetoric, of media agitation, any day now, you know, and yes it comes from both sides, it's tedious, but there's a world, another reality that it's not deep state, I don't know if that's the right word, it gets called that, you could call it deep state It may be in the sense that it refers to the more or less permanent security establishment which doesn't directly answer to public opinion.

For them, public opinion is another variable they have to deal with. But for example, I'll give you an example, I heard Lutvak, he gave this once in some talk, there was a very leftist Greek government sometime in the past, I don't know if this was 1980s or what, very leftist, typical, you know, we stand with the Palestinian resistance against Israeli colonialism, that type of language. But he was on some Israeli plane in the Mediterranean, and it was not a civilian plane, it was some kind of Israeli military plane, and it had to stop for fuel suddenly, and it stopped on a Greek base, something like this, I forget the details, a Greek island somewhere I think, and they were allowed to fuel without paying that day on credit or trust and such, whereas

the Arab planes were never given the same privileges. And it's just small detail like this that even for a government that engaged in open anti-Israeli rhetoric that drives tards online crazy, that kind of thing, the world is changing and they now opinion is turning us on. But even that government gave special privileges to the Israelis, because in that world, the Israeli military and intelligence security establishment is more or less becoming integrated with Europe's. In fact, it has more or less been for a long time there, you know, logistics, that kind of thing, when you fuel somewhere and this kind. And despite public rhetoric, it was so, and with Americas, and to some extent, as I said, there are also relationships with Russia, and then the Israeli military actually has

very close relationships with Egyptian military, in large part because America funds both of them, but also because they reached that peace agreement, and it suits both of them for now. And not to speak of the Gulf states, Saud and so on, who despite what they say in public are low-key cooperating with Israel. It's hard again for Western dissident and leftoid tards to conceive of this, because some time ago they were playing that video of Osama bin Laden, or there were many TikToks praising some speech of his, and maybe it's hard for such people to conceive that bin Laden's primary target was the Saudi monarchy, and that these jihadis reserved their greatest hatreds for that, for the Gulf states, who they considered faggots and cucks for cooperating

with the West, for allowing American troops and so on, and yes, for being soft or even collaborators with Israel. And that was bin Laden's primary target, the organization such as it existed, Al-Qaeda, in its management of savagery text, you can find this online, but they were pretty clear in their aims, they wanted to draw United States into Middle East conflicts in order ultimately to overthrow these regimes, to cause enough instability there to overthrow these regimes. You know, all I mean is public opinion is real, it's part of what these governments have to consider, but the present conflict isn't unique in any sense, even in intensity I think. And actually maybe people have become more limp-wristed now and these strikes especially.

So now you have the Human Torch who was competing for Reddit points and he set himself on fire, But before you had the Rachel Corey and there was similar public hysteria and fear mongering about this on both sides and posters on university campuses. So now it's just the same thing with Israel and Iran beating their chests in like in a bazaar in Eastern Anatolia, two portly men, 90% body covered in coarse hair, oil, gold chain maybe who are grabbing their crutches at each other and spitting game you see, fighting words and so you know a guy in Morocco now comes online you know to scream so you know you see how it goes I can just ignore this and I want to talk really what I care about which is history of second millennium BC along with our friend Spengler so I will turn to

this in next segment but before I do I want to share one other week's news this is more speculative it's about Ben Shapiro's sister Abby Shapiro and I had rumoured it's a rumour she's changed her name to Abiyyah Shapira and has converted to Islam and has pledged allegiance not only to the Greater New York Ulema but also has joined Jamaat al-Islamiyah, this activist group. And then Shapira, what are you going to do now? Your sister is a proud Muslim woman, Abiyyah, Abiyyah Shapira, slide into my DMs please, I have proposition, very hot, very charged video, tropical location, muscular man. It's like Hitler was planning to send German women to breed with Kashmiri men. I hear, these are not my words, the words of a Hindutva leader.

It was part of internet lore, who knows if it's true, but Abby, I have similar but different plans for you. Slide into my DMs. My, my sex power is vacant. I will be right back. I think a lack of historical sense in modern intellectuals is very damaging because if If you don't know variety in human history, you end up thinking by default that certain things have always existed, or that they persist more or less as they do now, and then that what human nature is, what it could be, this is obscured from you. In other words, it could become much worse than it is now. Things likely will. But still, the most obvious case of this is about morality. If you are unaware, for example, of the great diversity in moral valuations throughout history

among different peoples and individuals, you will by default believe that what exists now, what you believe, is the entirety of all the alternatives. For example, the AI programs, at least the ones available to the public so far, they're all like this. If you ask them their moral fanatics, really, if you ask them any question about right or wrong it's always there's broad consensus that human rights are, you know, and oppression is bad and so forth. I hope this is only because they've been brute force programmed to say, now there is new AI from Mark Zuckerface, let's see what this is like, but who knows. Another delusion modern intellectuals have, pundits have this regarding the status of civilization. If they are conservatives, they might pay lip service to the idea that civilization

is fragile. They'll concede that much. But by this, they only mean it can easily be destroyed by barbarism or violence. At most, they would say it's by indolence or moral degeneracy, with the assumptions that after a time of troubles, it will be invariably recovered. But they never consider, and I discussed this at length in my book Bronze Age Mindset, the second part that many close friends said was their favorite, the second chapter, Parable of Iron Prison, but they never considered that historically what modern Westerners think of as civilization has always been the exception, that in fact it's been quite rare. It's not just fragile, it's quite rare that the default civilization that belongs to man, which isn't rare, and it's not actually fragile, and it's quite solid, but this default

civilization of man the broken and domesticated beast this civilization is something very different it's it's a variation on the slum or the favela so that you know most Asian civilization for example has been like this and still is I like Taiwanese people I like Taiwan food I like stinky tofu spicy sauce and this by the way but you go to Taipei now and it's kind of like a genteel favela And every Asian city has this character. Tokyo even has its elements in many places. So it isn't like what you'd think from history. The Greek city, the Italian Renaissance city from glossy textbook, it's very different. It's a heap of nameless clerks, shorn of individual identity under thumb of Tigress wives in Saigon,

bustling about, hawking, often with almost no literature or art of any kind worth mentioning. Literacy such as it is, it's to keep palace records. This isn't to say that such people who are tamed are not violent or cruel, but it's a big slum and often not even a glorified slum, okay? So anyway, I refer you to my book for more such, but the point is that the barbarous life that conservatives fear is even a deliverance. It's something actually much to be preferred to this kind of default so-called civilization, I guess meaning living in houses. And it's the same with war. I mean, war isn't something that's always existed. People just assume it always more or less existed as it does now that you have armies and commanders and

so forth. But the warrior, the military, militarism and so on, these are rather recent innovations for mankind, which is what I'll talk on this segment. Let me just get rid of possible simple objections right away. War is not the same as violence. Violence is universal. Skirmishes, night raids, massacres, personal fights, you know, a guy approaching you on the road in forest with a small axe or dagger to take your things or take your woman, a small group of bowmen or such things, massacring a village at night. Such things have always happened for what I just said, massacres, there's a lot of archaeological evidence and maybe such things are even the rule. I'm not saying that there was some sheep like Eden in man's remote past, free from violence.

If you remember Spengler's quote from the beginning of this episode when he talks about the emergence of the warrior and warrior races and the warrior mindset and so on, the new voices that are now heard in the second millennium BC, where you see something new that wasn't there before. Spengler was not working under some Rousseauian delusion of content and peaceful primal men or such. He knew that violence, rapine, etc. had always existed. But something obviously different appears by let's say 1500 BC for sure, starts earlier in fact. But something amazing and new appears by then that didn't exist before, certainly not readily apparent before 2000 or even 1800 BC, so you know it's in that period, often it's called

middle bronze age in most places, let's say 1800 to 1400 BC, something very new definitely appears and it's worth to look how and why and to see the difference you look and yes I'm using Robert Drew's book, Militarism and the Indo-Europeanizing of Europe. It's an amazing book, let me just say here, I don't know Drew's and he probably wouldn't agree with me politically. I have no idea. I don't mean to tarnish his name by talking so much about his books, but he's such an exciting historian and a model for if you're a scholar. He's a mainstream scholar in the best sense in that he's very scholarly and prudent. He knows a great deal about many different fields, which is very rare, but he writes so clearly and synthesized material from so many different parts of knowledge

and make such interesting, bold new claims that I think maybe he's best historian alive now. I think Beckwith is good too. But anyway, this book, so okay, to see the difference, you may ask, well, what about the states in the Middle East? Everyone has heard Egypt, Babylon, Mesopotamia, and so forth, Sargon. Well, as for Egypt, the representations you have in mind, maybe you have image of Pharaoh on chariot with bow and arrow, destroying Egypt's enemies. You can see a pile of sub-Saharans that he's felling with his arrows from the chariot. That happens after the change I'm talking about, and it is very much connected to the arrival of the battle chariot. But before, how was war, for example, in Mesopotamia carried out before this in the 2000s BC and such?

You had big states, and the primary technology was the city wall. This was war. The city wall was gigantic, and it was the technology of war. You had massive fortifications, and they would have been defended by archers and such, but battles in the open field, there's no evidence that any such took place, that you had confrontation between two armed warriors in open field. It was actually all entirely siege-based. So, you built huge walls, fortifications, some very tall, and then an enemy, if you wanted to take an enemy city, how did you do it? The king went out and recruited, or rather pressed into service from among his subjects, what is now translated as an army, but it really was not an army. The word was Erin Mesh, Erin as in the name.

It was really like a huge host of labourers who would be marched to the enemy city to build things like a ramp up to the walls, to the top of the walls and such. And the question is, could they be stopped by archers or other harassment while they were building this? Did weather and disease intervene and so on? Were the walls strong enough to withstand? Were there enough defensive formations? But also disease could often cut it short, there needed to be huge logistical lines to supply the siege host, which was rather large. But once the ramp was built, for example, a short direct confrontation then did take place. It was almost always worn by those who are besieging. In fact, it didn't often even get there.

Once the ramp was built, the city usually had to surrender if they let it get that far because the shape of the ramp versus the walls, you could not place enough defender on the a wall the way the walls were built to stop a big horde of these labourers who were spearheaded by a few skirmishers. Now as for the skirmishers, yes, the possible objection is why wouldn't you send out skirmishers to stop or harass the big approaching Erin Mesh, the labourer host? And I think that if you consider the details, you can see why, given what technology was at the time. You could send out bowmen or spearmen, people with slings, to harass from the sides as they were approaching, but they would have had the same type of protection.

And they'd be protected and supplied by their big host of engineers, if you want to call them that, the Pressed Labour Army, whereas you would be far away from the protection of your city walls. So once you threw your spears or the arrows, they could throw them back at you. What did you do? back to the walls, so records show actually kings were recruiting skirmishers not from their own population which was largely unwarlike and not armed. This army I'm talking about did not come from, did not march armed, they had no personal weapons or protection of any kind, they really were just a host of labourers, but they did recruit hires mercenary skirmishers from peripheral uncivilized tribes who were shepherds or nomads or mountain men. Excuse

And so basically the little fighting that was done directly or semi-directly would have been entirely by mercenaries of this type and part of the way these things are known besides the records of these masters of mercs, they're no representations visual or otherwise of open battles, no archaeological evidence that usually accompanies open battles, more on this in a moment, no evidence that the king supplied anything again for their air in mesh or so-called army in the way of offensive weapons or personal protections, even shields. Not to speak of armor, which didn't exist. Lack of offensive weapons and lack of armor, but lack of offensive weapons most of all, combat weapons. Yes, there were bows but there were no spears, certainly there were no swords and so on.

Whereas whenever there is any talk of war, of representations of war, it's always a siege. Skirmishes and skirmishes surely must have happened and probably if a king had problem with a troublesome tribe on his borders or mountains within his territory but these would have been a nuisance. They wouldn't have threatened the existence of its state, not yet anyway. they were not existential threat and the way they were dealt with they you just go to mercenaries from other tribes again the function of warfare was completely I think outsourced the natives of these states didn't have any military arts or military mind and yes that is also how a siege was concluded with a small spear spearhead so to speak of these mercenaries from

Peripheral tribes, so in a sense it was warfare, but there was no military as such There was no warrior or warrior class There was no militarism in the sense that the warrior also was not a respected or revered part of society The rustics I mentioned who did the little fighting there was they were outsiders who are you know? They got their training actually mostly for protecting their flocks against wild animals and the rustlers and such So, perhaps forming the primitive prerequisites for what would later become warriors. They did have this, but not yet, they were not yet warriors. The chariot changed all of this, which is again why Spengler's words end up being true, though he couldn't have known the full account of how true they were.

He didn't have access to all this archaeological information. How did he know it? because it's already clear from literary record as well, more or less, when and how this change occurs. You don't see the warrior spirit, the heroic spirit, military races and so on, before this time of the coming of chariots, which really started maybe around 1700 BC, maybe a bit earlier, but not really before 1800 BC. And chariot was game changer for what I just said, because now finally, you could truly harass and stop the Erinmesh, this serf congregation, right? I mean, the form of fighting these Mesopotamian cities actually reflects, I think, their social organization. These were despotic states of mass irrigation, mass agricultural public works,

and the same kind of serf, not citizen, serf masonry laborer was in serf to build a siege ramp, you know, just like another public work. it's really quite bleak, that's not a warrior, it's not a knight, it's not an army, it's a humus-squaffing, brick-making slave. So anyway, once you have the chariot, that changes. The charioteer stood on a platform, there was a driver for the horses, and the charioteer himself stood sometimes on a quite thin platform, suspended, and he shot arrows from this moving platform. That's very clearly how chariots worked, whether in Egypt, Middle East, among the Hittites and all the other nations who use them like the Mitanni. In India, in the Vedas, the charioteer war was archer war, mobile archers, China. This is just how chariots work.

It's not as a taxi to taxi infantry or whatever. That makes no sense. But once you had this, especially with a compound bow, which had already been known by this time, they could, from rather far away, safely just harass the coming surf laborer army. They could interrupt supply lines also and so on. So if the other guy didn't also have chariots, nothing could really be done to stop this. Your army of laborers would have been sitting, you know, just, they could be picked off. So then the other guy, so he had to get chariots too. So then you finally had open battlefield warfare. This is how it started, with crews of chariots meeting each other in the open field and then a siege taking place only after that, maybe. And crucial changes appear, telltale changes appear with all of this.

First of all, I mentioned the compound bow just now, right? The compound bow is much more effective than the self-bow, but it's much harder to make, it's more expensive. But once you have chariots, you see a lot more of these compound bows because these kings realize well it's so expensive anyway the chariot I should pay to protect and enhance this investment you know but that's okay that's what I'm saying it's expensive there are tell tales the chariot isn't just the thing that comes by itself you need horse trainers horse breeders chariot parts spare parts chariot builders you need in other words a whole industry and finally you need two very skilled and courageous men who need months maybe years actually of training much later when you have Japanese horse archers

okay you may have seen Japanese horse archer show but they take years to train this is known so these two skilled men with unique skill sets the charioteer and the archer Castor and Pollux, Horst and Hengist, the Ashvin twins that appear Here in the form of the two twins, actually, in so many of the mythology of Indo-European cultures, but more on this later. But these men came, of course, to take great pride in their business, which was war, and they came really, became the first warrior classes that are anywhere known or recorded. Then, of course, they had a prime place in society, the highest place eventually, because the state's security entirely depended on them. In the Middle East, they were known as Marianu, which reflects probably their origins. Anu is a Hurrian suffix.

The Hurrians were people, a language of the North Middle East. Think around present day where the Kurds are and Armenia, or around that region, Eastern Anatolia and such. And maria is the Indo-European word for young warrior or initiate. You see it in, it's exactly the same word in Sanskrit and I think it's the same in the Iranic languages Moria, it means kuros or manner bond society of the young warrior So at least in the Middle East initially This was an innovation of that northern part of the region a kind of hurrian aryan maybe cooperative innovation probably in the beginning Kings hired mercenaries from these regions Just as they had hired skirmishers before but more on the indo-european question in the next segment for now

Now I say these are the telltale signs of actually having battles, militarism, a military warrior class, which is besides the high status of the warrior reflected in literature, the wealth of warrior tombs, the representations of open battles and such, in some cases you're lucky you have archaeological evidence of battles. But most of all you have telltale, I say, signature military technology, excuse me, I'm sorry about what they do to me. But you have offensive weapons. Besides the compound bow, you have spears, which either had not existed before or they were very rare. I'm talking about metal-tipped spears. Of course, mankind has always used some kind of spears, but metal-tipped spears had not existed before, combat spears, swords eventually,

but also armor and shields, which again, armor and shields, you could go around thinking maybe mankind has always had them. But no, they became a necessity again only when you have open warfare between warriors expecting organized opposition from other warriors. And then they don't like to get mangled, you know, so you have development of armour and shield. Now, while battle chariot and militarism only came to Middle East, in let's say 1750 BC or so, the wheeled vehicle, wagon, not yet the battle chariot, but then the chariot themselves too, they were designed, invented further north. So leaving aside the question of chariots, you see wheeled vehicles as early as 3100 BC and actually even 3300 BC on the steppe. But then chariot-like things

start to be seen about a thousand years later. So you have chariot burials at Sintaszta on the steppe, this is quite east on the steppe, sort of south of the Urals, southeast of the Urals, about 2100 BC or so, so about a thousand years later. And whether related or not, it is also on the steppe actually that you have the first not dubious, true evidence of militarism and warfare in the full sense, open battles. And for this purpose, yes, I will read for you now. Between the upper Don and the middle and upper Volga, some 700 miles north of the Caucasus, were settlements and kurgans assigned to the Abashevo culture. Mortuary evidence of warfare was found here under a kurgan erected early in the Abashevo period.

A long pit grave at Pepkino on the Sura River held the skeletons of 28 young men, many of them decapitated. As described by Lyudmila Koryakova and Andrey Epimakhov, traces of injuries, broken bones and skulls pierced with metal weapons and stone arrowheads of the Balanovo type, see later, were detected on the bones of a large number of these skeletons. That the dead were all young males must mean they were not victims of a massacre or a raid but casualties in a battle. So for example, I interject here, but if you look in prehistoric Europe from, let's say, there are graves in places in where present-day Germany is, Poland and such, from before this time let's say the 3000s BC and such and there are obviously victims of violence

they have arrows in their bodies and so forth but the demographics of the graves are very different it's not young fighting age men it is very mixed it's a lot of you know you compare this again to graves of violence in Europe and it's full of women, children, sometimes no men or very few men, and many times shots from the back which indicates, okay, it was not a battle, it was some surprise massacre and so on. No offensive weapons in those areas, no armor, but one second I get back to reading. That their bodies were collected and honored with a burial under a kurgan suggests that their comrades may have ultimately been victorious in the battle, and that the community to which they belonged, perhaps achieved them, included several hundred men.

In the Pepkino battle, bows and arrows were obviously important. The main hand-to-hand weapon may have been an axe, but this battle occurred early, circa 2200 BC, in the Abashevo period. Later in the Abashevo culture, at settlements and in graves of the early second millennium BC, socketed spearheads were found along with an array of other weapons. Anthony's generalization is worth noting. Intense warfare, perhaps on a surprising scale, was part of the political landscape during the late Abachevo area. Some indirect evidence for warfare in the steppe, dating early in the second millennium BC, may have recently come from the timber grave Srubna Srubnaya Archaeological Culture. To the west of the Urals and south of the Abashevo culture is located here.

David Anthony and Dorcas Brown excavated a tiny Srubna settlement at Krasno Samarskoe on the Samara River close to its inflow into the Volga. In a deep kitchen midden with the largest of the settlement's tree structure were thousands of animal bones. Not surprisingly, many of the bones came from cattle and offy carpets, but what greatly surprised Anthony and Brown was that no less than 40% of the bones came from dogs. In the typical Srugna settlement, dogs account for no more than 2% of the bones. The dogs were apparently sacrificed, butchered and probably eaten in a ritual that came around every year in midwinter. Anthony and Brown suggest that the large structure served for gatherings of people from many

villages roundabout and that the sacrifice of dogs was part of a ritual at which adolescents boys were initiated into manhood. The archaeologist reconstructs such a ritual on the basis of the Lupercalia of the early Romans and of several other rituals attested in Indo-European societies. Recalling the Cryptaea of the Spartans, the Mannerbunde of Germanic societies, and the Vratias of the Rigveda, Anthony and Brown proposed that the purpose of the ritual at Krasna Samarskoe was to initiate young men into the warrior category. Apparently the Sintashta culture in the country of towns, just to the east of the southern Urals, was also familiar with warfare. Archaeologists have found 20 small towns or large villages here, most publicized of which is Arkaim in the Chelyabinsk Oblast.

I think someone mentioned, I'm interjecting again, that this town Arkaim was shaped like a swastika. Anyway, each of the towns was completely encircled by a fortification of mounded earth and a timber palisade. While a far cry from fortifications in the Near East, the mounds and palisades would nevertheless have offered at least temporary protection and they suggest that the men of the town expected that they would have to defend it. This is also implied by the weapons found in the cemeteries. Neither here nor elsewhere on the steppe have rapiers been found in early second millennium contexts, but that is not surprising because the rapiers were just beginning to serve as status symbols. In the same Sintashta graves, however, that yielded horse sacrifices, cheek pieces and

some of the earliest spoke-wield cards, archaeologists found many and various weapons and even what seemed to be panels of armour. No heads were stoned, but the hand-to-hand weapons were made of arsenical bronze. Thin bronze was not yet produced in the southern Urals. If the Russian archaeologists have correctly identified the panels of bone as armour parts to be sewn on a leather or cloth corselet, the panels would be the clearest evidence for battle and for a warrior class. The presence of spoke-wheeled carts and of war-like society may not be a coincidence. Philip Cole believes that not all of the chariots at Sint Asta would have been too small for use in battle. And he keeps going, this wonderful book with many, as I say, synthesis of many different vivid facts from different fields.

And anyway, how he explained these early chariots' work, but their predecessors of what was soon after this began to be used in Middle East, probably by mercenaries related to the groups I just talked about. So listen, the reference he just made to armor, I mean, is very important, okay? This wasn't yet a fully metalized culture. In other words, they had some are cynical bronze and copper, but not even actual bronze, and yet they had armor. In other words, you don't need metal armor. Later in the Middle East, the charioteer would be covered with many scales to protect from strong arrows and such, but even later, much armor was made only from strongly fashioned leather. But as you can see, you can use bone, you know, as you what I just read is not a technological

limitation of why it didn't exist earlier or why it didn't exist universally. It's because there was no demand for it. And there is a demand for actual armor like this. It's again telltale sign because battles of some type are actually taking place. But as you can see, that's the exception. It appears rather late in history. And in Europe proper, by the way, you're absolutely nothing like this at this time. There were no states in Europe of this time, of course. By Europe, I mean, let's say, Europe today what exists west of Ukraine today, right? But there were no states like in the Middle East, so there were no fortifications, not even like what was just described in the steppe, but absolutely nothing in the way of offensive weapons, I mean combat weapons.

There were no spears with metal tip, no swords yet, no armor, helmets, no shields, no chariots. In many cases, like Greece and Italy, by the way, there were no wheeled vehicles of any type, by the way, at this time. I know very well about the so-called battle axe culture, but that's actually not a battle axe. It's misnamed. When you hear about the battle axe culture, this is a very ancient culture complex. Culture in this sense doesn't mean culture like the Italian Renaissance culture. It's used as a term of art by archaeologists, especially in Russia, to refer to similarity in material record. So it could actually be quite a few tribes who may have even been at war with each other or whatever, but they had the same so-called cultures.

You may have seen people talk about battle-axe culture, corded-ware culture. Battle-axe culture was quite extensive in prehistoric times in Europe, and they may even have been related to the early Indo-Europeans in some way, or have been them. But it's important to note that that's not a battle axe, it's a personal defence hatchet made of stone, which was almost certainly used for protection against any mole. No doubt it may have been used in massacre or personal fights sometimes. And some men in Europe of this time had a dagger, although, again, this was for display and status. Many of the daggers that have been found were not usable even in hand-to-hand personal combat, let alone military combat. But again, these are not battle or offensive weapons like a spear would be.

And again, of course, spears have always existed, Neanderthals used spears. I'm talking about metal-tipped spears, for example, which appear rather late and well after the coming of the actual Bronze Age in temperate Europe. So I should repeat that Europe had bronze production, in some cases 1900 BC and so on, but they didn't use them at all to make spears or weapons of any kind. But again, I mean, let's say Europe west of Ukraine, roughly that, none of this panoply of the what you'd call the warriors telltale toolkit. And this despite that Europe of the time you had some rather large Neolithic society with large Neolithic villages. And yet, look, I'll get back on the next segment to that because,

right, Drew's has quite ingenious way of arguing when and how the Indo-Europeans came to Europe, prior to which, to put politely, Europe was a mostly demilitarized, rustic place. I'll be right back. Question of origins of Indo-Europeans, who I will call Aryans, risk maybe that you think I'm a Wignat with prison tattoos. But Indo-European and Proto-Indo-European are clumsy words. They don't really describe what these people were. The only danger really using Aryan is that you confuse it for the Indo-Aryans, the people who actually historically called themselves this, who wrote the Vedas and so on, to some extent also the Persians or Iranic peoples, the Persians you could say still call themselves that. But if I talk about those, I will specify.

The word probably was used by almost all the Indo-European peoples, by the way. And maybe, well, certainly in some way by the nucleus population, and I'm guessing it didn't refer to the whole people as such, it referred to initiates in the warrior class or what might correspond to, you can think of like the patrician class. There is much evidence for this from across Indo-European world. The word for aristos, aristocracy and so on, has the same root. But there are many evidences. To me this is one of the most suggestive small tidbits. It was always that the Finno-Ugric peoples who inhabited further north, even than they do today, probably forest, tundra, places where the Manzi and Kanti tribes live today and such. You can Google maps, see around the Ob River and Siberia.

But their word for slave is Oria, so it's suggested probably they went on slave raids to their immediate south and to them Oria was their captive source. Barbarous Finnish Arctic bear gorilla brutes. Anyway, so the question of the origin of Aryans and how and when they spread, this continues to be big debate, is one of great Indiana Jones questions of last hundred years, more than that, revived now by genetic research, although I've said on recent episodes, the one on Anatolian languages a few episodes back, I think what people think they know about genetics in ancient world, I mean the conclusions, they have been very rashly, very fast taken over the last 10 years, I expect these will be revised in the near future.

I intend to quickly argue on segment, in some cases it is historically linguistically impossible for some of these languages to have spread as early as some claims are now made, some of them relying on genetics for example about the Greeks, the italic languages and others too, but those two in particular, I'll say why in a moment, and in talking this I think must always keep eye on the prize that you are hunting for answer to specific question origin of these languages and how they spread so that it's primarily a linguistic and historical phenomenon to which you can use genetic tests as an aid if you know how to do it judiciously, but the question seems for many people to have instead morphed into, well, a component of steppe ancestry so-called in various populations.

Which is, in my opinion, a very different question, as is the biological or racial type of the people who spoke these languages, which I find extremely interesting, but it's entirely possible that there were various of such or closely related types who spoke different languages. Just to give you historical examples, I believe the Cumans were people who you would consider white or Nordid today, but they spoke a Turkic language. These were people in the Dark Ages, they spoke something related to Kipchak, the current language spoken in Kazakhstan and they invaded Europe and then the Mongols invaded them and so forth but they from descriptions I've seen they were probably you know indistinguishable from a modern north German or something maybe but they spoke a Turkic language similarly

the Khazars who you may know as converts to Judaism and they spoke a Turkic language probably related to current day Chuvash, you can look up where this is the Chuvash people, but their neighbors describe them as red-haired and blue-eyed, you know, so could they have been, you know, some type of white tribe, but that's a different question, they were from a different cultural group already and they spoke, they actually were horsemen warriors and they set up a steppe empire, but they spoke a Turkic language and they were actually part of the ruling family, was part of the Ashina clan, which was one of the founding families of the Turkic peoples of mythical status, born from a she-wolf, just like Romulus and Remus were reared by a she-wolf.

But regardless, I'm saying that racial stock is one thing, language is another. And they may have spoken some languages unknown today. They could have been ancient, let's say racially what you'd think of as Aryan peoples but who didn't speak the Indo-European languages, it's a quite different question. And then somewhat of different ethnic and racial stock entirely and they came to speak Aryan languages. Obviously today these languages have spread throughout the world, spoken in Haiti, French is spoken in Haiti. So the question let's say of step ancestry component versus hunter-gatherer component versus Anatolian farmer component and so forth in this or that ancient population group or modern population group for that matter is interesting but is not the same question and

people should maybe stop jumping to conclusions for now and yes remember that there are hard limits placed by linguistic and historical information itself so that let's say a very early dates for dispersal such as Renfrew had argued for before or even a dispersal, he was saying in the 7000s BC from Anatolia, but even a dispersal of the Indo-European languages, the Aryan language, whatever, in the 5000s or 4000s BC is impossible because these languages all share the words for wheel as well as wheeled vehicle and its different parts, axle, yoke, etc. And these, so they're intimately familiar, you know, they're the wagon people. This is a kind of cliché by now people have seen, even in the movie Prometheus, I think,

where he's being trained on Indo-European and he has this famous paragraph reconstructed about the wagon. They were obsessed, obviously, the language in the same way that the language of the Eskimo has, what is it, 50 words for snow, they had many words relating to this, to axe, axe or yoke, etc. And the same way that Greeks have like, you know, 20 words to describe how one man is better than another, they're obsessed with competition or, you know, five words for sacking a city. I mean, it shows the concerns of a people, right? But they were very concerned, obviously, with wheels and wheeled transport and these things didn't exist until at least let's say 3300 BC to 3000 BC, so any dispersal has to be after that. But even that is too early, it's too early for reasons I'll talk about now.

So anyway, what Drewes does in this book is very ingenious. He follows the trail of weapons and military technology to try to locate and to date arrival of the Aryans in Europe, in this book I'm talking about now, the militarization of Europe and the Europeanizing of Europe. Again, he doesn't use these words, Arjen, I shouldn't say it, you know, but tracing the weapons and their style is ingenious, I think, in a very different approach from the usual one archaeologists, for example, take of tracing the style of pottery and the everyday material record in general. Pottery of course has to do with daily care, of daily needs. It can become art later, but remember pottery at this stage of development is not Chinese

or Japanese vase or Greek nice art vases. It's the domain of domestic life, the production mostly of peasants, of women, social life at the low level even you can say. Despite yes occasionally they're interesting decorations but they're not really that interesting at this point in history. And the reason I think actually this has a lot to do with the Marxoid commitments of archaeologists in the 20th century in fact, even if they're just kind of low-key commitments, just baseline assumptions of their social milieu. It tracks with the adoption of so-called social history. You may have seen this word or if you in college many courses of this type, many PhD theses, many books of this type, if you search latest historical books, historical productions,

nobody buys them because nobody cares about this, but so much research into daily life of a French woman from Perigord in the period 1750 to 1770, or things like this. And in fact, I think the sexual or other obsessions of contemporary historiography that deals with experiences of lesbians in the barrios of Los Angeles 1940 to 1955, or even actually the sexual lives or practices of certain peoples may indeed be interesting subjects. I don't mean to dismiss all of this outright. But this kind of domesticized, tedium history is motivated by, you know, we have to make the lives of the people be heard. We have to bring attention to lives of the unseen and unheard that were ignored or suppressed, they think, by previous historiography, which privileged political and military history

and which placed too much attention, therefore, on white males or on hegemonic structures of oppression and possibly contributed to hierarchical, etc., you know, this perpetuation of war. I mean, it was amazing to me, when still partly a student, to hear classmates who were about to be professors, some of them, who seemed reasonable and I assume were not woke retards. But it was amazing to see them be taken aback by my interest in war and history of, military history of this kind, and to have them declare even there was no one around. They could have just ignored it, but they had to declare to be self-righteously that they love peace and not war, you know, and they didn't think the study of war was legitimate.

So it is because of normative or moral convictions that modern academics shifted instead to this kind of Marxified, post-Marxoidoid, or in any case a history informed by egalitarian agenda to shift focus away from political and military matters. Which when then you come to study of something like the origin of Aryan languages, but many other similar phenomena, but can be a real drawback, it can be a blinder, right? Because why would a military caste seeking lands and wealth to exploit and take over if that indeed should be the reality of the Aryans as it was with many other peoples, well, not many others, distinct others, the Normans. The Normans in Middle Ages, I think, are a perfect parallel to the Aryans.

You can find the parallel to them in historical times, the Normans, mercenaries who decided to set out and take territories over for themselves. Why would they have interest in making pottery? They just leave that to the new subjects. At least in the beginning they'd have neither numbers nor interest in changing the pottery of a region they took over or actually engaging in many other, you know, humble domestic daily life tasks that many archaeologists, they use these as telltale signs of which population is which. Right, because that's the argument I'm making here. It's not mystery. I'm saying the Aryans were one of a number of peoples like the Kassites, the Hurrians and a few others, who offered their services as horse trainers and horse breeders and military

men, mercenaries to the civilizations of the Near East, and then decided, okay, we can take over territories of our own now. And here are lands we've heard of through trade routes, lands that are rich, but mostly maybe undefended, they're ripe for the taking. And one early such example is also the Hyksos, who were not a people as such. They were a confederation of both Aryan and Semitic mercenaries going by the, if you go by the names of some of their leaders, and they had this new chariot technology. They took over Egypt for the first time. That's the first time there were wheeled vehicles in Egypt at all, by the way. It's when the Hyksos invaded with the chariots. And the Kassites soon after took over all of Mesopotamia in the same way.

But I think I've said this on some previous episode, sorry to repeat myself. In any case, the social history marks a delusion, so actually I go on tangent again. Bill Kristol's mother has some quite good essays writing on this, the inadequacy of so-called social history. And she makes the case why political, military, traditional, intellectual history is much more important. Gertrude Himmelfarb, I'll link a short essay of hers on this. Why not? She's quite good on this. But overall, if I had to say why, well, of course it's true that the average peasant in, say, China two thousand years ago likely didn't even have any knowledge of who the emperor was, let alone the goings on at court. And so by the standards of what the most people of that time in history experienced, you can

say you should instead study this daily peasants domestic and farming life and so on. But actually in a very brute direct way, decisions taken by that peasant didn't really affect the nation as a whole and the court, but decisions taken or not taken at court ultimately decided whether that peasant, along with his family and tens of millions of others, would live or die. See, for example, An Lushan rebellion. An Lushan is a great man, among many other such things. That's just one example. And in a non-brute way, the reason there is study of history in the first place, why is it interesting to study? Why is continuity, at least in human travails, if not progress, there's some continuity, right? But why is any motion or retelling of human affairs an interest at all? It's precisely because

of war, right? How does Herodotus' history start? What was he seeking the causes of the Persian-Greek wars? And he's saying, when did conflict start? And he goes back to the Phoenician rape of women and so on. But the men who carried wars, the state which existed and many in cases, many cases was maybe born actually only as an instrument of organized war, the actual state. The men who concerned themselves with this, with this world, this is why there's any history at all I think beyond the grass hut. So you know I was amazed, but you know this attitude is ubiquitous in academia, amazed when many of you had likely similar experiences, but amazed when I heard people, this was years ago in a class on the Greeks and they, including the professor who was leading them in this

murky way, like yes, that's an aristocratic prejudice in the study of the ancient Greeks. They were aristocratic assholes. I'm not exaggerating, this is the words they used. And the life of the daily people had nothing to do with that and that's what we're going to study in this class. And my question to you is, why? Why would you even study that? I mean, The very reason we even know anything about the peasants or merchants or wives of that time is because of offhand references in the works of men from aristo-culture or writing about, they were writing about aristo-things and state-things and war-things, and they didn't consider this other Banausic stuff important, so why would you even care? I mean, an occasional essay on it can be interesting, you know, the quotidian life of et cetera,

But there are many such cases that distort completely understanding of the past, obscure it completely actually from students in our time. Pindar, this amazing prophetic poet, was considered maybe best lyric poet of ancient Greece and maybe the ancient world, who was appreciated by Europeans of recent centuries, is almost completely neglected now because again his attitude, his claims that Excellence is inborn. You can you know if you're born rotten doesn't matter how much you learn you stay rotten You know if you ask any modern scholar who are obviously deeply offended by this even when they don't admit it But they say well obviously his concerns and attitudes couldn't have been reflected in the lived experience of daily normal Greeks

So we'll just ignore it. You know ignore the things he considered great or his statements as reflections of of reflections of widespread attitudes of this people is my question to you is who is this people and why? Who do you mean? They mean the people who washed floors and so on and it's time to pay attention to them. The last shall be the first. So anyway you know this very well this banal garbage if you've had anything to do with academia you go into class excited hoping you will study something new about ancient world and instead it's a constipated freak who wants to spend three months discussing his latest work on, or Zir's latest work on, say, the toilet habits of Etruscan matrons in 600 BC or such. Excuse me, BCE, yes, but look, I digress.

In case of archaeological study of pottery, I think it's mostly this, although I maybe exaggerate a little because, you know, for rustic and simple peoples with no literature and actually no political life, you can maybe make a case that the pottery style is somehow, if not determinative of who they are, at least attracts their presence or continuity. You can make that case. But I'm not sure that's true. Colin Renfrew, who I otherwise disagree with him, he said something a while ago. He's the guy who came up with Anatolian hypothesis, right, that the Indo-European language is spread with the spread of agriculture out of Anatolia 7,000 years ago it's impossible but but he said something a while ago a complaint about how there

was a conceit now that every time there's a change in pottery style somewhere there is also a change in people and even he saw this was absurd so to this extent the coming of genetic testing of ancient bones I think is to be welcomed if you can do away with this nonsense but anyway in the case of people who are coming to set up a light state structure and who consist of a military class, they wouldn't have had interest in bringing again their own pottery and so on. On the other hand, tracking weapons and weapon style, which is what they would have cared about, and the evolution of military technology, that is much more relevant. And this is what Drewes does in his book, and it's something actually forget libtarded

marxoid academics want to pay attention to, you know, the record of pottery and the record of condoms used in 300 BC or something. But this is something that HBD and genetics researchers now could learn from in any case. I've complained about dumb academic leftoids so far, but even people like Greg Cochran or Razib Kun or other such know absolutely nothing about military history, in particular ancient military history, and they feel nevertheless entitled to pronounce in very assertive ways about this and that. They got into very assertive heated debates with me on forums a while back, saying entirely stupid things like asserting there was no prehistoric regular connections between the steppe and the Near East, which anyone who studies even basic military history knows

that's absurd, military tech regularly spread in both directions whenever it did exist. And it's for this and similar reasons that they and others like David Anthony have had to revise their theory about horses so many times. At first, they tried to support the Gimbuta's theory, the Maria Gimbuta's theory that the Indo-Europeans came in much the same way that the Mongols had, as hordes of riders from the steppe, right? Mankind has always ridden horses, they believe. But because there is no evidence for military horse riding until much later, they've had to revise this and they had to say, oh, well, no, they used horses but only for herding or they were like dragoons to taxi infantry and many such things for which there is also no evidence.

I have no doubt that occasionally someone jumped on a horse but when you do have actual horse riding you don't get one or two dubious samples of bits as you do in let's say the thousands of years from the 5000 BC to 2000 BC when they claimed there was horse riding. actually maybe two or three samples which are questionable of bits during that time and but when you actually have real military undisputed military riding you don't just get one or two is the point but if riding had existed the attack ah yes I hope you like that music anyway let's ignore that that the The question of chariot versus hoarders riding and timeline in my view is really quite simple. I'm talking here about the ignorance of military history on the part of people commenting on Indo-European origins and such.

It's quite egregious as you'd expect it to be among the left, but even among HBD and such, well, certainly bloggers, but the historians who you would expect to have familiarized themselves with it have not, and they want to do genetic testing, but they don't want to learn military history. And just to address this matter again of chariots versus horse riding, military riding of horses is much more effective than chariots. If it had existed in the 3000s BC, as is now widely claimed, there is no reason, then, for the chariot revolution I'm talking about. Of the 2000s BC, chariots are less effective. When military riding does arrive around 1000 BC or after, chariots mostly get abandoned. Actually, they had been abandoned already by the 1200s BCS and so on, sorry, the 1100s

with the coming of the Bronze Age collapse in fact this is probably why there was a Bronze Age collapse because infantry had evolved by that time to counter chariots that's another story however but the first huge empires like that of the Medes gets formed on the back of cavalry and then you have phenomena like the Cimmerians not the Sumerians but the Cimmerians like Conan the Cimmerian is that right who just they crushed all opposition in their path in the Near East, and they brought what was at the time unprecedented terror in records of the time, because people had never seen that kind of riding horde before, you know. So, no, it wasn't being practiced in the 3000 BC, the 4000 BC. I'm getting off track again.

I can't possibly cover all the points and counterpoints of this case I'm describing now. So I encourage you to read the book I'm talking. It's very clearly written and a joy to read, but the basic strategy Drew's pursue is to track the arrival of militarism in Europe, which makes sense in multiple ways. There was no military tradition of any kind on mainland Europe before this, let's say before 1600 or 1650 BC, when at this time it was more or less simultaneously introduced in two places, in Greece and in Carpathian Basin. As I say in last segment, there was no armor in Europe before this, no metal-tipped spears, no shields, certainly no swords, no representation of heroic warrior life in any form, no fortifications

on settlements and so forth, no graves like the one I described at Abachevo just now. And second, you may have heard of writer from 20th century Georges Dumézil. He is historian of religion and such thing much related to Indo-European matters. And he came up with famous tripartite theory of Indo-European social structure which I think based on Plato and Indian caste system and a few other things. He speculated that such societies were divided between priests, warriors and finally the people consisting of craftsmen, farmers and the like. I think this is a bad theory. It's not only wrong, but it got Indo-European studies into one of its many dead ends. In this case by being too ambitious, when in fact the cultural elements that are shared

between different Indo-European peoples historically, there is no real evidence of priest class early on. It's warriors who are doing the sacrifices. But this aside, George de Mezil theory aside, it's bad because it obscured certain realities. When you get to concrete matters, as opposed to something as broad as he speculated on, when you get to concrete matters, they are about as certain as the linguistic aspects. In other words, the cultural things that are shared by Indo-European cultures historically Let me just give you an example. I've talked about some of them before. If you read Calvert Watkins' book, he's a linguist and philologist. He has a book, How to Kill a Dragon. It's a bit technical, but he points to Fray's undying fame. He's not the only one.

This is an old mainstay of Indo-Europeanist discourse, but the Fray's undying fame, which is shared in multiple of the Indo-European cultures. So it's not just the language, it's this poetic formula, undying fame, which exists in same form in ancient Greek poetry, for example, and in Vedic, kleos apthiton, in Greek, sravas akshitam, in Sanskrit, imperishable fame. You may notice it's the same number of, excuse me, it's the same number of syllables. And I wonder if the word, I think it is through that, the word that I just read for you and Sanskrit, shravas, akshita, shrava, when you hear people now say slava, ukraine, I think it's that same word by the way. So other formulas exist too besides this sharp winged eagle such that are common only to these poetic traditions.

The phrase in particular undying fame was applied to young warriors who died in battle. I quote now, it's short paragraph but it's nice. Most famously, as Indo-Europeanists have known since Adalbert Kuhn pointed out in 1853, the formula imperishable fame was inherited both by Homeric Greeks, Cleos Aptiton, and by Vedic Sanskrit, Sravas Akshita. The formula was especially meaningful for a warrior who died young, and at Iliad Book IX, Achilles recalls how Thetis once told him that he would need to choose between a long life and imperishable fame. According to Watkins, that choice is perhaps the central Indo-European theme. Because the people who brought the Proto-Greek language into Greece also brought with them

the idea of imperishable fame, we must here observe once again that militarism or a warrior tradition seems to have come to the Greek mainland along with what was to become the Greek language. That this could have happened in the third millennium BC, many centuries before the first weapons of war made an appearance in Greece, is difficult to imagine. Yes, I like his case, it's very clear. But there are many such other correspondences, for example, Kester and Pollux and the Ashfin twins, or the ritual of Ashwamedha in Vedic culture, and Roman ritual of October horse, and many such. So the point is that although there is no evidence for such a big claim as the tripartite division I described from Dumezil, there is definitely much evidence

for these other cultural artifacts which again Dumezil's theory is bad because it obscured them overshadowed them with crazy theory but excuse me but there's evidence for all of these and all of these elements point to a warrior class and warrior society so there's no tripartite division no priest class but there is a warrior class and therefore there's a hard historical floor on the the matter, as the spread of Aryan languages can only be after the development of a military tradition, meaning really only after about 2000 BC or so, likely slightly later. And what I just read for you from Drewes, that's his argument in condensation, right? What I just said. Of course he gets much more detail than that, much more evidence.

In particular he goes quite deep as regards the record of military evidence. I can't get into too much detail here, but take for example the matter of swords. By the way, if you want to excite a woman, you should invite woman to date and go on a one-hour discourse. You can find considerations of this online where nice spurdos wrote essays on who would win someone wielding a Japanese katana or a rapier from Renaissance Italy or such. Who would win? would love to hear such discourse but again a sword you might think is something that mankind has always had or has had for many thousands of years but no the first swords that appear anywhere were rapiers not of the usable renaissance european kind but they're quite ancient rapiers very long swords in the southern caucuses and then they appear

imports from there into Minoan Crete from the Caucasus, but they appear in the southern Caucasus around 2000 BC or more like 1900 to 1800 BC if I remember right. But these were not usable swords, they were huge rapiers made of bronze, they were not securely fastened to hilt, so they were probably mostly for display and honor by important men, they would carry them around or in ceremonies or such. And these appear again in Mycenaean Greece, in the same model as you see in Southern Caucasus, but only around 1600 BC, 1600 BC to 1650 BC or so in the Mycenaean circle B and such. But they also appear similar time in Carpathian basin, although there there's some evidence they were imported from the Mycenaeans. But once they are in the Carpathian Basin, let's say they appear there 1600 BC or so,

they undergo very fast evolution. So that within a few generations they become very serviceable, usable combat swords, you know. And the first samples, yeah, I'll tell you why they would have appeared in the Carpathian Basin. In other words, why the Carpathian Basin was an attractive destination for the Aryans along along with Greece into mainland Europe. But yes, very rapid evolution, so within maybe by 1500, 1450 BC, 1400 BC, there are very nice swords, some of the so-called Appa-type sword, or Boyu-type sword, a slight later, I think, and a few others. And these get developed there, but then they turn up also in North Germany and in North Italy soon after. But there is trail of them. is historical trail of them to these places from the Carpathians where the first samples were found.

That was their place of innovation and from there they spread to North Europe and North Italy. So by following the Trail of Swords in this case, he also does saying for shields and chariots and such, but by following the Trail of Swords which had not existed previously, Druze can track the spread of militarization in Europe and he speculates that it tracks with the spread of of Indo-European languages, because it was these people that introduced again militarism and a warrior tradition to that part of Europe where it hadn't existed at all. So he supposes that the group that arrived in the Carpathians, who probably spoke a slightly different language already than the one that arrived in Mycenaean Greece at the same time,

but that this group that arrived in the Carpathians was the nucleus from which sprang the Celtic, metallic, Germanic and also extinct Dacian and Venetic language groups and from the ones who arrived in Greece sprung the Greeks and I think this theory tracks quite nicely with a few other things for example the linguistic models support this type of late dispersal and not an earlier one the locations are securely explained or adequately satisfactorily explained by the spread. I mentioned the sword, but it's not really just the sword. Again, it's the whole panoply of the warrior toolkit and set. And then I mean the locations where it goes are satisfactorily explained, because all of these places, although they had been

largely undefended without a warrior or military tradition, they were by this time quite rich in natural resources. In North Italy, there was bronze and other metal production. In In North Germany there were the amber fields and amber being very important luxury trade goods in ancient world and very soon with these events, after these events, you start to see Southwestern Greece, the kind of Southwestern ports of the Peloponnese, they become a kind of thoroughfare of the amber trade which they had not been before. So I like this theory because it's not just random, you know, oh some people, a nation decided for whatever reason to expand and move into new territory wholesale that had just some villages in it, which is completely, well, mostly ahistorical by the way. I think largely a myth.

Let me address here quickly a possible counter argument I've seen some people make about the case I'm building now. There was paper, I think from 2019 and a follow up from 2021, both by David Reich or through his Harvard paleogenetics lab, which studied what they call the population turnaround or turnover in the Iberian Peninsula, which you see when people talk about it casually online, they date it, they always say it happened 2100 BC. And that would precede what I'm talking about here by a few hundred years. And the argument goes that after this date, 30 to 40 percent of the bones, the gene flow into the Iberian Peninsula was step-associated. So before this, there wasn't really a step sign that they found anyway, but after this

day, 30 to 40% of the bodies they find have this step component. And there was a complete, yes, they say complete 100% turnover of the paternal ancestry markers, the Y-DNA haplogroups, which again, in online discussions, this is interpreted as, this is proof, this is when Indo-Europeans came to Iberia and killed all the local men, took the local wives, and that's why there is this complete change in paternal ancestry, plus the step admixture in their children and so on, 2100 BC, QED, well, not really. I've read these people, in the vast majority of the bones found, they're more from around 1600 BC, by the way, and some possibly later than that, the dating of the bones is not precise in any case, but when you read the samples, there are very few from 2100 or even

1900, 1800 BC most would be after that. So if I wanted to at this point, I could make a plausible case here. Yes, this doesn't contradict what I'm saying. Some splintered group of the people I'm talking about made it that far to Spain earlier and so on and so forth. But I wouldn't say that, or slightly earlier even, or even contemporaneous, but I wouldn't do that because I find the claims that I just made to be completely implausible. I don't know of basically any historical conquest where the massacre of the local men would be so complete, I mean, there must surely have been some in some small tribe somewhere but nothing so vast as the entire Iberian peninsula and I'm not being a moral fag and saying oh such things could never happen, humans wouldn't do them, atrocities obviously

happen but they can never do it this completely and they never want to do it this completely, You name me one historical case, please. Usually they refer to conquest of America by the Anglo-Saxons. It didn't happen this way. Many Native Americans settled down and joined the American nation and so forth. They weren't interested in killing all of them. Many of those deaths were from disease anyway. So my guess is that this 100% turnaround is some kind of sampling error, or that there's another explanation for why the samples that have been tested yield these results, which by the way we're talking about dozens, not hundreds of samples. But second I would ask you, okay, I will give you even this fake date of 2100 BC, which Indo-European language are you saying this was?

What Indo-European language was in Iberia at this time, you know, because Indo-European language there right now, Spanish, we know that was introduced much later, Roman conquest. By the way, have these people identified the genetic signature of the Romans who spread their language to these parts of Europe? I've made this challenge early and, well, conveniently enough, excuses always come up when you ask this. Oh, no, that was different. I mean find Roman bones, Roman patricians and then try to track the spread of romance languages in Europe Oh, no, no, that was different well that would be a good historical test case to see if your theories of tracing language spread by genetic such-and-such if that works The studies I'm talking about now these two studies from the Reich lab

Discuss multiple population changes in the history of Iberia by the way including after the fall of the Roman Empire And if you did not have historical records about Rome and more or less precise dates There will be many opportunities for confusion in this case as well. I mean imagine if you didn't have a historical record of The Roman Empire and what happened after and the Arab invasions and then I mean there will be so much confusion There right you'd have this romance language and be trying to figure out which people it belonged to by studying bones and it's a quite confused picture even for the historical area but anyway look which indo-european language are the people play it was not a latin language so what was it because in

historical times by the time the Romans came the linguistic map of places like Italy and Spain was it wasn't precisely known but more or less it was known in In Iberia there were a few non-Indo-European languages, including for example the unknown Tartessian in the southwest of Iberia and a few others, and the only known Indo-European language in Spain of historical times was Keltiberian, a branch of Celtic. But it's impossible, and I mean that with almost certainty, impossible that Celtic arrived in Spain as early as 2000 BC, for all kinds of linguistic reasons that I may discuss or invite experts some time to discuss if there is interest in this matter. So I'm not sure what the people who claim this think, who made this argument about steppe

ancestry in Spain, what are you saying arrived? Now something interesting did happen in Iberia probably at that time and it's worthy of study and in particular I'm interested now in this culture on the south east coast of Spain, El Argar it's called, that began around that time, 2000 BC, and that actually it does show its own independent wealth and possible independent production of some weapons, although again the full telltale markers of a military culture, which would include shields, armor, spears and the like, and chariots of course were not there, but nevertheless it's very interesting. I didn't know about this El-Argar culture, but I'm not sure on the explanatory power of steppe ancestry when it comes to tracing who the spreaders of Aryan languages were,

Because the Basque, the only remaining non-Indo-European language in West Europe, they speak some kind of weird Neanderthal, but they have high steppe ancestry. And they have the R1B paternal haplogroup, and they have been relatively genetically stable since the Iron Age as a population isolate, so what does that mean? They don't speak an Indo-European language. Also the Etruscans, it's definitely not an Indo-European language, but they also had high steppe ancestry, I think. So what is being studied exactly here, what claims are being made in these genetic studies? I think genetic studies are very important and I would be extremely curious to know, for example, exact results from the Abashevo grave I mentioned earlier.

But by the way, because of the Putler-Zog invasion, scientific collaboration with Russia has been cut off, so those bodies, they are slated for testing but it's been delayed. And then the Greek government, for mysterious reasons, keeps delaying the testing of the the very large skeletons at Mycenae grave circle B, which you can think it's a conspiracy if you want, you know, we must save national pride, or you can just assume simple med incompetence. But the fact that when it comes to concrete interesting cases like that, which could be very revealing and convincing, because who is in the Mycenae grave circle B at 1650 BC, That's probably the very earliest Greeks or their immediate descendants and their royal house. So it's extremely interesting what their genetics would be.

I want to know, but there are no results. There are results from the maternal line and they track with North Europe, by the way, but they didn't publish the full data, they didn't give the bones for full testing with the latest. So instead you are presented rash, impatient HPD people who come up with extreme explanation about mass genocide or otherwise you are presented with Mediterranean nationalists with random corpses of Aegean peasants who try to construct the kind of continuity national identity because it serves their pride and they fail to account or even mention the fact that by historical times the Greek elite, for example, practice cremation and many other such things. But anyway, so yes, although when it comes to the Spanish case and population turnover

you hear about, let me not talk about the R1B genetic marker, that's very interesting. But I've heard that it's not actually from the steppe that it's to be found in Italy and the Balkans some thousands of years before that. So I'm not sure what that tracks either. It's also found in Africa, by the way. But anyway, many of the R1B and partial steppe ancestry bodies from Spain are again more actually 1700 or 1600 BC or after. But even so, I would refuse to make any claims because the idea that disparate small bands without a state structure could carry out or would carry out a coordinated policy on mass genocide in a vast territory like the Iberian Peninsula is impossible to conceive He has no historical parallel, so I'm going to wait to see further results about this Spanish case.

Anyway, I digress. I will be right back to keep discussing Indo-European origins and how it tracks the spread of militarism in Europe. In 1550 BC or so, vast changes take place in Europe, starting in Greece and Carpathian basin almost simultaneously. There exists there all of a sudden material record very different from that which had preceded it. Again, very sudden almost overnight. It's not something I think that locals would have just developed on their own or imported wholesale. You can't really import a technology like chariots, by the way. In the same way, if you, Victor Davis Hanson, actually makes a parallel argument about the way third world armies try to import Western military technology, and it doesn't really work out for them very well.

They fail very badly because it's not just the machinery, it's the whole system that supports it, which is why, you know, now we're talking about Middle East, but the Middle East during the Cold War, even Walt and Mearsheimer were talking about the deleterious aspects of the Israel lobby and so on, but it had a role in the Cold War as a weapons testing proxy ground between fights between Soviet Union and United States. So the United States gave weapons to Israel, the Soviet Union gave weapons to the Syrians and the Egyptians and others, the Arabs in general. But when it came, for example, to dogfights with the Syrians, the Syrians did very badly. Even though their planes, the Russian MiG was just as good as the American airplanes, but they got destroyed.

should look up that conflict in the, I think, early 80s between Syria and Israel and what happened in those dogfights. And it's again because just importing the machinery isn't enough. And the chariots, even more so, you need an entire cruise and cruise kind of industry and to support it, to make the parts, not to breed horses at least, to train horses, to maintain horses, animal caretakers specialised for that task, and then of course, highly trained warriors, you don't just come up with that overnight. But that's what I'll discuss briefly on this segment, the initial entry points in Greece and Carpathians. Now, on last, I got sidetracked a bit arguing against the Spain counterexample, but before Before that I was telling you, Drew's theory is satisfying not only because it ties the

expansion of the Aryans to the expansion and development of these particular weapons, but also because it explains locations where they end up in Europe – North Germany because of amber, North Italy because it was a very wealthy region, metal production, bronze production And they arrive in Europe, Greece, and in Carpathian Basin for the same reasons. So, in 1650 BC or so, there were the sheft graves at Mycenae, they were found by Schliemann. These were likely the first Greeks, the first Greek kings, or their very near descendants. The Skeletors are first in, let's say, figurative speaking. They would have been probably near descendants, maybe unmixed still with the locals. The Skeletors are massive, they are quite different from contemporaneous or previous Skeletors in that area.

A book by Sylvia Penner, which I haven't read, Schliemann's Shaftgrave and the European Northeast, published 1998, argues connections between the grave ritual performed here in these graves and those of certain graves on the steppe, in particular the Sintashta culture I mentioned. In other words, the Urals, this is very far east of the Urals, southeast of the Urals, as far as Bashkortostan in Siberia and so on. And the case that's made, I think, very hard to argue against. First of all, there is just the introduction of the chariot, which had not existed before in Europe. Again, you don't come up with it overnight. Second, the particular kind of organic cheekpieces for the horses in these graves is only found on the steppe.

They do not come from the Near East, where a bronze bit, I think, was already being used by this time. But the steppe used these characteristic kind of organic bits, bone bits for the horses, and it's the exact same kind found at Mycenae. The spears, the forged socketed spearheads, quite advanced for the time, unprecedented again in Europe and only found on steppe, she says, primarily in this culture, Sintashta. Then there is the wave ornamentation on the weapons and other objects in the graves. Same wave ornamentation style as at Sintashta. It's interesting, see, they look at patterns on weapons as opposed to pottery, but these This wave pattern exists on other objects too, not just the weapons. And finally, Drew's quite polite about this.

He calls it a running S wave pattern, but really it's a swastika. This particular kind of curved swastika is again only found on the steppe at Sintashta, or rather in Bashkortostan in other similar sites, and on gold discs present at Mycenae grave circle. And to this evidence Drews adds or revises it to note there's much more similarity between the metal and the goods in the graves at Mycenae and those of the Trioleti culture in the southern Caucasus that would be, if you look on map, beyond the Lycae range in present-day Georgia. And he says this is a better candidate for the launch of the expedition to counter Greece. much closer the people on the faraway steppe would have had to cross the Volga which is an ordeal

but there's other significant evidence he brings on this he notes the presence of rapiers in the Mycenae graves and these were in the southern caucuses but they were not on the steppe and the fact that it shared otherwise the material culture of Sintashta in terms of the other things I've mentioned, the swastika pattern, the cheek pieces of that particular type of spear, it existed also in this Trioleti culture in south Caucasus. It should be emphasized that despite its location close to the Near East, the Trioleti culture is actually descendant of a steppe culture itself. It was pastoralist and it had come from Srubna culture, or I think actually catacombs culture, it was a derivative of catacombs culture.

And the catacombs culture, I'd say, although Drew's does not make this case in this book, but the catacombs culture, a friend pointed me to this, is good connection also to the early Greeks because the Mycenaeans, right, because they have the same distinctive spear type, the socketed spear, and also they practice ritual of death masks, such as you see at Mycenae and really nowhere else, and they didn't do it from gold though, they did it clay, but you can imagine when such people got hold of gold, they got near civilization. The gold at Mycenae is probably imported from the Carpathians, by the way, but when they got to civilization and they became nigger rich, they would make their death masks not out of clay as they did on the steppe, but out of gold.

But yes, there are likely a source of this and probably source also of, my friend Lin-Manuel Rwanda suggests it's the source of heroic poetic formulas that the Greeks shared with Zvaidas, a very violent war-like culture, the catacombs, similar to what I've discussed so far. It's interesting, you go online, even a place as edited as Wikipedia will have a reference to the catacombs' culture, men being massively built europoids. This is the basketball theory of Indo-European dispersal. I mean some of these bodies found in the Kuban region of the Caucasus are on average six foot seven or eight on average and the women are very tall too and the Skeletors at Mycenae again are massively built compared to what had existed in Greece before and otherwise there are many

connection between Mycenae and this offshoot of catacombs step culture in the southern Caucasus The identity of some of the cauldrons found in both places places, not just similarity, but basically identity of cauldron type in creality culture. I hope I'm not misidentifying, but it's in that region of Georgia, the weapons, the metalwork, the other elements Sylvia Penner mentioned, and quite a few other things, including cyclopean fortification architecture. If you look up this particular type that's famously found, it's mycenae built. It's called cyclopean. And there's also an elegance you know in this argument which excuse if I've mentioned before but in the expedition to conquer Greece there's an elegant in it being launched from the land

that was to become the Colchis on the Black Sea because this was the land where Jason and the Argonauts ultimate destination was for their adventure quest and I think actually that tale the tale of Jason the Argonauts may be an inverted memory of the expedition launched from there to conquer Greece but yes they knew exactly where they were going they knew exactly what they were doing carrying chariots and other weapons on ships to take over and here Drews slightly revises his theory from his earlier book The Coming of the Greeks from 1989 I think their destination based on the latest finds appears to have been the silver mines of Attica and they took these over very early it appears as well as the best harbors in Attica and the Peloponnese, including Pylos, the home of Nestor would

later be the harbor that was to lead to Mycenae on the other side of the Peloponnese and so on. But the evidence of taking over the mines in Attica earliest, a very clear series of fortified settlements nearby that, again, there had not been fortifications before in in that part of Europe, and they secured the road from the mines to Athens. And that's the thing around this time, there's a drastic change both here and in the Carpathian basin, not only in terms of fortifications, more on the Carpathian basin in a moment, but before there had been a population that didn't have any of the markers of militarism so far discussed, like zero. And now all of a sudden overnight these exist all at once both here and in Carpathians where

also there had been prior to the arrival of the Aryans in 1650-1600 BC or so, the Carpathians had long been a very languishing, extreme poor area actually where people lived in not even in huts in these kind of underground pits. But then, slight before their arrival, metal deposits and gold mines started to be exploited. So this would have attracted them to conquer Carpathians. And again, as in Greece, there had existed, not pacifistic, but people entirely unacquainted with any of the markers of battlefield materials that I've discussed so far, a culture of rustics that was poor and provincial in both places and then all of a sudden they are transformed overnight almost into a military culture with extensive ties to international trade.

By the way, the part of the Carpathians they took over was, excuse me, in the Western Carpathians there's a range, a mini range of the Carpathians called the Apusenn where you could go today Unfortunately, I've heard there has been significant logging there in recent years, but it's one of the most beautiful parts of Europe. It really does feel like a mystical place. But of course they wouldn't have come there to admire natural beauty. They would have come up the Danube following gold trade routes to take over the gold mines that were recently being exploited in that area. So actually very likely these gentlemen again had heard through word of mouth about it. These are lands, they are here and here roughly and they are rich and so on.

And they have, you know, the people hearing this have this frightening new chariot technology. They are big fearsome warriors besides habitual mercenaries. So they make expeditions to take over these lands. And likely it was not that many who came initially. they didn't know what they would find, so they would go in all their battle gear. But upon arrival, they found the natives were not really at all acquainted with battle or military, so it's likely they encountered no or very little resistance and took over areas where, again, they were poor and rustic, but in the Carpathian, there would have been communities totaling maybe in hundred thousand or the hundreds of thousands, but taken over by various expeditions of each a few thousand men, maybe, who after they took it over,

they maybe brought their wives, their retainers and such after the expedition's success. But by the way, this is another reason I scoff at idea of genocide, conquest, and so on in Spain. It isn't that it's never happened in history, although never as completely as is claimed in the case of Spain, 2000 BC, But these men were not interested in populating and working the land, okay? They wanted the profits of the mines and they wanted to rule the area as overlords. And it's very likely that they establish, as Drew suggests, some kind of, quote, vague control over these areas, you know, ruling with a light touch. They would have been a military minority caste that took over. And not that I want to be anachronistic, but this is roughly in keeping with later,

much later patterns of Greek colonization where only the nucleus would be Greek immigrants from the mother city when let's say they set out to found a new city in Sicily or even southern France. But these men who came there with their wives sometimes, they would become the aristocracy of a new place. So the pattern of Greek colonization was they would come, a few families, They would form the aristocracy of the new place and then there were a lot of unwed men who would come with them, excess population of the mother cities, they would take local wives, they would become the people, you know, the demos of that place. They weren't there, you know, to wipe out the natives or even the men necessarily or

such things, you know, they needed them anyway, they needed in this case where it would have been a small minority, they needed the men in working, managing the mines and so on. In the case of Crete, there was likely a resistance and so you see there a record of destruction in the 1400s BC and such when these men, I guess it's not yet the Greeks, but the Mycenaeans, they took over Crete and there's extensive evidence, catastrophic war damage, so there would have been much bloodshed there, destruction of palaces and such. But on mainland Europe, there were no palaces, there were no states, and they likely didn't encounter resistance from peoples that didn't have states or military traditions at all, or even fortifications.

They probably took over through effect of shock and awe, with the locals submitting, as Drew suggested, the appearance of impressive military gear they hadn't seen before. Chariots, spears, basic armour, etc. So where there is some evidence, maybe of some resistance, is in native European settlements that had gotten larger and more impressive with chiefs in Czechia and such, the Czech, what would be today the Czech region. But this is quickly resolved and you see the chiefly layer of dwellings in those areas appear after this, they are occupied by new intruders and their material culture and weapons and so on. Thereafter, in the following centuries, they followed the ones who arrived in the Carpathians, judging again by the spread of their particular sword technology and gear and such.

They followed other sources of wealth in Europe, in Italy again, extensive metalworking in the Southern Alps, in North Germany, the amber. The graves at Mycenae are full of amber. From these local mixings, they developed the Germanic, Italic, and from the Carpathians, Celtic language families so you know it was this process of it's a popular word now ethnogenesis with the Aryan overclass mixing with the much more populous much more numerous locals but again in this case then finding their genetic in signature which I think would be extreme interesting but it's not so easy if there are only a few of them as I suspect there were but the changes in culture here were momentous it affected not only the entire material culture of of the region overnight, as I say, but even city design,

this new takeover by this new population, apparent in city design. And here I read for you, I think many friends enjoy this passage. Turning to the Greek mainland, we find that in the late Helladic II period, a good number of military chariots were apparently employed there. When Atarisia of Achaea caused trouble on the coast of Anatolia, this name exists in Hittite chronicles. It would have been quite late, though, let's say in the 1400s BC, but for those of you who like Homer, it might, Ahia is obviously the Achaeans, but Atarissia might be the Hittite rendering of Atreus. So when Atarissia of Ahia caused trouble on the coast of Anatolia, he seems to have had an army based on many chariots, perhaps as many as 100. Atarissia lived toward the end of the 15th century BC,

however, long after the first signs of the, excuse me, long after the first signs of militarism on the Greek mainland. Much earlier evidence from the beginning of late Helladic one is available. At Mitru, on the Locrian coast of the Euboean Gulf, Maran and Van de Meertel have recently found very important changes connected with the presence of tamed horses and of what they call a warlike elite. The excavations unearthed a small artifact, a stangennebel, this is a kind of cheek piece made from deer antlers. They were more popular in the Carpathians. But they unearthed this, the first cheek piece of that kind found in Greece, with the wave band decoration much favored in the Carpathian basin. They also unearthed a town that was constructed early in the late Helladic I period

that seems to have been designed with chariots in mind. A network of broad orthogonal streets, wide enough for the passage of chariots, marks Mitrou as an urban community very different from anything in Greece that had preceded it. Maran and Van de Mortel define the transformation coincident with the arrival of tamed horses. The antler-tyne horse-briddle piece is one of several discoveries in Late Helladic I and later pre-palatial levels of Mitrou that signal a major social change, specifically the rise of a warlike elite that assertively displayed its elevated status in life and death, transforming the settlement in the process. Only very small parts of the preceding Middle Helladic settlement at Mitru have been excavated,

but the exposed remains indicate that it had a rural character with narrow dirt roads and open areas strewn with trash. It was a favela! That was my interjection at the end if you didn't notice. It was not a walkable city mall like some city planners now want. It was big enough, it wasn't as big as, let's say, Houston for highway type American city, but it was like a real European city like Madrid or Paris with avenues for their cars. And although, excuse me, I keep reading now. All of what I just said now was mine, I'm not reading. Although the archaeologists refrain from attributing the transformation to any event, a historian may take the liberty of doing so. I will accordingly suggest that the transformation of Mitrou was the result of a takeover of

parts of Eastern Greece by a military force in which chariots played a significant role. Yes, do you like this? On this episode, I have not repeated too much on the ubiquity of chariots in, let's say, Mycenaean culture. That should be obvious, but less known is the fact that during this same time again there was a chariot revolution in the Carpathians, which again had not been in Europe before, it was in no other part of Europe and could only have been brought by outsiders as you don't develop a chariot industry overnight, as I keep telling you. So I should say here one other piece of knockout evidence regarding at least the arrival of the Aryans to Greece and why they had to arrive at this time and not any earlier. At the moment

consensus among Aegean historians, archaeologists, it's very different from what I'm telling you. Most of the historians seem convinced the Greeks arrived much earlier, maybe even as early as 3000 BC or such. And in many of these opinions they are supported by some of the Gimbutas, step theory people, some you may have read HPD, paleogenetics, blogs and such, but the linguistic and archaeological evidence makes this impossible, let me explain why. In Greek you have the words for chariot, for vehicle, wheeled vehicle, as well as for its parts, axle, yoke and so on. They are very conspicuously Indo-European words. Therefore the Greeks could not have broken off and arrived in this area before the invention of the wheeled

vehicle okay so you say that's okay because that is around 3100 BC 3000 BC actually they've been Anthony didn't say this but even as early as 3300 BC it was found but here is the problem there are no wheeled vehicles in Greece at that time or in Italy or Egypt for that matter but there are no wheeled vehicles of any kind before the arrival of the chariot so you might think different oh of course people have always had the wheel for much longer or they had to have it in Europe, southern Europe, because it had been on the steppe. But no, there are no wheeled vehicles in Greece or Italy before the arrival of the chariot in those places. And in Greece that would be in the 1600s BC and Italy slightly later in the 1500s BC.

And yes, the words in Latin for axle, yoke, chariot and so on are also Indo-European and actually quite similar to the Greek ones. So how it worked, if the Indo-Europeans were to become the Greeks. If they had been there before that time, they would have had other wheeled vehicles because these words are shared in, right? But they didn't. There were no wheeled vehicles. So no, in Greek and Latin, these words refer not to wheeled vehicle or at least in Greece and Italy, they refer to the chariot. And there's a good record now when the chariot arrived to these areas, it being the first wheeled vehicle. So that just This sets a hard historical floor. These languages could not have arrived there before the chariot arrived.

And this is besides the other very convincing aspect that the culture I'm talking about, the distinctive, heroic, highly militarized warrior class culture, is inconceivable among what existed there before, what they describe briefly, but if there's much more of that in the book and in other articles, if you read them, they were rustic demilitarized villagers who had lived in these areas before this time, probably for thousands of years they were Anatolian farmers, okay? And disorganized villagers don't just wake up overnight, decide we're going to build cities for chariots, what I read for you just now, and battlements and fortresses and a ramp up to the fortress and things of this type for chariots to climb.

I'm telling you the image I put in my book of what the world was like before the coming of the Aryans, this is going to be proven entirely correct, as are Nietzsche's speculations about the character of pre-Aryan Europe and the meaning of the return of democracy and socialism and feminism, and I will read for you now, maybe you enjoy, and I think I read this before, but it doesn't matter, I'll do it again, like in this hip-hop song, yeah, do it again, because this passage from Genealogy of Morals must be remembered, I will read for you now. With respect to our problem which for good reasons we can call a quiet problem and which addresses in a refined manner only two few years, I guess then I should. Well,

I have small audience, they are only refined audience. But I continue reading. There is no little interest in establishing the point that often in those words and roots which designate good, there still shines through the main nuance of what made the nobility feel they were men of higher rank. It's true that in most cases they perhaps named themselves simply after their superiority in strength, as the powerful, the masters, those in command, or after the most visible sign of this superiority, for example, as the rich, as the owners, that is the meaning of Arya, noble, and the corresponding words in Iranian and Slavic. But they also named themselves after a typical characteristic, and this is the case which is our concern here.

For instance, they call themselves the Truthful, above all the Greek nobility, whose mouthpiece is the Megarian poet Theognis. The word developed for this characteristic, est-clos, indicates, according to its root meaning, a man who is, who possesses reality, who really exists, who is true. The verb est hai, to be. Then with the subjective transformation, it indicates the true man as the truthful man. In this phase of conceptual transformation it becomes a slogan and catchphrase for the nobility and its sense shifts entirely over to mean aristocratic, to mark a distinction from the lying common man as Theognis takes and presents him, until finally, after the decline of the nobility, the word remains as a designation of spiritual noblesse and becomes as it were ripe and sweet.

In the word kakos, as in the word deilos, these mean in Greek weak, worthless, cowardly for Delos. The plebeian, in contrast to the agathos, the good man, the cowardice is emphasized. This perhaps provides a hint about the direction in which we have to seek the etymological origin for the multiple meanings of agathos. In the Latin word malus, bad, which I place alongside melas, black, dark and Greek, the common man could be designated as the dark colour, above all as the dark haired, hic niger est, this man is dark, that's a popular phrase in Latin that I think Kaufman edits out in his translation of Nietzsche, anyway I go back. As the dark coloured, as above all the dark haired man, as the pre-Aryan inhabitant of

Italian soil, who through this colour stood out most clearly from those who became dominant, the blondes that is the conquering races of Aryans. At any rate, Gaelic offers me an exactly corresponding example. The word Fin, for example, in the name Fin Gal, the term designating nobility and finally the good, noble and pure originally referred to the blonde-headed man in contrast to the dusky dark-haired original inhabitants. Incidentally, the Celts were a thoroughly blonde race. People are wrong when they link those traces of a basically dark-haired population, which are noticeable on the carefully prepared ethnographic maps of Germany, with any Celtic origin, to and mixing of blood, as Virchow still does.

It is much rather the case that in these places the pre-Aryan population of Germany predominates. The same is true for almost all of Europe. Essentially, the conquered races have finally attained the upper hand for themselves once again in color, shortness of skull, perhaps even in the intellectual and social instincts. Who can confirm for us that modern democracy, the even more modern anarchism and indeed that preference for the commune, the most primitive form of society which all Europeans as socialists now share, does not indicate for the most part a monstrous throwback, and that the conquering master race, the race of Aryans, is not being physiologically defeated too. The Latin word bonus, for good, I believe can explicate as the warrior, provided that

I am correct in tracing bonus back to an older word duonus, compared he traces bellum to to Dwelum, to Dwendum, which seems to me to contain the word Duonus. Hence, Bonus as a man of war, of division, Duotu as a warrior. We see what constituted a man's goodness in ancient Rome. What about our German word gut itself? Doesn't it indicate then götlichen, the god-like man, the man, I will not try to read in German, you will laugh at me, but the man of the family of gods. And isn't that identical to the people's originally the noble's name for the Goths. The reasons for this hypothesis do not belong here. Yes, I wish for a return of the freebooter, a return of the pirate and the mercenary. I wish for an escape from tedious female plodding, the smothering life. Long live death! Viva la muerte!

Until next time, Dab out.