Welcome to this Caribbean rhythms episode 166. I have returned my friend, Eugipius. Many of you know him as a commentator, a writer, an independent thinker from era of COVID. He led, there is this word from the steppe, Kalous. You can find it in Magyar and other language. I think it's very old steppe word for a guide through the wilderness. And Eugipius was that for many readers during dark COVID times, but he talk many other interesting things. And now on show, Eugipius, welcome back. We are talk politic momentous thing going on, both Europe and United States. Welcome back, Eugipius. Thank you so much for having me back, Bob. It's fantastic to be here. Enormous privilege as always to be on Caribbean rhythms.

No, honor is mine. What you think everyone talking this last night was debate by Don debate where he burn show what I've been saying for many years establishment is sclerotic this appropriate word that a bunch of old stuffed shirts and now they have that everyone can see they have their zombie candidate. What you think this and what are people saying this if you know in Germany and Europe. Yeah, it's very interesting. So obviously it's many parallels to late-stage Soviet society with the gerontocracy and totally sclerotic incompetent leadership. Biden is clearly out of his mind, incapable of speaking coherently. I don't know if you saw after the debate a few hours later, he gave a campaign rally in North Carolina or some place and he was, seriously, he was on amphetamines or something.

he was speaking so quickly, it was absolutely insane. The man is just, his brain is rotted away and he's been puffed up on various drugs all this time. It's very, it's sort of grotesque really. I've never seen in my life a political spectacle like this. So I can talk a little about German media. So before today or yesterday, Beidern being demented or having mental problems was a total conspiracy theory across all German state media. He brought it up, you were a hootler sympathizer and so forth, and then today it changed 180 degrees. Suddenly all major media, Tagesschau, all state media, now all talking about how Biden is completely crazy and has lost his mind and how Trump is going to come back again. They're all terrified. It's just incredible how quickly that switched.

I have a friend in Sweden, he tells me Swedish media is still very much on the pro-Biden side, and so they are still trying to defend him and claiming he won the debate and so so forth, because of course in European media we don't really watch the debates, you know, so they can try to lie in this way. But it's very interesting how countries are portraying it very differently depending on where you are, but German media is totally demoralized and freaked out, very funny to watch. Yes, in this there are many theories. People always think there's someone at the wheel, that it was Machiavellian staged so so that they can replace Biden with somebody else. But many others are saying there is this pollster, the United States, I don't know if you know

Richard Barris, he's people's pundit, something like that on Twitter, but he is a very successful pollster in the last two elections. And he just has thread pointing out DNC actually will have very difficult time because of many technical issues to replace Biden, Revolver News has similar report, is not so easy to replace him, especially with this late stage in the summer before election. What do you think, other people are saying it's all set up to bring in Gavin Newsom or Big Mike, Michelle Obama and such things. What do you think these theories? Well, I think these theories are overthinking it and every time there's a big regime setback or they fuck up in some way, we have to have this first wave of interpretations that tell

us it is not real and they're not fucking up in really its 12-dimensional chess. And I understand that, you know, the regime is also powerful and people don't want to believe too much in its stupidity, but, you know, this strain of commentary takes away from us all of its, the signs of its fragility and failure and I think it is in general important to interpret things initially at face value, and it's pretty obvious to me that this was a genuine fuck-up. They didn't intend for this to happen. All of other major Beidarn appearances, they've managed to sort of squeeze him through somehow with, I don't know, earpieces, drugs. However, he's not had a major public fuck-up like this, and they clearly believe they could make it work one more time with the debate, and they were just wrong about

that. I think if they really wanted to get rid of Beidarn, they would have done it a a long time ago. Now it's almost impossible. He has the delegates already, as I understand the American system. He would have to voluntarily give up his delegates to the DNC so they could find another candidate. It's almost impossible. So short of by done dying was something they've really painted themselves into a corner. And it seems just obvious to me they fucked up. The panic in the media, the panic in democratic circles is absolutely genuine. Yes, I really think they believed they could keep this undercover and push him through with Cocktail. Speaking of Cocktail of Uppers, there is this very funny GIF video side by side with George Floyd where he convenience store and he's obviously tweaking.

He's on some kind of crystal meth. moving in a certain way, and right next to him is the Fuhrer Hitler, and it's sped up. But Hitler is obviously on some kind of stimulants also, and so I wonder, is Beidern's upper stimulant cocktail more potent than the Fuhrer's? What do you think? It's very possible. I don't really know too much about Third Reich stimulants, if they had Adderall or equivalent back then, or how it worked, really, when possible. Perfect in chocolate, isn't that what it's called? They had a chocolate with mess. Yes, yes, of course. Soldiers would eat it, yes. But I don't know precisely what it was, but I'm sure Bayh-Dan has the most powerful stimulants known to man at this point. He's totally fried his brain on them as well.

I'm sure it makes you more powerful in the moment, but it speeds up the processes that caused dementia in the first place. So this is absolutely a very remarkable case, I think. Yes, this relates somewhat to what we talked briefly on last episode, which it used to be that the right wing, what gets called the right wing and so forth, was associated in part because of public relations efforts and propaganda efforts with stodgy old people with stuffed shirts, with nurse ratchets and so on. been I think the libtards and the left's greatest triumph was to associate authoritarianism as they call it the authoritarian personality the right with that but in now as they have been establishment for so long they are the as you mentioned the Brezhnevs and even far worse than the Brezhnevs

and the Andropovs. I think Biden performance is well beyond anything, any senility that people like Chernenko or Andropov had. And, you know, in my view, the right, all it has to do is sit back and let the left self-destruct, let them take the loss. There are, excuse to go on tangent, There are at least in the United States, I don't know in Europe, a lot of people on the right who desperately don't want that because they've bought into being a stodgy stuffed shirt, they've bought into the persona that the left media built for, you know, you can be a token conservative if you wear a three-piece suit and pretend to act like Evelyn Vaugh and so on. And so we saw this also during the COVID crisis, we'll come back to that, when you had many in the United States

at least, so-called, and England, integralists, as they are called, people who believe in things like a monarch, if you can believe that. These are those eccentric Catholic political types, yes? Yes, who don't really exist in real life, they're mostly a creation of, I don't know what, but they exist in this conservative movement in the United States, and they used to self-righteously go during the COVID crisis. Oh, we believe in statism and the herd and personal sacrifice, so the lockdowns are good and this kind of, look, we'll come back to that. Sorry, I already drunk, this is why I go on tangent. But my point is in all this, in Europe, like we mentioned last episode or episode before last, there are young people, there are many young people

who are moving to what gets called the right-wing position, at least the anti-establishment right-wing parties like AFD in Germany and so on. Do you want to comment on this and how it's seen with Biden and so forth, the performance? You mean how youth in, for example, Germany see Biden's failures? Well, I don't know if there's time yet, because, you know- Yeah, I have no idea yet, it's too early for you, I don't... It's only been one day, I really think the media cover on this, the umbrella, you know, they tamp down Biden's senility so much that most Libtards, most centered left people in the United States, and I imagine Europe, just were not aware of how far Biden was gone, now they can't hide it anymore, you know.

But that maybe has not been seen yet or maybe you can comment on that, on what the reaction is. But I mean in general, is it the same in Europe where the establishment, which is left-leaning, left-wing or such, they are seen in the same way as old farts, you know? Yes, of course. What happened really was, it's sort of the transformation of the Greens from the... So of course we've always had the old stodgy fart parties, the post-war parties of Germany, like, for example, CDU, the center-rights, and the social democrats who even predate the war in some sense. So we've always had these traditionalist parties that your parents vote for and so forth. And then we had the New Left movement, like the Greens, for example, who were supposed to be the energetic youths and so forth

in the 80s and 90s, and their sort of light Soviet block fetishization and so forth that they, this whole countercultural 1968 generation movement. The big thing that's happened in my lifetime is the Greens have gone from being the cool kids, the people with the torn jeans and the tattoos and so forth, to being fat, stodgy school moms that try to police all of culture and all of society. And all of the youthful interest and energy in being subversive and being countercultural and so forth, They've lost that entirely. Now they're just boring old skulls that yell at you all the time. It's been one of the most important and least commented upon cultural transformations in Germany especially. I'm sure also in Austria this applies somewhat, don't know about the rest of Europe, but it's

had a huge, huge impact just at a cultural pre-political level. Now youth find it not very interesting or fun to be associated with the Green Party. If you look at younger people who are Greens, they tend to be a lot of head girl types, you know, sort of very dried out vagina women and it's just very disgusting and you don't want to hang out with those people and more interesting fun people who want to do something subversive in counterculture there's just undeniable an attraction to the right side of politics now. Yes, in Spain a similar situation, you talk to any Spanish guys, they will tell you, for example, the left wing Basque parties which are the craziest kind of socialist, wholesome, chungist type that like, not national

socialists but socialist nationalists, right, from Basque country. Yeah, I know exactly what you mean, yes, yes. Yes, but the stereotype about it is that the mainstay of that Basque kind of, you know, is a woman with short hair, they call them Neanderthals in Spain actually, this kind of, it's a type, it's a Basque, short-haired woman, strident, Neanderthal, I know what you mean. But look, I wanted to ask you something specific. You mentioned on last time we met, this woman, Sarah Wagenek, she founded a new party which is meant maybe to take votes away from AFD, the main, I hate the word dissident, but the main opposition party that did well in the last election. And this setup person is presenting some kind of old school socialist plus some conservative values type thing.

I wanted to ask you about this because friend mentions that this is the kind of thing Russia support in Europe. And I know the Russia interference thing is overdone in US, it was falsely done about Trump, and it's a mainstay of the establishment propaganda. Any opposition party must be Russian supported. But in this case, I think there's something to be said in her case, and Galloway, that type of post-Soviet kind of conservative-ish socialism. It's because, actually, Russia and Putin don't like to support mainstream, you can say, right-wing parties, like Vox in Spain, AFD in Germany, others. This is the kind of wedge they like to place, people like Sarah Wagnek, George Galloway, people who promote kind of sovietish

but plus wholesome chungus socialist conservative thing, do you have anything to say about that? Am I off base here on her? It could certainly be possible. So I have various theories about what's going on with Sarah Wachenknecht because it's also important to notice that she has been sort of promoted as the RFD killer by German media and for a while she was sort of, I wouldn't say canceled, that's a little strong, but she was sort of at the margins of respectability because of some statements she had made about migration. Of course she had made those statements today, they would be much more mainstream, but she made them in 2017 or 2018 when it was really sort of, you had to be open borders, it was a religious doctrine and she was skeptical and so she was then sort of the margins of

influence but then she's been very much welcomed back into the mainstream on all the talk shows and so forth since founding the alliance for Sarah Wagenknecht. So she clearly has seen a sort of a counterweight to the RFA by major media. But I have a theory about how the party is supposed to function and that it has an objective purpose and the real purpose is to replace the liberals in the current coalition. So the liberal FDP party, the market liberal party, they've been humbled, they've just bled so much support with their association in the current coalition government that it's likely that if the coalition tries to survive in the 2025 elections, they'll lose the FDP as their junior partner. They won't make the 5% cut off to get into the Bundestag.

If that happens, then the real issue is the Greens and the Social Democrats will need another coalition partner. And I think that that's sort of what Sarah Wacknick's Alliance is supposed to do. They're supposed to replace the FDP in 2025 elections. That was their purpose. There's sort of a remaking of the linker of the left party that is more viable, appeals a little more to East German voters, and then they can make it into the coalition and continue something along the lines of the present coalition only without the market liberals so even more leftist than they are now. So that's sort of my theory. Is there also Russian connection? That's a very interesting idea. What it would do, it's certainly conceivable

because in that case then some interests align here. There would be more war skepticism in the coalition, the FTP who are much more Atlanticist, pro-war types would be out. Then the sort of war skeptics of Sarah Valkenknecht would be in, and of course the Social Democrats and the Olaf Scholz, they also have some hesitancy about the war, so it would push the entire coalition in a more, I don't want to say mainstream direction, but a direction that is a little bit more aligned with what the German people want. And I also have a theory about the war in Russia, which I'm not sure you share, perhaps you don't, but it is sort of known behind the scenes that the whole thing is coming apart anyway, and there's just an effort to prevent any major military setbacks during

this big election year, and then afterwards it's going to be warmed down in some way, or at least it will be more conceivable that interest will decline. So perhaps that's also an angle, but it's conceivable that we see in Sarawak some sort of convergence of interests. Russian, a little bit of Russian subversion perhaps on the one hand, but also it meets various domestic political needs, so sure. Yes, I don't want to embarrass anyone listening to show, but I liked Putler somewhat always and beginning of this conflict I hoped he would execute it as quickly as he did in Crimea and Georgia, but it didn't happen that way, and then his continued support for third world countries, and in Europe for parties like this, and the acrimonious relationship between

the European right and Russia for a long time, now I know it might be different in Germany, you take anyone in Spain or Scandinavia or such, I lost, I don't know if I lost a lot of friends, but it came close to that, you get the answer, I lost a lot of, almost lost a lot of friends in Scandinavia, in Spain, and also in Germany because I supported Putler, and I, especially also in Finland, and I didn't take their concerns too seriously at the time, But as time goes on, I see he keeps supporting these kinds of things. And I don't even think a lot of it is being done with a full understanding of what Russian interest is. I think a lot of Russia is run like the West is by old Soviet Cold War era boomers who are stuck in their frame.

And so, oh, we need to support this kind of socialism because, you know, we're against Western exploitation. Look, we don't need to talk about this. I wanted to ask you… No, no, no. It's an interesting topic. I think it's conceivable because when we talk about people like Sarah Wagner and Delinka, her former party before she formed the current party, this is the old socialist unity party from the DDR, so it's very conceivable that people still in this party had connections to Soviet era Russian bureaucrats and so forth once upon a time, so these can be relationships that still exist at some level. It's not all that long ago, you know. It's not at all inconceivable that they revive them as it's convenient, that this is a familiar

way for them to exercise influence, and they're just a bunch of boomers that operate in this way and kind of blindly. It's not implausible to me. People are always stuck in their frame. It's the same William Oldham, General William Oldham was a friend of mine. He told me during Afghanistan, the Soviet foreign minister called Afghan embassy outraged or Afghan Soviet counterparts in Afghanistan asked, hey, why don't you mobilize the students? Why don't you bring out the students against what's going on in Afghanistan? I mean, they are stuck, you know, people are stuck in their frame. It's not, they're not gods, you know, they know what they know and not much beyond that. Yes, yes, I agree. But I wanted to ask you something slightly different.

Last time we met, you mentioned that it's not just migration, although I would guess that is the main problem in Germany, as in Europe, as in our time in general, but also But you said agricultural policy may be tied to so-called climate change concerns or climate change regulations that are motivating this anti-establishment push in Germany. Can you talk more about that or say what's going on? An American audience not familiar with this? So it has a few different aspects. It's important mainly because it activates the farmers and adjacent unions and workers' groups who are, for example, freight truck drivers and so forth, who are very well organized politically. So we on the right, a lot of us, we struggle to organize and there's a lot of active efforts

to subvert our own political organization. Nothing is more dangerous in Germany than trying to organize political meetings or something if you're on the right wing, you'll immediately be infiltrated by government spies. But they already have the pre-existing professional organizations, and so when they're offended, they bring all of this pre-existing organization to bear on the problem. So of course there were the farmers protests in Germany that were somewhat stifled by this false freakout against the right, but there was a big movement in January that was a reaction to attempt to squeeze the farmers by depriving them of what were called fuel subsidies or diesel subsidies for agricultural diesel, but they were in fact, it was in fact a tax increase

because it's a little complicated, but farmers don't, they're exempt from taxes on, certain taxes on diesel because they don't operate on roadways. So they want to impose the roadway taxes on farms as well, so they were raising their taxes, but of course state media framed this whole thing as farmers whining about losing their subsidies, which was sort of infuriating. So the farmers then protested, and they had a massive organization. I covered the protests, I went and visited them in Berlin. Yes. That was one aspect of it. But the farmers, when I was in Berlin for the protest, had a whole array of complaints that were much bigger than simply the fuel subsidy issue. And they attached, of course, to EU-level nitrogen regulations, so trying to limit the amount of nitrogen in the soil.

of course in various other EU regulations on the production of food and so forth, which basically makes EU produce non-competitive. So I talked to a farmer, he said the various EU regulations, I don't understand all of them, I'm not a farmer, but the various EU regulations, they increase the cost of production and then we simply import cheaper food from Turkey or some place, and so the farmers are put out of business and then food which is not produced according to these standards is imported and sold in supermarkets, so it's a very self-defeating regulation. We don't actually improve the environment or anything, so these are the various aspects of their protest. And of course it was all subverted very carefully, so for what it's worth.

I just was thinking as you were talking now, there's this Michel Wellebeck book, The Map in the Territory. I don't know if you've read it, but it ends with musings on how Europe will become a kind of playground, tourist playground for Chinese, Russian, and Arab tourists and others to come to enjoy luxury goods and organic farming and biodynamic wines and biodynamic farming. Is this what they're trying to do, you get me? I don't know. As I said, they've already done it a little bit, I mean, have you been, I don't know, you know, half of our cities are like little Disneylands, you know, you just, you go there and the whole city center, they close all the traffic, you know, and they restore all the medieval buildings and nobody really lives there or anything and they are just expensive

perfume shops and so forth. And everyone in there, for example, in the center of Munich, everyone in there is a foreigner and none of them are Germans. All the Germans live in outside neighborhoods and so forth. So we've already sort of made ourselves halfway into an amusement park already. It's kind of absurd. I hate this. You know, you don't need to comment on this, this show is never... I used to go, I went twice to Toledo outside of Madrid. Many places aren't even open in this... Yes, it's walkable, walkable streets, beautiful medieval buildings, and yet most places aren't even open except on weekends because it exists entirely for tourists, and I absolutely hate this. They're trying to turn Paris into this. There are a few European cities that have resisted.

and are still actually what the city is supposed to be, which is a place where people live and work, you know? I can't stand fake amusement park cities, you get Piers. I know the idea of Europe becoming this. Yes, no, it's very bad, yes. No, I also dislike it. And it's a little bit better in Germany. Some of the towns and a few of the smaller cities are much more real. They're not as fake, you know. I spent some time recently in Erfurt, which I thought was a nice medieval city, but there's pretty much traffic open everywhere still. People actually live in the old city, in the medieval center still. It felt pretty normal actually. But especially in Western Germany this cancer has gotten very advanced. It's horrible. You go to Portugal. There's this place not far outside Lisbon.

You drive north. It's called Obidos. It's like what you're describing. It's a beautifully preserved medieval city. But I walked around there loathing every moment every moment because I was thinking this is the place and Sintra outside of Lisbon where voyages that first colonized the world were launched by men of vision and now it's these middle-aged Chinese fat tourists walking around, this is what it's become, it's not supposed to be that, I'm sorry, I don't mean to attack. I totally agree, I also have very passionate feelings about this matter, I totally agree. in general has been a sort of plague on Europe. I know it's important for the economy and so forth, but so many beautiful cities are just utterly destroyed by this. I mean, I

lived for a while in Rome, you know. Rome is just an absolute tragedy, what they've done to it. And if you ever go to Venice or anything like that, you just want to shoot yourself. I've never been to Venice. Venice seems to be, it's just absolutely overrun with tourists, if you're there, then these massive cruise ships full of fat Australians dock and in the city, 50% of everyone in the city is wearing weird cargo shorts and terrible flip-flops, fat 70-year-old Australian women walking around, it's just unbelievable, absolute atrocity. Yes, no, this needs to stop, there needs to be a futurist, yes, futurist AFD party maybe in Europe, but I wanted to ask you what you think about FPO, the kind of right-wing party

in Austria, it is now first in the polls, what would you say is the difference between Georgy Heider's FPOs and AFD in Germany, what European about Georgy Heider, and I have friends to say that if it was not for influence of FPO, the right-wing party in Austria, if it wasn't for their influence in Austrian politics and this, you know, Austria guiltless so-called compared to Germany, then AFD would not exist. There would be no energy. What do you think about this claim? What do you think about going on in Austria? Yeah, so it's a very interesting theory. There's probably a little bit of truth to it, though We must admit that AFDA is a very recent party, of course, the Eurosceptic party formed in the wake of the Euro crisis and were originally sort of just market liberal focus, whereas

FBR has been, the Freedom Party of Austria has been around since the mid-fifties, I believe, and so they have much older roots and they give me a little bit of hope because they were originally also sort of this evil, not evil, but sort of right-wing, under suspicion of fascism party, but they've been in Austria so long, they're now just accepted as part of the system. They've been in government several times, so it gives me hope for RFA that all we have to do is wait this out a little bit and then we'll become more accepted and they'll just leave us alone ultimately and allow us to function like an ordinary political party. So FBAO for that reason gives me some hope, but no, there are many similarities to RFA.

They are, of course, when they were originally founded, they were also a very small party. They had sort of market liberal elements, which IFDA has as well. I know we're supposed to hate libertarians and stuff, but I really insist this is an important segment of the right. You don't have to be a libertarian yourself or embrace all the ideas, but it's an important interest group. People who earn money, ordinary businessmen, have specific financial interests and they should be represented in our parties. So the F-Payer had always from the beginning that element and of course they didn't want to be, they sort of resisted the mainstream People's Party Catholic orientation, so they wanted to be a little bit more, they had some nationalist elements, there was some pan-Germanism

I believe also, and they were more secular, so already they feel a little bit like maybe this is sort of fascism, maybe we should be worried about them, but they were always small party and then Jörg Heider, they sort of really blew up under him and they became a a serious force and of course he's famous, he died in a sort of suspicious car accident in 2007, 2008 I think, so now FPR, they have over 25% of the vote in the recent European elections, so they are the strongest party in Austria, very impressive, you see what happens when the party isn't constantly like if there's constantly media tricks just wall-to-wall suppression propaganda all the time if that's just loosened up a little bit they would be the strongest party in Germany as well I believe so

it's though they're very interesting analog to if they an older version a more mature version of course there's downsides to that too I think they have a little bit of boomer cringe sometimes not always but there's sometimes an element of this with the men showing up in Tracht and listening to Schlager music and stuff that the youth don't find as interesting, where the IFD, a younger party, have a lot of sort of youth appeal, they're a very cool party with their marketing and their social media and so forth, so that's another contrast with younger versus an older party on the right. Yes, you get this. I've been keeping you for a while. We should go for a smoke break soon, but before we do, I want to ask you, do you have any

general predictions of what will happen in Europe in this next election and what, let's say, short-term and maybe long-term prospects of AFD or of the right in Germany and Europe is? Yeah, I don't know. So I think the coming elections in East Germany, I think it's very likely, maybe it's not, not, okay, let's say there's at least 30, 40% chance, maybe even 50% chance that there's a government crisis in Turin and North Saxony. So that is that the IFDA is so strong, or that the other parties are so weak, particularly if the FDP, if the Liberals or the Social Democrats don't get in, don't make the 5% cut off to get into the land tug, then arithmetic it's very awkward, that we have substantial possibility of there being a government crisis

where it's impossible to form a government because the centre-right Christian Democrats refuse to enter coalitions with the IFDA and of course they're now trying, there are big directives coming down from on top that they should also not enter any coalitions with the Sarah Wackenknecht party. So in that case, especially in Turing and the math begins to look really difficult and It's sort of hard to see how they can form a government at all. Might have to form a minority government under very strange arrangements, but it could be a serious crisis. So I think that's very important because that will put more pressure on the Christian Democrats to rethink their entire Cordon Sanitaire strategy, which is really just walling off the party from all possible coalitions in the East.

So that's sort of my near-term prediction. In the longer term I really think that probably the IFD aren't going to be banned and now that they're not doing as strong in the polls there's a little bit of relaxation. Also I think a lot of that freaking out that we had earlier was about the European elections. I misinterpreted it a little bit. I thought it was really about the East German elections and it was really all about European elections which is a little bit surprising to me because the European Parliament isn't a very powerful body at all. But I guess maybe for symbolic effort or maybe because there's just so much NGO money and so much international attention about these elections, there's a lot of different foreign

parties with their fingers in our public opinion and our media trying to manipulate it. I don't really know, but things have really calmed down since the European elections. So maybe after they can get a little bit stronger and do a little better than they've been doing because again, the constant suppression and propaganda scares people. In the longer term, my hope is that, of course, there's going to be more suppression of the IFDA. I think maybe they'll lose their official election funding, which would certainly be bad for the party, but not an existential threat. But I think if they can get through these near-term crises, maintain their strength, then they'll just become like the F-barrier. They'll just become an ordinary German political party on the right.

And that would be a very important transformation in German politics and would really, I don't introduce some minimum sanity to German politics. So that is my hope for the next four or five years. Yes, and I hope you're right and that some kind of Denmarkization where other parties, especially dominant parties, dominant establishment parties, try to co-opt these popular anti-migration positions but yes this long talk I've been keeping you for a while on this first segment I need desperate tobacco injection is this okay it sounds great I also need I also need cigarette so that sounds like a good plan but very good we come right back cigarette yes yes it's very good Back, Eugepius, I want to ask you sensitive matter that greatly angered me.

Merkel, during her disastrous reign, let in so many refugees in 2015. It was a terrible time for me to see that, and there are even reports that the German youth have been turned into minorities in their own country because of Merkel's actions. Is this true? Second, what is the action of young people to current situation now in terms of demographic composition? Yes, so the German youth are still not a minority yet, but you know that you can extrapolate current trends and the initial fertility of migrants is very high, so it declines of course with each generation. but at first it's fairly high so you can extrapolate trends and so it's you know it's foreseeable that this will happen but right now they are the youth are

still still not a minority but they're you know they're more squeezed than than older generations and even my generation is of course so so there's yes yes well but what is that do you know what the reactions to that I I know a number of young people not in Germany but France where my oldest online friends are but But even not oldest, I just happened by chance, I guess, to meet French people. I met a French guy in Argentina. He was from one of France's colonies, but he was pure French stock and so forth. But he had gone to study in Lyon, and he told me that his experience daily was he was walking on street. He was insulted. So he fought, you know, he just punched these kind of migrants in the face, you know,

because he was not, I don't know what native French are like, but he was not that. He was very different mindsets from French colonies. So he just, his daily experience was physical fighting. Are you hearing things like this now in Germany? Is this the case? Yes, of course this is actually a whole national political issue, the increasing violence in our school system, so obviously migrants are much more violent than natives, I don't want to say that German schools were totally peaceful, non-violent places when it was only Germans of course, boys fight all the time and I got in fights as a child, but it's gotten much worse and of course the migrants they have very perfidious behaviors so they gang up on single single single victims and they often put them in hospital you

know really hurt them these aren't these aren't just you know that didn't say friendly fights those don't really exist but they're not the more honorable fights that occur among ordinary children and so of the same ethnicity of course and so so there's obviously a whole political problem which is itself kind of radicalizing politically and has helped to drive support to more right-leaning parties. As far as what students themselves think about this, it's a little hard to put my finger on. I live in the West, of course. Here around Munich everyone is just so unbelievably cucked, you know. And imagine all the schools, you know, the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Leftists, they have such an overwhelming representation in the school system. They're all, they're

core demographic is urban school teachers you know so these children are sit there every day in class and they get nothing but oh you know there's going to be an atomic meltdown if we keep the nuclear plants open and the sacred migrants from the global south are to be worshipped and everything like that so the few young people I talk to seem to have very very their views simply reflect all of these psychological pathologies you know but But I'd say it's more radicalizing for their parents. Of course, things are probably different in the East. I don't spend as much time in the East, and I'm not as well connected with ordinary people, but it's easier for me to believe that this is more, that the youth in the East, lacking

a lot of this indoctrination, are probably less brainwashed than they are here. Yes, it's strange. colonies, even though this guy was 100% French, he was not a young student, I mean, whatever you want to call young, but he was a college student in France, and his experience, and he said other French colonial same, they didn't take any crap from migrants, and they punched him right in the face, and usually such migrants, you get this, as you know, they back down immediately if they have shown any resistance. But it sounds like you're saying same in Germany is not Colonials, but it's, you know, marginal, so-called same East, East Germans act different. Can you comment on this? Because I think American audience not really aware of what difference

between West German, East German still tracks to, you know? Yes, of course. So there's the East East Germany obviously was part of the Warsaw Pact, it was the DDR, the communist state of the German Democratic Republic until 1990, so that's only 24 years ago, so it's only a generation ago, and they have rather different subtle and not so subtle cultural social differences in the East, so they're not as wealthy as the West of course, they don't have the the same sort of liberal western political indoctrination as we do here in the West. They look a lot more like other Eastern European countries like Hungary, for example. It's pretty easy to believe that if East Germany were its own country and weren't tied to or even colonized by the West, they would look a lot more like Hungary.

Their politics would be much more in that direction, you know. So there's, of course, they're poor as well, they're not as wealthy. are older because they suffer a terrible brain drain, everyone wants to come to, or the children want to come to the West where you get paid more money and so forth. Their population density is lower so most of the Eastern cities where in the West they have grown to two or three times their early 20th century size and the East they sort of stayed the same all this time. This also I think has very important cultural and social influence. I I think very high density populations start to manifest political pathologies, at least sort of one of my eccentric theories. That's not, none of that's the case in the East. And there's also, I think, sort of just a remnant

of the communist period, it sounds a little odd, but there's some sort of, the communists weren't, they didn't encourage an overt nationalism, but they definitely, with the sort of old style socialism that foregrounds the rights of the workers and so forth, inevitably entails some sort of national sentiment or camaraderie that has been so depleted in the West that even these tattoos of it that remained in the East lend a certain common feeling that doesn't exist in the West and it is sort of fertile ground for nationalist ideas and for thinking of oneself as a people and identifying with co-ethnics that has been totally eroded in the West. So that's another aspect of just life in the East and how Easterners act. For example, I was at a tram stop, I don't have a car,

and I was waiting to get the tram and the line broke down or there's some, it happens all the time because German public transit is a total catastrophe. And the man who's waiting with me, he offered to give me a ride into the center of the city just because I was another German and it was raining and that's inconceivable that someone would do that in Munich, for example, this sort of public feeling and this nearness to somebody because they are just another German like you is something that is a little different in the East, so yes. Yes. I think you, Gippius, what you are describing sounds familiar to me as an East European, but I must touch on one subject here that may be sensitive to, let's say, right-wing

audiences in United States or Anglo world, which is that of, let's say, moral turpitude or such. Do you know the series on Netflix called Cleo about an ex-East German, she portrayed as ex-East German intelligence officer or such, who ends up jailed, and then after 1990 gets freed. And in this series, there's casual reference to how East German girls are, let's say, easy. I don't want to say sluts, but easy. Where Russian girls are sluts, okay, everyone is this common knowledge. And then, if you look East Europe in general, post-communist East Europe, I think this may be misunderstood because of Duganist propaganda, Russian propaganda about this, and maybe people who want to believe this in the West. But actually, communism really did destroy a lot of traditional sexual mores, and so

you take certain countries, I think most countries actually, East Europe, whether it's Czech Republic, everyone knows about this, or Hungary, or Romania, where actually in Bucharest an old pickup culture existed for decades, people don't know about this. But yes, would you say this is true, that there is communism having destroyed traditional morality in a sense, allowed this kind of sexual looseness or other, and that people in the West don't really understand what communism was like? I don't know. No, I think that's definitely true, and it applies not only to sexual relationships... Sorry, I forgot to say abortion rates, for example, in the bloc of Russia, in Ormus, you know? Yes, yes, much higher, I believe. I don't have statistics right now, but I believe rates of

children out of wedlock in East Germany are higher than the West, of course. These sorts of social indicators do suggest that a society where traditional morality has been eroded, obviously the church attendance rates and so forth are much lower. This is just the legacy of 45 years of communism. Yes, I don't mean to say that's good, by the way, but I also don't mean to say that it's bad. and obviously it tracks with a much more, I don't know if you want to say aggressive nationalism or group feeling in the people that's not as susceptible actually to Western libtardism. But look, these are sensitive subjects. We don't need to talk this now. I wanted to ask you, I mentioned Denmark at the end of last segment. In Denmark, the anti-migration position proposed by the right wing,

or as some would say the far right wing, was co-opted by the center left, by the social democrats. And I've mentioned this a few times. There was a poster on Twitter for a long time. His name was Europe Esperance. He was a personal friend of mine. He mentioned for a long, he was a Danish man, he mentioned for a long time the Danish example and he was hoping that the rest of Europe would adopt this. He also mentioned that the right wing in America especially and mostly in France, let's say the far right wing, what gets called the far right wing, was very undisciplined to put it lightly. It was, he used much worse words, he said it was malicious and stupid, because it didn't take the path that Danish right took, which allowed its one position of migration restriction

to be co-opted by the Social Democrats. And when I mentioned this recently on Twitter thread, there were several responses, including to the effect that Denmark can do this kind of low-key way because it's not in the eye of Sauron, it's a small country, nobody cares about it. Or things like the Danish Social Democrats must have been exceptionally well-intentioned and so it was because of their goodwill that they adopted these positions to co-opt the the far right, whereas in other parts of Europe or the United States, the mainstream parties do not have goodwill, and so that it depends somehow on the goodwill. But I think the point is, it's not just the goodwill, it's whether the far right so-called parties have the discipline, the political discipline, to not spur out, to not start

checking every base box, oh, you know, we are also, by the way, against seed oils and into tanning. I'm joking here. I mean, I'm actually… No, of course, I totally understand what you mean, yes. I'm against seed oils, but you know what I mean. They cucked, the Danish right publicly cucked, as these people would call it, on a lot of things except this issue of migration and that forced the Social Democrats in Denmark to adopt this policy. What do you think about this case? Is Denmarkization possible in Germany or other parts of Europe or are the European or German AFD too undisciplined to adopt the same strategy? What do you think? I would say the AfD of course is not a perfect party and they have however been getting better over time.

So I would reject a little bit the idea that they are so undisciplined because we are under so much pressure here from our own domestic spy agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the constitution and you know we have sort of a managed democracy in Germany but being based can really be a problem even if it gets you support you can get banned or something so the RFA is pretty toned down and I would say they have foregrounded migration as their main issue of course under COVID they also opposed lockdowns and vaccine mandates which I think is was at the time seemed equally as important as migration they are of course not a perfect party, they've made various missteps. People like Maximilian Kraa have

attracted a lot of negative attention, gotten in some unnecessary fights, even though I think they're well-intentioned people. The prospects of getting mainstream parties to adopt anti-immigrationist positions from the IFDA to sort of deprive the IFDA of supports, supports. In the near term, the difficulty is that the party cartel system, all the main parties, are determined to use legal mechanisms to quash the AFD right now. And only after that fails would they fall back to behaving like treating the AFD like an ordinary political party. So I think whatever the AFD does, they're not going to escape this legal repression in the near term, and it's going to be the preferred method of dealing with them rather

than adopting any of their positions. So I understand this basic strategy is a good idea. Germany is actually kind of a unique state in Europe in that our 1949 constitution has all these protections built into it to prevent another machte Greifung, to prevent 1933 from happening again. So there's a lot of things the state can do to harass and infiltrate and undermine parties. That's another point to bring up is that the IFDA we know is very thoroughly infiltrated with informants and domestic intelligence agents. We have confirmation of this, there are thousands of them in the party already. So every time the IFDA does a misstep or something goes wrong, you always have to ask to what degree these are government provocateurs, these are staged events that are being caused

from within the party. This is not crazy at all. We know that they do this. We have judicial proof of this from past cases with the NPD and so forth. So it's very complicated and Germany is a somewhat special case. I think it's a very special case in Europe. I think the only counterpart to Germany is the United States, where anything so-called with the far right or hard right, with the image of that, immediately gets infiltrated and co-opted. And the only state I know of in Europe that's the same is Germany, where, forgive me, I'm quite drunk at this point of the night you get this, but there was a party, the German Democrat or something like that, with that name, where almost all the leadership was federal informants for the German state security.

They are Heimat, but they were the NPD, the Nationalist Party of Germany. They were the ones who, some years ago, there was a procedure to ban them, they are sort of an old right party, you know, they may be, they are accused of being neo-Nazis and so forth, that's not how they describe themselves of course, but they were sort of old right as opposed to new right, and they definitely, there was a procedure to ban them, and it that emerged in the course of this procedure, that they had been thoroughly infiltrated, the leadership was full of federal informants, and for this reason the procedure to ban them failed because the court decided that, well, it's unclear that all the illegal things they did were actually of their own making. Yes.

I think it's a very funny case you get, Piers, because people on the right, however you want to define the intellectual right in the United States so like Carl Schmitt. But maybe they forget that Carl Schmitt was actually a big inspiration for post World War II German constitution because before Hitler took power, Carl Schmitt was giving basically advice to the Social Democrats that they need to ban the Nazi and Communist parties to keep the Republic together, and that advice was not taken by the Social Democrats in Weimar, but it was taken in post-World War II Germany, and it is those kinds of arguments that are used, forgive me, you correct me if I'm wrong, you can be as long as those... This is absolutely correct, this is absolutely correct, yes.

Yes, it's those kinds of arguments that are used to ban essentially and now to do lawfare against the the AFD but I hope AFD can can you know let's say secretly maybe not excuse I drunk I secretly is not right word but low-key cock a low-key cock and force force the issue of migration to forefront where other parties are forced then to adopt it in some way and in this connection you get yes I wanted to ask you there is man Martin Selner he popularized idea of re-migration and if I understand this right it can actually be very humane idea because many people have image oh the far-right the hard-right parties take over in Europe and they will have immediately, you know, SD-type state police round up migrants and kill them or deport them in, mass deport them in ships or such things.

And that's used, of course, to scare normies away from these positions. But there is a much more humane path that I think even libtards could agree to if they were made to see the truth of it, which is, hey, you improve conditions, you allow conditions to improve in the third world, especially in the Maghreb, in North Africa, and so forth, to where migrants, and in Turkey, and that's where probably most migrants, correct me if I'm wrong, are from in many of these countries, Holland, Germany especially, and those migrants can then maybe, they don't especially necessarily want to live in North Europe, they may start to spend part of the year in Algeria or Libya or maybe not Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey

or such, they can go back and forth and then eventually they can just move back because things are getting better in their home countries and the European nations are maybe providing them incentives to move back, friendly incentives, you know, carrot as opposed to stick. Am I misrepresenting this and what do you think prospects of this and of what Martin Selner calls re-migration are for, let's say, the next 10-20 years in Europe? Yes, so Martin Zellner, I consider him a friend, we've talked several times, so I disagree with him a little bit, but I think of course he's very well-intentioned and he's a very clear thinker and very clear writer, I reviewed his book on re-migration a few months ago. I think, so he has sort of to describe the plan, he's sort of a three-tiered plan, at

first he wants to of course deport all the people who are here illegally, then deal with people who are here on work visas by temporary residence permits and so forth by allowing these to expire, just sort of quietly incentivizing the return of these people to their home countries. It's unclear how many people that is actually. And then the people who have actually got permanent residence or who are naturalized, he wants to buy their German passports back from them potentially or of course incentivize them to return in other ways. plan has different elements, for example setting up a kind of model city somewhere in North Africa and arranging with the North African government to receive all the stateless asylees

and of course Germany or Europe would fund this city to put them up there and so forth. It sounds sort of crazy and elaborate but when you look at how much migration costs already, you know, spending, giving somebody ten thousand dollars to give up their German passport if they just go back to Turkey or wherever is not a crazy idea at all. It's a net win for the state because these people end up costing, it's unbelievable, hundreds of thousands of euros over the course of their lifetime. So buying them off in a simple way is not a bad idea even if not all of them take it. So obviously the question is how, So I don't oppose the plan in an ideal world, of course, let's do it, that sounds fine. First of all, it's just, you have to understand there's this massive cultural, social consensus

about the fact that they are Germans now, there's a whole body of jurisprudence about how there's no German ethnicity anymore, and anyone who has a German passport is a German. all this has to be undone, you know, and it just feels really heavy, to be honest. It's a lot, it's a lot. And sort of imagining how much cultural and social change has to happen for the full re-migration plan to be implemented is, I don't know, it's sort of, it's depressing to think about, to be honest. The other thing that I, you know, I understand where Zellner is coming from, and he's also trying to present a political program that is viable and that can win voters and so forth and so I totally I'm not complaining that he's wrong or anything but

I think what he's doing is even necessary but there's going to be some level you're not going to reverse an invasion just by realigning incentives there's going to be a fight at some point I fear and I'm not advocating for violence or anything but I think you know we have to at some point I'm sure Zellner thinks this way too though he's never said it to me so don't go after to him, but I'm sure Zellner at some point, at some level recognizes this as well as all rational people must, that it's not all going to be tea and crumpets, you know, there's going to be a little, it's going to be a hostile process at some point, and it's just important to be realistic about that. You don't want to necessarily initiate it, certainly you

don't want to make plans for this or anything, but it's not going to be a process that can be totally reversed by an entirely peaceful means. So that's just, I think, just trying to be realistic, you know. Yes, well since you and I are not political actors and not political men, we can be honest where others who have political ambitions cannot. But I think the case that economic, that there is any economic benefit to migration, is completely false and can be shown to be completely false. I totally agree, it's total nonsense, yes. Yes, even if first generation migrants can be argued to work, they actually bring a lot of family dependents who rely on state services, and so in the end it is a drain on taxpayers and on economy as a whole. The economic case for migration really isn't there.

And then you are left with this other thing. You mentioned Eugepius, which is, yes, anyone who has a German passport is German. There is no such thing as the German ethnicity. In other words, the leftist anti-nationalist, I would say actually anti-human argument, which I've called global, I cannot say because you are a polite guest, it's called GNC, let's say International Racial Marxism, let's be polite that way, and so my thought was always you need some kind of, we'll talk about this on next segment because this very big issue, But you need some kind of moral philosophical push against this morality, because whatever cope arguments are used, that, oh, migrants are really brought in to help the big capitalists,

which actually is true, you get this, I think, in East Europe, I mean, nobody there really believes in this kind of leftist humanitarian thing I'm going to talk about now. But there are actually migrants being brought in into East Europe at the moment by the big corporations because they want labor, because the young people have left for West Europe. It's a very disgusting system. That being said, if, for example, there is a mass starvation event in the third world or any such thing, which these people are talking about possibly happening soon or at at some point in the next five years. All of these arguments are oh, they're bringing in migrants to help the big corporations are going down the toilet. Actually, they are bringing in migrants because for humanitarian reasons,

which is why the left has always brought in migrants. And so then the question becomes, do you have some type of counter to this morality of empathy of empathy, or human rights, which is really the impetus to bring in all these migrants. This is a very big issue. I don't know if you want to comment on it briefly now, or what. No, of course. Well, it's the fundamental, this famous Nature paper from ten years ago, I think, that shows the sort of locus of moral concern of people on the left versus on the right. And so the sort of a heat map, you know, and there's these concentric circles, the first circle is yourself, and then your family, your children, and so forth, and the outermost circle is like asteroids in space, you know.

And the leftist morality, the locus of concern, the heat map is really like, in like the sixteen circles I think, and the center is like fourteen, which is all things in existence, including plants on other planets. It's talking about, just they've developed an insane out-group moral focus, and people on the right have a much more rational approach to these things, which is also cost demanded by natural selection. It must be instinctive. There's no other way your genes could be passed on if you did not have a morality centered first around your immediate family and then around your village and then around your country or your region. So there has to be some return First of all, I have big questions. I don't think that this leftist morality has any long-term prospects.

It seems to me that this is a guaranteed way not to have children and not to pass on your genes. And we know all of these orientations are very heritable, of course. So how long would that even last? And how did it even arise in the first place? It seems because it's so counterproductive and pathological that maybe it can just be switched back by realigning some incentives or reversing some Something taking something out of the water. Maybe it's a chemical or some unnatural element of the environment I don't know too much television or something Maybe maybe it's that simple. But the yes, absolutely. There has to be a return to this more natural grounded morality which all of humanity had until 80 years ago and which almost all the world still has, you know, talking about 2% of the

world's population has this pathological moral orientation and they just happen to be super influential. Yes. China, I will just tell the audience, China will not blink an eye if there is mass famine or disease in Africa or war and hundreds of millions of people die there. China will not let them into China, whereas I'm afraid that at the moment if such event happened in Africa or other such global south place, Europe will open its gates, which is also from a practical point of view absurd because you could probably help them in Martin Selner type camps for much cheaper and much better for them than to let them into your own countries, but look, these are big subjects. I don't want to dwell on that. Now, I want to ask you other hot-button issue because audience care about this, everyone

talking. Israel probably about, well, who knows probably, people are saying going to attack Lebanon because of Hezbollah and such thing. This thing with Israel and Gaza has been going on since October of last year. talking about it. I imagine emotions are at the pitch also in Europe. This is a sensitive subject. Do you want to comment on this, on how AFD and other maybe European right parties position themselves in regard to this and how these events in Middle East play into Europe? Because I imagine that in some countries, for example, Belgium. I have a friend, he said, a relative recently went to Belgium and there are daily counter-protests. On the one hand, you have pro-Palestine, pro-Palestinian protests. On the other hand, you have anti-migrant protests.

And I asked him, well, are these just coincidental or are they actually directed at each other? And he say, well, that is the question, I don't know. And I imagine, especially in Germany, the case must be very sensitive. What is going on there? Some of these parties in Europe that are right wing are aligning themselves strategically with the anti-Palestinian position, but that doesn't need to mean pro-Zionist, whereas others that issue isn't so important, and so they can say, fuck, excuse me, I was quite drunk in this night. They can say, fuck both parties, we don't care about that. What do you think about this? Yeah, so it's a very interesting question. Germany has, because of, of course, our historical misdeeds and the current management of German

politics to be as Jewish friendly as possible. The sort of support for Israel, at least moral support for Israel, but also in present case material support for Israel, is an absolutely unquestioned aspect of German political orthodoxy and all the major parties, including the mainstream leftist parties, including the Greens, which aren't this way in all countries, but here absolutely are pro-Israel, and that's not so remarkable for our Greens, they're also very Atlanticist, so the entire left political side that is associated with the establishment is very pro-Israel, but of course the center parties, the right-wing parties, the market liberal parties are also pro-Israel fundamentally, and the AfD is as well, because there's not

really anything gained to be, so one of the things that I think causes, in other countries, I'm just seeing from the outside, causes a lot of, so I see this in the United States for example, you know better, but one of the things that causes a lot of very sort of uncomfortable, intense pro-Zionist signaling on the right wing is the desire to differentiate themselves from left wing parties on this issue. That's not, that doesn't work so well in Germany because the entire left is also, if not overtly Zionist, at least supportive of Israel in in some moral sense, and so the right wing doesn't feel the need to differentiate themselves in this way. So, if you ask them, yes, Israel is great, we hope they can defend themselves against

Palestine and so forth, but it's not sort of rabid Zionism, which I find kind of embarrassing if you're not an Israeli in any way. So that's one aspect of it. Of course, there are pro-Palestinian protesters that tend to be on more sort of fringe left-wing or old left activists, so for example, I've read that some of the old associates of the Red Army faction, you know, these crazy terrorists from the 70s and 60s, they are very pro-Palestine. For example, some of the more hippie left is pro-Palestine, there's some smaller contingents at universities that do smaller pro-Palestine protests, but it's not a huge, huge thing. The Antifa very interestingly in Germany is very, I would say is pretty staunchly Zionist, very pro-Israel, sort of unique in Europe and I saw a very interesting thing.

I was in Berlin and I saw posters sort of in a dodgy neighborhood, saw posters put up by some Palestinian group trying to get some neo-Nazi group to do joint anti-Israel protests, which I thought was pretty funny. And the Antifa was all mad about this and were trying to rally up support to get people to go and crack all their skulls in, which was sort of an interesting political constellation. But yeah, so I think German politics here are just not as interesting as in other countries. The pro-Palestinian left is very attenuated here, so we don't have a lot of the fireworks that you get on American campuses, for example, though there's a little bit of that. Do you have other information for listeners regarding this problem in Europe and how it

relates into migration arguments, other parts of Europe. How are right-wing parties positioning themselves on this matter of Israel-Palestine now? I don't know about other parts of Europe very well. So I don't think, aside from, so the old left parties, at least in Germany, will be a little bit more pro-Palestine, sort of like Wignats in the United States, you know. Maybe not all of them, but it's definitely a tendency. I'm not sure about other countries. The pro-Palestine really seems to be by and large a leftist phenomenon, you know. It's the same in the United States as well. The thing that changes on the right is the degree to which you are sort of how pro, whether you talk about it at all, whether it's interesting to you, but also how pro-hardline Zionist

you are, which is sort of, for me, correlates with humanness, you know? Yes, I was just curious in how it relates to migration argument, because it seems to be, you take Sinn Fein in Ireland, that is supposedly a socialist nationalist party, but because it's always been aligned with the international left, it's actually very pro-migration within Ireland and also well look let's not talk about this it's not such interesting subject then I wanted to ask you regarding COVID just briefly on this segment because most audience knows you from you began during COVID times and you were one of few points of light during that very dark period where you were telling the truth about what was going on with regard to lockdowns and many other things. I wanted to ask you about this.

What you think fundamentally went on wrong with COVID worldwide regulations? Because, and feel free not to talk this, but my impression is major arguments are, well, COVID is a worldwide conspiracy on part of the pharmaceutical industry or some such form. Oh, COVID was a conspiracy to, centralized conspiracy where various globalist interests were coordinating through world governments to have a worldwide ID or some other such argument. Whereas the opposing view was maybe, oh, Argentina, why did it enact such extreme COVID tyranny? And it wasn't because someone called them from world central globalist government to tell them to do it, is because the Argentine stupid Marxified upper class so-called or its, let's say, media

academic class look to places like Denmark first or other places in Europe and say, oh, those advanced European countries are doing this, we are going to copy them and such things. I am somewhat greatly simplifying the issue, but do you want to comment on just general problems of what went wrong during COVID crisis and how this relates to possible future crises such as climate change hysteria and so forth? Yes, of course. So, I'm sort of writing a whole book about this. I've written it already. I just have to publish it. So, it's pretty clear that, at least across the West, there's a sort of pandemicist establishment, is what I call them. They are sort of a sub-sector, subset of the epidemiological establishment who are especially worried about infectious diseases,

especially infectious respiratory diseases and influenza-like illnesses. And these people, they got their start in the smallpox and with World Health Organization vaccination campaigns, and they've been sort of very interested in using vaccines to eradicate viruses. And they've worked their way into all of our public health bureaucracies. So they have, of course, US has important nodes, but there's some of them in Germany. They're all internationally networked with each other. They travel, they go to conferences, they write papers in the same journals and so forth. So all these people are sort of connected to each other. And they have affiliates in other fields in phyrology and so forth. So we're talking about a group of maybe at most several hundred

people all over the globe and all sorts of influential within our bureaucratic systems. Nobody really noticed these people before. They just didn't matter. There had never really been a pandemic. The one time that they tried to get some panic going was during 2009 with this swine flu, almost a hoax-level scare. That went nowhere. They were discredited. They went away for a while. But they're always sort of lurking there. The interesting thing about them is that they developed a whole body of thought for how to respond to pandemic events and novel viruses, and it really involved not doing very much. So they had all these pandemic war games and tabletop exercises going back decades, I read most of them and wrote a lot about them, and they're like, well, you can't close down borders

because it will screw over the third world and they'll starve and we don't want to ruin the economy, no closures, everything stays open, the pandemic response is all about telling people not to panic and freak out and so forth. And so the real mystery of what happened with COVID is that they finally got the pandemic and did all the things that they themselves had just said even just months prior in this big pandemic war game held in I think New York that you weren't supposed to do. So something happened inside this confined establishment, this basically academic bureaucratic establishment of a few hundred people that caused them to change their minds. And if you go back into media reports, there are contemporary media reports and magazines like Stat that talk about this ongoing debate.

It was known at the time, no one was really paying attention. It happened in late February, early March. And so I can try to break down what happened, but they were convinced by Chinese lockdowns and especially by the Italian lockdown that lockdowns were the thing to do. And so there's a big internal debate in this confined establishment, and opinion changed very rapidly in the course of two or three weeks, there was a preference cascade, and then they worked to convince the local countries, the local politicians, and lockdowns themselves turned out to have infectious properties. Once someone else does it, then there's a lot of, as you said, Argentina wants to copy first world countries because lockdowns are cool, and once Italy locks down, then Germany

is like saying, well, are politicians going to be on the hook for COVID deaths? If we don't lock down, we better do the same thing. It's safer that way. And so there's all lockdowns and virus repression measures have sort of these contagious properties where they get passed around from country to country because politicians having assumed responsibility for virus deaths now have to find a way to escape the blame for them. And you do that by doing what other people are doing so they can't be your fault. That's really how it propagated. In the lockdowns, once they got going, they have self-perpetuating properties because you have to terrorize the citizenry to stay home, to actually obey all these rules because Western democracies don't have the security apparatus of the DDR, their soft

authoritarian regimes. So they have to terrify the people a little more, psychological warfare. And of course, once you create this virus tear, then you create political demand for more lockdowns and more things like this. And we've had, of course, releases from Matt Hancock, the health minister in the UK, his text messages were released and published by the Telegraph. And he goes, you can follow their discussions. And this is exactly the force that maintained lockdowns in the United Kingdom. They were always trying to manage public opinion, and they created such great panic, they had to respond to it and fulfill the political demand they had themselves engendered. So that was a big part of lockdowns and in my opinion mass vaccination was itself simply

a sort of a follow-on, a consequence of lockdowns because politicians were so desperate to get out from under the closures that they had themselves locked themselves into and couldn't end. They were so desperate to end them they wanted to use the vaccines to eradicate the virus and of course the vaccines couldn't do that and so they got crazy and started trying to vaccinate everybody as many times as possible. These German releases just came out from a military group that was set up. The whole purpose was to not ensure that everyone got a booster, but to ensure that just they used as many vaccines as possible. They had ordered so many vaccines, they wanted to just use as many vaccines as possible. And so that's why you see in Europe, there's like, well, maybe four doses are okay

for certain groups or five doses. They really wanted to use up the vaccine. They had this sort of theory that the more you vaccinate, the less violence there will be. It was really truly insane. It was all irrational, just insane policymaking also by people with no expertise at all. They're not immunologists. They don't know what they're doing. The guy running this thing was some general in the Bundeswehr. It's really just the most retarded stuff you can imagine. So that's sort of my view of COVID. You ask what is that like with other policy areas? Well, there's this, so the pandemic is this group of three or four hundred people maybe, there are similar influence nodes, I call them, in all kinds of domains that you've never heard of before.

Some of them advocating for the protection of birds from the predation of house cats, and some of them advocating for zero traffic fatalities, and some of them all kinds of extensive issues, and this was one worried about influenza, they're all over our bureaucracies and governments and we don't see most of them, and there's something occurs to cause them to become influential and the locus of attention and political favor and patronage, and they seize policy and take control of everything. Something very much like this has happened to the whole climate thing. That's where it originates. If you look back into where climate policies come from, they started out with very similar climatologists in the 80s, later 70s, look very much like the pandemicists did before COVID.

So the Venish field, they were worried about pollution, they were worried about overpopulation and so forth. And they seized upon the CO2 issue and stirred up a lot of panic. They sort of have grown and metastasized over the years. And this seems just to be a big problem with the way Western liberal democracies function in general. The sort of reliance upon technocracy, their porousness so that they're always sharing policies with each other so they have these contagious policies that get shopped around. The lack of strong political control, politicians just take policies that have been written in think tanks and various lobbying groups and then implement them. Of course, the preference for government by committee, so consensus positions are very

important and nobody wants to be responsible for anything. We have these very complex bureaucratic systems by which we're governed over which we have very little control and which people don't really understand and they're steered by sort of hardline organized special interest groups, which caused them to act in very strange ways. No, yes, I agree with you and it reminds me of AIDS crisis from early 1980s. Absolutely, yes, great parallel. Yes, which is a so-called sexually transmitted virus that's actually not traditionally sexually transmitted by the normal definition. And so it's never left its focus groups which was, you know, hemophiliacs at first and especially gays and so forth, but it's never left its initial groups the way normally sexually transmitted viruses do.

And yet it was made into this big public policy thing that I think actually had quite a lot to do with the suppression of birth rates in the West because whether you want to go as far as I and other crazy people do regarding the HIV virus and so on. Certainly among straight people it's not really a problem and yet it was made by especially people like Fauci and others into a gigantic worldwide crisis and they keep coming up with these crises because that's what gives them prominence, it's what gives them status and so on, and now it's this avian flu which was all over the news a month ago and now it's disappeared. It's all very strange it appears. I'm afraid they'll just keep going and it's a consequence of technocracy like you say,

but look, we don't need to keep talking this, it's long subject. I have more interesting things to ask you on next segment if you don't mind about world changing, world-changing ideological properties belonging to people like Nietzsche and Heidegger and Ernst Nolte. We can come back and talk about that. But I wanted to ask you before we go, what is best food in Germany? I've heard it's Schweinhacke. is pork knuckles that has been baked for a long time in oven or in some cases boiled. I've had this dish, Schweinshacks, this pork knuckle. Do you have a preference on best German dish? I also know Berlin likes, he's obsessed with white asparagus in spring. Do Do you have any opinions on this, Eugippius? Excuse me, I'm going to go on.

I like sauerbraten, which is a sort of roasted slice of pig, you know, with the skin on the edge. Sauerbraten? Yes. Wait, this is sauerbraten, it's not saumagen. I think this is Helmut Kohl's favorite dish, saumagen. Oh, sauerbraten, yeah, yeah, yeah. I don't like that so much, but there are various different organ meats, which I quite like. It's called a sour lung dish, but it's not only lung, it's also other interior organs and it's sort of in a soup kind of dish, I guess. And there's sort of a knurl in it and it's also very nice. There's various internal organ dishes, including cow testicles, which I also enjoy. I thought the EU banned the selling of lungs. I know in Greece there is this dish called kokoretsi, which is the various organs of

the lamb wrapped in lamb intestine and roasted. It's a very Homeric dish, but for a while it was banned by the EU. Of course the Greeks ignored that, but I thought that lung was banned. I don't know. But it could be. I've certainly always been able to order at restaurants and so forth, so perhaps it's also ignored here. I don't know. It could be a ban of some kind. What do you think about this, Eugippius? I was driving once around Blumenau, this city in South Brazil. It's mostly with Germans, so-called, or I know maybe you're a snob. I don't mean to say that. Maybe you would not consider them Germans. I know in the same way that Japanese don't consider Brazilian-Japanese to be true Japanese. Maybe Germans don't consider Brazilian-Germans to be true Germans. I don't know.

I don't want to be presumptuous. But they live there in this Blumenau section where Giselle Bündchen is from. And I went there and I was driving around and I stopped at Stoplight and I just asked girl there on street corner, do you want to come have Eisbein with me? Because Eisbein, this pork shank, roasted German style, it was too big for one person to have. I try to get girl from there to come have Eisbein with me. Is this okay, you give me? What do you think about Eisbein and what do you think about this? It's also, yes, the pork shake is excellent. All these dishes are very good. They can be a little monotonous, so if you only eat these traditional Bavarian dishes all the time, it can be a little tiresome, you know. But these, no, they're very good, I like them a lot.

But do you consider the South Brazilian Germans to be true German? I'm sorry, I don't mean to be rude. No, of course Germany has a whole diaspora. I've seen pictures of these Brazilian German communities. They have Tracht, the traditional lederhosen and so forth. Of course they're called Blumenau, the German name. It's very interesting, but there are of course Germans all over the place. There are the Volga Germans. Many of them have the right to return to Germany if they wish to activate their citizenship. Yes, I was once in Argentina, I met Volga German, he had extremely broad face, like take Arnold Schwarzenegger, that kind of Styrian face, but times three, it was almost alien face to me, you know.

You get this, look, I've been keeping you, I know, I can tell you, I'm wearing you out, I'm sorry. No, I'm not worn out yet. We must take we must take smoke break. I am one we must take smoke. Okay, we take smoke break We come back. We are going to come back discuss a very big matters of World historical importance regarding Nietzsche Heidegger and a snow T and such figures. Is this okay you get here? This seems okay. Yes. I look forward to it Very good. We will be right back. I'm here with you keep yes Yes, one of the most wonderful independent thinkers of online sphere today, but online sphere is actually real sphere in general because it's only place for independent thought. Welcome back, Eugipius, I wanted to ask you sensitive matter because during this last

round of elections in the European Union and in Germany there was controversy, there was was Maximilian Krah, excuse if I don't pronounce name right, politician of AFD or the right-wing opposition party in Germany, and he was somehow goaded into talking about relitigating, let's say, World War II and so forth, and I wanted to know if you have any opinions on this matter because I find very disgusting how central mainstream parties in Europe and actually also United States, but it's mostly Europe and of course especially Germany, they use this guilt-tripping and this World War II, oh, if you are against migrants and you are against out-group or whatever other language they use, you must of course be planning to

to build ovens to burn hundreds of thousands of livers in them and this kind of thing. Excuse if I'm being crass, but I find it disgusting, this kind of guilt-ripping. What is your opinion on this matter and, yes? Yes, of course. So can you hear me sorry, there's something? I can hear you, yes. I think only Baba interfered, the Japanese wanted to interfere. Yes, they attacked my internet. So Maximilian Kraa, we talked a little bit about our last conversation about your elections. He was the focus of a huge shitstorm because he gave an interview to Italian media where they asked him a trap question about whether the SS were all criminals and he said they weren't, specifically the Waffen-SS who were simply military units recruited ordinary Germans,

just often we would say teenagers, 17 underage boys towards the end of the war to fight on the front. Many of them died shortly after being recruited in heavy fighting against the Russians in particular, and he said of course it depended on what they had done, whether they were criminals or not, and that's just, it was so outrageous because it's subjectively true what he said. You can go to any graveyard in Germany and find the grave of 17-year-old boys who, not any graveyard, but I've seen them, 17-year-old boys who were Waffen SS soldiers who died in 1945, and they weren't criminals, they were ordinary, often heroic people, and it's just it's very remarkable how all of these aspects of the German past have become almost the subject

of a kind of theology or quasi-para-religious belief system where they have to be an absolute evil and they're withdrawn from history in the context of what happened. And what's even more disturbing about this is how this process becomes more extreme with time. So it's not like you would think it would get less extreme people would become more relaxed, but in fact as the war has passed out of living memory, the events of those times have become sort of almost like a theological image of evil and they have to all be super bad and so any suggestion or reference to historical context or just objectively true things about who was fighting in the German army, where they came from and what they did is seen as apology for the Nazis and it's deeply irrational and

also just I think very, very destructive culturally and socially because it's the entire notion of now that we've taken German ethnicity and said it doesn't exist, we've replaced it instead with this kind of pseudo-ethnic concept of historical guilt, right? And so attacking this, it's become sort of a bizarre kind of patriotism in Germany where this loathing one's ancestors and loathing the past and this moral repudiation which has to always be performed at quasi-religious civic ceremonies and so forth, this has become sort of what remains of German national, even ethnic identity. So we think about, you know, if migrants are naturalized, we're probably going to say they don't bear any guilt for the Holocaust, you know.

That's something that only ethnic Germans have, so that's what remains of German ethnicity, and this, so it, what Maximilian Karr said, though it's objectively true, was actually personally even ethnically offensive to many very cucked Germans who have imbibed this entire moral system. I think it's very perverse, a very perverse, I don't know, cultural construct that is, yeah, yeah, I don't know what else to say about it. Well, it get me very angry in some way, you get this, I'll say why in a moment, but before we move on to the historical matters of what I've called Holocaustianity, and I'll talk this in a moment, I understand it, it's sensitive subject and so forth. But before we do that, And just to address the political practicalities of it, couldn't Maximilian Kraa or anyone

else who's asked such a loaded question, instead of getting into relitigating World War II and so on, which I know the left always tries to reframe things in that way. Oh, if you're anti-migrant, if you're nationalist, you must be for burning people in ovens and so forth. But instead of getting into relitigating World War II and whether there were some SS officers who were good or SS men who were good people and so on. Couldn't he have just said, you know, what Trump might have said, you are asking a loaded question, you are trying to get me to look like a Nazi, you're a faggot, why don't you stop asking me these questions, they have nothing to do with whether we should replace our population with 100 million Gabonese or such. Do you think from practical point of view

that just such questions should not really be part of political discourse, and the left is of course trying to make them because they think they have right frame on that, but should the right take the bait? Shouldn't the right instead of, which I'm going to do with you on this show because we care about truth, not about politic, but from point of view of political pragmatism, shouldn't the politician just say, fuck you, faggot, I'm not talking about that, it's nothing to do with anything going on today? Of course, I totally agree, though if I were in Kra's play, I'm not a politician, as you say, I probably would have fallen into the trap as well, but he absolutely, I think, just as a basic rule for right-wing politicians, especially in Germany, just refusing to talk about Second World War

is not a bad idea, you know? Certainly, it comes from a good place. I think people like Kra want to not disavow, not to be forced into positions of cucking and so forth, and so they try to stay strong in the face of these provocations, but you're totally right, it's a tactical mistake. The proper response is to say fuck off, I'm not talking about that, it has nothing to do with migration policy in Germany in 2024. Yes, and of course Heider, who my friend says was inspiration for AFD, Heider being the politician in Austria, he on many times said similar things as you have said on last episode. He refused to cuck on this issue, and yes, if you are pressed to do more... No, he also had serious problems because of that, you know, he faced a no-confidence vote

at one point over some trumped-up Nazi controversy, you know, it's very ridiculous, but yes. Yes, but this is the kind of theatre they push, but look, since we are not politicians and we can discuss the truth as such. I recognize, normal people maybe recognize that this is being used as a kind of replacement religion, replacement identity, even you just say, in which Christianity is actually replaced by Holocaust. It's very remarkable the way you have traditionalists, but who are really regime lackeys and toadies in the United States, especially so-called conservative intellectuals, you know. And they devote article after article to attacking the five so-called Nietzschean pagans like me online instead, you know, and accusing us of idolatry and being the Antichrist and so on.

of really attacking the idolatry that is holocaustianity, which is a parody of christianity, look, you don't have to get into that, but there is a thinker, a historian, Ernst Nolte, who is actually I think politically quite a centrist, who has quite historical theory, historical context on what happened in World War II. Do you want to comment on this? Yes, so when I first read Nolte, this is a long time ago now, but it was very amazing to me because I realized no one had ever really tried to explain the National Socialist atrocities of the Second World War historically and tried to just ground them in the broader context of events at the time. Because when you make historical actors figures of absolute evil,

you chase out all historical explanations and theories of them. They just do what they do because they're super bad. That's the whole frame that's imposed on this and then trying to explain it of course gets you attacked for being an apologist for Hitler or something like that. But I found it very powerful and Nolte, his basic thesis which started this whole controversy, the historical stride, in 1986, was that... Wait, sorry to interrupt you. Explain to the audience what is the historical stride, because they don't understand that. Yes, it was a huge controversy, kicked off mainly by Noelté, but also a few other historians who were writing in more objective ways suddenly about World War II and National Socialist actions in the war...

Sorry to interject, I want to remind the audience, the only reason this is an issue, it's not because there are people on the right and so forth who want to march in uniforms on the street. It's because the left says every time there's someone who is under reasonably centrist position actually who says, maybe we shouldn't bring in 100 million Gabonese, it doesn't make economic sense, it doesn't make any other kind of sense, it will lead to strife. And they immediately say, oh, you're a Nazi, you want to put people in ovens, there's this legacy of World War II. They are the ones making this an issue. And I, regarding what we just said earlier, I agree the right should not take the bait and then try to re-litigate these kinds of things.

But in the realm of ideas and of historiography, these people like Nolte and so forth did do do that and they try to explain the World War II in some kind of objective historical context that's not hysterically emotional. I'm sorry to interrupt you, Eugapius, please go on. No, it's very important, I agree. So Nolte, his idea, which set off this whole controversy and of course he was slapped down by Jurgen Habermas, who really helped. In the course And also this controversy, it's an important, lasted for, it was carried out in newspapers and journals and it lasted for about a year and a half or so. All of the essays that people had written against each other were compiled into a book. It was taking place exactly as the current kind of Holocaust orthodoxy was forming.

So it's easy to make the mistake that our current views about the Holocaust as the original sin of the German ethnicity and so forth, date all the way back to 1945. But in fact, the system took a long time to work out. There was, of course, a notion of some kind of original German war guilt that goes all the way back to de-Nazisification and so forth. But specifics of the current system really built in the 70s and 80s. So people didn't even talk about the Holocaust really before the 60s. And not to say that there was no Holocaust, but it wasn't an intellectual category of inquiry his subject, really until Hilbert wrote his book in 1961. And it didn't really make its way into German media as a separate topic, as a phenomenon, until a series of documentaries in the 70s and 80s.

And this prompted historians to then try to say, okay, well, how do we explain this historically? And Nolte had this idea, he sort of said, well, the Nazism, National Socialism, in its approach to the war and in its attempts to destroy Jewish populations, was acting in a way analogous to and even responding to earlier Soviet efforts to eradicate those sectors of the population, those specific classes that are regarded as enemies or as the soil in which future counter-revolutionary movements might grow, you know, Stalinist purges were part of this but even earlier efforts to liquidate the peasantry, bourgeois peasantry and so forth. These sort of mass extermination efforts and this is proven Hitler has many speeches in his writings. He talks about, he very much associates

communism with the Jews. It's very sort of striking one-to-one. He collapses the two almost entirely onto each other and then he says they have killed 10 million people and that same fate awaits us if we don't stop them here. This is almost literally what he said in one of these speeches from the 30s, I believe. So well before the actual war began, he was already thinking in this way and it clearly resonated with other Germans. So this seems to have been a somewhat unique aspect of Hitler's thought. And so Nolte's argument is that, well, so the National Socialists then sort of began their extermination campaign to get rid of not the class soil, but the biological soil from which sort of communism might grow, especially if they were to lose the war, to sort of immunize Germany against

communist takeover if they should lose, you know? And so this was this sort of, so this was a way of contextualizing German actions towards Jews in the 1940s and it's set off, somewhat surprising, but it's set off this huge debate with Jurgen Habermas basically arguing that he's relativizing or apologizing for the Holocaust and you can't compare it to other events. It's an incomparable quasi-religious happening and it's basically accusing Nolte of not only fascism but of a kind of impiety. That is the basic controversy in how it unfolded, but I always found Nolte's basic sort of historical view very clear-minded and very helpful and also generally explanatory, sort of explains many aspects of the Second World War in general.

So he has a whole thesis that events between 1917 and 1945 are really one big European civil war against communism. And this also allows you to include the Spanish Civil War, of course it's a very useful chronology, and the end of the First World War and then the intervening period where you have a lot of sort of street battles and growing tensions between communist parties and nationalist parties and even just social democrats and liberal parties in the streets, there's this growing threat of communism and an attempt to deal with it that culminates in sort of the fascist, with scare quotes, response, which is sort of an immune reaction of European society to the communist threat, and I find it's a very helpful way to view the Second World War in general.

That's why I thought it would be fun to talk about Nolte a little. Yes, no, I agree with you, and of course it should be noted for audience that Nolte, who, whatever you can say about him, I actually think he's kind of a centrist cock boomer, He thinks all of this was a German overreaction. I think he uses words like that to the Soviet mass annihilation of classes before World War II even started. But that being said, it should be noted for the audience that there are historians like Like Arno Meyer, who is a mainstream academic historian, but nevertheless, he's denounced as a Holocaust denier, much as Nolte is, simply because Arno Meyer points out that the primary motivation for the Holocaust was anti-communism. In other words, that the Nazis viewed the Jews as a vehicle for Bolshevism.

And this kind of thing is obscured by polemical and propagandist so-called historians like Jonah Goldhagen who try to make it out that, oh, it was just a racial theory or a racial supremacist theory, where I think for most of Germans at the time who were living in an extreme crisis period, and this is what Daltie is saying, it was extreme crisis, they didn't really think about that. They thought about, well, you know, there's class annihilations coming, gulags are coming, and so maybe look the other way and so forth. I don't know if you want to comment on this, I have more to say about these matters, Eugapius. I would just say it's interesting to look at how Nolte has been received since the whole

historical strife just means historical controversy or actually controversy among historians since the whole historical strife played out. So Nolte's thesis about the Holocaust is a reaction to in some ways also an imitation of earlier communist atrocities. This has been totally repudiated and Nolte is totally wrong here, only crazy right-wing schizoids like me are interested in that aspect of this theory, whereas the other side of it, the sort of European Civil War framing, has been actually picked up. I wouldn't say it's a dominant historical interpretation, but you can find it in popular books and so forth, that people find this general approach useful and interesting. It suggests that they generally, Nolte's approach

is very explanatory, they just don't want to adopt the most ideologically sensitive Well, no, I agree. Look, I don't want to make things uncomfortable, but I'll say it if you don't want to say it. But for example, you take Lvov and the SS approaching the city of Lvov to liberate it, I would call, from the Soviets. And as the German army was approaching Lwów, in the prison there, the NKVD butchered 5,000 people in the most gruesome ways, and this was not unprecedented. Communist crimes really were what people show on Holocaust movies, Holocaust shows to be Nazi crimes, but they don't show the preceding communist crimes where there were communist commissars in Sevastopol. You don't have to comment on this, I will. They boiled people live in Sevastopol and so forth.

And then in Lvov, they tortured at least 5,000 people and so forth. And so as the German army was approaching and the Soviet army was leaving, it was not the Germans, it was the local Ukrainian population in Lvov who massacred the local Jews. I will not say why and so forth and get into the details. but in retaliation for what had happened during the Soviet occupation. And this part of the story is left out completely in the telling of World War II, okay? And in the very vivid example of what I just gave, I would say is the kernel of, let's say, Nolte's contextualizing, as people say, of the Holocaust story, that part isn't told. I have other things to say. We can move on to the European Civil War if you want to, Gippius. I don't know if you want to comment on what I just said.

No, I totally agree with what you said. The communist atrocities were shocking, not only to Germans, but to Europeans in general. Also, the Spanish Civil War was another occasion for Europeans to be exposed to these atrocities, and it's a very important element of the fascist reaction, just using fascism again with air quotes, I don't like the word in this way, but it's very important, let's say the nationalist reaction to communism, it's a very important component for understanding Second World War in general, and just the extreme rejection and militarization against this threat. It's very helpful to read the war in this context. Yes, and you don't have to comment on this, but by the way, historians, some are moving, and I mean the mainstream historians,

not like weirdo revisionist Nazi ones, but are moving toward recognition of the fact that the Holocaust, while it happened, it really was, there was a Holocaust 1.0 and 2.0, and the 1.0 was not the Germans, it was the East European and Ukrainian and other populations who, as the German armies were approaching, engaged in kind of impromptu pogroms in the retaliation for what had happened during Soviet occupation. And I won't get into details about that and what had gone on in the, in let's say the ethnic element of the Soviet occupation. But it wasn't the Germans. It was the liberated, let's say, East European and Russian populations who engaged in Holocaust, who kicked off Holocaust 1.0. And then later on Holocaust 2.0 was the Germans kind of amplifying and picking up on that

with Himmler's policy, such as, oh, well, you are killing all the men, it's not humane to let the women and children live. I'm sorry, you don't have to come and go. This also begins the German response becomes more extreme as things go bad in the war, course so and I think it really points to the fact that the German leadership was trying to think what happens after they lose. Yes and that big part of it plus the well let's not get into it there was a declaration from United States that they would depopulate Germany after the war which I think happened either soon before or after Stalingrad. I think almost any population would do this, which the United States did, you know, they put, I'm sorry to sound like a libtard, but they put the Japanese into camps and so forth.

Look, we don't need to go into this. No, of course, Nozze goes through all of this, obviously, because the National Socialists identified Jews with, as basically Fifth Columnists, or potential Fifth Columnist Communist sympathizers, They regarded them as basically equivalent to the Russian enemy and treated them as Americans treated Japanese, of course, incarcerating them in concentration camps and so forth. Yes. You know, of course, the counter to that is that once you incarcerate people you are responsible for their well-being and so forth. Look, Eugipius, I would like to have you on future episodes because there are European writers like Pierre Drew de La Rochelle who point out that Hitler and Germany could have formed a pan-European alliance but did not because of German chauvinism.

I don't know if you would agree with that or not, but it's kind of a tangential issue to what we're discussing and I don't mean to introduce it now. But you pointed out Ernst Nolte's thesis that the events from 1914 to 1945 constituted a kind of European civil war in which the main antagonists ended up being Marxism versus some form of fascism or National Socialism. I want to read something now about this thesis from Nolte, in which Nolte actually makes a claim that it was Nietzsche who formed the ideological or spiritual core of the opposition to Marxism during this European civil war. So I will read from now. Is this okay? Can I read? Yes, please read, Bap. It sounds exciting. I will read. In fact, Nietzsche's whole thought represents the very antithesis of the Marxist conception

and the idea of destruction is the negative aspect of its core. For if history is not realization but an attentat thousands of years old, then only the destruction of the perpetrator of this crime can restore things to their true balance. Nietzsche is not in any obvious sense the spiritual father of fascism, but he was the first to give voice to the spiritual focal point toward which all fascism must gravitate, the assault on practical and theoretical transcendence for the sake of a more beautiful form of life. Nietzsche was not concerned with magnificent animality for its own sake, nor was destruction per se Hitler's goal. Their ultimate aim was the supreme culture of the future. Yet it was inevitable that the positive concept of both men in its fantastic abstractness

was completely outweighed by the concrete aspect of their negative will. decades in advance, Nietzsche provided the political, radical anti-Marxism of fascism with its original spiritual image, an image which even Hitler never quite showed himself the equal. So now I stop reading, that is Nolte towards the end of his thesis of European civil war where he posits Nietzsche as the anti-Marx and this image of supreme culture of the future and life as opposed to Marxism, I wonder what you say about this. I have my own opinions about this, I think Nolte is quite wrong in this parenthesis I gave here. What do you think about this? Well, so I'll leave discussion in Nietzsche to you, but Nolte is a very, he's both sort

of, as you say, a centralist thinker, but he's also a very, he's not a historian, he's is a philosopher, and so he reduces all of this thought to very abstract philosophical concepts which he then associates with different thinkers like Hitler, for example, or different schools of thought like fascism, so forth, although this is not really how things worked historically at the time. So, Armin Moller, who was Ernst Jünger's secretary, has extended criticism of Nolte for his sort of false construct of fascism in this way. And so I would say that, so also this passage is a little bit convoluted. So by transcendence, very roughly speaking, Nolte means something like progressivism or the belief in human progress. And so his idea is that fascists wanted to,

they wanted to sort of achieve a sort of non, they wanted to destroy transcendence, get rid of it, and create a stable, I don't know how to describe really, a situation which mankind is in a perfect, elevated state and no longer advancing via, I don't know, technological or social improvements or whatever. Of course, there would still be technology and everything, but that this sort of liberal progressivism would be eliminated and mankind would be elevated to a higher, more natural state, perhaps. That's sort of what he means by transcendence. And so then I guess, as I understand the passage, the idea is that there's, you have to destroy the past or history so you get out of this sort of progressive system so you're no longer moving through history and you're in a static, elevated state.

And yeah, that's sort of how I understand the passage. I don't think anyone at the time thought in these terms. I think it's sort of note his own analysis or his own construction of how their ideas worked in some theoretical, philosophical plane? Yes, I think when Nolte talk about, he shows himself to be total cucks, cuckservative, you know, because Nietzsche is hardly for year zero, you know, the parenthesis where Nolte says, what is culture without the acknowledgement of real history. I don't know of another thinker besides Nietzsche who has such a rich, vivid historical imagination. It's like saying Renaissance Italy did not acknowledge history because it rejected the immediate past and went for a kind of radical Hellenism. Nietzsche has a very rich image of history.

And yeah, I think Nolte here, and not just Nolte, but the reason I brought up this passage is conservatives like Nolte in general, co-conservatives is what I would call them, they think that culture has something necessarily to do with historical traditions. Whereas what Nietzsche and I actually would think Plato and other fundamental thinkers mean by culture is simply the cultivation of human nature, it's development. And so, I don't know that he writes, I don't know that he writes here, Eusebius, when Nietzsche talks about human nature as an assent, an assent human nature, the way that Napoleon represented an assent human nature in military affairs or such. That could be said, a spiritual root of fascism or I don't know necessarily Nazism, but the radical European progressive rights

from 1900 to 1940, exemplified in men like Danunzio or Stefan Goerge. They represented this potential and it was a break with, let's say, historical tradition, religious tradition and so forth. And I don't know that men like Nolte are up to the task of continuing that in modern world. I don't know. Yeah, I think also, I think Nolte is one of the reasons that I'm a little hesitant to call, for example, National Socialist Fascists, I wrote a whole piece about this, Nolte sort of constructs fascism as a, so I think it's explanatory in some ways, the way he builds fascism. This is really in his first book, Fascism in its Era. I think it's in English, it's called The Three Faces of Fascism. But he looks at fascism in France and in Italy and Germany and sort of argues that the French

are the thesis and the Italians are the antithesis and then German fascism is the synthesis or whatever. It's sort of this complex sort of historical philosophical thing. So he builds fascism to be by these kinds of arbitrary philosophical analysis into his own kind of construct which then he can, I guess, put Nietzsche into it as he wishes because it's not really a historical thing that existed. For me fascism is mainly a Mediterranean phenomenon. It's something in addition to politics, it's not strictly political, it's really formed in the First World War and the experience of veterans like Ernst Jünger in the war, they're interested in individual heroism in their own death in battle, it's a very aesthetic

movement and it is a little bit independent of politics, so you see sort of fascist figures and writers, there's a lot of artists involved, some of them appropriate some socialist ideas, some of them seem to be much more hard right and reject socialism and workers, labor movement ideas, syndicalism, so there's fascism for me is a much different, more aesthetic sort of warrior ethos that emerges from the First World War and Nolte, it becomes something much more associated with political parties. For example, the National Socialists were by the 40s pretty hostile towards fascism because they were interested in collective ideals and collectivism and they thought the fascists were too interested in individual heroism and in their own sacrifice and so forth. So Nolte mixes some things up that

I don't think really belong together historically, though again, it's just a theory, it explains some things, it helps you think about some things but not others. Yes, well look, the point isn't about Nolte as such because he's just one historian. It's about, excuse me, the importance, the enduring importance of these ideas in European and American future and what means. And I hope I'm not keeping you too much, but I have two further questions. The first one is as regards Heidegger. What's your opinion on Heidegger and Heidegger versus Nietzsche, if any, in current European debates and so forth? In this I interject to say that I know Mr. Selner, who I like, has attacked me a few months back, he very much like Heidegger and he attacked me for liking Nietzsche. I don't

know what you think about this. That's interesting. I don't really. So, Zellner is Heideggerian. So, I don't know. Heidegger is of course a little above my pay grade. I would only note that Nolte was Heidegger's student of course at Freiburg. So, we're definitely in this strain of philosophical thought, but why he attacked you? Over what? Well, I don't know what exactly his objection was to Nietzsche, but he thought that Heidegger was a much more important, relevant thinker to the current plight of Europe and so forth. I disagree with that. I don't know if you had any opinions on this, on the meaning of Heidegger or or Heidegger versus Nietzsche. My own take of it, as far as I can tell, is that many traditionalists and also, not just traditionalists, but let's say,

philosophical nationalists like Heidegger, and then many people like me, like Nietzsche instead, and I think that Nietzsche is much more important for countering the left than Heidegger is, because Heidegger, well, this gets into, Heidegger is, I think, fundamentally egalitarian thinker, where he thinks everyone equal in death, and death is the determinative event, you know. Well, this big subject is gipius. I don't know if this is appropriate to radio show, but basically, Heidegger favored by mainstream nationalists, Nietzsche, as Nolte even says, a Heidegger student, favored by radical anti-communists. I don't know what you think about this. No, I think that's basically correct. Now that you describe, I understand more where Zellner's coming from.

So this probably goes more to the old right, new right split in Europe. So there's, of course, there's an effort to, the whole idea of the new right is an effort to sort of reconceive of what is right-wing politics after 1945, and to found a sort of new tradition of right-wing thought and politics that is independent of the old right, which of course would be the fascists or the National Socialists or whoever. And so there's, of course, so it's an effort to find different thinkers, different philosophers, and to distinguish oneself in various ways. And so I'm very, so there's this, you know, this is, well, I would generally identify with European New Right. It's the people whose books I read and so forth. I definitely also find myself rather on the Nietzschean side of things

in these discussions. Yeah, I guess I'll leave it there. I don't want to say, I don't want to make, I understand optics are important, but I don't want to make them, I don't want to sacrifice core principles on the altar of such marketing things, you know. I hope that doesn't offend anybody. Well, we have many friends and we're trying to not offend them maybe with saying explicit things, so let's not. But I wanted to ask you, the young right in Europe, are they reading what the, let's say, the new right after World War II started to read? You know this group Gress, I'm sure you've heard of it. They read Nietzsche, Mishima, Selim, and Junger, these were their main authors. Is there still this going on in Europe right now, among the young right, and if not, can it be introduced?

Of course, there's always something going on. I would say it's sort of a niche thing, but it exists, it's real. I'm sorry to interject, I want to tell you, in 2008 I was reading these authors, they are for me still the main authors, and I was trying to get friends I knew to read them, a few did, but not many. No one was reading these authors, you get these in the United States in 2008. Now I'm getting the sense a lot of people are reading them. What does that mean? Is it millions? No. But is it thousands? Yes, yes, it's thousands are reading Nietzsche, Saline, Junger, Bishima, Schopenhauer. These mainstay thinkers, you can say, of the European, I don't want to say hard right, but the radical progressive right, they're being read now by thousands of people in the

United States where they were not being read in 2008. This is what I mean to ask you, are they being read by the youth in Europe right now? Of course, I would say that if anything, there was never… So these authors have always, at least I can't, have done surveys, but I don't think there was a period where they weren't being read. So perhaps the United States has a little hiatus here or something in the earlier years, but I think they've always, with at least a few thousand people, have always been important to some people, you know. I also encounter and talk with older Germans who talk about leading, especially Jünger in their youth and finding him very interesting, which is curious for an older German to admit because Jünger is sort of borderline politically dangerous, you know.

These are other academics, they're not political activists or anything like that, so you have people who grew up in the 70s, you know. So no, I think these authors have been continually read, I don't know if they're being more read now than in the past, but it's definitely an aspect of, they've always felt a little bit like they make the European right feel a little bit different than the American one. So perhaps that's also changed, as you say, Americans also into these things now. Yes, I think it's the best cure to conservatism, which is an obvious failure. You keep saying conservatism, Anglo conservatism is an obvious failure, both in England and in the United States. my opinion, and this doesn't mean that they need to go full whatever, Himmler or something,

but these authors weren't that either, they were the artistic vanguard of their times, and I think it's the key to unlocking potential of right in United States in a way that's It's not, how to put it, Mike Pence-type conservatism, if audience in Europe knows what this is. But look, since we are on naughty topics, I've been keeping you for a long time on this show. Before we go, I ask you naughty thing, feel free to not respond. But peoples like Japanese and Italians and Germans and ancient Romans, you know, are very much into dark things, into dark things about conquest and so forth. you have comment on that. Am I right in making a connection between these peoples, you know? Yes. I see this definitely between Japanese and Germany, the many interesting parallels in this way.

Sorry to interject. Nietzsche calls it masculine versus feminine peoples. He says the French, Greeks are a feminine people, they receive ideas from others and develop them and give birth to cultural things and so forth, whereas there are masculine peoples among which he mentions the Romans, the Germans, actually the Jews also, but I would mention, well, the Japanese can go either way, that's more debatable. But what you make of this, and yes, do you think the Germans are this, yes? I think it's true that Germans are like this and it's made post-war history very interesting because Germans have tried to withdraw and not inseminate the world like they were doing before. They are trying to withhold the energy and it's caused a pervasive sickness in German culture.

I've always thought this basic idea of Nietzsche is fruitful and explains some aspect of what's wrong with Germany right now, so yes. Yes, that they're always seeking other people's restlessly to put their ideas in them. I think this is very powerful, Eugipius, and I think Germany of Weimar period, and I mean Goethe's Weimar, and this is very powerful. Before we go, do you, you know, in all, in all, do you see prospects of that Germany returning and leading Europe once again sometime in the future? I'm sorry to ask you in discrete question, but I actually deeply hope for this. Do you, do you see any prospects of this happening? Well, it's a weird thing because I often think of European Union as sort of a German-led cartel, you know, to represent German interests,

but it's constructed in the most cucked, inverted way, to subvert all German energies and deny Germany any political claims over other countries and really just cost Germany money and resources. So there's still a hint of this even in the present arrangement of Europe and despite all efforts by friends in England and sometimes America to prevent the German dominance of the continent, It still kind of happens in uncomfortable ways that aren't acknowledged. So I think these are dynamics that are inherent to European culture. I'm not saying Germany should conquer Europe or anything, but I think a lot will change when the boomers are gone. I think there's a very heavy political weight just dragging us down, and I think really

Really they are a very extreme generation and when they are gone we can begin to think a little bit more rationally about politics and perhaps also how to pursue our own interests again. Yes, you get this. You are very polite and very moderate. I don't. I hope for the return of Weimar Germany under Goethe-type Weimar and a complete unity of Europe under German domination which should follow a Roman domination of Europe and the earth. This is what I hope for, you don't need to comment on that, that's fine. I am very happy you came on the show, excuse my drunkenness, I hope you come again. Absolutely, my pleasure, thank you so much for having me. Very good, and ave Napoleon and so forth, until next time, and I mean that under German

dominance, you know what I mean, yes, I drank, I drank, excuse me, yes, until next time, dive out!